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Abstract 
"Attrition: Its Theory and Application in German Strategy, 1880-1916" examines 
the development of the strategy of attrition in German military thought from its inception 
in the Strategiestreit which began in 1880 to its culmination with the battle of Verdun in 
1916. "Attrition" traces the reaction of German military intellectuals in the pre-World 
War I period to this controversial idea put forward by Hans DelbrUck, a civilian military 
historian. Then, it looks at how DelbrUck's ideas were refined and put to use by Erich 
von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the German General Staff, who was forced by 
circumstances to abandon the tradition German approach to war. "Attrition" examines 
how Falkenhayn drew upon the experiences of the war to date to produce an operational 
counterpart to DelbrUck's theory at the battle of Verdun in 1916. 
Until recently, any history of the German experience in World War I has been 
hampered by a lack of archival sources. Consequently, it has not received the attention 
that has been paid to other nations, most notably Great Britain. The discovery of the files 
of the Kriegsgeschichtfiches Forschungsanstalt, the organization responsible for writing 
the German official history of the war, has changed this situation. Contained within these 
files are many documents previously thought destroyed or lost, and this source will cause 
all earlier histories of the German experience to be re-examined. 
To date, only a limited number of monographs have used this important source. 
These monographs have generally focused on the relations of the German military 
leadership with the political leadership, at how "grand strategy" was created. "Attrition, " 
on the other hand, uses these new sources to examine how the German military 
leadership (Falkenhayn) interacted with subordinates to create a new operational 
approach, which reacted to the changes in warfare brought on by World War I and which 
attempted to find a military solution to the stalemate of the trenches. 
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[ad. L. attrition -em, n. of action f. attrit-: see ATTRITE and -IONJ 
2 b. Mil. The wearing down of the enemy's strength and morale by unremitting 
harassment, esp. in phr. war of attrition. 
For English-speakers, the term "war of attrition" only entered the language with 
the outbreak of World War I. According to the Oxford English Diction , its first 
recorded usage was in the British periodical Sphere in November 1914, which wrote of 
the ongoing war on the Continent: "This is a war of attrition, in which each side tries to 
wear down the other. "' The long and costly conflict would ensure that the military 
definition of "attrition" would find a permanent place in English vocabulary. Since 
World War 1, the term "attrition" has come to be associated with senseless slaughter, 
uninspired generalship, and body counts. Those generals who followed such a strategy, 
both during the war and since, have been described as "donkeys, " "butchers, " "bunglers, " 
and worse. ' 
Unlike the Anglophone world, however, the German-speakers began World War I 
with an understanding of the concept of "war of attrition. " For them, the equivalent term, 
Ermattungsstrategie (strategy of attrition), had been in use since 1889, but the idea had 
been the subject of much acrimonious debate since a decade earlier. Through the course 
of this debate, the concept of a strategy of attrition had been fully developed by a German 
academic, Hans Delbrack. ' Although DelbrUck's theory was not widely accepted by 
1 "The Great European War: Week by Week, " The Sphere 21 November 1914, p. 18 1. 
2 Alan Clark, The Donkeys (London: Hutchinson, 1961); and John Laffin, British Butchers and Bunglers of 
World War I (Gloucester: Alan Suttin, 1988). 
3 Although Delbrilck first used the term Ermattungsstrategie to describe the strategy of Frederick the Great 
only in 1889 (Hans Delbrack, "Die Strategie des Perikles erlautert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des 
Grossen, " PreuBische Jahrbacher (Hereafter, I! J) Bd. 64 (1889), p. 258), the debate over the concept had 
begun in 1878 with Delbrack's controversial interpretation of Frederick the Great's strategy. See Hans 
Delbrack, Review of 'Das militarische Testament Friedrichs des Grossen. Herausgegeben und erlautert von 
v. Taysen, Major im Grossen Generalstabe. ' in Zeitschrift fUr preuBische Geschichte und Landeskunde 
(Hereafter, ZfpGLj 16. Jg. (Jan-Feb 1879) pp. 27-32. 
German soldiers before World War 1, it provided an intellectual foundation for their 
conduct of the war after the failure of their strategic plan in 1914. The new Chief of the 
General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, would apply DelbrUck's theory when it became 
clear that the pre-war idea of Vernichtungsstrategie had proved bankrupt under the 
tactical and strategic conditions prevalent in 1914. 
It is an understatement to say that World War I has been the subject of much 
research. As one of the pivotal events in modem history, and perhaps as the most 
important event in 20'h century European history, it has deservedly received much 
attention from historians. In particular, the events of the battlefield and the strategic 
designs of the military leaders have come under close scrutiny. However, no study has 
examined the connection between the ideas formulated by Hans DelbrUck on the strategy 
of attrition in the pre-war period and Germany's conduct of the war under the strategic 
direction of Erich von Falkenhayn. The purpose of this thesis is to correct this omission 
by tracing the development of the idea of Ermattungsstrategie from the theoretical 
pennings of Hans Deffiftick to the hard realities of the application of Falkenhayn's 
strategy on the battlefield of Verdun and to place the development of this strategy into 
the context of the changes in warfare that took place in the late 19th and early 20th 
century. 
The thesis begins by examining the experience of the Germans in the Franco- 
Prussian War of 1870/71. While most accounts have focused on the decisive nature of 
this war, a number of prescient Germans recognized the challenges to the traditional 
German approach to warfare offered by the French Volkskrieg, or people's war, of the 
second phase of the conflict. The first chapter of this work examines how men such as 
Helmuth von Moltke the Elder and Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz reacted to what they 
saw as a fundamental shift in warfare and a true problem for German strategy, 
represented by the ideas of Volkskrieg and "nations in arms. " 
The second chapter analyses how Hans Delbriick ftirther challenged the accepted 
military wisdom with his concept of Ermattungsstrategie. While Delbriick's writings 
ostensibly dealt only with historical matters, his questioning of the intellectual 
2 
foundations of the army's theory of warfare coincided with the crisis in strategy brought 
about by the re-emergence of Volkskrieg. This link was clearly understood by DelbrUck, 
who applied his historical ideas to contemporary events, and to the army, who were 
struggling to deal with the challenges offered by modem, increasingly industrial warfare. 
Chapter 3 looks at why the army continued to adhere to a strategy that assumed a 
short war, when the evidence pointed to the difficulties, if not impossibilities, of fighting 
such a war. The chapter focuses on the impact of Germany's ever changing strategic 
situation upon the ideas and war plans of Alfred von Schlieffen and his successor 
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. 
The thesis' second section begins with an analysis of the reaction of the German 
strategic leadership to the failure of their short-war strategy. With its failure also came 
the dismissal of Moltke the Younger and the appointment of Erich von Falkenhayn. In 
Falkenhayn, Germany had found someone who recognized and accepted the changed 
nature of warfare. Chapter 4 examines how Falkenhayn attempted to reorient German 
strategy to one approximating Moltke the Elder's and DelbrUck's ideas. 
Chapters 5 and 6 investigate Falkenhayn's attempts to bring about a negotiated 
peace with at least one of Germany's enemies during 1915. Moreover, the chapters 
examine the battlefield lessons this year offered. In addition to an altered strategic 
situation, Germany's soldiers had to adjust to a new tactical environment - trench 
warfare, or Stellungskrieg. Only by finding a tactical solution to this problem could they 
reach their strategic goals. The events of 1915 offered ample lessons for Germany's 
thinking soldiers. 
The third section of this thesis examines how Falkenhayn applied the lessons of 
1915 to the battlefield in an attempt to find a solution to Germany's strategic and tactical 
problems. The result was the Battle of Verdun - the battlefield application of the strategy 
of attrition. Chapter 7 analyzes the development of Falkenhayn's strategy by looking at 
the planning process for the battle during late 1915 and early 1916. By February 1916, 
the General Staff Chief had developed a unique strategy which called for the French 
manpower reserves to be exhausted by "bleeding the French army white" at the fortress 
of Verdun. This was to be followed by a second German attack, most likely after 
successfidly defending against an Entente relief offensive, which would separate the 
Western Allies and bring France to the negotiating table. 
3 
While most accounts tend to focus exclusively on the Battle of Verdun, ' this 
study takes a wider approach; the final two chapters examine both the events on the 
Meuse and the preparations for the second German offensive. Chapter 8 looks at how the 
5 th Army attempted to apply the lessons learned from 1915 to fight a battle designed 
solely to kill as many of the enemy as possible. It demonstrates how Falkenhayn's 
original tactical and operational ideas changed as the conditions of the battle altered. The 
final chapter looks at Falkenhayn's plan for the second offensive and how the much- 
desired Entente relief offensive actually resulted in the attrition of Germany's army and 
the end of Germany's dalliance with this strategy. 
While both Hans Delbriick's theory of attrition and Erich von Falkenhayn's 
conduct of World War I have been the subject of much scholarly interest, this study is 
unique in looking at the development of the concept from DelbAick's theory to 
Falkenhayn's practice. An examination of the pre-war theory has offered few problems to 
researchers. ' Delbrflck's private papers still exist and his ideas are well represented by his 
voluminous writings. This study, however, has made use of an under-utilized source - 
Delbrtick's columns in his journal, PreuBische Jahrbticher. These show very clearly the 
links drawn by DelbrCick from the historical examples of the 18th century to the realities 
of the early 20th century, and how Delbrflck envisioned his theories being applied in 
contemporary affitirs. ' 
Research into Falkenhayn's application of the concept of attrition has proved 
more problematic. Until recently, it has been thought that writing a thorough history of 
Germany's military operations during the First World War would be impossible. ' This is 
due to the fact that the main archives of the Prussian/German army were largely 
4 Recent examples of this include, Alistair Home, The Price of Glory: Verdun 1916 (London: Penguin 
Books, 1993; originally published, 1962); and German Werth, Verdun: Die Schlacht und der My9jos 
(Augsburg: Weltbild Verlag, 1989). 
5 For excellent accounts of the Strategiestreit, see Arden Bucholz, Hans Delbrfick and the German Militga 
Establishme (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985); and Sven Lange, Hans Delbrack und der 
Strategiestreit: Kriegfiffirung und Kriegsgeschichte in der Kontroverse 1879-1914 (Freiburg: Rombach 
Verlag, 1995). 
6 Adren Bucholz has recently edited and translated a number of Delbrilck's columns in DelbrUck's Modem 
MilLtM History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997). However, he fails to make clear the 
connection between these essays and the Strategiestreit. 
4 
destroyed during an Allied bombing raid on Potsdam in 1945. Research from primary 
sources about the German side of the war was restricted to those archives which had 
survived the destruction of zealous censors and the Second World War. ' These tended to 
be political or archives of the smaller states of Germany (Bavaria, W&Uemberg, etc. ), 
which held little of value to those historians looking for the decisions taken by 
Germany's strategic leaders regarding battlefield operations. The nature of these 
archives, along with the changing idea of military history, has meant that accounts of the 
German side of the war have focused primarily on the political realm, rather than on 
military operations. 9 
The loss of the bulk of the army's archive has indeed caused difficulties in 
writing a comprehensive account of Germany's conduct of the war. However, this thesis 
has been greatly aided by several important sources, which make possible a fresh 
examination of Germany's military operations during World War I. The most important 
of these sources are the files of the German army archive which have recently come to 
light after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe. 'O 
In 1988, the Soviets returned to East Germany some 40 tons of documents that 
had been seized by the Red Army at the end of World War II and kept in secret archives 
in the Soviet Union ever since. Included in the material returned were 3,000 Prussian and 
German army files thought destroyed in the Allied bombing raid on Potsdam in 1945. At 
the heart of this material are the files of the section of the Reichsarchiv responsible for 
7 For a recent example of this belief, see Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Passchendaele: The Untold StoKy 
(London: Yale University Press, 1996) p. 219. 
8 For German efforts to destroy sensitive material, see Holger Herwig, "Clio Deceived: Patriotic Self- 
.y 
Vol. 12 Nr. 2 (Fall 1987) pp. 262 Censorship in Germany after the Great War, " International SecNdt -301. 
9 Falkenhayn's tenure as Chief of the General Staff has, indeed, been relatively well researched. See Karl- 
Heinz Jan8en, Der Kanzler und der General: Die Fohrungskrise um Bethmann Hollweg und FalkgpLayg 
(G6ttingen: Musterschmidt, 1967); Heinz Kraft, Staatsrason and Kriegsfiffirung in kaiserlichen Deutschland 
1914-1916: Der Gegensatz zwischen dern Generalstabschef von FalkenhM und dern Oberbefehlshaber 
Ost im Rahmen des BfIndniskrieges der Mittelmachte (Frankfurt: Muster-Schmidt Verlag, 1980); and 
Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhg3Ln: Politsches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 1994). Each of these works is largely focused on Falkenhayn's political role, rather than his role in 
military operations. 
10 Afflerbach made extensive use of these files in his biography, as did Annika Mombauer in her study of 
Moltke the Younger, Helmuth von Moltke and the German General Staff: MiljjM and Political Decision- 
Making in Imperial GermM, 1906-1916 (University of Sussex, DPhil Thesis, 1997). Holger Herwig has 
also made limited use of them in his The First World War: GermAny and Austria-Hungm, 1914-1918 
(London: Arnold, 1997). 
5 
the writing of the German official history of the war, the Kriegsgeschichtfiches 
Forschungsanstalt des Heeres (Army Research Institute for Military History). 
Founded in 1919, the Reichsarchiv was initially headed by the last 
Oberquartiermeister of the Historische Abteilung of the General Staff, Generalmajor 
Hermann Ritter Mertz von Quirnheim. " The organization had a two-fold task. First, it 
was to collect and organize archival material of the Kaiserreich and to construct a history 
of the recently lost war. To accomplish this, it was divided into four departments, an 
archival department and three sections responsible for economic, political, and military 
history. " The second task of the Reichsarchiv was to provide a cover for the continued 
work of the banned Historische Abteilung of the General Staff. "' As such, the 
Reichsarchiv had a very pronounced military flavor; of its 65 members, 52 were active or 
retired officers. " 
To accomplish the task of writing the official history of the war, the KGFA 
collected, in addition to the official records of the army, copies of private diaries and 
testimonies of important figures in the war, which were used to elaborate the official 
records. For instance, the KGFA obtained from Generaloberst Hans von Plessen, the 
commander of the Imperial headquarters, a typescript copy of his personal diary kept 
throughout the conflict. These, and many other similar sources, can be found in the files 
now stored in the Bundesarchiv/Militýxarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau. " 
Another important source contained within these files are the various papers 
generated by the writing of Der Weltkrieg. The KGFA had a set methodology to which 
its writers worked. First, sources relevant to the subject at hand would be collected 
together into a "Materialsammlung. " This collection would include extracts from 
11 The material was originally returned to the East German authorities in December 1988. With the 
unification of Germany in 1989, the material became available to western scholars. It was kept in Potsdam 
until 1993, when it was moved to the Bundesarchiv/Militdrarchiv in Freiburg. See Uwe Lobel, "Neue 
Forschungsm6glichkeiten zur preussisch-deutschen Heeresgeschichte: Zur Rtickgabe von Akten des 
Potsdamer Heeresarchiv durch die Sowjetunion, " MilitArveschichtliche Mitteilungen (Hereafter, MGM 51 
(1992) pp. 143-149; and Helmut Otto, "Der Bestand Kriegsgeschichtliche Forschungsanstalt des Heeres im 
Bundesarchiv-, Militirisches Zwischenarchiv Potsdam, " MGM 51 (1992) pp. 429441. 
12 Mertz held this position until 193 1, when he was replaced by Hans von Haeften, until then the director of 
the military history section of the Reichsarchiv. Wolfgang Foerster took over upon Haeften's death in 1937 
and maintained this post until the end of World War 11. See Otto, op. cit., pp. 430-432. 
13 Concerning this task, see Mertz' forward to Reichsarchiv, Der Weltlcrieg 1914-1918 Bd. 1: Die 
Grenzschlachten im Westen (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1925) pp. vii-x. 
14 Bucholz, Delbrilck p. 144; Mombauer, op. cit., p. 10. 
15 Bucholz, Delbrilc , p. 142; Otto, op. cit., p. 430. 
6 
documents such as orders, Kriegstagebacher, and post-war testimonies. From this 
MaterialsammIung, the writers would construct a "Forschungsarbeit" which would be a 
rough narrative with long extracts from key documents. In the Forschungsarbeiten 
analysis was kept to a minimum; priority was placed on reconstructing the course of 
events and actions of the various commands. When completed, these works were then 
circulated within the Reichsarchiv and sometimes to important participants for 
comments. Only after the writers were confident that all relevant sources had been 
examined did they proceed from the Forschungsarbeit to writing drafts for Der 
Weltkrieg; it was within this final stage that the writer's historical analysis was added. 
Although unfortunately few MaterialsammIungen have survived, many 
Forschungsarbeiten have, and these have provided an important source for extracts from 
documents which were destroyed in April 1945. Additionally, the comments of the 
readers of these works often provide crucial testimony of individuals who played central 
roles in the war. Although these works cannot fully replace the original material lost 
during World War II, they go a long way towards giving researchers a more complete 
picture of the development of German operations during the war. While historians of 
Germany's war effort have had to rely mainly upon archives which provided information 
about the relationship of Germany's military and political leaders, the resurfacing of the 
KGFA material Provides researchers with a source from which to examine the planning, 
decisions, and actions of Germany's military leadership. 
This thesis has also made extensive use of the final product of the KGFA's work 
- Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918: Die militarischen Overationen zu Lande. " This 14-volume 
series is an invaluable and often overlooked source for the war's operational events. Der 
Weltkrieg is an excellent example of traditional military history. It provides perhaps the 
16 A copy of Plessen's Tagebuch is spread through a number of files in the archive. The period 18 August 
to 10 October 1914 is in BA/MA, W10/51063 and the period 14 October 1914 to 29 August 1916 is in 
BAMA, W10/50656. 
17 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkriejz 1914-1918: Die militirischen QRerationen zu Lande 14 vols. (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1925-1944); and Reichsarchiv, Der Weltlcrieg 1914-1918: Kriegsrilstung und Kriegswirtschaft 2 
vols. (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1930). Several other series came out in the Interwar period under the auspices of 
the Reichsarchiv, but these were usually written by former officers not directly associated with the 
Reichsarchiv. These were the Forschungen und Darstellungen aus dern Reichsarchiv (7 volumes), the 
Schlachten des Weltkrieges (38 volumes), and the Erinnerungsbldtter deutscher Regimenter (250 volumes). 
See Hans von Haeften, draft of a letter dated 20 August 1928, in Haeften Nachlass, BA/MA, N35/24; and 
Erich Murawski, "Die anitliche deutsche Kriegsgeschichtsschreibung flber den Ersten Welt1crieg, " 
Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau. (Hereafter, Jg. 9 (1959) pp. 513-531 and pp. 584-598. 
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most detailed and the most authoritative narrative of Germany's land war. " However, as 
a source it is not without its problems. As Annika Mombauer has noted, its writers had a 
clear political purpose - to provide evidence that would support Germany's rejection of 
the "war guilt" clause of the Treaty of Versailles. " Moreover, and perhaps more 
importantly for this study, the work was written largely by former General Staff officers 
and was intended to be a source from which Germany's soldiers could learn. As such, it 
is often prescriptive rather than purely descriptive, and it reflects the strategic ideas of its 
authors. ' 
This brings us to Der Weltkrieg's most significant problem, at least for this thesis. 
The writing of Der Weltkrieg was entrusted to the Reichsarchiv, which as we have seen 
above took over many of the duties of the Historische Atedung of the now proscribed 
General Staff. Accordingly, most of its researchers were former General Staff officers, 
many of whom had very pronounced view on how the war should have been fought. The 
first seven volumes of Der Weltkriejz were written under the direction of Hans von 
Haeften. " During the war, Haeften had been one of the strongest supporters of Erich 
Ludendorff and his idea of Vernichtungsstrategie. As such, he was one of Falkenhayn's 
most bitter opponents. Indeed, during the war, he had actively worked to have the 
General Staff Chief removed and replaced with Ludendorff. " After the war, Haeften 
brought his wartime beliefs to the writing of the official history. " In addition to Haeften, 
who as editor of Der Weltkrieg had the most impact on the interpretations contained 
within the work, the president of the Reichsarchiv, Mertz, was a wartime opponent of 
18 Prior and Wilson's assertion that Der Weltkrieg is flawed because it was "written entirely during the 
Nazi period" is patently false. Eight of the 14 volumes were published before the Nazi seizure of power, 
and volume 9 was largely completed. Further, the flles of the KGFA indicate that the Nazis had little 
influence over the writing of remainder of the work. Prior and Wilson, op. cit., p. 219. 
19 Mombauer, op. cit., pp. 8-10. 
20 In this, the Reichsarchiv was following a long German tradition. See Arden Bucholz, MoItke Schlieffen 
and Prussian War Planning (Providence, RI: Berg, 199 1) for a discussion of the writing of history in the 
German army. 
21 Otto, op. cit., p. 430. 
22 Ekkehart Guth, 'Ver Gegensatz zwischen dem Oberbefehlshaber Ost und dem Chef des Generalstabes 
des Feldheeres 1914/15: Die Rolle des Majors von Haeften im Spannungsfeld zwischen Hindenburg, 
Ludendorff und Falkenhayn, " MGM 1/84 pp. 75-111. 
23 For the most blatant example of this, see the transcript of a planning meeting for Band VIII of Der 
Weltkrieg in which Haeften said the volume should proceed from the assumption that Falkenhayn's 
strategy "... had led us to catastrophe. " "Protokoll Ober die Besprechung bei Herm General von Haeften am 
6. Dezember 1930, " BA/MA, W10/51408. 
8 
Falkenhayn. "' The result of this was a bias against Falkenhayn and his strategic ideas 
throughout the official history. " 
The Reichsarchiv was not alone in its criticism of Falkenhayn's strategy. The 
post-war period saw a bizarre renascence of Schlieffen studies, which attempted to 
demonstrate that if Germany had only followed the teachings of its former Chief of the 
General Staff (as these "teachings" were interpreted by a select number of Schlieffen's 
"disciples"), then the war would have ended in a German victory. " Those who had 
deviated from Schlieffen's ideas, such as Moltke the Younger and Falkenhayn, were 
castigated, and any strategy other than Vernichtungsstrategie was considered a false path. 
Even more than the Reichsarchiv work, this literature was prescriptive in nature, as these 
authors tried to inculcate a new generation of German officers with the "proper" 
operational and strategic ideas, which would prevent a repeat of the indecisiveness of 
World War L" 
With such an authoritative work as Der Weltkriejz biased against Falkenhayn and 
his concept of Ermattungsstrategie and the other criticism of this strategy after the war, it 
is hardly surprising that a good deal of the secondary literature has continued along this 
path. With the advent of new source material, however, Falkenhayn's decisions and 
operational ideas can be examined anew, without the bias of his contemporaries, and the 
following study will put his strategy into the context it deserves. 
24 Mertz had served from 1914 to 1916 as the first general staff officer (Ia) of Kronprinz Rupprecht's 6'h 
Army. Rupprecht and his staff played a key role in undermining Falkenhayn's position as Chief of the 
General Staff. Mertz brought these wartime grudges with him to his post-war position. See Mertz to 
Foerster, 4 January 193 5, BA/MA, W 10/51523. Mertz was succeeded as president by Haeften in 193 1. 
25 This bias was noticed by many former officers who commented on drafts of the Reichsarchiv's work. For 
example see, Eugen Ritter von Zoellner to Reichsarchiv, 10 June 1930, BA/MA, W 10/51305; and 
Hermann von Kuhl to Reichsarchiv, 7 January 1934, BA/MA, W10/51523. 
26 Wilhelm Groener, an important officer in the General Staff during the war and Reichswehrminister after 
the war, was the most prominent member of this group. See his Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 1930); and Feldherr wider Willen: ORerative Studien Uber den Weltkrieg (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 193 1). The beliefs of the "Schlieffen School" were also conveyed in the memoirs of some of the 
war's key participants. For example, see Max Bauer, Der zrosse Krieg in Feld und Heimat (Tabingen: 
Osiander'sche Buchhandlung, 1921); and Max Hoffmann, Die Aufzeichnungen des Generalmaiors Max 
Hoffmann (ed. Karl-Friedrich Nowak) (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1929). 
27 This aim was freely admitted by Groener, who wrote of his works, "Ich schreibe nicht flir Historie, 
obschon natürlich für sie auch eine Quelle in meinem Büchern fliesst, ich schreibe für die Zukunft, weil ich 
fürchte, unsere Hohlköpfe werden im nächsten Krieg die Strategie ebenso verballhomen, wie es im 
Weltkrieg geschehen ist. " Groener to Gerold von Gleich, 16 May 1935, quoted in Wilhelm Groener 
Lebenserinnerungen (ed. Friedrich Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen) (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1957) p. 16. 
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Part One: 
Pre-War German Military Thought 
Introduction 
In a lecture to the Militdrische Gesellschaft in Berlin in 1888, Major August 
Keim of the Kriegsakademie gave his view of German military thinking near the close of 
the 19th century. To Keim, his army's approach towards military education and thinking 
was one of intellectual openness that challenged past views of war. He spoke of how 
poorly commanded and thought out German maneuvers and war plans would appear to 
the generals of Prussia's past. Were Duke Ferdinand of Brunswick to inspect the German 
plan of operations for the Franco-Prussian War, declared Major Keim, he would in all 
probability "find little satisfaction in a plan of campaign, according to the views of his 
time, so thoroughly unscientific and inadequate. " If General von Saldern, Frederick the 
Great's drillmaster, were to see the German maneuvers of 1888, he "would shake his 
head at the decay in tactics, over the complete lack of the finer comprehension of the 
true tactical art, which certainly, [to von SaIdern] consisted principally in permitting the 
genius for drill to shine in complex forms. " Keim. saw the negative impressions of past 
Prussian masters to be an indication of progress within the German army. To Keim, the 
orthodoxies of the day had constantly to be questioned in an effort to keep the German 
army ahead of its opponents, and the army should be kept free of all rigid tactical and 
strategic schemes. In the conclusion of his opening remarks, Keim hoped that "at the end 
of the next century" the German approach to preparing for war would be judged 
favorably. ' 
Towards the end of the "next" century, historian Martin Kitchen published an 
article examining German strategic thinking of the 19th century. Keim's hopes were to be 
1 [August ] Keim, "Kriegslehre und Kriegfikhrung. Vortrag, gehalten in der Militoxischen Gesellschaft zu 
Berlin am 12 Dezember 1888, " Beiheft zurn. Militar-Wochenblatt I. H. (1889) pp. 1-2. Keim, a sometime 
journalist, later became one of Waldersee's "pen hussars. " After retiring from the army as a Generalmajor, 
he continued his political bent by becoming a leading member of the Flottenverein and later founding the 
nationalistic Deutsche Wehrverein. 
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dashed by Kitchen, who did not judge him and his colleagues favorably. Kitchen denied 
that the German army possessed the very attribute of which Keim was so proud - 
intellectual openness. He wrote, "the development of German strategic thought is marked 
by a slow hardening of a subtle dialectical approach to military problems into a set of 
unchallenged axioms. "' From Carl von Clausewitz in the beginning of the 19th century to 
Alfred Graf von Schlieffen at the end of the century, the German approach to war had 
become more rigid and obsessed with purely military thinking, ignoring the changes in 
warfare that had occurred over the previous century. The German strategic thinkers, with 
Schlieffen being Kitchen's prime example, believed that the uncertainties could be 
removed from war if only enough planning was put in before war's outbreak. "In pursuit 
of a perfect strategic plan, " he wrote, "general staff officers pored over railway 
timetables, examined production figures of industry, undertook countless exercises and 
manoeuvres, and produced reams of memoranda. "' The result was an "infallible key" to 
success - the Schlieffen Plan, a purely military solution to Germany's strategic situation. 
The Schlieffen Plan was based on principles which its author believed were constant, and 
thus provided Germany with a recipe for success. These principles, particularly 
encirclement and annihilation, in Kitchen's eyes, became the philosopher's stone of the 
German military, who permitted no questioning of their beliefs from within. 
Martin Kitchen's view that the Kaiserheer was actually dogmatic and doctrinaire, 
and not intellectually open as Keim believed, echoes much of the literature concerning 
German army before World War I, most notably the writings of Gerhard Ritter and 
Jehuda L. Wallach, and can be considered the general view of historians today. ' The most 
prominent histories of the Kaiserheer focus on the General Staff and its head, and the 
origins of Germany's failed strategy are found in the teachings of Alfred von Schlieffen, 
chief of the GGS from 1891 to 1905 and author of the infamous plan which bears his 
name. Gerhard Ritter in his classic study of the Schlieffen Plan wrote of Schlieffen as a 
2 Martin Kitchen, "The Traditions of German Strategic Thought, " The International Histo! y Review, 1/ 2 
(April 1979), p. 163. 
3 [bid., p. 170. 
4 There have, however, been some attempts to revise this thesis. For example see Dennis Showalter, 
"German Grand Strategy: A Contradiction in Terms?, " MGM 2/90 pp. 65-102; Antulio J. Echevarria, II, 
"Borrowing from the Master: Use of Clausewitz in German Nfilitary Literature before the Great War, " 
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"pure technician" who ignored the political implications of his war plan and thus sowed 
the seeds of Germany's defeat. ' Jehuda Wallach traced the origins of the "dogma of the 
battle of annihilation, " which kept German soldiers blind to other strategies, back to 
Schlieffen. ' To the followers of this wing of historiography, the German army was solely 
obsessed with annihilating its enemies in great decisive battles and in achieving rapid 
victories. 
The following three chapters will show this view to be an oversimplification of 
German military thinking in the years before World War 1. While there is some truth in 
the opinions of Ritter, Wallach, and Kitchen, the Imperial German army defies such easy 
answers. Even Alfred von Schlieffen, who indeed at first glance seems to be the 
archetypal narrow-minded strategist, was more complex than portrayed by the above 
historians. Moreover, Schlieffen was but one of many strategic thinkers in Wilhelmine 
Germany, and, at the time, perhaps one of the least known. ' By focusing narrowly on the 
General Staff and their plans, these authors have neglected other important streams of 
thought within the German army. After 187 1, the German military j ournals were awash 
in debates over strategy and tactics! Indeed, as one perceptive historian has noted, the 
volume of German military literature that appeared from 1870 to 1914 is so great that "to 
wade through the flood of technical and theoretical literature that appeared after 1870 
could easily consume the worst years of one's life. "' However, it is precisely within this 
"flood" of literature we find the debates which foreshadowed the changes in German 
strategy and tactics within World War I. 
Therefore, this section will look at areas of debate often ignored by historians of 
Germany's General Staff. Chapter I will examine German interpretations of the second 
phase of the Franco-Prussian War - the Volkskrieg - particularly the war plans of 
War in HistoKy Vol 3 No. 3 (1996); Stig F6rster, "Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen 
Krieges, 1871-1914. Metakritik eines Mythos, " MGM 54 (1995) pp. 61-95. 
5 Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: A Critique of a M3b (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958). 
6 Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen 
and Their IMpact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). 
7 Indeed, Rudolph von Caemmerer, in his influential book, Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft 
im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Wilhelm Baensch, 1904), never mentions Schlieffen. 
8 Already by 1859, the Germans produced 50% of the military literature in Europe. Samuel P. Huntington, 
The Soldier and the State (London: Harvard University Press, 1994; originally published 1957) p. 48. 
9 Jay Luvaas, "European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870-1914, " in Michael Howard, ed. The Theory 
and Practice of War (London: Cassell & Co., 1965) p. 71. 
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Helmuth von Moltke the Elder and the writings of several historians of the war. Chapter 
2 will look at Hans Delbrilck's controversial ideas about the historical origins of, and the 
continuing role of, Ermattungsstrategie and the debate which these ideas caused with the 
German military. Chapter 3 will return to the military and attempt to explain the reasons 
behind the military's rejection of Moltke the Elder's warnings about Volkskrieg and their 
rejection of Delbrilck's strategic ideas, which ultimately resulted in their continued 
adherence to Vernichtungsstrategie. 
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Chapter One: 
The Volkskrieg in German Military Thought 
In 1817, in an essay dedicated to his mentor Gerhard von Scharnhorst, Carl von 
Clausewitz described the radical change in warfare brought about by the French 
Revolution. He wrote: 
Now war stepped forth in all its raw violence .... War was returned to the people, 
who to some extent had been separated from it by professional standing armies; 
war cast off its shackles and crossed the bounds of what had once seemed 
possible. 1 
Clausewitz discerned clearly the shift from professional, dynastic armies of the 18'h 
century to the people's armies of the Revolutionary period. The Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars showed to the world the terrible destructiveness that nations could 
inflict upon other nations when the passions of the people became involved. The 
architects of the peace which followed the victory over Napoleon were anxious to put the 
genie of nationalism and its concomitant people's army back into the bottle. In this goal, 
the powers of reaction were largely victorious. Of the European powers, only Prussia 
retained short-term conscription, and even in Prussia this was not fully implemented. ' 
Through most of Europe, armies were once again small and beholden not to the people 
but to their monarchs. 
Thanks in large part to the efforts of the participants in the Congress of Vienna, 
the 19'h century was one of relative peace in Europe. The few wars that occurred 
remained local and did not engage the passions of the masses. European wars had once 
again become Kabinettskriege rather than Volkskriege. The armies of Europe, including 
Germany's, took this political situation to be the norm and created strategies to fit this 
system. The experience of the second phase of the Franco-Prussian War, though, 
reawakened the European powers to the potency of a "nation in arms. " The consequences 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, "On the Life and Character of Schamhorst, " Historical and Political Wrifing-s. 
(trans. Peter Paret and Daniel Moran) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) p. 102. 
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of this shift were, however, not widely comprehended by soldiers who were focused on 
fighting and winning campaigns rather than wars. 
Indeed, the German Wars of Unification, with their great battles of annihilation, 
suggested to many that future wars would be fought and concluded in the same fashion. 
As recent historiography has clearly shown, many German military intellectuals formed 
their ideas based upon the assumption that future wars would be won quickly through 
one or a few great battles. ' Alfted Graf von Schlieffen is probably the prime example of 
this school of thought, and this idea found its expression in his war plans, which called 
for Germany to defeat her enemies in what amounted to one great battle. However, there 
were a number of German military intellectuals who held opposing views, which have 
until recently been ignored by historians. ' 
The same experience that had led to the expectation (or illusion as it is often 
called) of a short war amongst German military intellectuals, also led to the foundation of 
another school of thought that at least questioned this comfortable assumption and 
ultimately provided German soldiers with alternative strategic ideas during World War L 
While most German commentators on strategy before World War I looked to the Austro- 
Prussian War and the first half of the Franco-Prussian War for their inspiration, some 
viewed the second half of the Franco-Prussian War, with its Volkskrieg, as more 
important, and perhaps a better model of future war. These observers saw that the 
conditions would not always be right for a short war based on a strategy of annihilation 
(Vernichtungsstrategie), favoured by most of the military. Instead, the campaigns against 
the hastily raised armies of the French Republic in the winter of 1870/71 pointed to a 
slow, drawn-out war, one without spectacular, decisive battles. 
2 In 1824, the term of service in France was extended to 8 years. The Habsburg Empire followed suit in 
1845, while in Russia, peasant soldiers served 15-year terms. The Prussia, on the other hand, retained the 3- 
year term of service introduced during the Napoleonic period. 
3 See Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen 
and Their IMpact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986); 
Gunther Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment, " in Peter Paret, ed. 
Makers of Modem Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 32-63; L. L. Farrar, Jr., The 
Short War Illusion: German Poligy, Strategy and Domestic Affairs Augist-December 1914 (Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-Clio, 1973). 
4 See Stig F6rster, "Facing 'People's War': Moltke the Elder and Germany's Military Options after 187 1, " 
Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 10 Nr. 2 (1987) pp. 209-230; and Idem, "Der deutsche Generalstab und die 
Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-1914. Metakritik eines Mythos, " MGM 54 (1995) pp. 61-95. 
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The Volkskrieg in France, 1870-1871 
On the morning of 2 September 1870, General de Wimpffen surrendered the 
Army of Chdlons to the Germans at Sedan. For the loss of 9,000 men, the German army 
captured over 100,000 Frenchmen and the Emperor Napoleon III himself. With the Army 
of the Rhine trapped in the fortress of Metz, the majority of the Imperial French army had 
been rendered hors de combat within 6 weeks of mobilization. By conventional 
reckoning, the Franco-Prussian War was over, won stunningly by the German forces. ' 
The battles of this period, particularly Sedan and Metz, were viewed by the world as 
spectacular successes and entered German mythology as quintessential battles of 
annihilation. 
However, with the surrender of Napoleon III came also the collapse of the 
Imperial government, which was replaced by the radical Gouvernement de la difense 
nationale on 4 September. Quickly this new government decided to continue the war, 
despite its many handicaps. To the German peace offer (with its demand for 
Alsace/Lorraine), they replied: "There can be no answer to such insolent demands but a 
guerre ii outrance. "' Within the next several months, the French went about mobilizing 
their nation for war. In mid-September portions of the government evacuated the 
threatened Paris for the provinces, where the government was re-constituted. On 14 
October, an order went out to the provinces threatened with German occupation: All 
bridges, railways, and telegraphs were to be destroyed before being allowed into enemy 
hands; similarly any material which might be useful to the invaders was to be evacuated 
to a safe area. A series of calls to arms culminated on 2 November when a levie en masse 
was declared: All able-bodied men aged 21 to 40 were drafted into service. ' 
The efforts of the Government of National Defense produced astounding results. 
After the investment of Paris, the French army in metropolitan France, including active 
elements, troops in depots, the National Guard, and theftanc-fireurs numbered some 
5 On the German difficulties toward finding peace see Eberhard Kolb, "Der Schwierige Weg zurn Frieden: 
Das Problem der Kriegsbeendigung 1870n I, " Historische Zeitschrift 241. Bd. (1985) pp. 51-79. 
6 Quoted in Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 196 1) p. 222. 
Howard's work remains the standard English-language treatment of the war. 
7 French mobilization is covered in detail in numerous sources, including: Howard, op. cit., pp. 233-256; 
and William Serman, "French Mobilization in 1870, " in Stig Forster and J6rg Nagler, eds. On the Road to 
Total War. (Washington: Cambridge University Press, 1997) pp. 283-294. 
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7,000 officers and 494,000 men. ' By 5 February 1871, the French army had increased by 
more than 400,000 men to a strength of some 950,200. ' These men were equipped from 
existing stocks of weapons and supplemented by importing arms from abroad. Within the 
space of several months, the Government of National Defense under the direction of the 
minister of the interior, Leon Gambetta, had reconstituted a French army, quite literally 
raising new armies from the ground. 
Despite the impressive appearance of these figures on paper, the newly formed 
French armies had serious shortcomings. First, they lacked trained officers. Relatively 
few Imperial officers survived the destruction of their army. Retired officers and those 
coming from Algeria could only go a short way to meeting this deficit. Training suffered 
accordingly, as did leadership in battle. Even the remnants of the Imperial Army who had 
survived its destruction at Sedan and Metz had only received a month or so of training. 
Additionally, the new French armies lacked the artillery required for modem war, which 
proved a severe handicap when fighting the professional, well-equipped German 
armies. " 
By sheer numbers, though, the new French armies were able to cause the 
Germans considerable difficulties. Moltke was forced to dispatch large numbers of troops 
to hunt down the new French armies, as well as maintain the siege of Paris and the 
numerous sieges of other French garrisons to his rear. Franc-tireurs kept large numbers 
of German troops occupied guarding lines of communication. " German manpower was 
stretched to the limit. " The French had turned the tables on the Germans, who had won 
the first phase of the war in large degree due to their superior numbers. However, the 
German superiority in training and organization told against the French in the end. The 
8 Archivrat Greiner, "Der Volkshrieg in der zweiten HAfte des Krieges 1870/7 1" unpublished manuscript in 
BA/MA, WIO-50203, p. 9. This manuscript is part of a larger work written in the 1920s to examine the 
prospects of a German Volkskrieg. The Interwar period saw a renewed interest in improvised and militia 
armies on the part of the Reichswehr. For examples see, Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, "Das 
preussische Volk in Waffen der Befreiungskriege, " WuW Jg. 1924 pp. 30-36; and Hermann Balck, " 1813. 
Ein Feldzug mit improvisierten Heeren, " WuW Jg. 1932 pp. 505-522. 
9 Greiner, op. cit., p. 16. 
10 See Howard, op. cit., pp. 299-317, pp. 397-406. 
11 Some 110,000 men alone were usedjust to guard lines of communication from Germany. Howard, 
op. cit., pp. 277-278. For the French partisan campaign see, Georg Cardinal von Widdem, Deutsch- 
französischer Krieg 1870-187 1: Der Krieg an den rückwärtizen Verbindunzen der deutschen Heere und der 
Etappendien (6 vols) (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1893-99). 
12 Julius Verdy du Vernois, Im GroBen Hauptquartier 1870n I (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1895) pp. 229-23 1. The 
German manpower problem has not been the subject of much detailed research. The best source remains, 
Gustav Lehmann, Die Mobilmachung von 1870/71 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1905). 
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improvised annies, though they bought some months, could not in the end prevent the 
fall of Paris and with it peace on German terms. 
Moltke's Response 
Perhaps not surprisingly, it was the victor of K6niggrdtz and Sedan, the 
intellectual father of the Kaiserheer, who was disturbed most by the campaign against 
Gambetta's improvised armies. It was Moltke who was faced with formulating a strategy 
to defeat an amorphous foe shortly after his spectacular victories over the Imperial 
French army. It was Moltke who had to bear the strain of conducting operations against 
armies to the north, south, and to his rear, as well as supervise the siege of Paris. Moltke 
realized quite clearly the shift in warfare represented by the war's second phase and the 
consequences this had for future wars: While he labelled the Austro-Prussian War a 
"Kabinettskrieg" fought purely "for an ideal end - the establishment of power, "" he 
labelled the Franco-Prussian War a "Volkskrieg. " After this war, he wrote: 
The days are gone by when, for dynastical ends, small armies of 
professional soldiers went to war to conquer a city, or a province, and then sought 
winter quarters or made peace. The wars of the present day call whole nations to 
arms .... The entire 
financial resources of the State are appropriated to military 
purposes... 
Moltke realized clearly that such wars would be "more terrible" than wars of the past, but 
hoped that they would occur less frequently. "' 
Indeed, as early as 1867, Moltke had recognized the difficulties in waging a war 
against France. In a Denbchrift of this year, he wrote: "Even if the French were to lose a 
battle on their own territory, it would never cause them to conclude peace; rather their 
patriotism would cause them to summon up all the strength of their resource-rich land. "" 
Once war had broken out in 1870, however, his early victories led him to hope for a 
speedy conclusion to the war. By December, though, frustrated by Gambetta's armies, he 
began to despair of concluding peace quickly and began instead to make preparations for 
a long war which would take the German army into the south of France and break once 
13 Helmuth Graf von Moltke, "Ueber den angeblichen Kriegsrat in den Kriegen Konig Wilhelms I., " 
reprinted in The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 (trans. Archibald Forbes) (London: Harper & Brothers, 
1907) p. 417. Rudolf Stadelmann wrote that this document, written in 1880, could be considered Mottke's 
"Military-Political Testament. " Moltke und der Staat (Krefeld: Scherpe Verlag, 1950) p. 173. 
14 Moltke, The Franco-German War p. 1. 
'-' Quoted in Stadelmann, op. cit., p. 260. 
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and for all her powers of resistance. "' In early December, his headquarters had begun 
planning for an increase in the German army of 100 reserve battalions. " He wrote to a 
friend on 18 December that he could not foresee how long such a campaign would last, 
and warned that "a whole people under arms should not be underestimated... "" 
The continued resistance of the French after the battles of Sedan and Metz and the 
encirclement of Paris had led Moltke to decide that the only recourse was to fight to the 
end against the French people, to fight an "Exterminationskrieg, " which would settle 
once and for all the great Franco-German rivalry. In early January, Moltke expressed his 
frustration and outlined his thoughts to Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm: He saw the 
impending fall of Paris not as the end of the war, but rather as an opportunity to free 
troops to take the war deep into the French provinces. Convinced that the French would 
not give up until completely crushed, Moltke declared: "We must fight this nation of liars 
to the very end! Then we can dictate whatever peace we like. "" As Moltke now believed 
France would fight on until the last of her resources, the task of the German army became 
to destroy or neutralize these resources. " 
Moltke's decision to conduct a "war of extermination" met with resistance from 
the German leadership. Bismarck, despite some nasty rhetoric, stayed firm on his course 
for a swift conclusion to the war. This divergence of views between Moltke and 
Bismarck played a role in the well-documented split between the two which required the 
intervention of Kaiser Wilhelm I to solve. " Bismarck was not alone, however, in his 
resistance to Moltke's views. Even the Minister of War, Albrecht von Roon, balked at 
the prospects of prolonging the conflict and the ftirther manpower and economic 
demands which this course would necessitate. As early as 20 August, Roon was already 
16 Ibid., pp. 244-245 
17 Paul Bronsart von Schellendorf, Geheimes Kriegstagebuch 1870-1871 (ed. Peter Rassow) (Bonn: 
Athenaum-Verlag, 1954) pp. 212-213. This increase met with opposition from the Minister of War, 
Albrecht von Roon, and created tension between his and Moltke's staffs. Bronsart, Moltke's chief of 
operations, joked it would be better for Germany if they traded Roon for Gambetta! See also Eberhard 
Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart: KF Koehler Verlag, 1957) pp. 575-576. 
18 Moltke to Privy Councillor Schiller, in Helmuth Graf von Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften und 
Denkwdrdig3witen Vol 5. (Berlin: ES Mittler, 189 1) p. 179. 
19 Quoted in Howard, op. cit., pp. 436-437. See also Emperor Frederick III, The War DiM of Emperor 
Frederick 111,1870-71, (trans. & ed. A. R. Allinson) (London: Stanley Paul, 1927) p. 253, p. 257. 
20 Thus, Moltke too bears some responsibility for the shift from Kabinettskrieg to Volksk*g. This point is 
drawn clearly by F6rster in "Facing 'People's War, " pp. 213-214. 
21 See Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the &epLer Vol. 1: The Prussian Tradition 1740-1890 (trans. Heinz 
Norden) (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 1969), pp. 219-223; Stadelmann, op. cit., pp. 212- 
250; Kessel, op. cit., pp. 581-592. 
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complaining about the difficulty in finding replacements for fallen officers. " Later, in a 
comment to one of Moltke's letters, Roon wrote that he felt it best to return the 
Landwehr troops to Germany after the fall of Paris and that, "a strategy which leads us to 
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the foot of the Pyrdn6es is a task for years if we are not to over-tax our strength. 
In the end, Bismarck's point of view prevailed. With the fall of Paris came the 
end of the Franco-Prussian War, and with it, according to Moltke's biographer Rudolf 
Stadelmann, a great disappointment for Moltke, who had wanted "to direct the Franco- 
Prussian War as a war of extermination because he had hoped to settle unilaterally a 100- 
year-old rivalry. ""' With France not definitively defeated, Moltke soon began to fear that 
a chance such as the Franco-Prussian War would never come again. He believed that 
France would learn quickly the lessons of her defeat and reconstitute rapidly her armies. 
By ending the war before Moltke could achieve his expanded goals, the war had, in his 
eyes, made France stronger rather than weaker in the long run. 
Moltke, and Bismarck as well, reckoned that France would never accept the loss 
of her two provinces and would look for an opportunity to take them back. Therefore, 
while Bismarck concentrated on keeping France diplomatically isolated, Moltke planned 
for possible war. In his deployment plan of 1871, Moltke believed he could achieve 
another rapid victory against France's army. The French, however, learned quickly from 
their defeat, and Moltke watched with trepidation the rapid rebuilding of their army. The 
French quickly introduced effective conscription to bring their army up to the level of the 
German. " By 1873, Moltke considered it to be strong enough to fight another war. " By 
1875, although he toyed with the idea of a preventive war, French military reforms made 
it clear that France would not be defeated again easily. " 
The re-emergence of Volkskrieg after 1871 called into question Moltke's basic 
way of war. Following the teachings of Clausewitz, Moltke had always aimed to destroy 
completely his opponents' armies as a means of achieving a decisive victory and a peace 
22 Albrecht Graf von Roon, DenkwUrdigjceiten aus dem Leben des General-Feldmarschalls Kriegministers 
Grafen von Roon Vol. III (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1892) p. 193. 
23 Helmuth von Moltke, Militqfische Werke 1: Militarische Korrespondenz (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1897) 
p. 581. Though the Moltke-Bismarck tension has received much attention from historians, this tension 
between the Ministry of War and the General Staff has received almost none. 
24 Stadelmann, op. cit., p. 280. 
25 France instituted general conscription in 1872. See Douglas Porch, The March to the Marne: The French 
AM, 1871-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 198 1) pp. 23-32. 
26 Ritter, op. cit., p. 227. 
27 For the most recent analysis of the "War-in-Sight Crisis" of 1875 and for a survey of the historiography 
see, James Stone, "The War Scare of 1875 Revisited, " MGM 53 (1994) pp. 304-326. 
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on German terms. The evidence of the second phase of the Franco-Prussian War 
suggested, however, that this goal might not be attainable in the future. The Wars of 
Unification had shown the world the worth of universal conscription on the Prussian 
model, creating whole "nations in anus. "" Moltke realized that even if he could defeat 
his opponent's armies quickly, this did not mean the fight was over, as the war in France 
had shown. Additionally, he assumed that Germany would be forced to fight a two-front 
war - against either a France allied with Austria or against a France allied with Russia. " 
Moltke feared that even if he could defeat one foe quickly, he would be forced to shift his 
armies to meet the other, preventing him from exploiting any battlefield victories he 
might achieve. Rudolf Stadelmann captured the tension in Moltke's thinking after 1871, 
"... in Moltke's Aufmarschpldne from 1871 to 1890, two tendencies battle one another: 
the hope for a new K6niggrdtz and the fear of a new Loire campaign. "" 
By 1877, his deployment plans reflected clearly his pessimism: Fearing that 
Germany could not completely destroy the armies of its enemies, he wrote into his war 
plan that it would be the responsibility of the diplomats to conclude a peace, even if the 
peace had to be concluded on the condition of status quo ante bellum. He wrote: 
Bei sofortiger Offensive ... werden wir im Westen schon in der 3. Woche 
eine grosse Entscheidungsschlacht habe. 
Ist der Erfolg für uns, so werden wir ihn zwar auszubeuten suchen, 
können'aber die Verfolgung nicht bis Paris ausdehnen. Es muss der Diplomatie 
überlassen werden, ob sie uns, wenn auch nur auf der Grundlage des status quo 
ante, nach dieser einen Seite hin Ruhe schaffen kann. ' 
28 Following the spectacular successes of the Prussian army, Russia, as well as France, began a long period 
of reform under the guidance of Dmitrii Miliutin, introducing the Statute on Universal Military Service in 
1874. Bruce Menning, Bayonets Before Bullets: The imperial Russian AM, 1861-1914 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1992) pp. 21-23; and Forrest A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in 
Russia (Charlotte: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968) pp. 196-200. Austria had instituted short-service 
conscription in 1868. Gunther Rothenberg, The AM of Francis Josep (West Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press, 1976) pp. 80-8 1. 
29 On this point, Moltke saw perhaps more clearly than Bismarck. He believed that Austria and Russia were 
locked in a long struggle over the Balkans, and that "the way to Constantinople goes through Berlin. " 
Quoted in Hugo Zeitz, "Der Schirmer des geeinten Reiches, " in Friedrich von Cochenhausen, ed. Von 
Scharnhorst zu Schlieffen 1806-1906: Hundert Jahre 12reul3isch-deutscher Generalstab (Berlin: ES Mittler, 
1933) p. 233. 
30 Stadelmann, op. cit., p. 325. 
3' Helmuth von Moltke, "Zweifrontenkrieg gegen Frankreich-Russland, " 3 February 1877, reprinted in 
Ferdinand von Schmerfeld, ed. Graf Moltke. Die Aufmarschplane 1871-1890 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1929), 
p. 66. This Denkschrift has more recently been reprinted in Stig Forster, Moltke: Vom Kabinettskfiejz zum 
Volkskrieg: Eine Werkauswahl (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1992) pp. 610-612. 
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Moltke's Aufmarschplan for 1879, when the prospect of a Franco-Russian 
agreement became even greater, was even more pessimistic. " By this date, Moltke 
reckoned that the French army could field at least 10,000 more troops and around 160 
more artillery pieces than Germany. Further, the French had created an "almost 
hermetically sealed border ... 
from Switzerland to Belgium. "" Even if the German army 
could breach this line, Moltke feared that the army's supply lines would be extremely 
vulnerable to French forces in his rear. If that wasn't enough, the newly fortified Paris 
would, in Moltke's view, be able to hold off almost any German siege. He concluded that 
in case of another Franco-German war, Germany "could no longer expect a rapid 
conclusion to the struggle. 5934 
Moltke, then, realized that there would be no quick victory in the next war, and 
even feared that the next war might destroy the new Reich and perhaps even German 
culture. His view is perhaps best summed up by his oft-quoted final speech in the 
Reichstag on 14 May 1890: 
The age of Kabinettskriege is behind us - all we have now is Volkskrieg, and any 
prudent government will hesitate to bring about a war of this nature with all its 
incalculable consequences... 
................................................... 
If war should break out, this war which has now been hanging like a sword of 
Damocles over our heads for more than ten years, no one can estimate its duration 
or see when it will end. The greatest powers of Europe, which are armed as never 
before, will fight each other. None can be annihilated so completely in one or two 
campaigns that it would declare itself vanquished and be compelled to accept 
hard conditions for peace without any chance, even after a year's time, to renew 
the fight. Gentlemen, it might be a seven, or even a thirty years' war - but woe to 
him who sets Europe alight and first throws the match into the powder-barrel! " 
Although Moltke was pessimistic about a future war, he was still a professional 
soldier, and it was his duty to try to create a workable strategy. His war plans from 1872 
until his retirement in 1890 reflect his attempt to solve the dilemma that the re- 
emergence of Volkskrieg forced upon him. 
32 Moltke reckoned that Germany's anti-Russian diplomatic stance during the Russo-Turkish War made the 
prospects of a Franco-Russian alliance more likely. [bid., p. 77. 
33 Kaiser Wilhelm I to Bismarck, 2 October 1879, reprinted in Schmerfeld, op. cit., p. 80. 
34 Helmuth von Moltke, "Zweifronten Krieg gegen Russland-Frankreich, " April 1879, reprinted in 
Schmerfeld, op. cit., p. 77. See also F6rster, Moltke pp. 613-617. 
35 This oft-quoted passage can be found in Helmuth Graf von Moltke, AusgewnIte Werke Vol 3 (Berlin: 
ES Mittler, 1925) p. 345; Jeduha Wallach, op. cit., p. 66; F6rster, "Facing People's War, " pp. 223-224. 
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The historian Gerhard Ritter believed that Moltke's solution to this strategic 
dilemma was to shift his approach in keeping with the change in warfare. Ritter felt that 
Moltke intended to fight on the strategic defensive, though he would begin with a tactical 
offensive to weaken Germany's enemies. Ritter wrote: 
All that was left to Germany was the strategic defensive -a defensive, however, 
that would resemble that of Frederic the Great in the Seven Years' War. It would 
have to be coupled with a tactical offensive of the greatest possible impact until 
the enemy was paralyzed and exhausted to the point where diplomacy would have 
a chance to bring about a satisfactory settlement. " 
In short, Moltke's Vernichtungsstrategie of the Kabinettskrieg would give way to the 
Ermattungsstrategie of the Volkskrieg. 
Ritter's interpretation is disputed by Stig Fbrster who believes that Moltke's 
realization of the difficulty in fighting the next war drove him to reject the prospect of 
war and to rely instead upon a system of deterrence. F6rster shows that Moltke's calls for 
a preventive war became weaker and weaker as he became more and more convinced that 
even if Germany were to win the initial battles, the war would drag on and ultimately 
destroy the social order of Germany. Instead, according to F6rster, Moltke decided that 
the only true course was to avoid war if possible. To this end, he relied increasingly upon 
the deterrent effect of a strong German army to keep Germany's enemies from beginning 
a war. 37 
Clearly, Moltke feared the next war and preferred to put it off if at all possible. 
However, it is difficult to reconcile Moltke's often bellicose statements with F6rster's 
view. Moltke believed that a war with France would come sooner or later and that it was 
his task to find a way to fight such a war. VVhile Moltke would probably not have used 
the term "Ermattungsstrategie" to describe his strategy, he clearly felt a quick 
annihilating victory was beyond the strength of Germany. However, he still believed it 
was possible to achieve significant successes against his enemies which would make 
easier the diplomats' task of negotiating peace. Thus, though Moltke increasingly 
emphasized the role of diplomacy in concluding a war, he believed that the army had an 
important role in creating the preconditions for peace (i. e., a greatly weakened enemy). 
36 Ritter, op. cit., p. 230. 
37 F6rster, "Facing People's War, " p. 224. 
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Colmar von der Goltz and the "Nation in Arms " 
Moltke's unease with the rise of Volkskrieg was reinforced by the research and 
writing of a member of his staff, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Drawing on his work 
with the Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung of the General Staff, " Goltz published "Leon 
Gambetta und die Loirearmee" over several issues of the PreuBische Jahrbticher in 1874 
and 1875. " This was expanded and published 2 years later as Leon Gambetta und seine 
Armeen. " Goltz was full of admiration for Gambetta's achievements. He believed that 
Gambetta showed the world what was possible under a motivated and patriotic leader. 
However, Goltz correctly pointed out the shortcomings in Gambetta's improvised armies 
- their lack of proper training and equipment. 4' Goltz' studies of Gambetta and the 
second phase of the Franco-Prussian War led him to conclude that Germany needed to 
improve her armed forces to deal with what France had shown possible. 
Goltz believed that, in order to win the next war, Germany must increase the 
potential of her army by institutionalizing many of the ideas tried by Gambetta in his 
improvised armies, and he used his conclusion to Leon Gambetta to advocate a number 
of ways in which Germany could and should prepare herself for future war. He wrote that 
German officer training should be improved, specifically that the reserve and Landwehr 
officers should be given better training. A more professional reserve officer corps meant, 
to Goltz, that the German reserve units would fight more effectively and could be used in 
wider roles. Aware of German manpower shortages in 1870/71, Goltz also believed that 
Germany should apply conscription more rigorously. He believed that Germany must 
make use of every able-bodied man. To make this so, he controversially declared that 
Germany should reduce her active service from 3 to 2 years, a stance that brought down 
upon Goltz the wrath of the Kaiser and resulted in his removal from the Great General 
38 Goltz served on the Kriegsgeschichtfiche Atedung of the General Staff from 1872 to 1874 and helped 
prepare the official history of the war. His wartime experience on the staff of the 2" Army made him 
ideally suited for the task of examining the campaign against Gambetta's armies. Hermann Teske, Colmar 
Freiherr von der Goltz: Ein Kgmpfer far den militirischen Fortschritt (G6ttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 
1957) pp. 25-26. 
39 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, "Leon Gambetta und die Loirearmee, " PJ. Bd. 34 (1874). 
40 Idern. Leon Gambetta und seine Armeen (Berlin: F. Schneider, 1877). 
41 Most other accounts of Gambetta's armies were based on Goltz' analysis and stress the weakness of 
militia-type armies. For example see, Hauptmann von RoeBler, "Vergleich des Feldzuges 1809 am Tajo mit 
den Kampfen 1870/71 an der Loire, " Beiheft zurn Militar-Wochenblatt (1888). 
24 
Staff. " To help ease the way for extended conscription, Goltz also proposed that the 
youth of Germany be prepared by schools and youth organizations for military service. 
He aimed at instilling Germany's young men with the discipline and love of Fatherland 
necessary for army service. By preparing thoroughly in peacetime, Goltz hoped to avoid 
the improvised nature of Gambetta's armies, and hence make Germany capable of 
fighting a Volkskrieg more effectively than the French had in 1870/71. "' 
Despite being censured by the Kaiser himself, Goltz continued throughout his 
long career to stress the necessity for a greater application of conscription and 
preparation for war, believing that Germany must be able to do better than the French had 
in 1870/71. In a series of books and articles published over the course of his career, he 
elaborated his views. In Rossbach und Jena (1883), Goltz used the Prussian defeat at 
Jena to show how an army apart from its nation was doomed to failure, a theme which he 
continued with Jena bis Pr. Eylau (1907). ' He recognized that Prussia had lost in 1806, in 
part, because her leaders were still fighting a Kabinettskrieg, not the Volkskrieg of 
Napoleon and Revolutionary France. " He believed that Prussia had become too 
complacent after Frederick the Great's victories, and had ignored the changes in warfare 
brought on by the French Revolution. Quite clearly, "Rossbach" was meant by Goltz to 
read "Sedan" -a warning to his contemporaries not to be complacent in their own 
victories. " 
Goltz' best-known and most influential book was Das Volk in Waffen, which 
was first published in 1883 and was translated into English as The Nation in Arms. " 
Goltz stated early that his goal with this book was to "recall to strategy the attention 
42 The 2-year service requirement had long been a goal of German liberals, who saw it as a way to weaken 
the conservative nature of the army. As such it was vehemently opposed by Germany's conservatives. 
Goltz' career was only saved by the intervention of Moltke. For the Kaiser's reaction to Goltz' call for a 2- 
year service period see, Dennis Showalter, "Goltz and Bernhardi: The Institutionalization of Originality in 
the Imperial German Army, " Defense Analysis Vol. 3 No. 4 (1987) p. 306. 
43 Goltz, Leon Gambetta, pp. 289-295; Teske, op. cit., pp. 29-30. 
44 Colmar von der Goltz, Rossbach und Jena (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1883), revised as Von Rossbach bis Jena 
und Auerstedt (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1906); Jena bis Pr. Eylau (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1907). 
45 Goltz, Jena his Pr. Eylau, pp. 217-220. 
46 Teske, op. cit., p. 35. 
47 Colmar von der Goltz, Das Volk in Waffen (Berlin: R. v. Deckers Verlag, 1883). This went through five 
editions before World War 1, a sixth after, and was translated widely. A recent historian has called this 
book "... the most significant work of military theory from Wilhelmine Germany. " Gerd Krumeich, "The 
Myth of Gambetta and the 'People's War' in Germany and France, 1871-1914, " in F6rster and Nagler, 
op. cit., p. 646. 
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which hitherto has been diverted almost exclusively to generalship in battle. "" To Goltz, 
the period of modem war brought on by the French Revolution allowed the use of the 
"whole manhood of the nation. "" He believed this change in warfare was shown clearly 
during the Franco-Prussian War, writing: "The day of Cabinet wars is over. It is no 
longer the weakness of a single man, at the head of affairs, or of a dominant party, that is 
decisive, but only the exhaustion of the belligerent nations. "" Goltz' message was the 
same as his earlier works: only by thoroughly preparing her population in peacetime 
could Germany hope to win the next war. Goltz believed that there was no better place to 
start than with the nation's youth, and in The Nation in Arms he once again advocated 
the training of German youth. " 
Throughout The Nation in Arms, Goltz looked back to the experience in the 
second phase of the Franco-Prussian War - the Volkskrieg - for his inspirations. He 
maintained that a future war would pit nation against nation, and wrote: 
It is, indeed, conceivable that, in order to impose one's will by force upon an 
obstinate people, led by a great man, it may be necessary to literally flood [sic] a 
country with troops and to exert extreme pressure upon the population for years 
on end. " 
His vision of a future war excluded decisive battles such as K6niggrdtz and 
Sedan. The size of the armies produced by nations in arms, as well as well-placed 
fortifications, would slow the pace of operations and make such battles impossible. 
Further, Goltz believed the large modem armies would be able to stretch out across entire 
border areas, making flanking movements difficult if not impossible. He envisioned that 
only after a period of encounter battles would any movement be restored in a future war: 
Only when, after the greatest of exertions on both sides, a crisis supervenes, 
followed on one side by inevitable exhaustion, events begin to move more 
rapidly. It is absolutely certain that in afuture war events will not march with 
anything like the rapidity peculiar to our last campaigns. " 
Goltz believed that only the moral pressures of the conflict would cause one side 
eventually to collapse. After destroying an enemy's army, he believed that the enemy's 
48 Colmar von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms. Revised Edition. (trans. Philip Ashworth) (London: Hugh 
Rees, 1906) p. 5. Based on the 5h German edition (1898). 
49 Ibid., p. 2 1. 
50 Ibid., p. 9. Emphasis added. 
51 Ibid., p. 26. 
52 Ibid., p. 465. 
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capital and important provinces should be occupied. If this failed to bring about peace, 
Goltz then recommended: 
There remains the last means, namely, heavy pressure upon the most prosperous 
and sensitive districts, or the occupation of the whole country and the cutting off 
of its communication with the outside world. " 
Colmar von der Goltz worked throughout his career to implement his ideas about 
warfare. Goltz was not merely a man of letters; he was a serving officer. As he advanced 
up the ladder of command in the German army, he was often in a place to put his ideas 
about preparing Germany for a future war into practice. As a corps commander from 
1902 to 1907, Goltz was solely responsible for the training of his troops. He used his 
position to implement many of his ideas within his corps district, particularly the training 
of reserve officers. " In 1911, Goltz took steps towards implementing his ideas for youth 
training by unifing the various youth organizations of Germany into the 
"Jungdeutschlandbund. " Goltz saw this organization as a means of preparing Germany's 
young men for military service and set forward a set of principles by which its members 
should live. This "Jungdeutschland-Gesetz" emphasised "truthfulness, frugality, 
reliability, respect for others, healthy living, politeness, and chivalry. "" Throughout his 
career, Goltz used every opportunity to prepare Germany better for the difficult war 
ahead by applying his ideas of a nation in arms. 57 
Other Interpretations 
Although Goltz is today perhaps the best-remembered interpreter of Volkskrieg, 
he was not the only writer in Wilhelmine Germany concerned with the phenomenon. In 
the early 1890s, the army opened its archives of the Franco-Prussian War to researchers. 
A number took advantage of this and published works which focused on the second 
phase of the war. However, unlike Moltke, these authors did not conclude that German 
officers would have to rethink their basic assumptions about strategy and, unlike von der 
53 Ibid., p. 159. Emphasis in original. 
54 Ibid., p. 468. 
55 Teske, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 
56 [Bruno] von Mudra, "Generalfeldmarschall Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, " introductory essay to Das 
Volk in Waffen (6h Edition) (Berlin: R. v. Decker's Verlag, 1925) p. xxv; Teske, op. cit., p. 69. 
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Goltz these writers did not conclude from their research that Germany would have to 
introduce major reforms into her army. These writers recommended instead relatively 
minor improvements which would enable the army to fight more efficiently. Two writers 
in particular from this group stand out - Fritz Hoenig and Georg Cardinal von Widdern. 
In 1893, Fritz Hoenig, a retired officer and well-known military writer, " 
published the first of a six-volume account of the second phase of the Franco-Prussian 
War entitled, Der Volkskrieg an der Loire im. Herbst 1870. " Prior to this book, Hoenig, 
who had served as a battalion adjutant in the 2 nd Army during the war, had written a 
number of other accounts of the conflict which mainly focused on the war's tactical 
lessons. " His interest in the phenomenon of Volkskrieg had been piqued by his 
experience during the war, and he had begun researching the campaign of the 2 nd Army 
in 1871 shortly after the war's conclusion. However, only in 1892 was he given the 
access to the official documents necessary to complete his study. " 
Hoenig believed that the German army had hitherto paid insufficient attention to 
the campaign on the Loire, representing it merely as a "struggle between two opposing 
armies" rather than the "Volbkrieg" which it really was. He held that interpreting the 
second phase of the Franco-Prussian War strictly as a conflict of army against army 
missed the "change in the character of war. " To ignore this change, argued Hoenig, 
meant seriously underestimating the enemy's [i. e., France's] will and ability to resist in a 
future conflict. " Hoenig wrote that certain nations had the necessary political willpower 
and the necessary resources to resist to their utmost. Based on the experience of the 
Franco-Prussian War, he felt that France would show the same powerful will and ability 
to resist in a future war, even if faced with severe defeats at the outset of a war. He wrote, 
57 Goltz' 2-year service period was finally introduced in 1893 in the teeth of much conservative opposition. 
Lamar Cecil, Wilhehn II: Prince and Emperor, 1859-1900 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1989) pp. 201-205. 
" Between 1875 and 1902, Hoenig published 15 some-odd works of military history and theory and 
countless articles. Hoenig's career as a military writer is analysed in Joachim Hoffinann, "Der 
Militarschriftsteller Fritz Hoenig, " MGM 1/70 (1970) pp. 5-25. 
59 Fritz Hoenig, Der Volkskrieg an der Loire im Herbst 1870 (6 vols) (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1893-1899). 
Hoenig's work largely served as the basis for Lonsdale Hale's The 'People's War' in France 1870-1871 
(London: Hugh Rees, 1904). 
'so Fritz Hoenig, Zwei Brigaden (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1882) and 24 Stunden Moltkes'cher Strategie 
entwickelt und erläutert an den Schlachten von Gravelotte und St. Privat (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1891). 
61 Count A. Bothmer, review of Der Volkskrieg an der Loire, United Services Magazine N. S. Vol. VII 
(1893) p. 1032. Bothmer also noted that the principle commanders of the German campaign were deceased 
by 1892, making "a criticism of their doings ... easier for the author than 
it would have been inunediately 
after the campaign. " 
62 Hoenig, Volkskrieg 1, pp. 5-6. 
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"southern France ... can organize powerful 
forces and conduct considerable resistance 
even when all of northern France, including Paris, is subdued. 3963 German strategists 
ignored this fact at their peril. 
Hoenig charged that the German strategic leadership had made just this mistake 
in their initial approach to dealing with the armies of the Government of National 
Defence, and Hoenig hoped his history of the war would be a critique from which 
officers could learn and prepare for future wars. ' In his opinion, the German leadership 
in 1870 had made the error of believing that France's ability to resist had been removed 
when the Imperial armies had been destroyed. They did not believe France would be 
capable of raising new forces. Therefore, when reports came in of new French forces 
being formed in the provinces, Germany's leaders discounted them. Hoenig faulted the 
leadership for not taking the threat more seriously and for not doing more to ascertain the 
whereabouts or strength of these forces. " He further believed the German response, when 
it came, was too weak. He again put this down to an underestimation of the enemy as 
well as to the shortcomings of some of the German higher commanders. 
Indeed, Hoenig's work consisted of a long critique of the German command in 
1870/71. In all, he felt that the German leadership was taken completely by surprise by 
the continued French resistance after the defeat of the Imperial armies, and that they 
reacted slowly and ineffectively to the threat posed by the newly formed French armies 
and to the partisan threat to the German lines of communication. After underestimating 
the French threat, Hoenig felt that some commanders (most notably the Grand Duke of 
Mecklenburg-Schwerin) then began to overestimate them after a few set backs. ' Further, 
the German response to the French armies on the Loire was poorly co-ordinated. ' 
Hoenig maintained that a more robust initial German response to the fresh French armies 
would have dealt them a blow from which they would never have recovered. With 
stronger leadership, Hoenig argued, the whole campaign on the Loire could have been 
ended almost before it had even begun. 
In the same year that Hoenig's first volumes appeared, a retired cavalry colonel, 
Georg Cardinal von Widdern, began publishing his multi-volumed history of the partisan 
61 Ibid., p. 8. 
64 Ibid., p. iii, p. 7. 
65 Ibid., pp. 27-29. Generalleutnant von Podbielski, Moltke's Generalquartiermeister, described the 
French forces as a "mob, " incapable of serious operations. p. 339. 
66 Ibid., p. 10. 
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war on the German lines of communication in 1870/7 L" Cardinal had served during the 
war with the Etappendienst guarding the German supply lines and had later become an 
instructor at various Kriegsschulen in the new Reich. Like Hoenig, Cardinal believed that 
the next war would in all likelihood be a Volkskrieg similar to the second phase of the 
Franco-Prussian War. In particular, he felt that the war's second phase had shown just 
how vulnerable modem armies were to partisan warfare. Cardinal wrote that, as the size 
and complexity of armies increased, so did their reliance upon fixed lines of 
communication. He maintained that the German army should leam from its experience in 
the Volkskrieg, and, like Hoenig, intended his work to be a guide from which officers 
could leam. " 
At the heart of Cardinal's work was the opinion that Germany must better prepare 
her armed forces for the "Kleinkrieg, " or partisan war, 'O which was sure to accompany 
any future war. He noted that in 1870/71, the German army maintained a force of over 
110,000 troops and close to 70 artillery pieces to cover the long lines of communication 
through which the supplies for Germany's 454,000 man field army came. Thus for every 
four fighting troops, one was necessary to guard the flow of supplies. " Cardinal also 
noted that in the Franco-Prussian War this task had fallen to the troops of the Landwehr, 
a force which he believed the war unsuited to fight this difficult type of conflict. Cardinal 
felt that the Landwehr officers had been out of active service for too long to be able to 
respond to the demands of such a tactically challenging task. He also maintained that the 
troops as well were too old to fight the mobile war demanded by the nature of the 
Kleinkrieg. " 
Although Cardinal recognized the changed nature of war and the likelihood that 
the next war would be similar to the Volkskrieg of the last, he, like Hoenig, did not feel 
large changes were needed in the German army. Cardinal wanted the army to train its 
officers to fight the Kleinkrieg as well as the more glamorous mobile war. He 
67 Hoenig, Volkskrieg VI, p. 334. 
68 Georg Cardinal von Widdern, Der Krieg an den rackwartigen Verbindungen der deutschen Heer und der 
"ta pendiens (6 vols) (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1893-99). 
69 The concluding volume even offered "Taktische Aufgaben aus dem Gebiet des Kleinen Krieges, " from 
which officers could practice what they had learned. Der Krieg an den rfickwartigen Verbindungen V, pp. 
77-84. 
70 The terms "Kleinkrieg" and "petite guerre" were generally used to describe partisan warfare. Cardinal 
assumed that the Kleinkrieg of the future would be more systematic than in the past and would be carried 
out by larger and better prepared formations. 
71 Der Krieg an den rackwartigen Verbindungen I, pp. iv-v. 
72 Ibid., III, p. 56,73. 
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recommended Germany assign more active-duty troops and a few higher-level officers to 
the Etappendienst so that the German army would be better prepared for the attacks 
against its communications which he believed must come in a future conflict. " 
Therefore, like Hoenig and most other German officers, Cardinal felt the German army 
needed only to tinker with its formula to overcome the changes in warfare brought about 
by the re-appearance of the Volkskrieg. 
Thus, the works by Hoenig and Cardinal were at heart quite different from those 
of Goltz. While all three saw the Volkskrieg on the Loire as a foreshadowing of future 
conflicts, Hoenig and Cardinal stressed the deficiencies of the German army, rather than 
the capabilities of the French improvised armies. ' In the end, Hoenig and Cardinal felt 
French successes could be better explained by German failings. As Dennis Showalter has 
noted, "this was a comfortable answer. It implied that the situation could have been 
prevented by measures within German control. "" While Hoenig and Cardinal hoped that 
German officers would learn from the mistakes of the campaign on the Loire, they did 
not feel the Germans were incapable of winning another Volkskrieg. Thus, unlike Goltz, 
they did not feel a thorough-going program of reform was needed. Despite the sometimes 
controversial nature of their works, Hoenig and Cardinal reflected more clearly the 
interpretation of the Franco-Prussian War generally accepted by the rest of the German 
army. 
Conclusion 
Looking back nearly 130 years, it is obvious today that the second phase of the 
Franco-Prussian War pointed more precisely to the way of the future than the great 
victories of the first phase. This phase displayed many features of the much greater 
Volkskrieg which would come 45 years later. Although recent research has called into 
question the amount of public support for the policies of the Government of National 
73 Ibid., V, pp. 23-49. See also his Der Kleine Krieg und der Etgppendienst. Kriegsgeschichtliche und 
taktische Studie (4 vols. ) (Leipzig: Eisenschmidt, 1892-1907). 
74 Many of Hoenig's other works stressed German shortcomings during the war. In particular, Hoenig's 
quest for historical accuracy regarding the Battle of Gravelotte landed him in front of an Ehrengericht for 
allegedly maligning the character of General Schwarzkoppen. See Fritz Hoenig, Meine Ehrenhandlung mi 
dem Oberst und FlUgeladjutant von SchwarzkoRpen und dem Oberst und Abteilungschef im. Generalstabe 
von Bernhardi (Berlin: 1902). 
75 Showalter, op. cit., p. 309. 
31 
Defense, " the French clearly strove hard to achieve near total mobilization and to create 
a "nation in arms, " even if they fell somewhat short of their goals: The government 
attempted to follow a "scorched earth" policy, issuing orders to destroy anything of value 
lest it fall into enemy hands. Manpower mobilization called a large proportion of the 
male population to the colors. French partisan activity brought forth reprisals against 
civilians from the German army, creating an upward spiral of violence remembered by 
both sides long after the war's end. The German army also deliberately targeted the civil 
population of fortresses under siege in an effort to bring resistance to an end sooner. With 
the Franco-Prussian War, war in Europe had ceased to be a war of government against 
government and became one of nation against nation. 
Thus, although the Franco-Prussian War appeared to be a spectacular victory for 
the Germans and appeared to secure German military dominance of Europe, in fact, the 
war sowed the seeds of the destruction of the Second German Empire. The war's first 
phase showed the world the worth of an army based on conscription, while the second 
phase of the war demonstrated the ability of a modem nation-state to mobilize 
considerable resources, both manpower and industrial, and to continue resistance even 
after suffering a severe military defeat. These lessons were not lost on Germany's 
enemies, and they quickly instituted conscription and built up the structure of a "nation in 
arms" along Gambetta's model in their countries. After 1871, Germany could no longer 
count on her enemies being unprepared. Any future European conflict would pit the 
resources of whole nations against one another. 
This shift in warfare was recognized by a number of clear-sighted German 
military commentators. Foremost amongst these was the intellectual father of the 
Wilhelmine army, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder. Moltke's war plans from 1872 
onwards, as well as his public writings, reflected his understanding of how the rise of 
Volkskrieg affected Germany. His solution to Germany's growing strategic dilemma was 
to work more closely with Germany's diplomats, both in peacetime and in war, to ensure 
that Germany fought under the most favorable conditions possible. 
76 Sanford Kanter, "Exposing the Myth of the Franco-Prussian War, " War and Socie! y Vol. 4 Nr. I (1986) 
pp. 13-30 and Krumeich, op. cit., pp. 641-655. While the views of both authors on the support enjoyed by 
the government might be true, there is no doubting that the armies of Gambetta caused the Germans 
considerable difficulties and that the second phase of the war represented a distinct departure from the 
conditions of the war's first phase. 
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Moltke's ideas about Volkskrieg were supported, to a greater or lesser extent, by a 
number of young writers, who also focused their research on the impact of Volkskrieg. 
The writings of Colmar von der Goltz - one of Wilhelmine Germany's most prominent 
military intellectuals -centered on how Germany should prepare herself for the task of 
fighting and winning another Volkskrieg. His solution was to institutionalize Gambetta's 
improvisations - to prepare Germany in peacetime for the utmost exertion in wartime. 
Hoenig and Cardinal were less radical in their demands for army reform than Goltz, 
calling for small improvements rather than fundamental change. Each author, however, 
believed that, with suitable changes in place, Germany could prevail in a future 
Volkskrieg. 
Unlike Moltke, though, Goltz, Hoenig, and Cardinal were not in positions of 
authority when they wrote their books on the Volkskrieg in France. All three authors took 
a minority view on the lessons of the Franco-Prussian War. Goltz was even disciplined 
by the Kaiser for proposing to reduce the terms of service. Hoeing too was censured. His 
attempts at "de-mystifying" the Wars of Unification landed him in front of a court of 
honor. Despite this, however, Goltz, Hoenig, and Cardinal had at least the tacit backing 
of the authorities. Goltz had reached his conclusions while writing the official history of 
the war and his historical books were written using the archives of the army. Hoenig and 
Cardinal, as well, were given access to the official records and to the private papers of 
many of the higher commanders for their works -a fact not missed by observers. Given 
the scope of access these men had to official records, and the protection given them by 
the army leadership (every military work had to clear the censors at the General Staff 
before publication), the historical works of these men could rightly be seen as semi- 
official accounts. 
Indeed, the works of these men served to fill a void in the historiography of the 
war against France. Moltke himself believed that the official history should not tarnish 
the prestige of the leaders of the German army. He felt it important to maintain a certain 
image of the army in the eyes of the German public and in the eyes of Germany's 
potential enemies. Accordingly, the official history consciously avoided criticizing 
officers. As such, it lacked the criticism of an impartial history. " The research of these 
77 Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Providence: Berg, 199 1) p. 49. 
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writers should be seen as an attempt to redress this imbalance and to provide works from 
which the army could draw the real lessons of the war. 
Yet, despite the warnings of these authors, the German army before 1914 focused, 
as a whole, on the Franco-Prussian War's first phase and used this to support a short-war 
strategy. Moltke the Elder's successors as Chief of the General Staff planned to defeat 
the French and Russian armies in a few great battles. His successors cut diplomats from 
Germany's war plans and planned instead for the German military to impose a "victor's 
peace" upon both France and Russia. In short, the German strategic leadership after 
Moltke the Elder rejected the idea that a "change in the nature of warfare" had occurred. 
One of the most important reasons for this rejection can be found within the 
writings of the very men who stressed how warfare had changed. While Moltke rather 
quietly emphasised the shift in warfare and Goltz spoke a bit louder, the research of 
Hoenig and Cardinal undermined their arguments. Both Hoenig and Cardinal recognized 
that warfare in the future would be different. However, their works, by examining 
Gerrnan errors in 1870/71, maintained that only minor changes would be necessary to 
deal with a future Volkskrieg. To these authors, the change in warfare did not require an 
abandonment of Germany's traditional approach to war. Thus, their work supported the 
rejection of Goltz' radical approach and supported the more conventional thinking of 
men such as Schlieffen. 
In rejecting the idea that the Franco-Prussian War represented a shift in warfare, 
the German strategic leadership before 1914 fatally weakened Germany. Believing that 
the army could win the next war without outside assistance, the General Staff cut both 
the Ministry of War and the Foreign Ministry out of its planning process. The result was 
a fragmentation rather than an integration of Germany's higher authorities. Not knowing 
the details of Germany's war plan, the Ministry of War would not support the army 
increases demanded by the General Staff. Not knowing the army's war plan, the Foreign 
Office could take no steps to ease Germany's diplomatic situation before the conflict. 
Once Germany's plan had failed and the Volkskrieg rejected by the General Staff had set 
in, Germany was forced, like Gambetta in 1870, to improvise her war effort. 
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Chapter Two: 
The (Re)Birth of Ermattungsstrategie 
One of Wilhelmine Germany's most important strategic commentators was not a 
serving soldier, but rather an academic - Hans DelbrUck. The 60 some-odd years of his 
career spanned the bellicose life of the Kaiserreich - from its foundation through the 
Franco-Prussian War to its demise through the First World War. During that period, 
DelbrUck played a key role in many areas of Wilhelmine society. He was at once a 
teacher at one of the most important universities in Germany (Friedrich-Wilhelms- 
Universitdt in Berlin), editor of the influential journal PreuBische Jahrbiicher member of 
the Freikonservative Partei in the Prussian Landtag and later in the Reichstag, and writer 
of numerous works on history and contemporary affairs. ' Most importantly for this study, 
DelbrUck was a sharp cntic of German strategic thinking in the years before World War 
1, believing it to be close-minded in its approach to learning lessons from the past. ' 
At roughly the same time as Moltke the Elder and Colmar von der Goltz were 
questioning the army's continued adherence to Vernichtungsstrategie by examining the 
consequences of the Volkskrieg of 1870/71, DelbrUck was challenging the intellectual 
underpinnings of the German army's approach to war from another direction. The young 
professor went so far as to attempt to form a new strategy (or rather, in his view, recall an 
old strategy) to deal effectively with the new reality of Volkskrieg. The resulting Streit 
would eventually draw in most of the army's intellectuals, and if DelbrUck's ideas were 
not fully accepted, the discourse would at least provide Germany's soldiers with the 
intellectual basis for an alternative strategy in 1914. 
1 Peter Paret saw him as a forerunner of the modem "national security" specialist. Peter Paret, "Hans 
Delbrilck on Military Critics and Military Historians, " MiliýM Affairs Fall 1966 pp. 148-149. 
2 Despite playing such an important role in German society before World War 1, Delbrack has never been 
the subject of a thorough biography, as has been noted by Arden Bucholz and others. Several studies of 
limited aspects of his career have been subjects of monographs. Most recently, Sven Lange, Hans Delbrack 
und der 'Strateiziestreit': KrieRfUhrunp, und Krieasaeschichte in der Kontroverse 1879-1914 
(Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte No. 40 Herausgegeben vom Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt) 
(Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 1995). 
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Delbrack's Early Career 
As a young man, Hans Delbriick had served in the Franco-Prussian War, first as a 
corporal and then as a reserve lieutenant, winning the Iron Cross, first class, before being 
invalided home with typhus. This experience was to serve him well in his later career as 
a military historian. In France, he encountered battle first hand, taking part in the long- 
remembered battle of Gravelotte. From his letters during the war, we can already discern 
DelbrUck's keen eye for analysis. Amongst other things, DelbrUck wrote that he was 
impressed by the importance of discipline under fire, noting after Gravelotte: "Now I 
begin to understand how 10,000 closed formation Greeks could beat 100,000 Persians 
and how the city of Rome could conquer the world. "' However he also noted, "the men 
openly admit they do not go into fire the second time with the same enthusiasm as the 
first and have even less courage the third time. "' DelbrUck's experience also brought him 
to see the same problem that the professional soldiers would argue over for many years 
after 1870 - the problem of mounting an attack in the face of modem small amis. 
' 
Typically, he used his experiences as a junior officer as a guide when writing on military 
history. Having encountered the rigours of campaigning first hand, Delbrack used his 
knowledge as a critical filter through which to judge the veracity of many of his sources 
when later writing military history. 
After the Franco-Prussian War, Delbriick returned to his studies and completed 
his dissertation in 1873, ' the first to be submitted and defended in German to the Faculty 
of Philosophy at the University of Bonn. ' He then took up a number of important 
teaching positions; first as tutor to Crown Prince Gustav of Sweden, a position that he 
held for less than a year, and then in 1874 as tutor to Prince Waldemar, the son of 
Kronprinz Friedrich Wilhelm. DelbrUck's 5 years with the Prussian royal family had a 
great impact on his thinking! Exposed to the highest political and military levels of the 
newly formed empire, DelbrUck took advantage of his position. While Prince 
Waldemar's tutor, he struck up friendships with a number of army officers who had 
3 Hans Delbrdck, letter of 19 August 1870, quoted in Arden Bucholz, Hans Delbrack and the German 
MiliýM Establishment: War Images in Conflict (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985) p. 23 
4 Idem, letter of 11 August 1870, Ibid., p. 22. 
5 Idem, letter of 19 August 1879, Ibid., p. 23. 
6 Idem, Ueber die Glaubwtirdiaeit. Lamberts von Hersfeld (Bonn: Carl Georg, 1873). 
7 Anneliese Thimme, Hans Delbrück als Kritiker der wilhelminischen Epoche (Düsseldorf. Droste, 1955) 
P. 9. 
8 Hans Delbrack, "Pers6nliche Erinnerungen an den Kaiser Friedrich und sein Haus, " PJ Bd. 62 (1888) pp. 
97-116. 
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played key roles in the war, not least being the Kronprinz and his former chief of staff, 
Albrecht Graf von Blumenthal. ' DelbrUck looked back on this time as being very 
important for the formulation of his interest in, and many of his ideas on, military 
history. " 
This period also afforded Delbrilck the opportunity to lay the foundations for his 
career in military history. At court he met Hedwig Grafin von BAU, the granddaughter 
of Neidhardt Graf von Gneisenau, who asked him to complete the editing of her famous 
grandfather's memoirs and papers begun in the 1860s. Delbriick later expanded this into 
a biography. " This decision to pursue a career in military history, however, brought 
Delbrtick into conflict with the military and with many other members of the academic 
historical community, as both groups were hostile to the idea of civilians researching 
military history. The soldiers saw the field as their own purview, while the academics 
viewed military history as not a true sub-discipline of history (perhaps a view still widely 
held today). When Delbrack left the royal family in 1879 and attempted to secure an 
appointment at the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universitat, this choice of discipline caused him 
much difficulty. 
In the summer of 1880, Delbrtick tried to have the Prussian Minister of Cultural 
Affairs, Gustav von Gossler, appoint him as a professor in military history at the 
university. This met with opposition on two counts. First, the faculty at Berlin were 
opposed to someone using such blatant political influence to skip the chain of seniority. 
Second, they were opposed to his choice of speciality, seeing military history as part of a 
specialist discipline, not part of humanities. Delbriick argued that contemporary military 
history lacked a political facet, which was essential for understanding war. In the end, 
DelbrUck was appointed Privatdozent in 1880 and gave his first lecture ("The Battle of 
Napoleon with Old Europe") in January 1881. " Though military history was often the 
9 Delbrack formed close friendships with a number of important officers (such as Albrecht von Blumenthal 
and the future chancellor, Leo von Caprivi), corresponding with them in subsequent years. Contained 
within the Delbrfick Nachlass in the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin are these letters as well as Delbrack's notes 
on interviews with Blumenthal and Pape. He used these notes when writing his lectures on the Wars of 
Unification. (These were later published in WeItgeschichte. Vorlesungen, gehalten an der UniversitAt 
Berlin 1896-1920. Vol. 5 Neuzeit von 1852 bis 1888. (Berlin: Otto Stollberg, 1928. ) 
10 Hans Delbrilck, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political Histojy Vol. l: Antiquily 
(trans. Walter J. Renfroe) (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975) pp. 13-14. 
11 Idem, Das Leben des Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau 2 Vols. (Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1880). 
12 For Delbrilck's struggle with the academic community, see Bucholz, Delbrack particularly, pp. 19-44. 
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subject of his lectures, he never succeeded in having a chair of military history founded. 
His various positions at the university were all confined to general history. 
Two years after DelbAick began his academic career, he joined the Prussian 
Landtag as a deputy for the Freikonservative Partei, a position he occupied until 1885. 
From 1884 until 1890, he was a Freikonservativer deputy in the Reichstag. Delbrack 
seems, however, not to have considered politics a career. Though he often criticized 
specific policies from his column in the PreuBische JahrbUcher, he does not seem to have 
been deeply engaged in Reichstag politics. The party for which he was a deputy claimed 
to represent no specific interest groups, holding itself to stand for "das Vaterland Uber die 
ParteV' and for "das Nationalinteresse über alles. "" 
In addition to his duties as a professor and representative, Delbrtick also went on 
to edit the PreuBische jahrbUcher for almost 40 years, where he published a column in 
each issue entitled Politische Correspondenz. The PreuBische Jahrbilcher was founded by 
Heinrich von Treitschke in the 1850sto support German unification and independence. " 
(In 1896, DelbAick would take over Treitschke's chair at the Friedrich-Wilhelms- 
Universitift. ) The j oumal went out to a large number of decisionmakers in the 
Kaiserreich, reaching, according to one contemporary source, the "best circle" of German 
and foreign society. " Its pages provided DelbrOck with a forum from which he engaged 
his intellectual opponents frequently. " 
The Strategiestreit and Ermattungsstrategie 
DelbrUck's differences of opinion with the faculty at Berlin over military history 
were echoed by a debate with the military that was taking shape at roughly the same time 
-a debate which illustrates the thinking of a significant portion of the military in 
Wilhelmine Germany and one from which DelbrUck's concept of Ermattungsstrategie 
would spring. In 1879, DelbrUck published a review of Frederick the Great's "Military 
13 Thimme, op. cit., p. 3 1. 
14 Preu8ische Jahrbilcher. HA Bd. 3 (1859), Vorwort. 
15 According to KtIrchners Handbuch der Presse, quoted in Thimme, op. cit., p. 12. Among the readers of the 
Preul3ische JahrbUcher was Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. Arden Bucholz, Moltke, Schlieffen and 
Prussian War Planning (Providence, RL Berg Publishers, 199 1) p. 217. 
16 Delbrack took over as editor-in-chief from Treitschke after a heated debate over the personality of Kaiser 
Friedrich III, whom Deffirtick defended. Hans Schleier, "Treitschke, DelbrUck und die 'PreuBischen 
Jahrbilcher' in den 80er Jahren des 19. Jahrhunderts, " Jahrbuch far Geschichte Jg. I (1967) pp. 134-179; 
Bucholz, DelbrUck, p. 46. 
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Testament, " which had just been published for the first time in an annotated version. " In 
his review DelbrUck took the editor, Major Adalbert von Taysen, to task for several 
points. Aside from some minor historical inaccuracies, Delbrflck found Taysen's editing 
to be heavy handed and that, most damningly, Taysen misunderstood the central point of 
the "Testament. " 
Frederick's "Military Testament, " written in the autumn of 1768 and originally 
part of his "Political Testament, " called for a "Detachmentskrieg" to be waged in case of 
a war with Austria - Prussian forces would seize Austrian territory and fight a defensive 
battle from prepared positions. In his comments to the edition, Taysen stated that the 
"Military Testament" only outlined a campaign plan for the next encounter with Austria 
and could not be in any way considered an elaboration of Frederick's general philosophy 
of war. Taysen maintained that Frederick normally sought decision through battle, not 
through occupying enemy territory and destroying enemy crops, etc. To Taysen, 
Frederick sought to win his wars through great decisive battles which annihilated the 
enemy's armed forces, just as Napoleon and Moltke would in the future. DelbrUck argued 
precisely the opposite - Frederick's "Military Testament' 'was not a campaign plan for 
the next war but a general statement of Frederick's approach towards war. DelbrUck 
ftirther declared that "Frederick had at all times ... looked upon 'battle' as an evil, which 
one must subject oneself to only in the case of the utmost necessity"" and that 
"Frederick's aversion to battle [outlined in the "Testament"] was in no way something 
new, but rather it was an improvement of a previously held conviction. "" 
DelbrUck's strident criticism of Taysen's editorial views and his unique 
interpretation of Frederick the Great brought him into conflict with the military. His 
review received immediate challenge from one of Taysen's colleagues in the General 
Staff. In the next issue of the Zeitschrift f& preuBische Geschichte und Landeskunde 
Colmar von der Goltz wrote an "Antikritik" rejecting DelbrUck's analysis. " DelbrUck 
17 Hans Delbrack, Review of 'Das militdrische Testament Friedrichs des Grossen. Herausgegeben und 
erlautert von v. Taysen, Major im Grossen Generalstabe. ' in Zeitschrift fUr preuBische Geschichte und 
Landeskunde (Hereafter, ZfRGL 16. Jg. (Jan-Feb 1879) pp. 27-32. 
18 [bid., p. 3 1. 
19 Ibid., p. 32. 
20 Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, "Antikritik, " ZfpGL 16. Jg. (Mai-Juni 1879) pp. 292-304. Goltz at the 
time was serving as an instructor at the Kriegsakademie and in the Kriegsgeschichtliche Atedung of the 
GGS. Hermann Teske, Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz: Ein Kampfer f1dr den militarischen Fortschritt. 
(G6ttingen: Musterschmidt Verlag, 1957) pp. 32-37. 
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responded in turn, defending his views in the same issue. " For the next 30 years, 
Delbriick and the military sparred, ostensibly over interpretations of Frederick the Great's 
strategy; each article by one side brought forth a response from the other with each side 
only slowly coming closer to the view of the other. The list of Delbriick's opponents 
reads like a "Who's Who" of Wilhelmine military intellectuals: Colmar Freiherr von der 
Goltz, Theodor von Bernhardi and his son Friedrich, Rudolph von Caernmerer, Fritz 
Hoenig, Wilhelm Scherff, and Alfred von Boguslawski - most of whom taught at the 
Kriegsakademie and reached the rank of general. By criticizing a key figure in the 
panoply of the German military, Delbriick succeeded in uniting an otherwise fragmented 
officer corps against him. ' DelbrUck's debate with the military has been well covered 
elsewhere, " thus it is not necessary to explore it in great depth here. It is important, 
however, for this study in two ways: first, from this Strategiestreit Delbriick's idea of 
Ermattungsstrategie developed fully; second, implied within Delbriick's interpretation of 
Frederick the Great's strategy was a criticism of the military's conception of 
contemporary war. 
Delbriick began to develop his unique views on war while editing Gneisenau's 
papers. While working through Gneisenau's notes, DelbrUck was brought into contact 
with the ideas of a close friend and colleague of Gneisenau's, Carl von Clausewitz. In 
Gneisenau's papers, DelbrUck found a manuscript by Clausewitz, entitled "Ueber das 
Fortschreiten und den Stillstand der kriegerischen Begebenheiten" ("On the Progress and 
the Stagnation of the Military Arts"). ` This essay, in conjunction with Clausewitz' 
"Nachrichten" to his collected works, " made Delbrdck reflect on Clausewitz' ideas. 
Delbrijck came to believe that Clausewitz had posited, shortly before his death, not the 
one form of strategy normally accepted by DelbrUck's contemporaries 
(Vernichtungsstrategie), but rather two forms of strategy. DelbrUck believed that 
Clausewitz was in the process of editing Vom Kriege to reflect this new discovery, but 
21 Hans Delbrilck, "Duplik, " ZfpGL 16. Jg. (Mai-Juni 1879) pp. 305-314. 
22 The lively debates within the German army during this period have never been fully examined. For an 
introduction see Daniel Hughes, "Schlichting, Schlieffen and the Prussian Theory of War, " JMH 59 (1995) 
pp. 257-278; and Antulio J. Echevarria, "A Crisis in Warfighting: German Tactical Discussions in the Late 
Nineteenth Century, " MGM 55 (1996) pp. 51-68. 
23 DelbrUck himself gives an overview in his Histo1y of the Art of War Vol IV: The Dawn of Modem 
Warfare (trans. Walter J. Renfroe) (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985) pp. 378-382. See also 
Lange, op. cit., passim. 
24 Later published by Delbrflck in ZfipGL 15. Jg. (Mai-Juni 1878) pp. 233-241. 
25 These Nachrichten remain even today the subject of much conjecture and debate. See Azar Gat, 
"Clausewitz's final notes, " MGM 1/89 pp. 45-50. 
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this editing was interrupted by Clausewitz' call to Poland in 1830 and his subsequent 
death. 
The first of the strategies elaborated by Clausewitz formed the core of the 
unedited Vom Kriege and consisted of Clausewitz' interpretations of Napoleon's 
strategy. This he called Niederwerfungsstrategie (strategy of annihilation), and was based 
on his experiences in and research on the 20 years of Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
warfare. At the core of this strategy is the "Schlacht, " the "battle. " Clausewitz observed 
that Napoleon always sought an encounter with his enemy that would result in a decisive 
victory. To achieve this decisive victory, Napoleon aimed to annihilate his opponent's 
army in a great battle. To Napoleon, the "battle" was everything: "FOnf Meilen den Tag 
zu marschiren zu schlagen zu nihen, das sei seine ganze Kriegskunst ... 
"2' Thus 
Clausewitz outlined his first strategy: "... the object is to overthrow the enemy - to render 
him politically helpless or militarily impotent, thus forcing him to sign whatever peace 
9927 we please... 
Based on the experiences of the Napoleonic Wars, Niederwerfungsstrategie, or 
Vernichtungsstrategie as it came to be known, formed the basis for military strategy after 
1815. Soldiers, particularly Prussian soldiers, had learned a hard lesson at the hands of 
the Emperor of the French and were determined not to repeat their past mistakes. The old 
careful approach to warfare of the 17'h and 18'h centuries gave way to a less restricted 
way of war that sought to defeat totally an enemy's forces in battle, and thus dictate, 
rather than negotiate, peace. German strategists embraced this form of warfare, and 
"proved" its validity with the defeat of the Austrian armies in 1866 and the Imperial 
French armies in 1870. Wilhelm Groener admitted after World War I how deeply 
ingrained this idea had been in the German army before 1914: 
Das Offizierkorps hatte sein Denken gebildet an dem Studium der Kriege 
Napoleons und Moltkes. Sie waren geschlagen im Stile der 
Niederwerfungsstrategie: ein reißendes Hinströmen der Heere über das feindliche 
Land, die Entscheidung des Krieges in wenigen, gewaltigen Schlägen, ein 
Friedensschluß, in dem der wehrlose Gegner gezwungen war, widerspruchlos die 
Bedingungen des Siegers anzunehmen. ` 
26 Hans DelbrUck, "Die Strategie des Perikles erlautert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des GroBen, " in PJ 
64 (1889) p. 265. 
27 Carl von Clausewitz, "Note of July 1827, " On War (trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret) (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1976) p. 69. Quoted by Delbrack, "Perikles, " p. 26 1. 
28 Wilhelm Groener, "Delbrilcks Lehre, das Heer und der Weltkrieg, " in Emil Daniels and Paul Rilhimann, 
eds., Am Webstuhl der Zeit: Eine Erinnerungsgabe Hans Delbrack dem Achtzigjahrigen von Freunden und 
Schillern dargebracht (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1928) p. 44. 
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German historians and strategists, however, looked ftu-ther back for their inspiration than 
Napoleon, claiming that Frederick's approach to war foreshadowed Napoleon's. 
Thus, when DelbrUck challenged this view of Frederick as the forerunner of 
Napoleon, he challenged the accepted wisdom of the military establishment. In his 
"AntikritiW' to Delbrack's "Kritik, " Goltz espoused the General Staff view of Frederick, 
arguing that the King "... held the tactical decision to be the surest way to impose his will, 
and that he in no way had an aversion to [battle]. "" Goltz went on to provide illustrations 
to show that Frederick sought "battle" whenever possible, and concluded, "the possibility 
of beating the enemy appeared to Frederick as valid a reason to seek battle as it did to 
Napoleon. " 
DelbrUck could not accept this view of Frederick's strategy. To the 
Niederwerfungsstrategie espoused by Goltz and the military establishment, DelbAick 
outlined what he believed to be Clausewitz' second type of strategy - 
Ermattungsstrategie (strategy of attrition). DelbrUck believed that towards the end of his 
life, Clausewitz had realized that by focusing purely of Niederwerfungsstrategie, he was 
excluding the experiences of earlier warfare from his supposedly universal theory of war. 
The campaigns of the pre-Revolutionary period were not noted for the decisiveness of 
their battles, but rather the opposite. Clausewitz observed that commanders before 
Napoleon avoided costly "battles" and preferred to rely upon maneuver and smaller 
engagements to achieve their, generally more limited, goals. Clausewitz, according to 
DelbrUck, recognized that there were circumstances where the motives of a nation did not 
warrant annihilating an enemy's armed strength completely and also (more importantly 
for this study) that there were times when a nation's limited strength made the total 
annihilation of an enemy army, and with it a dictated peace, almost impossible. Delbilick 
believed that Clausewitz showed the time for Ermattungsstrategie was when a nation had 
only "modest political goals, weak motives, [or] limited strength. "O 
DelbrUck argued that Frederick followed Ermattungsstrategie not because his 
will was any weaker than Napoleon's but because he was constrained by the conditions 
of his age. Deffirtick repeated his assertions that Frederick fought battles only when 
forced to by circumstances and added reasons why this was so: 
29 Goltz, "Antikritik, " p. 299. 
'0 Quoted in Delbrack, "Perikles, " p. 262. 
42 
Friedrich hatte nicht genug Geld, nicht genug Soldaten, nicht genügend 
zuverlässige Soldaten, um den Krieg zu führen im Style [sic] Napoleons: darum 
schlug er eine Schlacht nur, wenn es ein anderes Mittel, zu seinem Zwecke zu 
gelangen, nicht gab. " 
Frederick's army was in no way up to the campaigns of Napoleon's. It was made up of 
professional soldiers, impressed men, and prisoners of war. The army of Frederick was 
exactly that -a dynastic force, not a national force as under Napoleon. Soldiers, held 
only in line by "iron discipline, " deserted when ever possible, making fighting war as 
under Napoleon - living off the land, fighting in broken terrain, pursuing a beaten foe - 
impossible. In short, according to Delbriick's analysis, Frederick's Prussia did not have 
the ability to annihilate its enemies. 
The most systematic exposition of Ermattungsstrategie came in DelbAick's "Die 
Strategie des Perikles erldutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des GroBen, " first published 
serially in PreuBische jahrbUcher in 1889. " DelbrUck held that under certain 
circumstances, most notably in the days of Frederick, it was not possible to wage 
Vernichtungsstrategie. When these circumstances prevailed, DelbrUck hoped to show 
that means other than great battles must be used to win a war. Operations other than 
"battle, " he termed "maneuver. " These included occupying an enemy's territory, 
destruction of an enemy's commerce and trade (especially through blockade when 
possible), and destruction of key industries and crops. In between the two "poles" of pure 
maneuver and decisive battle, DelbrUck placed "small battles" (Kleingefechte) and 
"sieges of fortresses. "" He believed that, depending upon circumstances prevailing at the 
time, commanders moved between the two poles of battle and maneuver. "' When a 
Feldherr possessed insufficient forces to pursue a Vernichtungsstrategie, 
... so kommt es 
darauf an, wer zuerst erinattet, also nicht nur die Kräfte des 
Feindes zu schädigen, sondern ebenso sehr die eigenen zu schonen; 'den letzten 
Thaler in der Tasche zu behalten. ` 
Thus, a Feldherr following Ermattungsstrategie followed a variety of methods by 
which he compelled the enemy to do his will. "Battle" was only one, usually shunned, 
31 DelbrUck, "Duplik, " p. 308. 
32 See footnote 25. "Perikles" was later published as a pamphlet. Die Strategie des Perikles erhiptert durch 
die Strateizie Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin: Walter & Apoland, 1890). 
33 Delbrack, "Perildes, " pp. 267-268. 
34 Ibid., p. 270. Hence, Delbrack's alternative name for Ermattungsstrategie, "Die zweipolige Strategie. " 
35 Ibid. 
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element. Occupation of enemy territory, destruction of enemy trade, and the wearing 
down of enemy forces through small battles took the place of great battles. In short, 
military means served as only one weapon in Ermattungsstrategie. DelbrUck continued to 
stress that a Feldherr was compelled by the conditions of his age to fight one strategy or 
the other. To DelbrUck, Frederick was a great captain because he realized the limitations 
imposed upon him by his age and fought intelligently within those limitations. " 
The publication of "Perikles" marked the beginning of a new period in the 
Strategiestreit. " In "Perikles, " DelbrUck elaborated for the first time fully his new 
interpretation of Clausewitz and his ideas about Ermattungsstrategie. In "Perikles, " he 
linked Ermattungsstrategie to not only Frederick the Great, but to other historical figures 
as well. DelbrUck tried to establish that Ermattungsstrategie was not limited to warfare 
of the 18'h century but operated at other times as well - in short, that it was a strategic 
principle which could not simply be ignored by modem soldiers. "Perikles" drew even 
greater response from the military, and the Streit expanded off the pages of specialist 
journals onto the pages of national newspapers. DelbrUck's ideas were attacked by 
military writers in the National-Zeitung, the Norddeutsche Alljzemeine Zeitung, the 
VoBische Zeitung, the Dresdener Tagebl , and the StraBburger Post, to name some of 
the more prominent papers. " Contrary to the wishes of the soldiers, the expansion of the 
debate onto the pages of the national press brought DelbrUck's ideas to a much wider 
audience than previously and merely prolonged the debate. " 
Nowhere in the writings of the Strategiestreit did DelbrUck explicitly criticize the 
military's views on contemporary war. The debate always stuck rigidly to historical 
topics. However, DelbrUck's analysis of Frederick's strategy and his new interpretation 
of Clausewitz threatened the military in two ways. First, by challenging the veracity of 
36 Idem, "Die methodische Kriegfiffirung Friedrichs des Grossen, " PJ 54 (1884) p. 196. 
37 Lange also recognizes this date as the beginning of a new phase of the Streit. However, he believes it is a 
separate phase because of the growing support for Delbrack's ideas. Lange, op. cit., pp. 98-113. 
38 Clippings from these newspapers are contained in the Delbrack Nachlass, Folder 93/1, Staatsbibliothek 
zu Berlin. 
39 The debate was even picked up by foreign armies. See the Austro-Hungarian Reichswehr 14 February 
1892; and Spenser Wilkinson's "Recent German Military Literature, " United Services Magazine NS Vol. 
V (1892) p. 668. It is clear from reading Wilkinson's survey, however, that he had not actually read 
DelbrUck's works, only those of his opponents. 
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the army's historical interpretation, DelbrUck called into question, albeit indirectly, the 
army's view of warfare. History played a crucial role in the Wilhelmine army, especially 
as officers with combat experience retired. Moltke the Elder himself put forward the 
view that "... long-range strategy could be developed with common sense and knowledge 
of military history. "" Accordingly, in 1890, military history stood second only to tactics 
in number of hours per week (4) in the curriculum of the Kriegsakademie, and the 
continuity between the wars of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke was 
emphasised. " At the Kriegsakademie, and within the army in general, students applied 
historical examples to modem situations, a process called the applicatory method. 
Officers focused not on seeking historical truth but rather on examples which illustrated 
their current ideas. A prominent General Staff officer, Maximillian Yorck Graf von 
Wartenburg, wrote, "we study military history not to recapture historical events, nor to 
use the opportunity to repeat past occurrences ... 
but to choose what is valuable to us and 
to say how it went and why. "' DelbrUck's questioning of a central figure of the army's 
interpretation of military history thus challenged their view of modem war. Friedrich von 
Bernhardi admitted as much in 1892, saying that Delbriick's writings represented a 
"... judgement on modem strategy through historical research and public opinion. "" 
Delbriick, however, not only called into question the army's analysis of history 
but also the army's understanding of Clausewitz. This represented a more direct attack on 
their current approach towards war. After the Wars of Unification, Moltke had thrust 
Clausewitz into the center of German military thought, by declaring Vorn Kriege one of 
the greatest influences on his life. " Indeed, Moltke's direction of the campaigns in 1866 
and 1870/71 owed much to his interpretation of Clausewitz' analysis of Napoleon's 
40 Steven E. Clemente, For King and Kaiser! The Making of the Prussian AM Officer, 1860-1914 (New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1992) p. 18 1. 
41 Ibid., pp. 179-180. 
42 Maximillian Yorck Graf von Wartenburg, Ngpoleon als Feldherr Vol. I (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1885) p. 1. 
Yorck, who served as military history instructor at the Kriegsakademie from 1897-1898, was tipped as a 
possible successor to Schlieffen but was killed during the Boxer Rebellion. Bernhard Schwertfeger, Die 
zrossen Erzieher des deustchen Heeres: Aus der Geschichte der Kriegsakademie (Potsdam: Akademische 
Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1936) p. 13 8; Bucholz, Prussian War Plannin , p. 188. 43 Friedrich von Bernhardi, "Mittheilung zum Streit Uber die strategische Theorie und Praxis Friedrichs des 
Grossen, " Beilage Allizerneine Zeitung Nr. 65 (1892) p. 6, quoted in Lange, op. cit., p. 101. Bernhardi 
was later an instructor in military history at the Kriegsakademie and Chef der Kriegsgeschichtfichen 
Abtedung of the General Staff. Walter K. Nehring, "General der Kavallerie Friedrich von Bernhardi - 
Soldat und Militarwissenschaftler, " in Bradley and Marwedel, eds. Militargeschichte, Militarwissenschaft 
und Konfliktforschung: Eine Festschrift far Werner Hahlweg (Osnabrack: Biblio Verlag, 1977) pp. 295- 
308. 
44 Eberhard Kessel,. Moltke (Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler, 1957) p. 108. 
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methods. After 1871, Moltke's reading of Clausewitz became the predominant view 
within the army, and Vom Kriege was increasingly used by soldiers to support their own 
ideas about modem warfare. " By attacking the prevailing view of Clausewitz, DelbrUck 
attacked the main theoretical underpinning of German strategic thought. 
However, the reaction of military intellectuals to DelbrUck's ideas was far from 
the uniform front portrayed by most accounts. ' As Delbriick's critique of the military 
took place on two levels, so did the military response. One school, by far the largest, 
attacked both Delbriick's historical and theoretical critiques. After the publication of 
"Perikles, " this school was spearheaded by Friedrich von Bernhardi. "' In 1892, Bernhardi 
published DelbAick, Friedrich der Grosse und Clausewitz in which he rejected both 
Delbrdck's historical interpretation and his views on Clausewitz. "' In his memoirs, 
Bernhardi wrote that he attacked Delbrtick because "at the time there lay the danger that 
unquestioning people [urtedslose Menschen] might be dazzled by the originality of 
[Delbr(ick's] opinions. "9 
Another school within the army accepted, to a certain degree, Delbriick's 
historical analysis, but had difficulties with his strategic interpretations. Rudolph von 
Caemmerer was one example of this group. " Caemmerer represented a school within the 
German army (headed by Sigismund von Schlichting) which accepted the periodization 
of military history. To them, the German Wars of Unification represented a new strategic 
era, dominated by the ideas of Moltke rather than Napoleon. " In their view, 
improvements in technology and the increased size of armies between the Napoleonic 
45 See Antulio J. Echevarria 11, "Borrowing from the Master: Uses of Clausewitz in German Military 
Literature before the Great War, " War in History 3/3 (1996) pp. 274-292. 
46 Arden Bucholz' DelbrUck and Gordon Craig's "Delbrfick: The Military Historian, " in Peter Paret, ed. 
Makers of Modem Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1986) pp. 326-353, tend to portray Delbrilck's military opponents as a uniform bloc. The most recent and 
thorough account of the Strategiestreit, Sven Lange's DelbrUck is somewhat more nuanced but still falls 
into the same pattern. 
47 At the time, Bernhardi was in charge of the General Staff's history of Frederick's 1742 campaigns; 
published as Grosser Generalstab, Die Krieg Friedrichs des Grossen: Der Erste Schlesische Kxieg, 1740- 
1742 (2 vols. ) (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1892-1893). Other members of this school include Alfred von 
Boguslawski and Wilhelm Scherff. 
48 Friedrich von Bernhardi, Delbrack, Friedrich der Grosse und Clausewitz. Streiflichter auf die Lehren des 
Professor Dr. Delbrflck i1ber Strategie (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1892). 
49 Idem, Denkwilrdigkeiten aus meinem Leben, (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1927) p. 143. 
50 Another member of this school was Fritz Hoenig. See his "Die ein- und zweipolige Strategie, " Deutsche 
Heeres-Zeitun 70. Jg Nr. 18 and 19 (1892). Cf. Lange, op. cit., p. 106. 
51 Sigismund von Schlichting's Taktische und strategische Grundsätze der Gegenw (3 vols) (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1898-1899) and Rudolph von Caemmerer's Die Entwicklung der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19. 
Jahrhundert (Berlin: Wilhehn Baensch, 1904) are the prime works of this school. Indeed, Deffirtick himself 
largely accepted Schlichting's views on modem strategy. See below. 
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Wars and the Wars of Unification changed the strategic conditions so much that one 
could not speak of Napoleon and Moltke following the same strategy. This view was 
heavily attacked by many other military writers. " Delbriick's periodization of military 
history offered reinforcement to their own interpretation. While Caernmerer could accept 
Delbrfick's analysis of history, he rejected DelbAick's interpretation of Clausewitz, 
believing that Delbrflck had read too much into Clausewitz' "Nachrichten. " Caernmerer 
believed that Clausewitz wrote Vorn Kriege as a practical tool for contemporary and 
future soldiers and statesmen. Delbriick, on the other hand, believed that Clausewitz 
intended his book to be a dialectic work which explained the nature of war throughout 
the ages. " 
This second school had two other important members, Max Jahns and Reinhold 
Koser. In 1891, Jahns, a former instructor at the Kriegsakademie, published the third 
volume of his Geschichte der Kriegswissenschaft. " In this work, Jdhns virtually agreed 
with DelbrUck's historical interpretation of Frederick. He wrote that Frederick, although 
he had attempted to follow Vernichtungsstrategie in his early campaigns, had been forced 
by the circumstances of his age to abandon such an approach to war. " Another member 
of the Kriegsakademie staff, Reinhold Koser, began in 1904 to publish a number of 
works on Frederick which also came close to accepting DelbrUck's historical 
interpretations. " Both authors, however, steadfastly rejected that their interpretations of 
Frederick were identical to Delbrilck's, in large part because they rejected Delbrack's 
strategic interpretation. 57 
52 See Antulio J. Echevarria, Neo-Clausewitzianism: Frey! gg-Loringhoven and the Militarization of 
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Lange, op. cit., p. 98. 
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56 Reinhold Koser, Die Geschichte Friedrichs des Grossen (4 vols) (Berlin: Cotta, 1914); Idem, "Die 
preussische Kriegsffihrung im Siebenjahrigen Kriege, " Historische Zeitschrift 92 (1904) pp. 239-273. 
57 Max Jgms, "Ueber den Wandel der strategischen Anschauungen Friedrichs des Grossen, " Allgerneine 
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In the end, the writing of Caemmerer, Jdhns, and Koser proved that DelbrUck's 
interpretation of Frederick had achieved a degree of grudging acceptance from many 
military intellectuals. " DelbrUck's interpretation of Clausewitz and his 
Ermattungsstratgie, however, continued to be rejected by military writers. While some 
officers, most notably Jdhns and Koser, came close to confirming DelbrUck's beliefs 
about Frederick, they refused to become closely associated with them because of 
Delbrdck's strategic ideas. Others, such as Caemmerer and Hoenig, accepted in principle 
DelbrUck's periodization of military history but also continued to rejected his strategic 
interpretation. In the end, the debate was brought to a close by World War 1. DelbrUck's 
ideas remained disputed but had begun to achieve a degree of acceptance from a sceptical 
military. 
Delbrzýck's Vision of Future War 
Early in DelbrUck's career, he had drawn the distinction between the functions of 
a "military historian" and those of a "military commentator. " DelbrUck argued that a 
"military historian" had the task of merely presenting the facts of an event in the past and 
in putting these events into a historical context. On the other hand, he believed that a 
"military commentator" had the obligation, when discussing historical events, not merely 
to tell what had happened, but also to tell what should have been done - in other words, 
to draw lessons from history applicable to the present day. " DelbrUck placed himself in 
the former category, and most studies of his thought have accepted his statement and 
have focused on his work as a historian. " 
Delbruck, though, lived in a period of great international tension, as Europe went 
through a series of diplomatic crises and an arms race before World War I. As editor of 
PreuBische Jahrbticher he had the opportunity to comment on current affairs and on 
current military matters. Throughout the 1890s and the early 1900s, he published analysis 
58 Lange, op. cit., p. 98- 
'9 DelbrUck outlined these categories in a review essay entitled "Clausewitz" in ZbGL 15. Jg. (March-April 
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Hintze: Achievements and Failures of Military History, " Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 3 Nr. 3 (Dec. 
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Press, 1997). 
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on wars around the world and on the growing tension within Europe. These 
commentaries, as well as his reviews of works of military theory, placed DelbrUck into 
the middle of the various debates on contemporary strategy which were engaging the 
German military in the years before World War I. Further, these commentaries show that 
DelbAick believed his concept of Ermattungsstrategie was very applicable to 
contemporary affairs and demonstrate that despite declaring himself a military historian, 
DelbrUck also engaged in work as a military commentator. " 
DelbrUck saw quite early that the division of Europe into two opposing camps 
would make a future war extremely dangerous for Germany. In September 1897, he 
published a column in the "Politisische Correspondenz" section of the PreuBische 
Jahrbdcher on this issue, in which he wrote of the strategic implications of the growing 
Anglo-German antagonism. To DelbrUck, the recent war between Turkey and Greece had 
confirmed once again the strength of the two power blocs on the Continent. He wrote: 
"The two blocs, the Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance, appear to be as far from each 
other as a decade ago. "" However, DelbrUck felt that the international situation was 
made all the more perilous by the growing Anglo-German antagonism over trade, which 
had just been exacerbated by Kaiser Wilhelm's ill-considered telegram to President 
Kruger of the Transvaal Republic. This antagonism made the prospect of a future war for 
Germany even more dangerous in Delbriick's opinion. While Germany had hoped Great 
Britain would fear a Russo-French victory more than a German victory, the situation was 
clearly changing. Growing German industrial and trade strength made Great Britain feel 
threatened. Wilhelm's telegram made the situation even worse and made the prospect of 
Great Britain entering into an alliance with the French and Russians in case of a general 
European war even more likely. In this essay, DelbrUck wrote that if this came to pass the 
next war could very well be a long, drawn-out affair ("... only the unthinking conclude 
that the next war will be short merely because the last were... "). Having the British, with 
their great financial strength and their seapower, for an enemy would therefore be 
disastrous for Germany. " 
61 Both Paret in his "Hans Delbrack on Military Affairs" and Felix Gilbert in his "From Clausewitz; to 
Delbrilck and Hintze" recognize Delbrilck's role as a "military commentator. " However, neither have 
examined his analysis of contemporary events. 
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In the wake of the Bosnian annexation crisis in 1908, DelbrUck returned to this 
danger of a war stemming from the continuing Anglo-German tension. He declared the 
position of Great Britain to be crucial in deciding whether or not war was imminent in 
the wake of the crisis. DelbrUck wrote, "England stands today as a special opponent and 
rival of the German Empire. " This condition had come about because the English 
people were "filled with fear and antipathy against Germany, and fear is perhaps the 
greatest cause of war throughout world history. "" He was pessimistic about German 
chances if faced with war between Germany and Austria on one side and France, Russia, 
Italy, and Great Britain on the other. DelbrUck again stressed that Germany could not 
count on winning a war quickly, feeling it would be impossible to defeat France before 
Russian troops posed a significant threat to Germany. While DelbrUck felt that Germany 
and Austria might be able to hold their own in the field against their Continental 
enemies, he feared with Britain in the war, the conflict would develop into another Seven 
Years' War, which would lay ruin to much of Europe. " 
In the years leading up to World War 1, Delbriick continued to give similar 
warnings about the course of a future general European war. For example, in December 
1913 he wrote: 
Frankreich ist so gut gerüstet, daß auch bei einem isolierten Waffengang 
zwischen uns der Erfolg uns sehr hart bestritten werden würde. Wir würden den 
westlichen Nachbarn gewiß schließlich niederringen, aber nur nach einem 
langen, sehr hartnäckigen Widerstand. Gehen wir in einen französischen Krieg, 
so haben wir es unzweifelhaft auch mit Rußland und wahrscheinlich auch mit 
England zu tun. " 
While Delbrtick did not shrink from the prospect of war, he obviously considered 
it to be a more difficult undertaking than many of his contemporaries. In general, he 
supported German armaments programs as a means of keeping the peace, but cautioned 
against going to war lightly. " In his December 1913 essay, DelbrUck wrote that Germany 
64 Hans DelbrUck, "Danger of War, " in Delbrack's Modem MilitM Histoly p. 91. (Originally published as 
"Kriegsgefahr, " PJ 135 (Jan-Mar 1909) pp. 163-182). 
65 Ibid., p. 94. 
66 Ibid., p. 97. 
67 Hans DelbrUck, "Die Alldeutschen, " PJ 154 (Oct-Dec 1913) p. 574; Paul Rohrbach, "DelbrUck als 
Prophet, " in Daniels and Rilhlmann, op. cit., p. 57. Emphasis added. 
68 For example, Hans Delbilck, "Die Armee-Reform; " "Die Armee-Vorlage; " and "HeeresstArken, " in 
"Politische Correspondenz, " PJ 70 (Jul-Dec 1892). 
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should only contemplate war when there remained no other way to protect her national 
honor. " 
In addition to commenting on the prospective course of a future war while 
examining the growing tensions in Europe, DelbrUck wrote extensively on the course of 
various conflicts around the world. From these wars, like his contemporaries in the army, 
he drew conclusions about the possible course of a future European war. The first 
conflict to come under DelbrUck's inspection was the Second Anglo-Boer War. In 
January 1900, DelbrUck wrote, "the Boer War is not only politically an important event, 
but it also appears that it must also have a great effect on Europe's armies... "" In this 
essay, he went on to examine General Buller's actions at the battle of Colenso and to 
discuss what he saw as the failings in British strategy and training, as well as the danger 
from taking false lessons from the war. 
Despite the success of the Boers in defensive battles, DelbrUck believed that one 
should not conclude that the defensive had become the decisive form of warfare. Fighting 
in South Africa had shown clearly just how modem weapons had made overcoming a 
defender more difficult. However, like many of his contemporaries, DelbAick maintained 
that defensive action alone could not decide a battle; offensive action was still necessary 
to bring a battle to its conclusion. He believed that the experiences from South Africa 
showed that, given the power of modem weapons in the defense, a combination of 
defensive and offensive action was needed to win battles in future wars. He wrote: 
Der grundsätzliche Werth der Offensive bleibt bestehen; wo es aber irgend 
angeht, ist auf die Defensiv-Offensive hinzuarbeiten, d. h. Uebergang zur 
Offensive in dem Augenblicke, wo die Vorteile der Defensive erschöpft sind. ` 
The task of the modem general was to know when that crucial moment had come. 
The Russo-Japanese War offered DelbrUck another opportunity to comment on 
contemporary warfare and strategy. After the war's initial encounters, DelbrUck wrote 
that the Russian commander, Alexei Kuropatkin, was obviously not up to date with 
modem warfare. DelbrUck felt Kuropatkin should fight a war based on the strategic ideas 
of Moltke, i. e., the Russians should launch a concerted attack against the Japanese on 
69 DelbrUck, "Die Alldeutschen, " p. 575. 
70 Idem, "Die Lehren des Transvaal-Krieges, " PJ 99 (Jan-Mar 1900) p. 366. 
71 Ibid., p. 372. 
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more than one front at a time. " Further, he argued that the Russians had not learned the 
importance of firepower and relied too greatly on the bayonet. ' As the war wore on, the 
lack of decisive battles surprised DelbrUck, and this caused him to raise the idea that 
perhaps the age of Ermattungsstrategie had returned. DelbrUck made the point that 
neither the Japanese nor the Russians seemed to have the ability to exploit any battlefield 
victory they might achieve. In his opinion, if this condition continued, the war would be 
decided, as in the time of Frederick, "by the side which has the 'last dollar in the wallet' 
[wer den letzten Taler in der Tasche behd1t], by the side which can maintain half a 
million soldiers in the field the longest. "" 
Even before the Russo-Japanese War, DelbrUck, in a lengthy review of Ivan 
Bloch's The Future of War, had raised the idea that a return to the days of 
Ermattungsstrategie might be imminent. In general, he rejected Bloch's thesis, believing 
it still possible to wage war in pursuit of national goals. DelbrUck did, however, raise the 
question of whether future wars would be decided by one or a few great battles. In doing 
so he wondered whether a return to the 18'h century, i. e., Ermattungsstrategie, was likely 
in the future. He wrote: 
Die Feldherren werden es sicherlich erst noch einmal darauf ankommen lassen, 
ob das natürliche Gesetz des Krieges, die gewaltsame Vernichtung der 
feindlichen Streitkraft heute nicht mehr gilt. Solche Fragen entscheidet entgiltig 
[sic] schwerlich die Theorie, sondern immer erst die Erfahrung. Aber nehmen wir 
einmal an, Bloch hätte wirklich recht, so wäre mit der Unmöglichkeit, oder besser 
gesagt, Zwecklosigkeit von großen Schlachten noch keineswegs dasselbe vom 
Kriege nachgewiesen. Wir wären erst zurückgedrückt auf den Standpunkt der 
Strategie des sechzehnten bis achtzehnten Jahrhunderts ... und man würde mit 
dem 
Kriege der kleinen Mittel, nur bei besonders günstiger Gelegenheit oder stärkster 
Spannung mit Niederwerfung, sonst aber mit der allmählichen Ermattung des 
Gegners durchzukommen suchen. " 
Contrary to DelbrUck's own statements that his views on Ermattungsstrategie 
should be considered purely of historical interest, his writings on contemporary aff4irs in 
72 Delbrack cited Caernmerer's Die Entwickluniz der strateRischen Wissenschaft as his source for the 
correct interpretation of Moltke's strategic ideas. "Der Krieg, " EJ 118 (Oct-Dec 1904) p. 557. 
73 Hans Delbrack, "Die Schlacht bei Mukden, " PJ 120 (Apr-Jun 1905) pp. 176-177. 
74 Idem, "Der Krieg, " ZJ 120 (Apr-Jun 1905) p. 560. Delbrack had used exactly this phrase - "wer den 
letzten Taler in der Tasche behdhlf' - in describing Frederick's strategy. See "Perikles, " p. 270. 
75 Hans DelbrUck, "Zukunftskrieg und Zukunftsfriede, " PJ 96 (1899) p. 215. Emphasis added. 
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the "Politische Correspondenz" column of the PreuBische Jahrbiicher show Delbrtick 
applying his ideas about strategy to current aMirs. DelbrUck increasingly feared the 
consequences of a general European war. As Europe went through a series of diplomatic 
crises in the years before 1914, he concluded that the next war would not be won as 
quickly as the Wars of Unification; the forces arrayed made such a result impossible. 
Instead, he came to believe the next war would be long and indecisive - much like 
Frederick the Great's Seven Years' War. 
DelbrUck's commentary on international afffiirs was complemented by his 
analysis of the various wars which took place before World War I. Delbrack paid 
particularly close attention to how modem weapons and the size of modem annies 
changed the nature of war. While examining the Second Anglo-Boer War, DelbrUck was 
inclined to discount the revolutionary effect of modem weapons. The Russo-Japanese 
War, however, showed quite clearly how warfare had changed from the 1870s. In 
Manchuria, despite winning great battles (at Mukden, the Japanese inflicted about 
100,000 casualties upon the Russians, or one-third of the Russian forces involved), the 
Japanese were unable to bring about the complete defeat of the Russians. This caused 
DelbrUck to question seriously whether or not in the immediate future Great Powers 
could be defeated decisively on the battlefleld. Events on battlefields around the world 
reinforced Delbrack's belief that wars of the future might be wars of exhaustion, where 
the power, or power bloc, with greater resources would be able to stay the course longest 
and, hence, be winner by default. 
Conclusion 
Although Hans Delbrfick claimed to be merely a military historian and not a 
military commentator, his long-running debate with the intellectuals of the Wilhelmine 
army and his analysis of contemporary affairs in the PreuBische jahrbUcher proved this 
assertion to be false. His unique interpretation of the wars of Frederick the Great led him 
to define a strategic system that was at odds with the view prevalent in the army at the 
time. DelbrUck attempted in his writings to show that the strategy chosen by a Feldherr 
was dictated by the conditions of his age rather than his military genius. Thus, Frederick 
followed a strategy that was designed not to overthrow his opponents in great battles, like 
Napoleon and Moltke would do in the 19al century, but to wear down his enemy's ability 
and will to continue the war through a series of actions. To Frederick, the occupation of 
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an enemy province would be at times of far greater value than a victorious battle. 
DelbAick called this strategy, Ermattungsstrategie, a name, with its connotations of 
weakness, that was guaranteed to put off the military. 
DelbrUck went much further than challenging the military's interpretation of 
Frederick the Great. He also questioned their reading of Clausewitz, whose Vom Kriege 
served as the intellectual basis for their view of Vernichtungsstrategie since it was 
brought to prominence by Moltke the Elder. DelbrUck claimed to have derived his 
concept of Ermattungsstrategie from Clausewitz' writings. If his strident criticisms of 
the army's view of Frederick was not enough to set military writers against him, his view 
of Clausewitz offered a direct challenge to the military's competence that could not be 
ignored. 
DelbrUck also turned his penetrating eye to contemporary afffiirs in his column in 
the PreuBische JahrbUcher. Reading these columns shows several important things. First, 
DelbrUck's analysis of the alliance system in Europe led him to believe that a general 
European war could not be won quickly. By the early years of the 20"' century, he 
recognized that the size of armies involved would prohibit a rapid, decisive victory. 
Further, with Great Britain allied with Germany's enemies, Germany would face the 
difficulties of naval blockade as well as an indecisive land conflict. With this being the 
case, DelbrUck feared the consequence of any war. These conclusions were reinforced by 
his analysis of contemporary conflicts. The course of the Anglo-Boer War and of the 
Russo-Japanese War provided further worrying evidence about the course of future 
conflicts. Although he was always careful in how he phrased it, Delbrilck believed that a 
future war would in all likelihood require Germany to follow a strategy of attrition much 
like Frederick had been forced to do in the Seven Years' War. 
The effects of Delbrilck's 35-year Strategiestreit with the intellectuals of the 
Wilhelmine army are of course difficult to measure. The debate certainly achieved 
prominence in pre-World War I Germany and beyond. By the early 1890s, it had spilled 
from specialized j oumals to the pages of national newspapers and it had involved most of 
Germany's important military intellectuals. Additionally, it is clear from the files of 
Delbrilck's correspondence that he carried on his debates in private as well as in public 
with a good number of German officers. " Further, the Streit coincided with the growing 
76 The Delbrilck Nachlass at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin contains letters from Paul Bronsart von 
Schellendorf, Rudolph von Caernmerer, Colmar von der Goltz, Fritz Hoenig, Max Ahns, Egon von Gayl, 
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doubts of some of Germany's strategic planners, most notably Moltke the Elder and 
Moltke the Younger. While it is clear that by the outbreak of World War I Delbrtick had 
brought a number of writers around to his side, especially regarding his historical 
analysis, many opponents still existed. Even with doubts, however, the German military 
on the whole was not ready to jettison its reliance on great battles to destroy their 
opponents, and could not ultimately see beyond this aspect of DelbrUck's 
Ermattungsstrategie. 
There were a number of important consequences of this debate. First, it forced the 
German army as a whole to re-examine its assumptions about warfare. Even if they 
rejected most of Deffirtick's analysis, they were nevertheless exposed to an opposing 
point of view. That Deffirtick was allowed to voice his opinions in army j ournals shows 
that at least some soldiers believed the debate was a worthwhile exercise. "' Further, this 
debate prepared the groundwork for an intellectual shift that had to take place after the 
failure of Germany's short-war strategy in 1914. Many of Delbriick's concepts, combined 
with the ideas of Moltke the Elder and Goltz, would resurface in the strategy of Erich von 
Falkenhayn during his tenure as Chief of the General Staff. 
Sigismund von Schlichting, and Alfred von Schlieffen to name a few of the more prominent. See Horst 
Wolf, Der Nachlass Hans Delbrack (Berlin: Deutsche Staatsbibliothek, 1980). 
77 In 1887, "Premierlieutenant aD. " Hans DelbrUck published an essay on Frederick the Great in an 
supplement to the General Staffs official journal. "Ueber den Feldzugsplan Friedrichs des Grossen im 
Jahre 1757, " Beiheft zurn Milittir-Wochenblatt 1887. 
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Chapter Three: 
Schlieffen, Moltke the Younger, and 
the Short War Belief 
Over 80 years since his death, Generaýfeldmarschall Alfred Graf von 
Schlieffen remains one of Imperial Germany's most intriguing figures. Schlieffen's 15 
years as Chief of the Great General Staff left his stamp not just on the Kaiserheer but 
also on the Reichswehr and the Wehrmacht. Despite never having written a 
comprehensive work of theory (his ideas are scattered throughout his official 
documents and in a few short articles published after his retirement), he has inspired 
countless books and articles in support of his ideas and many which argue that his 
theories brought ruin to Germany and much of Europe. Certainly, few personalities in 
Wilhelmine Germany have provoked as much ink, and as much acrimony, as Alfred 
von Schlieffen. 
Following World War 1, the memory of Alfred von Schlieffen and his strategic 
ideas was elevated to almost mythic heights. (Culminating, perhaps, with the foundation 
of a Schlieffenverein in 192 1. ') Many of the officers who had served under Schlieffen felt 
that had the Gennan army followed his teachings during the war, defeat would not have 
occurred. The books written by these men in the Interwar period aimed at propagating 
their interpretation of Schlieffen's ideas, with the design of preventing another 
occurrence of Stellungskrieg. That many of these officers had risen to great prominence 
1 See Theo Schwarzintiller, Zwischen Kaiser und 'Führer': Generalfeldinarschall August von Mackensen 
(Paderbom: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1995) p. 208f 
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during World War I lent credence to their assertions. ' After the war, Schlieffen was 
venerated as "one of the greatest soldiers who had ever lived. "' 
In reaction to these hagiographical studies, accepted opinion of Schlieffen and his 
ideas has swung in the opposite direction. In 1956 Gerhard Ritter published his study of 
the Schlieffen plan, which he subtitled "Critique of a Myth. "' Jehuda Wallach followed 
with his even more biting critique in 196V Both men saw Schlieffen as dogmatic and 
blind to the strategic realities of his day. They place upon him, as the author of the 
famous "Schlieffen Plan, " the blame for Germany's adherence to the short-war belief. It 
is these critical interpretations of Ritter and Wallach which today represent the 
"accepted" view of Schlieffen. ' 
Yet despite the volumes written about him (or perhaps because of), Schlieffen 
and his strategic ideas remain in many ways paradoxical. For instance, Schlieffen and his 
followers adamantly denied that he sought to establish a school of his own within 
military theory. As late as the 1960s, German historians found it necessary to establish 
7 
that a distinct Schlieffen school of thought existed. However, his ideas clearly 
2 For examples of this work, see Wilhelm Groener, Das Testament des Grafen Schlieffen (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1930); Idem, Feldherr wider Willen: Operative Studien t1ber den Weltkrie (Berlin: ES Mittler, 
193 1); Wolfgang Foerster, Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1925); Idem, Aus der 
Gedankenwerkstatt des Deutschen Generalstabes (Berlin: ES Mittler, 193 1); Eugen Ritter von Zoellner, 
'Schlieffens Venntichtnis, ' Sonderheft, Jg. 193 8; and Hans von Seeckt, Gedanken eines Soldaten 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 1929). 
3 Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerunizen 1914-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1919) p. 18. 
4 Gerhard Ritter, Der SchlieffenRlan: Kritik eines Mythos (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1956). Published in 
English as The Schlieffen Plan: Critigue of a Myth (London: Oswald Wolff, 1958). 
5 Jehuda L. Wallach, Das Dogma der Vemichtunpsschlacht: Die Lehren von Clausewitz und Schlieffen und 
ihre Wirkungen in zwei Weltkriegen (Frankfiirt: Bernard und Graefe, 1967). Published in English as The 
Dogina of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the 
German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). 
6 For similar views see, Jay Luvaas, "European Military Thought and Doctrine, 1870-1914, " in Michael 
Howard, ed. The Theory and Practice of War (London: Cassell, 1965) pp. 71-77; L. L. Farrar, Jr., "The 
Short War Illusion: The Syndrome of German Strategy, August - December, 1914, " MGM 2/72 pp. 39-52; 
Martin Kitchen, "The Traditions of German Strategic Thought, " International History Review 1/ 2 (April 
1979) pp. 163-190; Stephan van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World 
War, " International Security Vol. 9 Nr. I (1984) pp. 58-107; Gunther Rothenberg, "Moltke, Schlieffen, and 
the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment, " in Peter Paret, ed. The Makers of Modem Strategy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986) pp. 296-325; Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germpy an 
Austria-Hungga. 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997) pp. 46-52. 
7 See Emanuel von Kiliani, "Die Operationslehre des Grafen von Schlieffen und ihre deutschen Gegner, " 
Wehrkunde H. 2 and H. 3 Jg. X (1961), pp. 71-76,133-138. 
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influenced a generation of general staff officers greatly. Through his staff rides and 
tactical problems, he tried to inculcate the officers of the General Staff with a type of 
"system, " which promised, if it was followed, victory. Additionally, his infamous plan 
called for the Feldherr to exercise firm control over the Feldheer, and even prescribed 
phase lines the advancing army was to reach. Yet in his staff rides and autumn 
maneuvers, Schlieffen consistently allowed junior officers the freedom of action to act as 
they saw fit. And last, the Schlieffen Plan called for immediate offensive at the war's 
outbreak. While in his last Kriegsspiel, Schlieffen displayed restraint and stood on the 
defensive until the enemies' plans became clear, rather than rushing headlong into the 
offensive. 
Perhaps most intriguing, however, was his continued adherence to the belief that 
Germany could fight and win a short war. This belief was reflected in the plan he 
bequeathed to his successor, Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. Why, despite the 
evidence of the second phase of the Franco-Prussian War and of the critiques offered by 
Hans DelbAick, did Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger not come up with a plan that 
reflected Germany's strategic realities more accurately? This chapter will attempt to 
provide some reasons for this. First, it shall examine the lessons drawn from the Wars of 
Unification by the German army and show the influence these had on Schlieffen's 
strategic thought. Last, it shall examine how these ideas combined with Schlieffen and 
Moltke the Younger's reading of the strategic situation to form their plans for war. 
Schlieffen's Operational Ideas 
Following the Franco Prussian War, great debates raged within the German army 
about the tactical and operational lessons to be drawn from the conflict! Although there 
were many variations, the results of these debates was a general consensus on how the 
8 Space prevents a discussion of these debates. For an introduction see Heinz-Ludger Borgert, "Grundzage 
der Landkriegfilhrtmg von Schlieffen bis Guderian, " in MilitArgeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed. 
Handbuch zur deutschen MilitArgeschichte 1648-1939 Vol. IX (Munich: Bernard & Graefe, 1979), pp. 427- 
480; "Taktik der Infantrie und die ThAtigkeit der verbundenen Waffen, 1874-98" in [Gerhard] von Pelet- 
Narbonne, ed. Von Lobell's Jahresberichte Uber die Veranderungen und Fortschritte im Militarwesen Jg. 
XXV (1898), pp. 549-592; and Antulio J. Echevarria II, "A Crisis in Warfighting: German Tactical 
Discussions in the Late Nineteenth Century, " MGM 55 (1996) pp. 51-68. See also Bruce Gudmundsson 
and John English, On Infant! y (Revised Edition) (London: Praeger, 1994) pp. 1- 13, for the tactical debate 
in a wider historical context. 
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German army was to fight, a "doctrine" of sorts. This operational doctrine was based 
upon what most observers saw as Germany's traditional approach to war as demonstrated 
by Moltke the Elder in the Wars of Unification. It consisted of defeating an enemy in 
rapid, mobile campaigns - Bewegungskrieg. 
Although Schlieffen was not a participant in the tactical and operational dialogue 
that followed the Franco-Prussian War, he nonetheless was influenced by it. Like his 
contemporaries, Schlieffen had to come to grips with the great changes in war (expansion 
of armies and theaters of war, lethality of modem weapons, changes in command and 
control, etc. ) demonstrated in the years after 1871. Like all responsible officers, 
Schlieffen wrestled with exactly how these changes would effect future conflicts. A close 
reading of his writings indicates that his operational thought was based firmly in the 
ideas current in the German army after the Wars of Unification, and that Schlieffen even 
based his ideas on those of his contemporaries. ' 
As with most of his contemporaries, probably the idea central to Schlieffen's 
thinking was the desirability of an annihilating, decisive battle, as Wallach so forcefully 
points out. " Everything else was focused on achieving this goal. That Schlieffen and 
many of his contemporaries chose to follow the model of decisive battle from the Franco- 
Prussian War should not be too surprising. From the military standpoint, K6niggrdtz and 
Sedan were certainly crucial, if not decisive, in ending both wars. During his tenure as 
Chief of the General Staff, he constantly taught the importance of the decisive battle in 
ending a war quickly, what he regarded as Moltke's legacy to the German army. 
Schlieffen was certainly not alone in this belief. As Chapter 2 has shown, this concept of 
Vernichtungsstrategie was shared by most of his contemporaries. 
To Schlieffen, Germany's next war would have to be solved on the battlefield. He 
believed that Germany would have to fight a short war as the costs of a long war to the 
9 Schlieffen never set down his thoughts about warfare in a single source. His ideas can be gleaned from his 
Kriegsspiele and his critiques of maneuvers published by the General Staff in the Interwar period. Out of a 
planned three volumes, two were published. Alfred von Schlieffen, Dienstschriften Vol. l: Die taktisch- 
strategischen AufgLben (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1937) and Dienstschriften Vol. II: Generalstabsreisen - Ost 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 1938). His post-retirement writings offer another source of Schlieffen's ideas. These 
were collected and published in a single volume after his death. Alfred von Schlieffen, Cannae (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1925). 
10 Wallach, op. cit., pp. 41 ff. 
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economy and society would be too great for the nation to bear. " He believed that a long 
war such as the Russo-Japanese War would be impossible in western Europe: 
Solche Kriege sind aber zu einer Zeit unmöglich, wo die Existenz der Nation auf 
einen ununterbrochenen Fortgang des Handels und der Industrie begründet ist, 
und durch eine rasche Entscheidung das zum Stillstand gebrachte Räderwerk 
wieder in Lauf gebracht werden muss. Eine Ermattungsstrategie lässt sich nicht 
treiben, wenn der Unterhalt von Millionen den Aufwand von Millarden 
erfordert. 12 
Not only was the idea of the decisive battle elevated, but Schlieffen had definite 
ideas as to how this battle was to take place. Towards the beginning of his time as Chief 
of the General Staff, Schlieffen believed different forms of attacks, such as 
breakthroughs, could be used to defeat an enemy on the battlefield. " As his tenure 
progressed, however, Schlieffen increasingly stressed envelopment, i. e., surrounding 
one's enemy completely, as the only way of annihilating enemy's forces and thus 
achieving decisive victory. He preached this form of attack repeatedly to his 
subordinates, especially during his staff rides and maneuvers" (leading some disgruntled 
officers to claim an " Umfassungssucht" had taken over the German army). " Ultimately 
to Schlieffen any other form of attack offered only limited chance of success and would 
lead only to an "ordinary" victory. " Schlieffen applied this form of attack to all levels of 
action from the tactical to the strategic. 
At the tactical level, Schlieffen's emphasis on enveloping attacks had its roots, in 
part, in the increased lethality of weapons. The Franco-Prussian War and subsequent 
wars had shown that frontal attacks were terribly costly in casualties, and the German 
army had learned this lesson well. At the battle of St. Privat on 18 August 1870, the Is' 
Prussian Guard Division had attacked a dug-in French force frontally. They were able to 
advance to within 600 yards of the French positions before being stopped cold by the fire 
11 Schlieffen, Dienstschriften II, p. 17 1; Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, pp. 4647. 
12 Schlieffen, "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart, " Cannae p. 280. 
13 For example, see his concluding remarks to the 1894 and 1899 Generalstabsreisen. Schlieffen, 
Dienstschriften II, p. 50,164. See also Oberstleutnant BrUckner, "Der Durchbruchsangriff vor dern 
Weltkriege in Anwendung und Theorie, " MVIR Jg. 5 H. 5 (1938) pp. 586-601. 
14 Schlieffen, Dienstschriften II, pp. 40,167,302. 
'5 Sigfrid Mette, Vom Geist deutscher Feldherren: Genie und Technik 1800-1918 (Zurich: Scientia, 1938) 
p. 197; Wallach, op. cit., pp. 80-8 1; Kitchen, op. cit., p. 173. 
16 Wallach, op. cit., p. 45. 
60 
of the defenders. Repeated attempts to resume the advance were beaten back by French 
fire. The Prussian troops were stuck under the French guns for hours before the situation 
was rescued by the arrival of the Royal Saxon Corps. The Saxons attacked the French 
flank and routed them, suffering only minor casualties in the process. The Prussians, on 
the other hand, had taken horrible casualties, losing over 8,000 men in the first 20 
minutes of the assault. " The results of this battle were long remembered within the 
German army, and many of Schlieffen's contemporaries advocated flank attacks as 
means of keeping casualties to a minimum. " Schlieffen's advocacy of the envelopment 
was an improvement on this idea. A properly executed envelopment offered increased 
prospects of crushing an enemy force completely. " 
In order to achieve his short war, Schlieffen intended also to make the German 
army at once more flexible and more responsive to the guiding hand of its Feldherr. To 
this end, he drew heavily upon the ideas of Sigismund von Schlichting. 2' A prominent 
participant in the various tactical and operational debates after 1871, Schlichting had 
developed the concept of Begegnungsgefecht [encounter battle] as one way to overcome 
21 
the difficulties posed by the increased power of the defensive. 
Drawing on Moltke's conduct of the Wars of Unification, Schlichting envisioned 
future German armies advancing over many separate roads. These armies would be close 
17 For a description of the battle see Grosser Generalstab, Der deutsch-franz6sische Krieg 1870-71 Vol. I 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 1874) pp. 866-881; and Michael Howard The Franco-Prussian War (London: Rupert 
Hart-Davis, 196 1) pp 167-176. This engagement became probably the most written about battle before 
World War I, and prompted much consideration about firepower and tactics. For examples, see Grosser 
Generalstab, Studien zur Kriegsgeschichte und Taktik V: Der 18 August 1870 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1906) 
and Oberst von Schack, "Der Angriff der Garde auf St. Privat, " Beihefte zum MiliW-Wochenblatt H. 6-7 
(1901). 
18 For example, see Sigismund von Schlichting, "Ueber das Infanteriegefecht, " Beiheft zum Milittir- 
Wochenblatt H. 2 (1879), pp. 38-39; Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms (London: Hugh 
Rees, 1906) pp. 295ff, Ludwig Freiherr von Falkenhausen, Flankenbewegung und Massenheer (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1911). 
'9 Schlieffen, Dienstschriften II, p. 302,309. 
20 The two men are often seen as intellectual rivals (See Mette, op. cit., pp. 163-220, passim; and Daniel J. 
Hughes, "Schlichting, Schlieffen, and the Prussian Theory of War in 1914, " Journal of Military Histo 59 
(April 1995) pp. 257-278). The following shall demonstrate that, in fact, their views shared many 
similarities. 
21 For Schlichting's career see Egon Freiherr von Gayl, General von Schlichting und sein Lebenswerk 
(Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1913); and Kurt von Priesdorff, ed. Soldatisches FUhrerturn (Hamburg: Hanseatische 
Verlagsanstalt, 1936-1942) pp. 444-452. For an examination of his thought see Joachim Hoffmann, "Die 
Kriegslehre des Generals von Schlichting, " MGM 1/69 pp. 5-35; and Donald Cranz, Understanding 
Change: Sigismund von Schlichting and the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth: School of 
Advanced Military Studies Monograph, 1989). 
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enough for mutual support but far enough apart that the enemy could not surround them 
with his own widely spread forces. Schlichting believed that a combination of the 
telegraph and Auftragstaktik would enable a commander to concentrate his dispersed 
forces quickly. He felt that the Wars of Unification had shown that an army operating on 
the classical principle of "interior lines" believing that it could fall on its enemy's spread 
out forces would be defeated. Instead, Schlichting held that future operations should be 
conducted from "exterior lines. " Only by concentrating once an enemy had concentrated 
could victory be achieved. Armies on exterior lines had the room to maneuver their large 
forces. This allowed one's armies to exploit flanks and engage the enemy with mutually 
supporting, if geographically separate, attacks. " 
Schlichting believed also that modem weapons had changed the tactical 
environment greatly. As modem weapons had made movement in the face of the enemy 
difficult, " he felt that commanders should respond one of two ways depending on 
circumstances. No longer did armies simply march to a battle and have the time to 
assemble before an attack, as in the days of Napoleon. The range and accuracy of small 
arms and artillery had made this impossible. Schlichting declared, "a 2000 meter clear 
field of fire held frontally ... is the strongest position 
imaginable. "" As a way of reacting 
to the changes in weapons, Schlichting believed that a distinction should be made 
between two types of battles: a Begegnungsgefecht and a geplanter Angriff (planned or 
deliberate attack). " 
Before the Franco-Prussian War, surprise encounters with the enemy were 
avoided as much as possible. Contrariwise, the Begegnungsgefecht sought to exploit 
these surprise encounters. Schlichting realized that an enemy in a prepared position 
22 Sigismund von Schlichting, Taktische und strategische Grunsätze der Gegenw Vol. II: 
TMpenftffimp,. Erstes Buch: Die Operationen (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1898) pp. 15-25; and Rudolph von 
Caemmerer, Die Entwicklung, der strategischen Wissenschaft im 19. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Wilhelm 
Baensch, 1904) pp. 249-252. 
23 Schlichting, "infanteriegefecht, " p. 38. 
24 Schlichting, Grundsätze II, p. 55. 
25 This concept of "geplanter Angrio" was not widely accepted by the Wilhelmine army and was, in fact, 
heavily attacked by Schlichting's contemporaries. See Wilhelm Scheff, Der Schlachtanzriff im Lichte der 
Schlichting'schen 'Taktischen Grundsätze' und der Bopusawski'schen Tetrachtungen. ' Ein kritischer 
Vergleich (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1898); Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, 'Triedensarbeit und 
Kriegslehren, " Beiheft zum Militär-Wochenblatt (1899); Alfred von Boguslawski, Stragische Erörterunge 
beteffend die vom General von Schlichting vertretenen Grundsätze (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1901). 
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would be much harder to defeat and would be able to inflict heavy casualties on an 
attacking force. If, however, the enemy force could be engaged before it had the 
opportunity to prepare defensive positions or even before it had time to deploy from 
marching to combat order, it could be defeated easier. Schlichting felt that the army 
should be able to engage an enemy immediately upon discovering its whereabouts, 
shifting from march to attack fluidly. He wrote: 
Der Uebertritt von Marsch zu Gefecht hat im Angriffsverfahren überall da, wo 
nicht eine vorbereite Stellung der Bewegung entgegentritt, ohne Absatz zu 
erfolgen, weil der vorgängige Aufmarsch in grossen Verhältnissen allein eine 
Tagesleistung in Anspruch nimmt. " 
This concept relied heavily upon the system of Auftragstaktik. " Subordinate commanders 
would have to use their initiative and engage the enemy, without waiting for orders. 
Higher commanders would have to weld many disparate actions into a homogeneous 
battle. " It also necessitated doing away with, or at least altering, march formations to 
allow them to deploy rapidly to attack formations. This merged, or at the very least 
blurred, the distinction between what had hitherto been two distinct phases of German 
operations - the marching" and combat stages. 
Schlieffen also felt that the German army could no longer afford to make a 
distinction between marching order and tactical formation. However, he carried 
Schlichting's idea perhaps a step further. The General Staff Chief conceived of battle 
actually being initiated at deployment. As German units no longer distinguished between 
marching and battle order, the position of the units from deployment determined when 
and where they would enter combat. This being so, Schlieffen maintained that battle 
actually began at deployment, a concept he termed "Gesamtschlacht. "" This idea made 
the plan of attack all the more important. He wrote: 
Der Anmarsch zur Schlacht beginnt, sobald die Truppen die Eisenbahn verlassen 
haben. Von den Endbahnhöfen aus werden Korps und Divisionen, die einen den 
26 Schlichting, Grundsatze II, p. 94. 
27 For the development of Aufiragstaktik see Martin Samuels, "Directive Command and the German 
General Staff, " War in History 2 (1) (1995) pp. 2242. 
28 Schlichting, Grundsatze II, p. 94. 
29 The term "Operationen" was used to denote troop movements when not in contact with the enemy. From 
this comes the term "operational level" so important in World War II. Cranz, op. cit., pp. 17-21. 
30 See Herbert Rosinski, The German (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1944) p. 85; and Wallach, 
op. cit., p. 56. 
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Marsch beschleunigend, die anderen etwas verhaltend, den Platz zu erreichen 
suchen, der ihnen in Schlachtordnung angewiesen ist. Da die Gefechtsfronten sich 
verbreiten, so werden auch die dem Schlachtfeld zustrebenden Kolonnen 
mindestens in der nämlichen Breite marschieren können, die sie im Gefecht 
einnehmen sollen. Das Zusammenziehen zur Schlacht wird an Bedeutung 
verlieren. Diejenigen Korps, welche auf die Feind stossen, werden den Kampf, 
ohne auf weitere Unterstützung zu rechen, durchführen müssen? ' 
Schlieffen believed that a properly formulated plan ensured that the enemy would be 
forced into a bad tactical position right from deployment. 
Schlieffen also had strong ideas about how to control the execution of the plan 
better. He wrote that the place of the Feldherr in future war would be comfortably behind 
the lines, ensconced at a desk, where he would be surrounded by the elements of modem 
communication. The modem Feldherr would use the telegraph, telephone, and motorcar 
to receive information from his units in the field and to issue his orders to them. From 
this position, the "modem Alexander" could survey the entire battle on a constantly up- 
dated map. " 
Schlieffen's view of the importance of the plan and of the place of the Feldherr 
has often been criticized, by contemporaries and by more recent historians, as being far 
too mechanical and far too restrictive for subordinates, and thus out of step with Moltke's 
system of Auftragstaktik. Schlieffen's contemporary, Friedrich von Bernhardi, thought 
that his approach called for a "drill-like advance. " Bernhardi expected at anytime to hear: 
"Army Commanders: Would you, please, align your men and put out 'right markers'! "" 
Bernhardi was not the only contemporary of Schlieffen who was critical. Schlichting also 
felt that Schlieffen had overstepped the bounds of Auftragstaktik. "' 
How does one reconcile Schlieffen's apparently restrictive control of the army 
with his habit of allowing subordinates maximum latitude during his staff rides and 
maneuvers? Perhaps one can find an answer by looking at the same source which was 
used to formulate his other operational ideas - the German experience in the Franco- 
Prussian War. Moltke's approach to command during the war allowed his army 
31 Schlieffen, "Der Krieg in der Gegenwart, " pp. 278-279. 
32 Ibid., p. 278. Other German officers shared similar views. See Schlichting, Grundsatze II, p. 24. 
33 Wallach, op. cit., p. 53. 
34 Gayl, op. cit., pp. 354-355 and Walter Goerlitz, Histoly of the German General Staff 1657-1945 (trans. 
Brian Battershaw) (New York: Praeger, 1957) pp. 136-137. 
64 
commanders great freedom of maneuver. He only wanted them to conform to his overall 
campaign plan. However, even this seemingly simple request proved a challenge. Moltke 
had great difficulty in getting his subordinates, especially Steinmetz, to recognize his 
authority and to conform to his directions. (Indeed, Steinmetz was eventually dismissed 
for his inability to follow orders. )" This difficulty sometimes resulted in battles when 
Moltke would have preferred to avoid them and caused Moltke to alter his campaign plan 
on a number of occasions. While this had been possible during the Franco-Prussian War, 
Schlieffen believed it would be fatal in a future war, which demanded coordination of the 
entire army to effect a quick victory. " This co-ordination would be difficult with corps 
and army commanders who held such autonomous positions. Indeed, Schlieffen was not 
alone in this belief. As Chapter I has shown, authors such as Fritz Hoenig also shared his 
fears. 
In addition to the general experience of the war, Schlieffen's personal experience 
may have influenced his views on the role of the Feldherr. When war between France 
and Prussia broke out in July 1870, Schlieffen was assigned to the staff of the Grand 
Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin's corps, who were initially given the task of defending 
Germany from a possible Danish attack. When it became clear that Denmark would 
remain neutral and, given French resistance, that the war in France would require many 
more troops, Mecklenburg-Schwerin's troops were transported to the theater of war. 
Once there, they were given the task of tracking down and destroying the improvised 
forces of the French provisional government, a task which proved more difficult than 
anticipated. 37 
The Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin's troops, and with them Schlieffen, were 
sent against these newly raised armies. VA-iile the new French armies were nowhere near 
the quality of the German troops, their destruction gave the Germans some difficulty. The 
German forces in France were over-stretched as they tried to maintain their investment of 
Paris, to guard their extended supply lines from Germany against partisan attacks, and to 
destroy the new French armies. They were operating in a hostile environment against an 
enemy who had the support of the population, knew the terrain well, and who was 
35 Howard, op. cit., pp. 83-85. 
36 Schlieffen, Dienstschriften 11, p. 179. See also his "Der Feldherr, " in Cannae pp. 264-272. 
37 Friedrich von Boetticher, Schlieffen (G6ttingen: Musterschmidt, 1957) pp. 29ff. 
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constantly reinforced. The task of defeating the improvised French armies was made 
more difficult by the fact that Mecklenburg-Schwerin appears to have been ill-suited to 
Moltke's Auftragstaktik. Without direction from above, he seemed to dither and the 
operation suffered. " In a letter to his wife from France, Schlieffen enclosed a map 
showing the marching to and fro carried out by his corps from 9 November 1870 to 26 
January 187l. '9 The lines on the map crisscross showing the difficulty the corps faced in 
hunting down their French prey. In another letter, Schlieffen complained about the 
seemingly endless and pointless marching the corps faced. ' Clearly, his experience of 
war under the direction of a poor commander was a further influence of Schlieffen's 
ideas about command. 
Schlieffen believed, like most of his contemporaries, that proper operational 
techniques would allow the German army to repeat Moltke's battlefield successes of the 
Wars of Unification, and this belief served as one of the bases for his plan of 1905. 
Although Schlieffen had his own ideas about how battles should be conducted, his 
concepts were firmly based in the orthodoxy of the day. To him, his operational ideas, if 
followed, increased the chances of a battlefield victory for Germany. 
Schlieffen and Germany's Strategic Situation 
As we have seen, a central theme of Schlieffen's strategy was that Germany 
would fight and win a short war. This concept was embodied in his plan of 1906 and was 
accepted by his successor Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. However, it is clear that 
Schlieffen had his doubts about the ability of his plan to succeed. Regardless, he stuck 
with a plan of operations that assumed Germany would be able to defeat France quickly 
and dictate peace terms before turning on Russia. NWhile the operational doctrine 
developed within the German army after the Franco-Prussian War served as one basis for 
this plan, Germany's strategic situation served as another. 
38 See Howard, op. cit., pp. 299-304 and Lonsdale Hale, The 'People's War' in France 1870-1871 (London: 
Hugh Rees, 1904). 
39 Schlieffen to his wife, 10 February 187 1, USNA, Schlieffen Papers (Microform Series M-96 1), Roll 8. 
40 Schlieffen to his sister, 25 November 1870, USNA, M-96 1, Roll 8. This letter was also included in 
Alfred von Schlieffen, Briefe (ed. Eberhard Kessel), (Gatingen: Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958). 
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Schlieffen was well aware of the strategic difficulties facing Germany. He clearly 
believed that Germany could not win a long, two-front war. Faced with enemies on all 
sides who could potentially mobilize far greater resources than Germany, he had to find a 
way to defeat at least one enemy swiftly. Until 1905, this was a tall order. In the east, 
Germany faced an enemy who, in addition to possessing an extremely large army, had the 
territory to trade for time. If faced with encirclement and defeat, Russian forces could 
always withdraw into the interior of their vast empire. Further, the poor road and rail 
network in the east meant that German forces lacked the strategic mobility necessary to 
carry out large-scale operations. " These difficulties caused Schlieffen to conclude that no 
quick decision could be reached in the east. 
However, the situation in the west was different. There, the French army was not 
as large as its Russian counterpart and it did not possess the space available in Russia. 
This offered some scope for a repetition of Moltke the Elder's victories of 1870. 
However, there were problems with this. Following their defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
War, the French had gone to great lengths to fortify their border with Germany. Already 
in 1879, Moltke the Elder complained that this "hermetically sealed" border would make 
a German breakthrough extremely costly. " The French had adopted a defensive strategy, 
and intended to wait behind their strong border fortifications for a German offensive. " 
This meant that in order to defeat the French, the Germans would have to advance into 
France. The French forts, however, ensured that a breakthrough would take time, a 
luxury Germany did not possess after the Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892. 
While the German army was occupied breaking through the fortified border, the Russian 
army would have the time to mobilize and fall upon the vulnerable German rear. Even if 
the German army could break through quickly, it would still take time to defeat the 
French army in the field, again allowing the Russians sufficient time to invade from the 
east. 
4 'Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, pp. 25ff, Dennis Showalter, "The Eastern Front and German Military Planning, 
1871-1914 - Some Observations, " East European Quarterly Vol. XV, Nr. 2 (June 198 1) pp. 163-180. 42 Kaiser Wilhelm I to Bismarck, 2 October 1879, reprinted in Ferdinand von Schmerfeld, ed. Graf Moltke. 
Die Aufinarschpldne 1871-1890 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1929), p. 80. 
43 Ritter wrote that "Schlieffen guessed the enemy's intentions with astonishing accuracy" in 1905. Ritter, 
Schlieffen Plan, p. 42. In fact German, intelligence had obtained portions of the French deployment plans, 
which gave them an accurate picture of Plans XIV and XV (1898-1906). Archivrat Greiner, "Welche 
67 
In 1895, Generalmajor Martin K6pke, an Oberquartiermeister in the General 
Staff, wrote a Denkschrift assessing the problems of a war against France. He recognized 
the difficulties the Germans would face in breaking through the border. He believed that 
the attackers could only expect minor successes after expending great effort over a long 
period of time. Given the strategic situation, K6pke was pessimistic about German 
chances in a future war, writing: 
Jedenfalls sprechen Anzeichen genug dafür, dass der Krieg der Zukunft ein 
anderes Aussehen, als der von 1870/71 haben wird. Schnelle Siege von 
entscheidender Bedeutung haben wir nicht zu erwarten .... Der Positionskrieg im Grossen, der Kampf um lange Fronten befestigter Feldstellungen, die Belagerung 
grosser fester Plätze muss siegreich durchgeftihrt werden. Anders werden wir 
keine Erfolge über die Franzosen erringen können. Hoffentlich wird es uns dann 
nicht an den hierzu nötigen Vorbereitungen in intellektueller wie materieller 
Hinsicht fehlen und werden wir uns im entscheidenden Augenblick für diese 
Kampfesform wohl vorgeübt und ausgerüstet sehn, 44 
Until 1905, when he began work on his eponymous plan, Schlieffen struggled to 
find a satisfactory way out of this strategic dilemma. His solution seemed to be to 
concentrate on improving the operational capabilities of the German army so that it 
would be able to fight more effectively than its enemies. The events of 1904/05, 
however, gave him hope that there was a strategic solution to Germany's dilemma. In 
1904, Russia and Japan had gone to war in Korea. While most in Europe expected a 
quick Russian victory once their army had reached the east, " the war, in fact, was a 
fiasco for the Russian army. Through the war, both sides grappled indecisively with one 
another, generally with the Russians coming off the worse. Slowly they were pushed 
deeper into Manchuria, and after losing Port Arthur and their Baltic Fleet in the battle of 
Tsushima and facing rebellion at home, the Russians were forced to come to a peace with 
Nachrichten besass der deut. GGS über Mobilmachung und Aufinarsch des franz. Heeres in den Jahren 
1885-1914, " unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, Wl0/50267. 
44 Martin Köpke, "Eine deutsche Offensive gegen Frankreich nach ihren Bedingungen, Richtungen und 
Aussichten, " August 1895, quoted in (Wilhelm] Dieck: mann, "Der Schlieffenplan, " unpublished manuscript 
in BA/MA, WIO/50220, p. 55. This passage was also quoted in Stig Förster, "Der deutsche Generalstab und 
die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 1871-1914. Metakritik eines Mythos, " MQM 54 (1995) p. 75. (My thanks 
to Dr. Annika Mombauer for the use of her copy of the Dieclanann manuscript. ) 
45 Helmuth von Moltke, Erinnerungen, Briefe, Dokumente, 1877-1916 (Stuttgart: Der Kommende Tag, 
1922) p. 300. 
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Japan. Russian losses had been substantial. At the battle of Mukden alone, the Russian 
army lost over 100,000 men. 
The course of the war had a profound impact on Schlieffen's appreciation of 
Russian capabilities and, hence, on Germany's strategic situation. " In June 1905, 
Schlieffen wrote a long letter to the Chancellor describing the poor state of the Russian 
army. "For a long time, " he wrote, "we have known that the Russian army possessed no 
effective leaders, that the majority of its officers were only of the most limited value, and 
that the troops had only limited training [Ausbildung]. " However, Schlieffen wrote that 
most had believed these shortcomings would be compensated to a certain degree by the 
steadiness and loyalty of the Russian troops. The war in the east had shown that this 
belief was false. Reportedly, Russian troops had little respect for their officers and did 
not obey orders. Further, the war had shown that their training was even worse than had 
been believed. Schlieffen concluded that the worth of the Russian army was minimal and 
that there was no prospect of it becoming an effective fighting force anytime in the near 
future: 
Es hat sich durch den ostasiatischen Krieg gezeigt, dass die russische 
Armee noch weniger gut war, als sie in der allgemeinen Meinung eingeschätzt 
wurde, und sie ist durch den Krieg nicht besser, sondern schlechter geworden. Sie 
hat jede Freudigkeit, jedes Vertauen und den Gehorsam verloren. 
Es ist durchaus fraglich, ob eine Besserung eintreten wird. Dazu fehlt vor 
allem die Selbsterkenntnis. Die Ursache ihrer Niederlagen suchen die Russen 
nicht in den allgemeinen eigenen Unvollkommenheiten, sondern in der 
Ueberlegenheit an Zahl der Gegner und in der Unfähigkeit einzelner Führer. Es 
fehlt aber auch an den Männern, welche eine Reform durchzuführen vermöchten 
und an den notwendigen moralischen Begriffen. ` 
Schlieffen's belief in the weakness of the Russian army now allowed him to 
contemplate seriously strategic options which had seemed unfeasible until this time. A 
window of opportunity had opened. " Schlieffen now felt that the bulk of the German 
army could be deployed in the west, with only a small force necessary in the east to 
46 The idea that Schlieffen "as chief of staff had never felt able to ignore the Russian threat... " seems to be 
false in the light of his statements about the worth of the Russian army. Dennis Showalter, Tannenberg: 
Clash of Empires (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1991) p. 59. 
47 Schlieffen to Bernhard von Bfilow, 10 June 1905, PRO, GFM 10/89 (Russland 72geh. /14: "Milititr und 
Marine Angelegenheiten Russland, 3 Oct 1896 - 31 Dez 1906"). 
48 Peter Rassow, "Schlieffen und Holstein, " HZ Bd. 173 (1952) pp. 297-313; Cf Ritter, Schlieffen Plan 
p. 46. 
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defend against a greatly weakened and flawed Russian army. Given that the French 
intended to remain on the defensive, protected behind their fortifications, Schlieffen 
needed to find a way to get at their army. K6pke's Denkschrift had painted a grim picture 
of how an attack through the French forts would develop and had reinforced an opinion 
already held by Schlieffen in 1891 ." Thus, Schlieffen turned to one of his favorite 
operational concepts, a flanking maneuver. 
The result was the Denbchrift, "Krieg gegen Frankreich, " or the "Schlieffen 
Plan" as it later became known, which Schlieffen completed in time for his retirement at 
the end of 1905. This document was taken up by Moltke the Younger and served as the 
basis for Germany's war plan from 1906 to 1914. Schlieffen intended that two-thirds of 
the German army (3 3 V2corps) be deployed in the west, with the bulk of this force being 
allocated to the right wing. This strong right wing was to advance through neutral 
Belgium and the Netherlands, into northern France, envelop Paris, and annihilate the 
French army in the process. " Once the French army was destroyed, German could dictate 
terms to a prostrate France and shift her forces east to deal with any Russian threat. " 
Schlieffen's planning process, though, indicates that even with the advantages of 
a superior operational doctrine and the favorable strategic situation of 1905, he had his 
doubts about the feasibility of the undertaking. Gerhard Ritter's groundbreaking work, 
The Schlieffen Plan went into great detail about the process that eventually resulted in his 
final plan. In addition to publishing the final memorandum, Ritter also published the six 
drafts that Schlieffen wrote before finally finding one with which he was satisfied. These 
are very revealing, as they show his difficulty in finding a solution to Germany's 
expected two-front war. They demonstrate that right up to the moment he submitted his 
memorandum, Schlieffen was undecided as to the best course of the Aufinarsch. " 
In addition to the drafts of his 1905 memorandum, the Schlieffen Nachlass from 
which Ritter worked contains the Schlussbesprechung of the last Kriegsspiel directed by 
49 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan p. 22. 
'0 Despite the moral indignation with which this move was greeted at the outbreak of the war (and, indeed, 
by some historians still today), violating Belgian neutrality was seriously considered by the Entente as well. 
See S. R. Williamson, "Joffre Reshapes French Strategy, 1911-1913, " in Paul Kennedy, ed. The War Plans 
of the Great Powers (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1979) pp. 133-154. 
51 For the completed draft of the plan see Ritter, Schlieffen Plan pp. 134-148. 
52 Ibid., pp. 148-160. 
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Schlieffen. " This document was not discussed by Ritter, as he dismissed Schlieffen's 
Kriegsspiele and staff rides as unimportant, saying that they were merely, "means of 
testing individual problems in his tactical-strategic planning. "' Other authors, however, 
have offered a more compelling assessment of the worth of Schlieffen's staff rides and 
war games. Arden Bucholz has demonstrated convincingly that they were used by all 
levels of the General Staff to test not just individual problems, but entire war plans. " 
This Kriegsspiel is of particular importance because it took place in November- 
December 1905, i. e., just when Schlieffen was drafting his memorandum, indicating that 
it was used as a test for the concepts he would employ in his final draft. 
This Kriegsspiel differs significantly from the final memorandum. Rather than 
take the offensive and invade France through Belgium and the Netherlands, Schlieffen 
awaited his enemies' blows in both the west and the east. The game began with two 
Russian units, the Niemen and Narew Armies, invading East Prussia, in a scenario 
similar to one played in Schlieffen's earlier games and to the one which actually occurred 
in 1914. Much greater numbers of German troops than were assigned in the Schlieffen 
Plan were on hand -a total of 13 active corps and 12 reserve divisions with large 
numbers of Landwehr and cavalry units - to meet this invasion. " The result of the game 
in the east was a German defeat of the Russians by the 35h day of mobilization. " These 
victorious troops were then shifted to the west in time to help parry the French assault. 
Significantly, unlike the Schlieffen Plan, the Kriegsspiel allowed the French to 
take the offensive and invade German territory. Schlieffen retained only small forces to 
guard key points in the west, assigning corps to defend Metz, Strassburg, Saarburg, and 
the lines of communication between. All told, 10 active corps and 10 reserve divisions 
were deployed against France. " In the game, the German forces detected strong 
concentrations of French troops near Lille, on the upper Mosel, and in the Vosges. 
Schlieffen wrote, "it was highly likely that the French intended to march through 
53 Alfred von Schlieffen, "Schlussbesprechung. Kriegsspiel November-Dezember 1905, " USNA, M-96 1, 
Roll 3. 
54 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan p. 33. 
'5 Arden Bucholz, MoZe, Schlieffen and Prussian War Planning (Providence, RI: Berg, 199 1) pp. 15 8- 
213, passim. See also Ulrich Liss, "Graf Schlieffen's letztes Kriegsspiel, " WWR H. 3 Jg. 15 (1965) pp. 
162-166. 
56 Schlieffen, "Kriegsspiel Nov-Dez 1905, " pp. 6-7. 
57 Ibid., p. 12. 
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Belgium along both banks of the Meuse. "" The French decided to deploy on the Belgian 
border (here we have echoes of the memorandum to come) because they would have 
more room in the north to develop their deployment and to avoid the German fortresses 
and troops along the Rhine. (One reason Schlieffen held back from attacking the French 
immediately upon the war's outbreak was to allow time for the Belgian and Dutch to 
declare themselves for one side or the other. ) As the French came through Belgium, 
German troops moved to meet them. Ultimately, the Germans, with Belgian help, 
surrounded the French forces and annihilated them in a great battle by the 42 nd day of 
mobilization. " 
Though the above scenario was unlikely, it brings to light several important 
points and raises some interesting questions. First, it shows even more forcefully than the 
drafts of the Schlieffen Plan just how far-reaching Schlieffen's ideas were before his final 
draft and how unsure he was of just how to wage a two-front war successfully. He was 
willing to entertain the idea of allowing the initiative to pass, at least initially, to his 
enemies, in part for political reasons, and to allow his enemies the opportunity of 
invading German territory. It also shows that he was at least somewhat sensitive to 
political questions. He believed that once Belgium was invaded, the Netherlands would 
also feel their independence threatened and would feel compelled to enter the war. " 
Schlieffen was obviously not a "military technician, pure and simple, " as Ritter 
believed. " His look at the reaction of the Low Countries shows he had an understanding 
of the political consequences of invading their territory, even if he chose ultimately to 
ignore it in his quest for a rapid victory. " 
Despite his views about the importance of the initial plan, Schlieffen's doubts 
made him clearly willing to abandon it if a more favorable opportunity arose to defeat the 
French. Schlieffen had played out the possibility of the main French attack falling against 
58 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
59 Ibid., p. 16. 
60 Ibid., p. 34. 
61 Ibid., p. 20. 
62 Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany Vol. II: The 
European Powers and the Wilhelmine ELnRire, 1890-1914 (Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press, 
1972) p. 194. 
63 The French of course considered an invasion through Belgium but rejected it on the grounds that it would 
damage relations with Britain. Williamson, op. cit., pp. 133-154, passim. 
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Metz and Strassburg in his General Staff ride during the summer of 1905. If this 
happened, he intended to fight the decisive battle in Lorraine, rather than continue the 
advance of the right wing. ' As Ritter has pointed out, the destruction of the French 
forces was Schlieffen's ultimate goal, not the wheel through Belgium itself. " 
Moltke the Younger and the Schlieffen Plan 
In January 1906, Schlieffen was succeeded by Hehnuth von Moltke the Younger, 
the nephew of the famous victor of the Wars of Unification. From the beginning of his 
tenure as Chief of the General Staff, Moltke was beset with doubts and fears. First, he 
doubted his own ability to carry out the tasks of chief of the General Staff. More 
importantly, he feared that Germany would experience great difficulty winning a future 
war. He expressed these fears in an audience with the Kaiser in January 1905: 
Wir haben jetzt eine über dreissigj ährige Friedensperiode hinter uns und ich 
glaube, dass wir in unseren Anschauungen vielfach sehr friedensmässig geworden 
sind. Wie und ob es möglich sein wird, die Massenheere, die wir aufstellen 
werden, einheitlich zu leisten, kann, glaube ich, kein Mensch vorher wissen. 
Auch unser Gegner ist ein anderer geworden, wir werden es nicht mehr wir fi-üher 
mit einem feindlichen Heer, dem wir mit Ueberlegenheit entgegentreten können, 
zu tun haben, sondern mit einer Nation in Waffen. Es wird ein Volkskrieg 
werden, der nicht mit einer entscheidenden Schlacht abzumachen sein wird, 
sondern der ein langes mühevolles Ringen mit einem Lande sein wird, das sich 
nicht eher überwunden geben wird, als bis seine ganze Volkskraft gebrochen ist, 
und der auch unser Volk, selbst wenn wir Sieger sein sollten, bis aufs äusserste 
erschöpfen wird. ' 
Moltke's pessimistic view was later reinforced by German intelligence, who 
concluded that the French had a clear outline of the German deployment plan. In a 
Denkschrift concerning possible French reactions to the Schlieffen Plan, they concluded 
that this knowledge could possibly prompt the French army to withdraw into southern 
64 Friedrich von Boetticher, "Der Lehrmeister des neuzeitlichen Krieges, " in [Friedrich] von 
Cochenhausen, ed., Von Scharnhorst zu Schlieffen, 1806-1906: Hundert Jahre preussisch: deutscher 
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65 Ritter, Schlieffen Plan, pp. 55-56. Schlieffen, however, had clearly become obsessed with this idea by the 
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DPhil Thesis, 1997) pp. 82ff. 
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France to avoid the German encirclement maneuver. The author of this report was not 
confident in the plan's chances of success. He wrote: 
Anderseits wird man allerdings in Zukunft auch kaum mit einer solchen 
völligen Vernichtung der gesamten Feldannee rechnen können, wie sie 1870 
durch die Katastrophen von Metz und Sedan erreicht wurden. Wenn von der 
heute 6mal so starken Feldarmee (heute 2,000,000 Mann, 1870 - 340,000 Mann) 
nach anfänglichen Niederlagen starke Teile in den angegebenen Richtungen 
entkommen, so ist die Fortsetzung der deutschen Operationen keineswegs leicht. 
Starke Kräfte werden vor den französichen Grenzbefestigungen zurückgelassen 
werden müssen. Der Vormarsch der deutschen Hauptkräfte gegen die Loire wird 
von Paris und Lyon her flankiert. Die Riesenfestung Paris wird schwer zu 
67 bewältigen sein. 
)While Schlieffen could rely upon his belief that the superiority of German 
doctrine was sufficient to allow the army to defeat any enemy in the field, Moltke the 
Younger could not. It was clear that he believed after 30 years of peace, the German army 
would have difficulties in combat. Further, he felt that France would not necessarily 
oblige Germany's plans, and that the next war would drag on for a long time, ending only 
when one side was exhausted. Yet, he maintained Schlieffen's plan as the basis for his 
Aufmarschpldne right up to 1914, and, in fact, applied Schlieffen's idea more rigidly than 
Schlieffen himself intended. Why should this have been? 
The best possible answer for this lies in Germany's changing strategic situation 
between 1906 and 1914. The weakness of Russia in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War 
had given the Schlieffen Plan a window of opportunity for success. However, Russia was 
able to rebuild her strength more rapidly than believed possible and, in fact, emerged a 
greater danger than she had been before 1905. The General Staff observed this process 
with growing alarm. 
By 19 10, the reform of the Russian army was evident to German observers. In 
August, Moltke wrote to Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg outlining the 
67 Grosser Generalstab, May 19 10, "Aufrnarsch und operative Absichten der Franzosen in einern 
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implications of the on-going Russian reorganization. In addition to raising seven new 
divisions in European Russia, "a considerable increase in the number of technical units, 
particularly aircraft and railroad formations, [had] taken place, so that the Russian army 
[would] soon be better equipped with such formations than the German army. " Further, 
the Russians were changing their deployment plans. Four army corps were pulled back 
from the border and deployed deeper in Russia, creating a "central army" that could be 
deployed according to need "in east Asia, on the western border or in the Balkans. "" 
Ultimately, this "central anny" was to be composed of 7 army corps (15 divisions), a 
considerable reserve force. " 
The Russians had also greatly improved the combat capability of their army. In 
the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, they had equipped their army with modem 
field howitzers, providing their infantry corps with important firepower. " Moreover, 
large numbers of old and unsatisfactory officers were dismissed, and younger more able 
men were promoted. " The army's regulations had also been thoroughly re-written to 
reflect the lessons of the war and training procedures had been tightened up. " While the 
Germans still reported that Russian tactics and training were below the standards of the 
German army, they acknowledged the great strides which the Russian army had taken 
and that it was a much more dangerous foe than had been the case in 1905. " 
The Russians also introduced reforms into their mobilization procedures, which 
decreased the time needed to deploy their army. The numbers of active personnel in units 
was increased and the mobilization procedures for reservists were simplified. Perhaps 
most importantly, though, in the spring of 1913, the Russians introduced a "war 
preparation period" [Kriegsvorbereitungsperiode]. This allowed for the beginning of the 
68 Moltke to Bethmann, 5 August 19 10, PRO GFM 10/89 (Russland 72geh/ 15: "Militar und Marine 
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mobilization process with a secret order in times of international tension, greatly 
reducing mobilization time. "' 
Further, financed largely through French loans, the Russians were expending 
great sums of money on improving their railroad capabilities, a process that had grave 
implications for German security. " German intelligence estimated that the great building 
program, which was to begin in 1912, would result in the laying of over 10,000 
kilometers of new track. By 1922, the Russian interior would be linked far better with her 
borders. " This program caused great alarm within the General Staff. Moltke wrote to 
Bethmann the effects: 
Dies heisst, dass jetzt die russische Armee am 13. Mobilmachungstag mit 
der Hälfte, am 18. Mobilmachungstag mit zwei Dritteln operationsfähig an der 
Westgrenze stehen kann, nach Durchführung der Bahni)läne am 
13. Mobilmachungstag schon mit zwei Dritteln, am 18. Mobilmachungstag in ihrer 
Gesamtstärke. 
Für die Erreichung der Marschbereitshaft sind hierbei veranschlagt vom 
Ausspruch der Mobilmachung ab für die Kavalleriedivisionen V2 -3 Tage, flür die 
aktiven Korps 5 Tage, für die Reserve-divisionen 8 Tage. Beginnt die 
Mobilmachung, womit gerechnet werden muss, schon vor dem offiziellen Erlass 
des Mobilmachungsbefehls, so können die Truppen unter Umständen 5 Tage 
fi-üher in den Aufmarschräumen eintreffen. " 
Already by 1911, Russian improvements in mobilization procedures meant that her army 
would complete its deployment to the western border in half the time it had taken in 
1906. " This railroad program made the situation even more difficult for the Germans. 
While in 1911 Moltke could still write that France was Germany's most 
dangerous enemy, " clearly Russia was becoming more and more of a threat. The internal 
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improvements of the Russian army made it a dangerous enemy by making it more 
tactically and strategically flexible. Its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War had prompted 
an updating of its combat regulations, the dismissal of unsatisfactory officers, the 
purchase of modem, mobile artillery, resulting in a more tactically capable force. The 
railroad building plan and improvements in mobilization procedures made the Russian 
army more strategically flexible. These reforms allowed the Russian army to deploy more 
men faster than had been the case in Schlieffen's day. These improvements also enabled 
Russia to form a large "central army" in the heart of Russia and to shift the border forces 
ftirther back. These changes made the army was less vulnerable to a sudden Austro- 
German pre-emptive strike and allowed the Russians to have a variety of deployment 
plans. " Needless to say, these were worrying developments for Moltke. 
The inability to strike at Russia, as well as the fact that any war against Russia 
would certainly be long and indecisive, forced Moltke to concentrate on France. " 
Russia's growing strength and speed of mobilization made her a steadily growing threat 
to Germany and made a rapid victory in the west even more crucial than in Schlieffen's 
day. Only by coming to a quick reckoning with France could Germany have the forces 
necessary to deal with the formidable Russian "steamroller. " 
Needing a rapid victory in the west, Moltke adhered to the basic outline of 
Schlieffen's 1905 plan. However, his fears caused him to make important alterations to 
Schlieffen's original concept. " First, to protect against an expected French invasion of 
Alsace/Lorraine, he had deployed eight army corps in the 6h and 7h Armies along the 
border. " Perhaps more importantly, in reaction to his fears about the possibility of having 
to fight a long war, Moltke had changed the course of the advance of the German right 
wing. Schlieffen's plan had called for the strong German right wing to outflank the 
go See Gunther Frantz, "Russlands Westaufmarsch seit 1880, " WuW Jg. 1930 pp. 235-255. 
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French border fortifications by advance through Belgium and the Netherlands. Instead, 
Moltke decided to limited the German advance to Belgian territory with the desire of 
keeping the Netherlands as an outlet to the world. In 1911, he wrote: 
A hostile Belgium at our back could have disastrous consequences for the 
advance of the German army to the west, particularly if England should use the 
violation of Belgian neutrality as a pretext for entering the war against us. A 
neutral Holland secures our rear, because if England declares war on us for 
violating Belgian neutrality she cannot herself violate Dutch neutrality. She 
cannot break the very law for whose sake she goes to war. 
Furthermore it will be very important to have in Holland a country whose 
neutrality allows us to have imports and supplies. She must be the windpipe that 
enables us to breathe. " 
This restriction of the advance to Belgium, however, caused severe constraints on 
the German deployment, as the right wing could not use the important rail lines of the 
Dutch Maastricht area. The German I" and 2 nd Armies, in total almost 600,000 troops 
with attendant supplies, were now forced to pass through a corridor only 12 miles wide. " 
Moltke's alteration made the immediate seizure of the intact Belgian railroads an 
absolute necessity. To this end, the General Staff devised a plan to take the Belgian 
fortress of Liýge with its crucial rail junction by a coup de main at the outbreak of the 
war. When this plan, judged by Ritter to be "verging on the fantastic, "" was originally 
drawn up in 1908, it was intended to be launched on the II th Mobilization Day. In the 
years before the war, however, the launch date was reduced to the 5 th Mobilization Day, 
putting more and more time pressure on the German mobilization plan. " Having to take 
Li6ge on the fifth day meant that the German forces earmarked for the attack would have 
to start their advance within hours of the mobilization order being issued. "' With the 
details of the plan worked out in such minute detail and with the time pressures imposed 
g4 Moltke, "General Observations on the Schlieffen Plan by H. von Moltke (apparently dates 1911), " 
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by the coup de main on Li&ge, it is no wonder that Moltke blanched at the prospect of 
having to scrap the entire plan in August 1914. '9 
Recent research has shown clearly that Moltke had grave doubts about Germany's 
ability to conclude a future war rapidly. This begs the question why did he not scrap the 
plan and prepare Germany for a long war. An answer to this can be found in the changing 
strategic situation. )While the General Staff may have believed France to be the more 
dangerous enemy in 1914, Russia was rapidly taking her place. When Russia's railway 
building and army reform were completed in 1922, she would be a far greater threat to 
Germany. These reforms would enable Russia to mobilize and deploy a massive army 
almost as quickly as the Germans could mobilize their army. Convinced that a general 
European war was inevitable, Moltke pushed for war as soon as possible, believing that 
once Russian military reforms were completed, Germany's slim prospects of success 
would diminish even further. ' However, even with the Russian re-organization 
incomplete she was still a far more dangerous foe than she had been in 1905. Germany 
needed to defeat France quickly in order to be able to meet this eastern threat, and only 
an offensive strategy offered even the slightest prospects of a rapid French collapse. 
Consequently, in July 1914, Moltke seized upon the assassination of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand as the pretext needed to launch Germany's war and set into motion the plan 
that he hoped, but perhaps did not expect, would bring about France's fall. 
Conclusion 
Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger have been roughly 
handled by recent historians. Martin Kitchen described Schlieffen as a man obsessed with 
the "minutiae of military planning, " who believed that the "uncertainties of warfare ... 
89 In August 1914, when it seemed as if France would remain neutral, Moltke was asked by Kaiser Wilhelm 
to scrap his western deployment and deploy against Russia instead. This caused Moltke great stress and 
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could be eliminated as far as possible by careful planning and technical experience. "" On 
the other hand, according to one historian, Schlieffen's successor, Moltke the Younger, 
was "unprepared by education and experience to understand war planning. " This meant 
that he was unable to develop a "clear defense policy during the years 1906-191 L"" 
According to recent historians, the shortcomings of these men led both to cling to a 
strategy that had no hope of success. 
This chapter has attempted to show why Schlieffen and Moltke, despite the 
evidence offered by the historical and theoretical writings of their contemporaries, 
developed and maintained a war plan that assumed a rapid German victory. It is clear that 
both men had doubts about the plan's prospects of success. However, they both believed 
there were sound reasons for not changing the basic structure of their plans. 
For Schlieffen, there were several reasons. First, he believed that the German 
army was operationally more capable than its enemies. The various tactical and strategic 
debates which had taken place in the army after 1871 had resulted, in his view, in an 
army that was better able to fight the Bewegungskrieg necessary to annihilate its 
opponent's forces. Second, Schlieffen believed that the Russo-Japanese War had shown 
that the Russian army, although it might be large, was by no means capable of fighting a 
modem war. Having never had much respect for the Russians, Schlieffen now believed 
that their army would not be able to reform itself in the foreseeable future. These 
conditions suggested to Schlieffen that a short war was indeed a possibility for Germany 
in 1905. However, a short war would only be possible if they could come to grips with 
the French army. As the French intended to remain on the defensive, the German army 
had to take the battle to them. The only way this could be accomplished was by 
outflanking the fortified Franco-German border. 
Moltke the Younger had very different reasons for sticking with a plan that 
assumed an expeditious German victory. The years after Schlieffen's retirement had seen 
a significant change in Germany's strategic situation. The Russian army reform, which 
the former General Staff Chief had believed would not take place, occurred in fact with 
surprising alacrity. Moreover, not only did the Russians rebuild the strength they had lost 
91 Kitchen, op. cit, P. 170f. 
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during the war with Japan, they increased dramatically the capabilities of their army. The 
German General Staff believed that reforms begun around 19 10 would be complete by 
1922 at the latest, and would make the Russian army almost invulnerable. With no 
prospect of being able to fight a short campaign in the east and with the growing threat of 
the Russian army, Moltke the Younger had no choice but to focus German efforts in the 
west. To meet the Russian advance that would come in any war, he had to defeat the 
French forces quickly. This meant that he had to carry out an offensive strategy, 
regardless of his doubts about the ability of the German army to defeat France quickly. 
Again, the only way that offered even the faintest prospects of carrying this out was to 
avoid fighting through the fortified border area, i. e., to outflank the French positions and 
keep the war in the free field where the Germans would be able to fight the kind of war in 
which they excelled - Bewegungskrieg. 
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Part Two: 
The Great Volkskrieg 
Introduction 
On I August 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm H signed the orders beginning German 
mobilization. With this act, the long-awaited general European war had begun. The 
Prussian Minister of War, Generalleutnant Erich von Falkenhayn, recorded the scene 
with pride in his diary later that day: 
Um 5 Uhr nachmittags Unterzeichung der Ordre durch Seine Majestät auf dem 
Tisch, der aus dem Holz der 'Victory' Nelsons geschnitzt ist. Ich sage dabei: 
'Gott segne Eure Majestät und Ihre Waffen, Gott schütze das geliebte Vaterland. ' 
Darauf drückt mir der Kaiser lange die Hand, in unserer beider Augen stehen 
Trdnen. ' 
The German army's various strategic debates and internal rivalries were put to the side as 
the plans prepared in 1905 by Alfred Graf von Schlieffen and modified by his successor, 
Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, were finally put to the test. The German military 
swung enthusiastically behind their leadership and advanced happily towards war, 
confident in a German victory. 
These beliefs seemed confirmed by initial events in the west. The German army 
advanced generally according to plan. The Belgian fortress of Li6ge fell to a daring coup 
de main only slightly behind schedule. Mobilization of the army went smoothly, and by 
late-August, the armies of the German right wing were advancing through Belgium on 
the French border. In the south, Marshal Joseph Joffre's offensive was repulsed with 
heavy losses by the German 6h and 7th Armies. On 22 August, Moltke ordered these 
armies to pursue the beaten and retreating French. Moltke's previous doubts were 
forgotten, as everywhere German arms seemed victorious. The mood at the German 
headquarters, the Oberste Heeresleitung (OHL), was exuberant. 
By mid-September, however, German plans lay in tatters. The German right wing 
had failed to annihilate the French army. In fact, it had been forced to retreat. Though the 
' Erich von Falkenhayn, diary entry for I August 1914, cited in Hans von Zwehl, Erich von FalkenhM: 
Eine bioarWhische-Studie (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1926) p. 58. 
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German left wing had succeeded in repulsing Joffre's advance into Lorraine, its 
subsequent counter-attack faltered against strong French defenses. The war in the east 
had, at least initially, gone badly with General Maximillian von Prittwitz' defeat at 
Gumbinnen and his subsequent intention to withdraw behind the Vistula. The German 
victory at Tannenberg under Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, though 
spectacular, only postponed the inevitable advance of the Russian steamroller and did 
little to help their Austro-Hungarian ally. German strategy had failed. The French were 
not defeated quickly and forces were not available for the east. Germany now faced the 
much-feared two-front war. Moreover, though in mid-September the German command 
did not yet realize it, their doctrine of a war of movement (Bewegungskrieg) had also 
failed. 
The German assumptions about war examined in Chapter 3 had been largely 
proved wrong by events in late 1914. The war was not brought swiftly to a conclusion by 
an annihilation of the French army in the west. There, the front had become static, with 
both sides facing each other in primitive field fortifications and with neither side strong 
enough to break through and defeat the other. Stellungskrieg had replaced 
Bewegungskrieg. The task of finding a solution to this largely unexpected and 
challenging strategic and doctrinal problem fell to Erich von Falkenhayn, who had 
replaced Moltke the Younger on 14 September. 
This section will focus on Falkenhayn's attempts to solve these problems from 
the time of his taking over from Moltke to the end of 1915. First, it will look at the steps 
the new General Staff Chief instituted to put the unsuccessful German plan back on track 
and the radical conclusions Falkenhayn reached after all attempts to win the war in the 
west in 1914 failed (Chapter 4). Then, the impact of the lessons drawn from Austro- 
German offensive in the east during the summer of 1915 on General Staff Chief s 
strategy will be examine (Chapter 5). And finally, the lessons of war in the west during 
1915 will be analyzed (Chapter 6). From this will emerge a picture of the development of 
Falkenhayn's strategic thought from the war's beginning to the end of 1915. 
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commanders within the first weeks of the war to carry out their own strategic schemes 
that sometimes ran counter to the OHL's directions. " 
Most pernicious for Moltke, however, were the Military Cabinet and the Ministry 
of War. The head of the Military Cabinet, Generaloberst Moriz von Lyncker, and the 
Prussian Minister of War, Erich von Falkenhayn, were close advisors of the Kaiser. Both 
accompanied the Imperial headquarters into the field in 1914 and were in a position to 
influence events. In Falkenhayn, Moltke found someone within the headquarters willing 
to criticise his strategic decisions vocally and prominently. "' In Lyncker, Moltke found 
someone willing to listen to Falkenhayn's criticisms. " When Moltke's strategy seemed to 
be going badly, each of these individuals was in a position to make important changes. 
The result was Moltke's dismissal and Falkenhayn's promotion. " 
The New Chief of the General Staff 
Like Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, Erich von Falkenhayn's reputation 
suffered the severe criticisms of his contemporaries after the war. From this criticism 
emerges the picture of a hesitant, weak leader, who lacked the strength of will necessary 
to take difficult decisions. Max Bauer, who served in the OHL through Falkenhayn's 
tenure and who recognized some of Falkenhayn's better qualities, nevertheless judged 
him unfit for high command. After the war, he wrote: 
Falkenhayn hatte grosse Vorzüge. Seine Arbeitskraft war unbegrenzt. Er 
faßte leicht, begriff rasch, hatte ein gutes Gedächtnis und entschied sich schnell. 
Aber, sei es weil ihm die sichere Grundlage fehlte, sei es weil ihm die Intuitivität 
des Feldherrn mangelte, es waren oft halbe Entschlüsse, und auch in diesen 
schwankte er. Im übrigen war er sehr gewandt und verstand die Menschen zu 
nehmen und auszunutzen, ohne dass sie es merkten .... Alles in allem war er eine 
ungewöhnliche Natur, die sicher einen glänzenden Staatsmann, Diplomaten oder 
Parlamentarier abgegeben hätte, der Feldherr lag ihm am wenigsten. ` 
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existed as autonomous institutions during peacetime. As Section One has shown, this 
allowed many competing views of warfare and doctrine to develop before the outbreak of 
World War I and allowed independently thinking officers a voice. However, it also meant 
that the German army entered World War I with a command structure which was open to 
challenge from within. 
The outbreak of war was meant to simplify the German command structure. With 
the declaration of war, Kaiser Wilhelm II assumed command of the various contingents 
(i. e., the Bavarian, WUrttemberg, and Saxon armies) of the Imperial army as the 
"Oberster Kriegsherr"(Supreme Warlord) under Article 63 of the German Constitution. 
Wilhelm was to be advised by the Chief of the Prussian General Staff, in August 1914 
Helmuth von Moltke, who became the "Chief of Staff of the Field Army. " In reality, the 
Emperor abdicated his command functions to the Chief of the General Staff, who issued 
orders under Wilhelm's name often without prior consultation. Thus, the Chief of the 
General Staff became the de facto director of Germany's war, able to issue orders with 
Imperial approval over a wide area. Armed with this authority, the General Staff was able 
to move into areas which had previously been the remit of other organizations. " 
It would be a mistake, though, to see the General Staff as an all-powerful 
organization, especially at the beginning of the war. Several competing organizations still 
wielded considerable power and many of the army's commanders held considerable 
personal authority. At the war's outbreak, the German army's 25 army corps and 14 
reserve corps formed 8 armies, with 7 deployed in the west and I in the east. The 
commanders of these armies were drawn from the high-ranking nobility and from high- 
ranking officers who had often held important posts in the pre-war army. Thus, three 
army commanders were members of the high nobility (Crown Princes Wilhelm and 
Rupprecht and Albrecht Duke of Warttemberg) and two had served previously as 
Prussian Minister of War (Josias von Heeringen and Karl von Einem). The very real 
personal authority of these army commanders was ftirther strengthened by the tradition of 
A uftragstaktik within the German army, " a tradition which was often invoked by army 
11 See Friedrich Hossbach, Die Entwicklung des Oberbefehls Ober das Heer in Brandenburg. Preussen und 
im Deutschen Reich von 165 5-1945 (WtIrzburg: Holzner-Verlag, 1957) pp. 56-7 1; and Holger Afflerbach, 
"Wilhelm as Supreme Warlord in the First World War, " War in History 5 (4) (1998) pp. 427-449. 
12 See Martin Samuels, "Directive Command and the German General Staff, " War in HistoEy 2/1 (1995) 
pp. 22-40. The position of Wilhelm and Rupprecht as crown princes of Germany and Bavaria, respectively, 
allowed them to play a political role. Wilhelm, in particular, was kept unusually well informed about 
events. See the diary of Major von Redern, the la of the Operationsabtedung, BA/MA, W10/50676. On 
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Chapter 4: 
The Rise of Stellungskrieg 
On I August 1914, Kaiser Wilhelm U signed the order mobilizing the German 
army. After years of intense preparation, the German army was finally going to war. 
German military leaders believed their army would never be better prepared. At the 
beginning of the crisis in early July, the Prussian Minister of War, Generalleutnant Erich 
von Falkenhayn, had assured the Kaiser that the German army was fully prepared for 
conflict, ' while the Chief of the General Staff, Generaloberst Helmuth von Moltke, 
stressed that the timing would never be better. ' After 40 years of theorizing about war, 
the time had come to put German military ideas to the test; with great anticipation, the 
German military theorists laid down their pens and took up their swords. 
The Kaiser's order set in motion the detailed workings of the Schlieffen/Moltke 
Plan. A series of long-prepared and meticulously planned events began: The Kaiser's 
mobilization order arrived at the NEnistry of War at 5: 20pm, only 20 minutes after it had 
been signed. By 5: 25, the necessary telegrams were already being dispatched. ' The next 
several weeks were spent in a state of organized confusion, as officers and men reported 
to their wartime posts and units assembled for the advance into France, all according to 
the detailed plans drawn up before the war. Over 11,000 trains carried the army to the 
offensive. Between 2 and 18 August, 2,150 trains (one every 10 minutes) crossed the 
Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne. In all, the Germans assembled and deployed close to 4 
million men and over 850,000 horses. The years of preparation seemed to pay off, as the 
1 Erich von Falkenhayn to the Parlamentarischer Untersuchungsausschuj3 (the Reichstag commission 
investigating Germany's failure in the war) quoted in Erwin H61zle, ed. Quellen zur Entstehung des Ersten 
Weltkrieges: Internationale Dokumente, 1901-1914 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1978) 
document 13 1, p. 308; For Falkenhayn's role during the outbreak of war see, Holger Afflerbach, 
Falkenhffl: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1996) pp. 147- 
171. 
2 For Moltke's role in the July Crisis and during the outbreak of war, see Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von 
Moltice and the German General Staff. Mifttga and Political Decision-Making in hpperial Germany, 1906- 
1916 (University of Sussex, DPhil Thesis, 1997) pp. 167-203. 
3 Ernst von Wrisberg, Heer und Heimat 1914-1918 (Leipzig: KF Koehler, 192 1) p. 4. A state of "drohende 
Kriegsgefah? ' (imminent threat of war) had been declared on 31 July. The German ultimatum to Russia 
expired at 4: 00pm on I August and the Kaiser signed the mobilization order at 5: 00pm. 
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mobilization proceeded like clockwork. A fortnight after the mobilization order was 
issued, the Westheer was declared "operationsbereit. "' 
The first few days after mobilization also saw the war's first encounters as 
German troops entered Luxemburg and Belgium. On 3 August, Luxemburg fell without 
resistance. ' Belgium, though, offered more difficulty. The taking of the fortress of Li6ge, 
with its rail network so crucial to the German deployment, took longer than planned. 
However, the fortress was eventually neutralized sufficiently to allow the troops of the 
German right wing to pass, creating just a small bump in the road for the advancing 
Germans. ' By 20 August, the powerful German right wing stood ready to advance into 
France and crush the French army in a swift, decisive campaign. 
At first, the plan created by Schlieffen and modified by Moltke seemed to be 
succeeding. The powerful German thrust through Belgium aimed at the French left wing 
took the French command by surprise. Committed to their own offensive in Alsace- 
Lorraine, they possessed few reserves readily available for deployment against the 
German right, and the German armies advanced deep into France pursuing the weak 
French left wing and with it the recently landed British Expeditionary Force. The pre-war 
emphasis on Bewegungskrieg, with its fluid battles and grand envelopments seemed to 
pay off. The German command was oveýoyed and convinced of their impending victory 
against the French. The Imperial headquarters celebrated victory after victory and daily 
anticipated another Sedan. ' 
However, in a story well told, the German advance was brought to a halt on the 
Marne River in a series of battles lasting from 5 to 9 September, and the German right 
wing was forced to retreat by re-deployed French forces and the BEF. With this retreat 
came the end of the Schlieffen/Moltke Plan and also the end of Helmuth von Moltke's 
career as the strategic head of the German army. In the sarcastic words of the Prussian 
Minister of War, "Schlieffen's notes [had] come to an end, and with this, Moltke's 
4 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd 1: Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1925) pp. 128- 
154; Hermann von Staabs, Aufmarsch nach zwei Fronten: Auf Grund der OperationsRhine von 1871-1914 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 1925) pp. 41-42. The Ostheer had been declared "operationsbereif' 3 days earlier. 
5 Der Weltkriejz I, pp. 106-108. 
6 Ibid., pp. 108-120. 
7 This feeling of impending victory was particularly strong amongst the Kaiser's entourage, while the 
professional military were a bit more guarded in their optimism. See the diaries of the head of the Kaiser's 
headquarters, Plessen, and those of the head of his Naval Cabinet, MUller. Hans von Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 
24 August -7 September 1914, BA/MA, W 10/51063 and Admiral Georg MtIller's diary entries reprinted in 
The Kaiser and His Court: The First World War Diaries of Admiral Georg von MUller (ed. Walter G6rlitz) 
(trans. Mervyn Savill) (London: MacDonald, 196 1) pp. 25-28. 
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wits. "' On 14 September, Falkenhayn took up the reins of Germany's strategic direction 
from the shattered Moltke. Thus, to Falkenhayn fell the task of taking the German army 
into poorly charted and largely unknown territory - Stellungskrieg and 
Ermattungsstrategie. 
The German Army at War 
Although the German army went to war in August 1914 with a high reputation, it 
had not fought a war in over 40 years. The army's reputation stemmed initially from its 
successes in the Wars of Unification and was sustained by its peacetime emphasis on 
professional excellence. Probably no other army dedicated as much time to the training 
and the development of its officers. This emphasis was reflected in the myriad of 
professional journals, societies, and schools that developed after 1870. This emphasis 
was also reflected in the debates over tactics and strategy which developed in the years 
before World War I. The professionalism of the German officer corps would be a crucial 
element in their reaction to the changes in warfare which manifested themselves in 1914. 
The intellectual openness of the officer corps allowed for a relatively rapid response to 
the tactical and technical problems of Stellungskrieg. However, before this could occur, 
one of the elements which fostered this climate of intellectual flexibility in the peacetime 
German army created difficulties for the smooth wartime operation of the army. 
The Wilhelmine German army could best be characterized during peacetime as a 
"polycracy, " with many different centers of authority competing with one another for 
power. ' The corps commanders, the Ministry of War, the Military Cabinet, and the 
General Staff all possessed important, often overlapping, powers during peacetime, but 
none had clear authority over the others. ' Additionally, the "Kaiserheer" was in fact 
made up of several armies, as the armies of Bavaria, WUrttemberg, and Saxony all 
8 Quoted in Hans von Zwehl, Erich von FalkenhM: Eine bio"a hische Studie (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1926) 
p. 66. 
91 borrow this term from Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who used the phrase "authoritdre Polyhratie" to describe 
the structure of Wilhelmine government. Das Deutsche Kaiserreich (G6ttingen: Musterschmidt, 1973) pp. 
69-77. 
10 On the tensions between the various higher authorities within the army see "Die Entwicklung des 
Verhaltnisses zwischen Generalstab und Kriegsministeriwn, " unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, 
W10/5021 1; Heinrich Otto Meisner, Der Kriegsminister 1814-1914 (Berlin: Hermann Reinshagen Verlag, 
1940); Rudolf Schmidt-Btickeburg, Das MilitArkabinett der preussischen K6nijze und deutschen Kaiser: 
Seine izeschichtliche Entwickluniz und staatsrechtliche Stellung, 1787-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1933). On 
the role of corps commanders, especially in training [Ausbildung], see Paul Schneider, Organisation des 
Heeres (Berlin: ES Mittler, 193 1) pp. 13-27. 
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Another of his staff, Wilhelm Groener, came to a similar conclusion. He wrote that 
Falkenbayn was "lacking in confidence, vacillating, and easily influenced by others. "" 
Others saw Falkenhayn as pessimistic and, hence, not dedicated to winning the war. " 
Indeed, Falkenhayn's appointment to Chief of the General Staff came as a 
surprise to his contemporaries. " At 53, he was younger than the army's corps and army 
commanders, and his experience in the Grosser Generalstab was very limited. " 
Falkenhayn, however, had been tipped as early as 10 August as a possible replacement 
for Moltke by the Chief of the Military Cabinet, and it was Lyncker and his deputy, 
Oberst Ulrich Freiherr von Marschall, who were instrumental in convincing the Kaiser to 
call Falkenhayn to the post. " Additionally, Falkenhayn was trusted enough by the Kaiser 
and his Military Cabinet to retain his position as Minister of War when he took up the 
post of Chief of the General Staff, an important consolidation of two powerful offices. " 
Falkenhayn had certainly not followed an "ordinary" career for a German officer. 
After attending cadet school, he was commissioned in the Oldenburg Infantry Regiment 
Nr. 91 in 1880. Though he graduated from the Kriegsakademie near the top of his class, 
Falkenhayn spent only 3 years (1893 -1896) in the Grosser Generalstab in Berlin. In 
1896, he left Prussian service for China, where he remained for 6 years, working first as 
an instructor for the Chinese army, then on the staff of the German expeditionary force 
during the Boxer Rebellion, and finally as a representative of the German government 
after the Rebellion. Upon his return to Germany in 1903, Falkenhayn resumed a fairly 
typical career for a German officer; he served as a battalion commander, as a regimental 
commander, and held various posts in the Truppengeneralstab. " 
However, due to his time spent in China and his limited experience in the 
Grosser Generalstab, many officers saw Falkenhayn as an outsider and charged that he 
18 Wilhelm Groener, "Die Strategie Falkenhayns. Herbst 1914, " Paper presented to the 
Mittwochsgesellschaft, 29 May 193 5, in USNA, Groener Papers, M- 13 7, Roll 13. 
19 Plessen characterized Falkenhayn as a "schrecklicher Schwarzseher. " Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 25 
September 1914. 
20 For examples see Gerhard Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 15 September 1914, BA/MA, NL Tappen, N56/1; 
and August von Cramon, Unser 6sterreichisch-ungarischer Bundesizenosse im Weltkriege (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1920) p. 76. 
21 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrie Bd. V: Der Herbst-Feldzug 1914 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1929) p. 8. 
22 Erich von Falkenhayn, diary entry for 10 August 1914, quoted in Zwehl, op. cit., p. 61; Wilhehn Solger, 
"General von Falkenhayn. als Chef des Generalstabes des deutschen Feldheeres, " unpublished manuscript 
in BA/MA, W10/50709, p. 2. 
23 From the very beginning this was looked upon unfavorably by some in the army. See Plessen, 
"Tagebuch, " 15 September 1914. 
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did not belong to the so-called "Schlieffen School. " Indeed, in December 1914 this fact 
was used against Falkenhayn in an attempt to have him removed from the post of Chief 
of the General Staff. Major Hans von Haeften, then adjutant to Moltke and later the 
president of the Reichsarchiv, said in a discussion with the Chancellor, Theobald von 
Bethmann Hollweg, that Falkenhayn lacked training in the "Schlieffen tradition" because 
he "had only served in the General Staff under Schlieffen for a short period. " Haeften 
maintained that because of this failing, Falkenhayn did not have the trust of the army. " 
These criticisms were taken up after the war by historians. Wolfgang Foerster wrote that 
Falkenhayn "did not belong to the close circle of General Staff officers who surrounded 
Graf Schlieffen and upon whom he relied for support. "" 
Despite later criticisms, Falkenhayn's time in China was to prove crucial to his 
career. In China, he came to attention of Kaiser Wilhelm 11 and Heinrich, Prince of 
Prussia. In 1913, due in large part to Imperial favor, Falkenhayn was suddenly thrust into 
the top echelons of the army. The Kaiser, in a move which caused considerable 
consternation in the army, named him to replace Josias von Heeringen as Prussian 
Minister of War. The hitherto obscure 52-year-old Generalmajor was to replace the 
longest serving general in the army. Not since Albrecht von Roon in 1859 had a 
Generalmajor been appointed to such a senior position. Accordingly, Falkenhayn was 
simultaneously advanced from Generalmajor to Generalleutnant, jumping over the heads 
of around 30 more senior Generalmajore -a move which created a further stir. " 
As Minister of War, Falkenhayn played a prominent role in the July Crisis, urging 
the Kaiser towards war at every opportunity, and, as Minister of War, he took to the field 
at the war's outbreak as a member of the Imperial headquarters. " However, his presence 
in the headquarters was unwelcomed by some. Perhaps because Falkenhayn was seen as 
a threat to Moltke, many General Staff officers expressed the opinion that the Minister of 
24 These biographical details are drawn from Affierbach's recent work, FalkenhM pp. 9-190. 
25 Quoted in Ekkehart P. Guth, "Der Gegensatz zwischen dem Oberbefehlshaber Ost und dem Chef des 
Generalstabes des Feldheeres 1914/15: Die Rolle des Majors v. Haeften im Spannungsfeld zwischen 
Hindenburg, Ludendorff und Falkenhayn, " MGM 1/84 p. 90. 
26 Wolfgang Foerster, Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1925) p. 86. For similar 
comments, see Solger, "Falkenhayn, " p. 2. 
27 Falkenhayn was, however, promoted initially "ohne Patent, " meaning his rank did not advance him in 
seniority. Only on 27 January 1914 was he given his Patent. See Falkenhayn's "Personal-Bogen, " in 
USNA, M-137, Roll 13. 
2" A copy of a portion of Falkenhayn's diary from the July Crisis has recently reappeared in the material 
returned to Germany from the former Soviet Union. The entries, from 27 July to 4 August 1914, show 
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War's place during wartime was in Berlin where administrative matters could be dealt 
with, not in the field. Consequently, Falkenhayn was not kept officially informed about 
the course of operations and played no role in the operational decisionmaking prior to his 
appointment as Chief of the General Staff. " 
Though he had not been kept in close touch with the army's operations, 
Falkenhayn was able to remain in unofficial contact with the front. Through these 
contacts, he developed an unfavorable impression of Moltke's handling of the war. Thus, 
he came to the General Staff determined to correct the wrongs he saw in Moltke's 
leadership. First and foremost, this meant to Falkenhayn a firmer control over the war's 
operations. " To this end, the new General Staff Chief immediately moved the OHL from 
Luxemburg to Charleville-Mdzi&res to be closer to the front-line formations. From there, 
Falkenhayn intended to exercise stricter control over the army's tactical formations. " 
Indeed, Falkenhayn was in a better position than Moltke to impose his will over 
the army. As both Chief of the General Staff and Minister of War, he brought two 
competing organizations, a significant portion of the army's bureaucracy, under a unified 
command. For the first time in many years, army planning and administration were under 
the control of one man. Hans von Zwehl, who as Falkenhayn's authorized biographer had 
access to his now-missing personal papers, wrote that even before the war, Falkenhayn 
had harboured the desire of reunifying the General Staff with the Ministry of War. " Now, 
in September 1914, he seemed to have achieved his goal. Falkenhayn believed that by 
retaining both positions, he could better the relationship between the two organizations 
and effect a more efficient running of the war. " In addition to Falkenhayn's control over 
the army bureaucracy, his good relationship with the Military Cabinet, and indeed with 
clearly Falkenhayn's desire for war in July 1914. BA/MA, W 10/5063 5. See also Afflerbach, FalkenhM, 
p. 148ff. 
29 On the policy to keep Falkenhayn out of the decisionmaking process, see Hermann Ritter Mertz von 
Quirnheim to Reichsarchiv, 4 January 1934, BA/MA, W10/51523. 
30 Falkenhayn was not alone in his criticism of Moltke's command style. On 4 September 1914, Wenninger 
reported to Munich that many were fed up with Moltke's "laissez-faire" leadership. Schulte, op. cit., p. 166. 
3' Erich von Falkenhayn, General Headquarters and Its Critical Decisions, 1914-1918 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1919) p. 10; Redern, "Tagebuch, " 25 September 1914. 
32 Zwehl, op. cit., pp. 53-54. Indeed, Falkenhayn is reported to have said in October 1914 that one of the 
war's lessons was that the General Staff should be subordinated to the Ministry of War. Wrisberg, op. cit., 
p. 2 1. 
33 Falkenhayn, General Headquarters, p. 2. The OHL's Biirooffizier, Friedrich Mewes, noticed a significant 
improvement in the relations between the General Staff and the Ministry of War, especially between 
Tappen and Wrisberg. Mewes to Reichsarchiv, 7 December 1920, BA/MA, W 10/51063. 
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the Kaiser himself, ensured that there would be little meddling from above in his 
direction of operations. " 
The Second OHL 
Interestingly, Falkenhayn made few major personnel changes when he took over 
Moltke's position. Although Hermann von Stein, the Generalquartiermeister, was 
removed from the OHL and given a corps command, most of Moltke's original staff 
remained. " The operations officer, Oberst Gerhard Tappen, remained at his post, as did 
the other important Abteilungchefs. Falkenhayn, however, entered his position 
determined to impose his command over the somewhat self-willed staff. Even 
Falkenhayn's critics credit him for his energy in re-invigorating the OHL following the 
Mame crisis. " One observer wrote, "we all lost our heads a bit - with one exception - 
Falkenhayn. A practical man, a Gneisenau, who leads us from retreat to victory! "" 
Although Falkenhayn did not make many personnel changes when he took over 
as Chief of the General Staff, the day to day running of the OHL changed considerably. 
Falkenhayn entered into the position determined to take all important decisions 
personally, later writing that from the day he was named Chief of the General Staff until 
his resignation in 1916, he "assumed sole responsibility for Germany's conduct of the 
war. 9738 Unlike Moltke, Falkenhayn was resolved not to delegate his authority unduly, and 
accordingly he broke up the clique of staff officers who exercised considerable power 
under his predecessor. 39 Under Falkenhayn, the staff officers of the OHL would assume 
the role of advisors rather than decisionmakers. Although he developed a small circle of 
advisors, the new General Staff Chief never took them completely into his confidence. 
34 Groener called Falkenhayn the "ausgesprochene Giinstling des Militdrkabinetts. " Groener, "Die 
Strategie Falkenhayns, " p. 4. For his relationship with the Kaiser, see Afflerbach, "Wilhelm as Supreme 
Warlord, " pp. 433443, passim. 
35 Stein was replaced by Generalmajor von Voigts-Rhetz, who died of a heart-attack shortly after assuming 
the position. Voigts-Rhetz was replaced by Generalmajor Adolph Wild von Hohenborn. (See below. ) 
36 Der Weltkrieg V, pp. 8-9; Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege Vol. 2 
(Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1921) p. 44. 
37 Wenninger to his wife, 10 October 1914, in Schulte, op. cit., p. 177. 
38 Falkenhayn, General Headguarters, p. 1. 
39 After the war, it was claimed a type of camarilla had developed in the OHL under Moltke, composed of 
the heads of the Operations-, Nachrichten-, Politischen-, and Centralabteilungen (Tappen, Hentsch, 
Dommes, and Fabeck). Mewes to Reichsarchiv, 7 December 1920, BA/MA, W10/51063. See also Wilhelm 
Groener, Lebenserinnerungen (ed. Friedrich Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen) (GOttingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1957), p. 188; Wenninger, "Tagebuch, " 14115 September 1914, in Schulte, op. cit., p. 174. 
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His distance from even his closest staff earned him the sobriquet, "der einsame 
Feldherr. "" 
Over time, a circle of advisors developed within the new General Staff Chief s 
staff, with whom he debated, often quite vehemently, different courses of action. 
Although the composition of this group changed from time to time, several officers 
remained close to Falkenhayn throughout his tenure. The first of this group was the 
OHL's operations officer, Gerhard Tappen. Almost universally disliked, " Tappen was 
once described condescendingly by Falkenhayn as his "registrar. "" Despite this remark, 
as Tappen's diary shows, he functioned as a sounding board for Falkenhayn's ideas 
through the war and on occasion exercised considerable influence over the General Staff 
Chief. 
Falkenhayn would often discuss events with his operations officer, and the two 
would often disagree violently as to the proper course of action. Tappen later described 
these exchanges: 
Die Ansichten des Gens. v. Falkenhayn waren ja oft nicht leicht zu erraten. Er 
warf manchmal eine Gedanken hin, der vielleicht gar nicht seiner Ansicht 
entsprach, nur um meinen Widerspruch hervorzurufen. Wenn es dann manchmal 
zu recht gereizten und unerquicklichen Auseinandersetzungen gekommen war, 
sagte er schliesslich, wenn ich meinen Standpunkt sehr scharf betont hatte, das es 
sei ja auch seine Ansicht. Ich habe dabei oft das GeMW gehabt, dass es zu einem 
völligen Bruch zwischen uns kommen müsse. ` 
This tension led on at least one occasion to Tappen proffering his resignation. " 
The second figure in Falkenhayn's inner core of advisors was an old friend, 
Generalmajor Adolph Wild von Hohenbom. "' In November 1914, Wild was assigned to 
M) Hermann Ziese-Beringer, Der einsame Feldherr: Die Wahrheit über Verdun 2 Vols. (Berlin: Frundsberg- 
Verlag, 1933). 
41 Max Bauer described Tappen to bis wife: "Wir hassen ... [ihn] alle von ganzer 
Seele. Er besitzt alle 
schlechten Eigenschaften, Egoismus, Arroganz, Unaufrichtigkeit, Unkenntnis und Dummheit in der 
Potenz! ' Bauer to his wife, 17 November 1915, quoted in Adolf Vogt, Oberst Max Bauer: 
Generalstabsoffizier im Zwielicht 1869-1929 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1974) p. 595. For other examples 
see Fritz von Loßberg, Meine Tätigkeit im 
ýVeltkrieg, 1914-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1939) pp. 127-128; 
Rauch to his wife, 11 January 1915, BA/MA, WIO/51305. 
42 Falkenhayn once remarked to Groener, "... in operativen Dingen hat Tappen gar keinen Einfluss auf mich. 
Aber er ist für mich ein vortrefflicher Registrator. " Groener, Lebenserinnerungen p. 188. See also 
Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 232. 
43 Gerhard Tappen, Kriegserinnerunizen unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, W 10/50661, pp. 92-93. 
44 Ibid., p. 165. Following a particularly violent argument concerning the attack on Verdun, Falkenhayn told 
Tappen, "I will not have a second Chief next to me. " 
45 Plessen, no fan of Falkenhayn's, was opposed to Wild being named Generalquartiermeister because of 
his closeness with Falkenhayn. Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 10 November 1914. 
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the OHL to replace the recently deceased Voigts-Rhetz as Generalquartiermeister. 
Although the traditional role of a Generalquartiermeister was see to the smooth 
operation of the lines of communication, Wild wrote to his wife about the different 
nature of his appointment: "... Falkenhayn ... said to me that 
he needs someone who can 
advise and support him, be his second conscience, someone who can help him bear the 
responsibility. "" Wild functioned in this role as an "unverantwortfiche Ratgeber" 
throughout Falkenhayn's time as Chief of the General Staff, even after he left the OHL. 
Falkenhayn's continued trust in Wild was shown when he named Wild to take over as 
Minister of War in January 1915 after intrigues had forced Falkenhayn to give up his 
position of Minister of War. " 
Wild's successor as Generalquartiermeister, Generalleutnant Hugo Freiherr von 
Freytag-Loringhoven, was the last of Falkenhayn's inner circle. Freytag, who before and 
after the war distinguished himself as a military writer, often discussed operations with 
Falkenhayn and participated in the OHL's evening "Flasterklub, " at which recent events 
were discussed. "' Despite their frequent discussions, however, Freytag ultimately 
concluded that his influence over Falkenhayn was limited. After the war he wrote, "the 
final decisions were always [Falkenhayn's] exclusive property ... Basically he 
lacked a 
truly trusted helper with whom he could have talked everything over. "" 
Outside of these three advisors, the other members of the OHL functioned largely 
as specialists within their areas of responsibility. Their influence over operational 
decisions varied, but was usually quite limited. Oberst Wilhelm Groener, as the head of 
the railway section, played an important role in planning and as such was never far from 
the decisionmaking center. Others played important roles in assessing the lessons of 
Stellungskrieg. Oberst Max Bauer was responsible for "heavy artillery. " Together with 
Oberst Fritz von LoBberg, " who functioned as the operations officer on the Western 
Front when the OHL moved to the east in spring 1915, and with Hauptmann Christian 
46 Wild to his wife, 10 November 1914, BA/MA, NL Wild, N44/3. 
47 , ... the personality of the new 
Minister of War, Lieut. -General Wild von Hohenborn, guaranteed the 
maintenance of [the co-operation between the General Staff and the Ministry of War]. " Falkenhayn, 
General Headguarters p. 3. Wild's close relationship with Lyncker must also have helped maintain smooth 
relations between the higher authorities of the army. See Wild to his wife, II November 1914, BA/MA, 
N44/3. 
48 Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, Menschen und Dinge, wie ich sie in meinem Leben sah (Berlin: 
ES Mittler, 1923) pp. 269-270. 
49 Ibid., p. 269. 
50 LoBberg was described as a "creature of Falkenhayn's" (! ) by a disgruntled Max Hoffinan, War Diaries 
and Other Pgpers (Vol. 1) (trans. Eric Sutton) (London: Martin Secker, 1929) p. 88. 
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Harbou, Bauer updated the army's regulations during the summer of 1915 taking into 
account the lessons of the war to that date. " 
Falkenhayn's First Strategic Decisions 
The German defeat at the Battle of the Mame marked the failure of German plans 
and left the army in a precarious position. Before being replaced as Chief of the General 
Staff, Moltke had ordered a general retreat. The armies of the right wing (I" and 2nd) 
withdrew to the Aisne River, while the P, 4h, and 5th Armies were withdrawn to a line 
running from Reims to north of Verdun . 
51 Moltke also ordered that the 6th and 7t" Armies 
end their attempts to break through the French position to the south and set up defensive 
positions. Keeping with pre-war ideas, this retreat was to be a purely tactical measure, 
designed to buy time to bring up sufficient forces to renew the offensive on the right 
wing. To this end, Moltke initially ordered the 7th Army to the extreme right flank of the 
army. Pressure from Entente forces, however, forced him to deploy the 7th Army to fill 
the hole which had arisen between the retreating 1" and 2"d Armies. 
When Falkenhayn replaced Moltke on 14 September, this strategic re-deployment 
had been largely completed. The I" Army stood on the Aisne River with its right flank 
on the Oise. The 7h Army had been brought up from Alsace to fill the gap between the 
1" and the 2nd Armies and it too stood on the Aisne. The 2nd Army's right flank 
connected with the 7h north of Reims and the P, 4th, and 5h Armies held a line running 
from Prosnes east to Verdun. Each army had established field positions and seemed in a 
good position to repel any frontal attacks from the enemy. The real weakness to the 
German army came from the extreme right wing. There, ls'Army's right flank was left 
hanging unprotected, vulnerable to an envelopment by French forces being shifted from 
the south. " 
The new German command needed to come up with an alternative plan of 
operation to restart the stalled offensive and defeat the French before the situation in the 
east became unmanageable. Groener believed that the German high command had the 
following options in mid-September 1914: 
51 Bauer, op. cit., p. 86; Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the 
British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 1995) pp. 158-170. (See Chapter 6. ) 
52 Tluoughout this chapter, please refer to Map 2 located at the end of this work. 
53 Der Welficrieg V, pp. 17-20. 
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1. To try once again to throw back the French through an immediate frontal "mass 
attack" [Massenangriffl before the French could effect an envelopment of our 
right wing. 
2. To go on the defensive behind the Aisne and to secure the right wing with large 
numbers of reserves. 
3. To continue the retreat and thereby effect a complete re-grouping of the 
German forces [Streitkrdfte] in order to undertake a new operation against the left 
Rank of the French army. " 
The new Chief of the General Staff believed that a speedy decision could still be 
reached on the Western Front, " and during the night of 14/15 September, he drew up a 
new plan of operation, choosing Groener's third option. Falkenhayn resolved to carry out 
an "eccentric" withdrawal to protect the vulnerable right flank and buy ftirther time for a 
strategic regrouping. He intended to order the I st Army to "break off from the enemy and 
to establish ... the 
line Artems-La Fere-Nouvion Catillon. " Falkenhayn intended with this 
manoeuvre to secure his right flank from French envelopment, await the arrival of the Oh 
Army, which was in transit from Lorraine, and to buy time to regroup the German forces 
for another assault on the French left wing. This renewed offensive would begin on 18 
September with the 5th Army and would proceed "in echelon" over the next few days, 
culminating in the 6h Army's envelopment of the French forces from the extreme right 
wing. 56 
Falkenhayn was dissuaded, however, from this plan by Tappen, who returned 
from a tour of the front on 15 September. Tappen put forward a number of arguments to 
convince Falkenhayn not to institute his initial intentions. First, he believed the French to 
be exhausted [erschdpffl and argued that only one final push was needed to decide the 
campaign. Further, Tappen argued that German morale was already shaken by the 
withdrawal after the defeat at the Marne and that any addition withdrawals would have 
an adverse effect on the morale of the German troops. " Although he did not completely 
54 Groener, Lebenserinnerungen p. 179. 
55 Wenninger to Bavarian Ministry of War, 14 September 1914, in Schulte, pp. 175-176. 
56 Erich von Falkenhayn, "Operationsplan am 15.9.14, " quoted in a letter from the Reichsarchiv to Tappen, 
26 February 1926, BA/MA, N56/3; Der Weltkrieg V, pp. 20-22. 
57 There is some evidence to suggest this belief came from the I' Army itself On 21 September 1914, 
Tappen told Hermann Ritter Mertz von Quirnheim, the la of the 6h Army, that the I" Army had declared its 
troops would not bear fin-ther retreat. Mertz to Reicharchiv, 24 January 1924, BA/MA, W 10/51177. 
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agree with Tappen's assessment, Falkenhayn was generally convinced by his arguments 
and agreed to scrap the plan of the 15'h. "' 
Tappen's reasoning displays several important characteristics that would re- 
appear throughout the war. His assumptions, which became Falkenhayn's as well, would 
have far-reaching consequences. First, Tappen, and Falkenhayn with him, underestimated 
the French will power and their ability to continue resistance. At the same time, both men 
overestimated German strength, which by this point was ebbing away quickly. Based on 
this belief, Falkenhayn was convinced that the French were at the end of their strength 
and that only one final push was needed to win the war. The General Staff Chief would 
again seriously underestimate the strength of his enemies before the French offensive in 
the autumn of 1915 and at the beginning of his offensive at Verdun in early 1916. 
Additionally, both men overestimated the moral effect of a withdrawal upon their own 
troops. This belief caused them to rule out any withdrawal, even tactical, by German 
forces. By November, this idea was translated into policy which solidified the trench line. 
Falkenhayn would write: "Hold what you have, and never voluntarily surrender a square 
foot of land in the west. "" 
More immediately, Falkenhayn accepted Tappen's opinion that the French were 
nearly exhausted and that they offered no pressing threat to the army's right wing. With 
ff Ih M this pressing threat gone, he believed there was su icient time to bring up the 6 Ar y 
without having to execute a strategic withdrawal. From 15 to 19 September, various 
orders to renew the offensive went forth from the OHL. BUlow's army group (It, 2 nd , and 
701 Armies) was allowed to undertake its planned offensive. The 3 rd , 4h, and 5th Armies 
were ordered to renew their assaults on the existing French positions. ' These new attacks 
were to go forward quickly, "with the intention of passing under the enemy long-range 
artillery, overrunning the French infantry positions and capturing as quickly as possible 
the numerous enemy artillery pieces. " These attacks were not intended to be decisive in 
themselves; rather they were to weaken the French further, to prevent them from shifting 
58 Der Weltkrieg V, p. 2 1. Herbert Rosinski judged this decision to be the real beginning of trench warfare, 
writing . ..... it is the 
15th [of September], the morning on which Falkenhayn decided against a return to the 
mobile strategy of the first weeks, that must be considered the real turningpoint of the war. " Herbert 
Rosinski, The German (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 1944) p. 9 1. Italics in the original. 
59 Falkenhayn to Colmar von der Goltz, 16 November 1914, quoted in Der Weltkrieg V, p. 585. 
Falkenhayn's policy may also have been influenced by the Kaiser's view on retreat. On 7 September, he 
had ordered: "Angreifen, solange es geht - unter keinen Umständen einen Schritt züruck. " Quoted in 
Mombauer, op. cit., p. 228. 
60 Der Weltlcrielz V, pp. 34-55. 
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additional forces to their left wing, and to demonstrate to the Entente that the German 
offensive strength was not exhausted. " 
Although he had rejected a tactical withdrawal, Falkenhayn decided to carry out a 
grand strategic flanking maneuver along the lines of Schlieffen. ' The ultimate decision 
was to come from the intervention of the 6th Army on the right wing, which had begun its 
re-deployment on 17 September. He informed the Bavarian Kronprinz Rupprecht, the 
commander of the 6h Army, that "the main goal of the [6h] Army must be ... to achieve 
the decision of battle [Schlachtentscheidung] on the right wing of the army as soon as 
possible. 116' However, by the 18d, the French were again threatening the German right 
with envelopment with units from quieter areas of the front. ' This forced Falkenhayn to 
set the 6th Amy a secondary task. Falkenhayn wrote, "6 th Army must use the first 
arriving units ... to throw 
back the enemy force which has recently arrived on the right 
flank of the army and thereby take over the task of securing the army's right flank. "0 The 
General Staff Chief hoped, however, that the French units would be in no condition to 
put up a determined fight. He informed Rupprecht that the French units were now 
hopelessly "mixed with one another" and that many French units on their left wing had 
previously been defeated by the 6th Army in Lorraine. 66 
The French, however, were not as exhausted as Tappen and Falkenhayn believed 
and the German attacks were unsuccessful in preventing them from transferring troops to 
their left wing. Using their better rail communications, they were able to shift their forces 
faster than the Germans. " Thus, as the first units of the 6h Army arrived on the German 
right wing, they were thrown immediately into battle to defend against a French 
envelopment. The 6th Army's secondary task, the protection of the right wing, became of 
necessity its primary task. For the next several weeks, the two opponents fed units, 
61 [Wilhelm] Solger, "Die Umstellung der Ob. Heeres-Ltg. vom Bewegungs- zum Stellungs-Krieg 
(DC. /X. 1914), " (Forschungsarbeit zu Band V), unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, W10/5115 1, pp. 8-9 
and pp. II- 12. 
62 Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma. of the Battle of Annihilation (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986) pp. 
128-129. 
6' Falkenhayn to 6h Army, 18 September 1914, quoted in Solger, "Umstehung, " p. 15. 
64 Der Weltkrieg V, P. 6 1. 
65 Falkenhayn to 6h Army, 18 September 1914, quoted in Solger, "Umstellung, " p. 15. 
66 Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayem, Mein Kriegstagýbuch Vol I (ed. Eugen von Frauenholz) (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1929) p. 127. 
67 Minist6re de la Guerre, Les Armdes Francaise dans, la Grande Guerre Tome I\Vol. 4: La Bataille de 
I'Aisne, la Course A la Mer, la Bataille des Flanders, les Qpýrations sur le Front Stabilisd (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 193 3) pp. 147-176 
98 
stripped from quieter sections of the front, on to the western flank piecemeal, in an 
attempt to outflank each other. " 
After the failure of the 6th Army to decide the issue with a flank attack, 
Falkenhayn again returned to the idea of building a strong strike force on the extreme 
right wing. As part of this attempt, the 4h Army was rebuilt out of the Ell Reserve Corps, 
which had recently been freed for further action with the fall of Antwerp, and four 
reserve corps, which had been formed after the war's outbreak by volunteers. ' This new 
attack was supplied liberally with the heavy artillery freed by the capture of Antwerp. " 
On 10 October, Falkenhayn assigned the 4th Army its tasks: "The 4th Army is to advance, 
without regardfor casualties, with its right wing resting on the coast, first on the 
fortresses of Dunkirk and Calais ... then to swing south ... at 
St. Omer. "" In conjunction 
with the 6th Army, the 4th Army was to smash the vulnerable left flank of the Entente 
forces and thereby deal the enemy an "annihilating blow. "" 
By 21 October, Falkenhayn's offensive was in progress. However, the desired 
results were again lacking. The 4th Army, composed mainly of hastily trained recruits, 
moved only slowly forward. Once again, the enemy was not as weak as the OHL had 
believed and was able to hold off the German attacks from hurriedly prepared defensive 
positions. Yet the 4th and 6th Armies continued attacking, in the belief that the enemy was 
near collapse, suffering severe casualties in frontal attacks poorly supported by artillery 
preparation. ' From mid-October to the beginning of November, the 4th Army had 
suffered 39,000 dead and wounded and 13,000 missing. The 6th Army had lost 27,000 
casualties and 1,000 missing. ' 
By early November it had become clear that the campaign would not be decided 
in Flanders. However, refusing for the moment to shift the main German effort to the 
east, Falkenhayn decided to continue operations at Ypres. Instead of attempting to win a 
"decisive" battle, the General Staff Chief now aimed at a more limited goal. He now 
68 For the details of this stage in the "race to the sea, " see Der Weltkri V, pp. 69-118. 
69 Kriegsministerium, MI Nr. 3531/14 Al, 16 August 1914, in USNA, Documents of the Royal Prussian 
Military Cabinet (Microfihn Publication M-962), Roll 3; Wrisberg, op. cit., pp. 15-19. 
70 This artillery force amounted to 20 batteries of heavy field howitzers, 12 batteries of 21 -cm howitzers, 
and 6 batteries of 10-cm cannon. Der Weldcrieg V, p. 282. 
71 Quoted in Der Weltkrie V, p. 279. Italics added. 
72 Mertz to Reichsarchiv, 24 January 1924, BA/MA, W10/51177. 
73 For the most recent account from the German perspective, which strips away much of the myth 
surrounding this battle, see Karl Unruh, Langemarck: Legende und Wirklichkeit (Koblenz: Bernard & 
Graefe, 1986). 
74 Der Weltkrieg V, p. 40 1. 
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instructed the 4h Army to seize Ypres, "the central point of the enemy's defensive 
position, " and Mount Kernmel. Although this would only be a "local result, " Falkenhayn 
believed it would be of great value to the overall situation on the Western Front. " 
it soon became clear, however, that even this limited goal would be more difficult 
than anticipated. On 8 November, Falkenhayn informed the Kaiser that operations in 
Flanders had come to a standstill, "the barbed wire cannot be crossed. " Despite being 
pressured by the 4th and 6d' Armies to continue the offensive, 76 two days later he told the 
Kaiser that he intended to call off the operations in Flanders as soon as the town of Ypres 
had been taken. The General Staff Chief felt that the Germans "could no longer reckon 
on any great success" in the weSt. 77 The German troops were exhausted and the 
ammunition for the heavy artillery was almost completely spent . 
7' Even the limited goal 
of capturing Ypres eluded the Germans, and Falkenhayn was forced to order the 
Westheer onto the defensive while he dealt with the growing threat in the east. 79 
The campaign's failure could be put down to a number factors, some of which 
were temporary. The German attacks, though supported by the siege train freed by the 
fall of Antwerp, lacked munitions and thus could not be properly supported by heavy 
artillery. Second, the four reserve corps employed were inadequately trained and led, and 
were completely incapable of the demands of conducting a breakthrough of a prepared 
enemy position, even one as primitively prepared as the positions at Ypres. Third, the 
attacks generally proceeded without proper artillery preparation or support, the infantry 
believing speed to be more important than careful preparation. The Ypres offensive, 
however, had shown forcefully the difficulties of attempting a "decisive" battle under the 
conditions of 1914. 
75 AOK 4, "Kriegstagebuch, " 4 November 1914, quoted in "Die deutsche Oberste Heeresleitung im Westen 
von 4. -28. November 1914, " (Forschungsarbeit zu Bd. Vl), unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, 
W10/51159, p. 2 (Hereafter, "Die OHL im Westen"); Mertz, "Tagebuch, " 12 November 1914, BA/MA, 
W 10/51177; Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 4 November 1914. 
76 Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen to Reichsarchiv, 3 November 1926, BA/MA, W 10/51176; "Die OHL 
im Westen, " p. 15. 
77 Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 8 and 10 November 1914; Falkenhayn, General Headguarters, pp. 33-34. 
78 By 12 November, the German army had munitions remaining for only 6 more days of combat. Redern, 
"Tagebuch, " 12 November 1914; Mertz recalled that on at least one occasion, German officers had to 
threaten their men with pistols to get them out of the trenches to attack the enemy. Mertz to Reichsarchiv, 
24 January 1924, BA/MA, W 1015 1177. In 10 days of combat around Ypres, the attacking units had 
suffered 160,000 casualties. Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 16 November 1914. 
79 Despite the "decisive" victory at Tannenberg, the Russians were threatening to knock Austria-Hungary 
from the war. The best efforts of the German units in the east were having little effect against the Russian 
"steamroller. " Reinforcement was necessary to stabilize the front and inflict a setback upon the Russians. 
See Der Weltkrieg VI, pp. 34-218; Herwig, op. cit., pp. 106-113. 
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The new General Staff Chief s attempt at bringing the war to a successffil 
conclusion in the west had failed. The French had matched his flanking movements at 
each step and neither side had been able to gain an advantage. Further, the French troops 
were not as exhausted as Falkenhayn and Tappen continually held and German troops 
were more fatigued than either believed. Wherever the opposing sides met each other, 
progress came to a halt and improvised field positions arose. All attempts to break 
through these positions were repulsed with great loss. By the end of the Ypres campaign, 
the German army was "exhausted. " Since the beginning of the war, it had suffered some 
800,000 casualties, including some 116,000 dead. " With the failure to bring the war 
rapidly to a close in the west, Germany now faced the nightmare of a two-front war 
against roughly equal opponents. Moltke the Elder's great fear, a Volkskrieg of 
indeterminate duration, had come to pass. 
Falkenhayn's New Strategic Direction 
The failure at Ypres had far-reaching consequences. First, the inability to break 
through the primitive Entente trenches meant that mobility could not be restored to the 
front. Over the next several months, these primitive trenches would become increasingly 
sophisticated and even more difficult to break through. Second, the failure of the 
offensive and the high casualties had caused Falkenhayn to re-think fundamentally 
German strategy. Although the Reichsarchiv's claim that he went through an "inner 
change" at this stage that led him to question his ability as Chief of the General Staff is 
overstated, clearly the failure of all his attempts to bring the war to a decisive end had an 
impact upon him. " Wild wrote to his wife that Falkenhayn, "carries with difficulty the 
weight of the responsibility of being both Minister of War and General Staff Chief, and is 
not sure of himself. "" 
From this experience, however, the General Staff Chief reached important 
conclusions about the future course of the war. Already by early November he was 
convinced that "decisive" victory was not possible with the forces at Germany's disposal 
in the west. The question then arose, whether or not to shift the focus of German efforts 
80 Herwig, op. cit., p. 119. 
8' Der Weltkrieg VI, p. 43 7; Afflerbach, Ealken phM, pp. 211-212. The Reichsarchiv's claim may also have 
been an attempt to cast aspersions upon Falkenhayn's subsequent strategic decisions. 
82 Wild to his wife, 10 November 1914, N324/44. The failure at Ypres also led others in the army to 
question Falkenhayn's competence see, Afflerbach, FalkenhM pp. 211-217. 
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to the east, a strategy favored by a number of German leaders, most notably Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff. With respect for Russia's military potential, the General Staff Chief 
rejected this. Not for the last time, Falkenhayn raised the spectre of Napoleon's 
experience in Russia as a justification for not becoming involved deeply in the east. " 
The day he called off the offensive at Ypres, Falkenhayn responded to 
Hindenburg's request for additional troops. In his letter, the General Staff Chief 
expressed his doubts as to whether or not Germany could expect anything more than 
limited results under current conditions. " He wrote that it would be easier for him to 
send reinforcement to the east 
... wenn eine 
begründete Hoffnung bestände, dass das Eintreffen neuer Kräfte in 
dem in den Grenzen des Möglichen liegenden Umfange eine endgültige 
Entscheidung im Osten herbeiführen würde. Diese Hoffnung besteht indessen 
augenscheinlich nicht. Im besten Falle wird es uns gelingen, den Feind hinter die 
Narew- und Weichsel-Linie zurückzudrücken und ihn zur Räumung Galiziens zu 
zwingen. Eine Kriegsentscheidung liegt darin an sich noch nicht, wenn ich auch 
nicht bestreiten kann, dass eine solcher Erfolg von weittragender politischer 
Bedeutung sein kann. " 
The clear difficulties of finding a military solution to the war with the forces at 
Germany's disposal led Falkenhayn to take a radical step. He now asked the Chancellor 
to find a diplomatic solution to Germany's strategic situation, admitting that there was no 
military solution. " The new General Staff Chief had returned to an idea from Moltke the 
Elder's war plans; military success would serve as a springboard for a negotiated peace 
with at least one of Germany's enemies. 
On 18 November, Falkenhayn met with Bethmann and asked him to conclude a 
separate peace with one of Germany's enemies. The General Staff Chief believed that 
this was the only way in which sufficient forces could be collected to achieve a 
"decisive" victory against the remaining enemies. Bethmann later conveyed the content 
of the conversation to the Under State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Arthur 
Zimmermann: 
This is how General von Falkenhayn judges the situation: 
83 Falkenhayn, General HeadgUarters, p. 14 and p. 3 5. 
84 Ibid., p. 35. 
85 Falkenhayn to Hindenburg, 18 November 1914, quoted in Der Weltkrieg VI, p. 95. 
86 Herwig, op. cit., p. 117. Herwig's statement that this was the "first time in German history" that a Chief of 
Staff asked a Chancellor to negotiate a peace is a bit too sweeping. Clearly, Moltke the Elder worked 
closely with Bismarck. He also wrote into his war plans after 1870 the necessity of coming to terms with 
his enemy after initial victories, a task which would fall to Germany's diplomats. 
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As long as Russia, France and England stay together it is impossible for us 
to defeat our opponents in such a way that we can make a decent peace. On the 
contrary we would rim the risk of slowly exhausting ourselves. Either Russia or 
France must be detached. If we can succeed in causing Russia to make peace - 
and in first line this is what we should try to do - then we will be able to defeat 
France and England so decisively that we could dictate the peace.... It is, 
however, to be expected with certainty that if Russia should make peace, France 
would also sing a different tune. Then, if England were not completely 
acquiescent we would wear her down, starving her out by means of a blockade 
based in Belgium, even though some months would be necessary to do so. " 
Falkenhayn felt that the "psychological moment for contact with Russia would be at hand 
if General Hindenburg should succeed in defeating the Russians in the battles now taking 
place. " With Russia out of the picture, Germany could concentrate her forces, and 
perhaps count on Austro-Hungarian aid, to defeat her enemies in the west. 
Falkenhayn's conversation with Bethmann revealed the General Staff Chief s 
views about Germany's enemies. Clearly, he felt that peace could be obtained easily with 
Russia and that between the two countries there was no deep conflict. He also believed 
that, if a negotiated peace could be agreed with Russia, it was likely France would 
follow. Great Britain was another matter. Falkenhayn believed that Britain was 
Germany's main enemy and that Britain's "Vernichtungswille" and hatred for Germany 
meant a negotiated peace between the two nations was almost impossible. " Only after 
her Continental allies had been defeated could Britain herself be truly engaged. " 
Falkenhayn had, in essence, come to a strategy reminiscent of DelbrUck's 
Ermattungsstrategie. After November 1914, he no longer aimed at a dictated peace 
brought about by a decisive victory, at least in the first stage of the war. Instead, the 
General Staff Chief now aimed at detaching at first one of his enemies from the anti- 
German coalition. With one front gone, sufficient forces would be available to force 
Germany's other enemies to the peace table. Rather than great "decisive" battles, smaller 
victories would serve a political goal - they would convince Germany's enemies that the 
87 Bethmann to Zimmermann, 18 November 1914, printed in Paul R. Sweet, "Leaders and Policies: 
Germany in the Winter of 1914-1915, " Journal of Central European Affairs Vol. XVI Nr. 3 (1956) p. 232. 
88 Falkenhayn's view that Britain would fight on even after her Continental allies had been defeated was 
shared by his predecessor, Moltke the Younger. See Hermann von Kuhl, Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918 Vol. I 
(Berlin: W. Kolk, 1929) p. 165. 
89 Falkenhayn wrote that Britain planned to win the war by following a strategy of "starvation and 
attrition. " Falkenhayn, General Headguarters pp. 23-24; Afflerbach, FalkenhM pp. 198-210. 
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price of continuing the war was too high to pay. With Germany's Continental enemies 
gone, she would be free to fight a long war against her real enemy, Great Britain. 
Stellungskrieg and Doctrine 
While the Germany army went to war in 1914 well-equipped with entrenching 
tools, they had always looked upon trenches and field fortifications as temporary tactical 
devices. Thus, the section on defense in the 1906 edition of the Exerzier-Reglement far 
die Infanterie ran: 
A defense, which is directed at not only to repelling an attack, but also at 
bringing about a victory, must be paired with offensive action. A defensive 
position, then, only has value when it forces the enemy to attack, thereby 
producing ... the required time or the 
favorable conditions necessary for the 
defender's own attack. ' 
Bewegungskrieg, not Stellungskrieg, was to be the method of waging war and, as we 
have seen in Chapter 3, German writers before the war stressed that only through 
offensive action could a decision be reached. 
The failure of Falkenhayn's flank attacks brought the whole Western Front to a 
standstill. By mid-November 1914, the German and Entente forces found themselves 
facing each other in almost unbroken trenches running from the Channel coast to the 
Swiss border. While these field positions were rudimentary compared with the 
sophisticated systems of later in the war, they were sufficiently strong to repel all but the 
most determined and well-supported attacks. The strength of defensive weapons, initially 
the magazine-fed rifle and the artillery piece, but increasingly as the war progressed the 
machinegun and trench mortar, combined with the protection offered by earthworks, 
brought an end to the war of movement and ushered in position warfare. " Thus, by early 
November 1914, the German army faced not only a crisis in strategy, but also a doctrinal 
crisis. 
This shift from Bewegungskrieg to Stellungskrieg came in stages, as both sides 
shifted forces to their northernmost flanks in the attempt to outflank each other. Despite 
its gradual appearance, the shift from a war of movement proved a shock to German 
90 Kriegstninisterium, Exerzier-Reglement fdr die Infanterie 1906, para. 398-399. 
91 See General der Infanterie a. D. Wollwarth, "Die Ursachen des Stellungskrieges, " Deutsche Wehr Nr. 18 
(3 May 1934) p. 271; Hew Strachan, EuroRean Armies and the Conduct of War (London: George Allen & 
Unwin, 1983) pp. 137ff. 
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soldiers. On 26 September, Tappen recorded in his diary, "it appears more and more that 
we have before us field fortifications across the entire front -a completely newform of 
warfare. " Unlike Tappen, Major von Redern, the first general staff officer of the 
Operationsabteilung, recognized this situation, recording in his diary, "it is a repetition 
of the conditions of the Russo-Japanese War. We stand facing the Entente armies in an 
unbroken line. "" Plessen recorded the potential problem this would cause for Germany: 
"It has turned out to be a regular war of siege [Belagerungskrieg], which may last a long 
time, and we do not have the time. "' 
Despite their abhorrence of Stellungskrieg, the German army was in fact in a 
relatively good position both conceptually and materially to adjust to its inception in 
1914. In intellectual terms, before the war, a number of authors had seen the necessity of 
training for "prepared attacks" as well as "encounter battles. " Although Sigismund von 
Schlichting is today better remembered for his ideas about the operational level of war, 
he was also a proponent of the "prepared attack7- attacks which would need to be 
carefully prepared by artillery and rifle fire. Schlichting was successful in having his 
ideas incorporated into the drill regulations in 1888. In theory, this led the Germans to 
place importance on achieving fire superiority before any assault on an enemy prepared 
position. " The advent of Stellungskrieg would cause a return to these ideas. 
The ability to adapt to the new conditions was further helped by the material 
factors in the German army. In 1914, the German army was unusually well equipped with 
heavy artillery. This was especially the case with howitzers. The German army went to 
war with over 950 light field howitzers (10.5 cm), 18 to each active division, and over 
450 heavy field howitzers (15 cm) deployed with its active corps. These artillery pieces 
fired at a high angle, which was crucial for hitting entrenched and defiladed targets. 
Additionally, their high angle of fire allowed them to be deployed in defilade much more 
easily than flat-trajectory guns. " The German army possessed a large number of 
Minenwerfer, or trench mortars. These weapons were relative light and could lob 
extremely heavy charges at very high angles. They were, thus, ideal for deployment with 
92 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 26 September 1914. Italics added. 
93 Redern, "Kriegstagebuch, " 20 September 1914. 
94 Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 9 November 1914. 
95 William Balck, "Ueber den Infantrieangriff, " M-W Nr. 29 (1919) pp. 561-566. 
96 By comparison, the French, reliant as they were on the 75mm gun, had no howitzers below army level at 
the war's outbreak. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, On Artillely (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995) pp. 31-38. 
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the infantry in the forward Positions. " These high-angle weapons would play a crucial 
role in trench warfare. 
By November 1914, the German army was not blind to the shortcomings in its 
pre-war doctrine. The campaign in the west since August had showed some glaring 
tactical problems in the German army. German units, accustomed as they were to 
Bewegungskrieg, often attacked without adequate preparation. Generalleutnant Karl 
Ritter von Wenninger, the Bavarian military plenipotentiary in the OHL, recorded this: 
"The attacking infantry are determined not to wait for artillery preparation. They are 
governed completely by the phrase: 'Forward, cost what it may. "" Other German 
officers made similar observations. This attitude, in part brought on by the lack of any 
combined arms regulations, had cost the German army, especially the officer corps, 
dearly in the early battles. " It was clear by late 1914 that the Germans would have to 
rethink their method of attack in the light of the prevalent tactical conditions. " The 
experience of the III Army Corps at Vailly in late October pointed one way out of this 
tactical dilemma. 
The III Corps, part of the I" Army, had retreated to the Aisne River following the 
Battle of the Marne. There, they took up defensive positions on the north bank of the 
river, which at 50-65 meters in width was a formidable obstacle. Their position was 
further strengthened by the fact that they controlled the high ground on the north bank of 
the river. However, Entente forces had managed to cross the river in several areas and 
gain a bridgehead that threatened the German defenses. The III Corps therefore resolved 
to carry out an attack on the French positions at Vailly to clear the north bank of the 
enemy. "' This battle became a model "attack with limited objectives" for the German 
army, the lessons from which were studied by the army's other units and which were put 
into practice later in the war. " 
97 On Minenwerfers see, Bruce I. Gudmundsson, "Trench Mortars, " Tactical Notebook March 1992. 
98 Quoted in Schulte, op. cit., p. 173. Wenninger was quoting paragraph 265 of the Exerzier-Rejzlement far 
die Infanterie. 
99 Liebmann, "Die deutschen Gefechtsvorschriften von 1914 in der Feuerprobe des Krieges, " MVV'R 
Jg. 1937 HA, pp. 456487. 
100 Falkenhayn, General HeadgUarters, p. 41. 
101 Der Weltkrieg V, p. 353; Hans von Seeckt, Aus meinem. Leben 1866-1917 (ed. Friedrich von Rabenau) 
(Leipzig: v. Hase & Koehler, 1938) pp. 77-78. 
102 The following is based on a translation of Major Arthur BuIlrich's article, "Die Schlacht bei Vailly am 
30X 1914 als Ausgangspunkt ffir die Erfolge bei Gorlice entscheidener neuer taktischer Grundsatze, " 
which appeared in Tactical Notebook November 1992-March 1993. The original is in the USNA, Seeckt 
Papers (Microfilm Publication M-132), Roll 20. See also Seeckt, op. cit., pp. 77-81. 
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The key to the operation's success was close co-operation between the infantry, 
artillery, and pioneers and careful preparation of the battlefield. The III Corps' attack 
order highlighted this: 
In order to prepare the attack, the night of the 28th and 29h is to be 
devoted to the most intense reconnaissance by all arms of service for the working 
forward [heranarbeiten] of the infantry and pioneers towards the most forward 
enemy infantry positions or barbed-wire entanglements, for the emplacement of 
the artillery and the light and heavy trench mortars. " 
This reconnaissance was designed to identify key enemy strongpoints which would have 
to be either avoided by the attacking infantry or, if they could not be avoided, neutralized 
by the artillery. The assault was only to proceed after the artillery had prepared the way. 
The preparatory fire was to proceed in Feuerwellen (fire waves) through the night of the 
29th and early morning of the 30th. During the pauses between Feuerwellen, the infantry 
and pioneers would advance to clear obstacles and check the results of the fire. The 
pauses also served to disorient the enemy and keep them guessing as to when the real 
attack would commence. 
In addition to preparing the way for the attacking infantry thoroughly, the artillery 
was to co-operate closely with the infantry during its advance. Although most of the 
artillery was to shift to targets behind the enemy's front line and to the flanks of the 
attack to prevent the French from reinforcing the threatened area, a portion was to 
advance with the attacking infantry to provide close support. Great emphasis was placed 
on direct observation by the artillery and the artillery observers stayed close to the front 
line to direct fire. The placement of the artillery under a single commander allowed the 
Germans to combine the fire of the Corps' widely distributed artillery against single 
targets when needed. Further, the infantry attack was scheduled to advance in phases to 
ensure the continued support of the artillery. 
At 8: 00am on 30 October, the III Corps launched its attack. By 8: 30, the attacking 
force had succeeded in occupying the first enemy position "almost without firing a shot. " 
The attacking German infantry found a "shaken and surprised enemy incapable of 
combat. " By 6: 00pm, the French had been pushed back over the Aisne and the town of 
Vailly had been taken. In all around 2,000 Frenchmen had been taken prisoner and many 
more had lost their lives. The Germans lost around 3,500 officers and men. Thanks to 
" III Army Corps, "Order for the Day, " 28 October 1914, printed in Bullrich, op. cit. 
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"thorough preparation and to sympathetic and systematic co-operation between the 
different arms, " the III Corps' attack achieved all its objectives, and proved that 
offensives could succeed in the conditions prevalent in 1914 if properly carried out. 
Although the offensive at Vailly was only a minor affair, it provided important 
lessons for the rest of the army for how to conduct attacks against enemy trenches. The 
rise of Stellungskrieg obviously demanded that the German army develop new skills. The 
attack at Vailly had shown the importance of close infantry/artillery co-operation and 
how artillery should be employed in trench warfare. "' Further, it showed that, under the 
right conditions, the enemy's trench line could be pierced. Not long after the success of 
the offensive, Falkenhayn ordered the I't Army's reports to be circulated to the rest of the 
Westheer for study. "' In addition to its doctrinal impact, the attack also made a name for 
the Corps' chief of staff, Oberst Hans von Seeckt. Seeckt would put his experience from 
Vailly to good use in May 1915 as Chief of Staff to the I Ith Army at the breakthrough at 
Gorlice-Tarnow. 
Conclusion 
Despite paying lip service to Falkenhayn's desire to conclude a separate peace 
with Russia, in fact Bethmann did not believe the idea could work. He found support for 
this view from within the Auswdrtiges Amt and from within the army itself Arthur 
Zimmermann stressed to the Chancellor that Russia was Germany's greatest threat and 
that only a severe military defeat would deal with this threat. " The German command in 
the east, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, felt that a "decisive" military victory was possible 
against Russia, if only they were given the necessary resources. "' 
This difference of opinion split the German leadership for the rest of 
Falkenhayn's tenure as Chief of the General Staff. The immediate result, however, was a 
paralysis in German strategy. With Bethmann unwilling to pursue aggressively a 
diplomatic solution and Falkenhayn unable and reluctant to supply large forces to the 
east, nothing positive was accomplished for the period following the failure of the Ypres 
offensive. Further, this split poisoned relations between Germany's strategic leaders. 
104 Der Weltkrieg V, p. 354; Grosser Generalstab, "Die Entwicklung der deutschen Infanterie im Weltkrieg 
1914-1918, " MWR Jg. 3 H. 3 (1938) pp. 37-375. 
1()5 Der Weltkrieg Bd. VII: Operationen des Jahres 1915 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 193 1) p. 317. (See Chapter 6. ) 
106 Zimmermann to Bethmann, 27 November 1914, printed in Sweet, op. cit., pp. 236-239. 
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Bethmann spoke of Falkenhayn as a "gambler" and "execrable character, " and concluded 
that he should be replaced by Ludendorff. For the next several months, the anti- 
Falkenhayn clique carried out a campaign to have him removed from his position. "' 
This strategic debate, which had turned into a bitter personal feud, had a lasting 
impact. Falkenhayn's reluctance to shift the main focus of German effort to the east 
earned him the lasting odium of many in the army. After the war, Hans von Haeften was 
named head of the section of the Reichsarchiv charged with writing the official history. 
In 1914/1915, Haeften had been one of the strongest supporters of an eastern strategy and 
one of Falkenhayn's most bitter opponents. " As a consequence Der Weltkrieg expressed 
Haeften's bias. "' The work repeated the assertion that Falkenhayn lacked the training 
under Schlieffen, which would have given him the skills necessary to be a good 
commander. They also believed that the new General Staff Chief was "too easily satisfied 
with minor ... victories ...... In short, the Reichsarchiv concluded that Falkenhayn did not 
have the vision or the authority required to make the difficult decisions necessary to 
defeat his enemies totally, and they placed responsibility for the strategic paralysis at the 
turn of 1914/1915 squarely on the shoulders of Falkerihayn. "' 
In fact, it was Falkenhayn who had come to the radical, and surely more difficult, 
conclusion that the German army alone could not win the war. In this, he certainly broke 
from the traditions of the Schlieffen clique within the army, represented most forcefully 
by Ludendorff and his supporters. He was, however, returning to the ideas of Moltke the 
Elder, who, as we have seen in Chapter 1, believed that a modem VolksA: rieg could only 
be solved by co-operation between the army and the diplomats. 
With the failure of Germany's diplomats to conclude a negotiated peace with 
Russia in late 1914, Falkenhayn realized that ftirther military success would be necessary 
to bring one of Germany's enemies to the negotiating table. Accordingly, he set about 
107 Bethmann learned of OberOst's views during his visit to their headquarters on 6 December. Der 
Weltkrieg VI, pp. 415-416. 
log In the end, Falkenhayn was forced to surrender his position as Minister of War. Space prevents a 
detailed discussion of the intrigues against Falkenhayn. See Affierbach, op. cit., pp. 218-232; Heinz Krafft, 
Staatsr9son und Kriegfiffirung im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1916: Der Gegensatz zwischen dem 
Generalstabschef von FalkenhMLn und dem Oberbefehlshaber Ost im Rahmen des Bandniskrieges der 
MittelmAchte (G6ttingen: Musterschmidt, 1980). 
109 For Haeften's role in the intrigues against Falkenhayn, see Guth, op. cit, pp. 75-11 1. 
110 Several officers complained about the eastern bias of the work. Hans Henning von Pentz to 
Reichsarchiv, 14 June 1930; and Eugen von Zoellner to Reichsarchiv, 10 June 1930, BA/M. A, W10/51305. 
111 Der Weltkrieg V, pp. 8-9. 
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mobilizing Germany's economic and manpower resources - in short, creating a real 
"nation in arms ...... He hoped, thereby, to raise enough new units to enable 
him to go 
once again on to the offensive. However, Falkenhayn stuck to his belief that Germany 
could not raise enough forces to defeat any of her enemies decisively. Therefore, any 
future offensive would have to be limited in scope. "' In this the Reichsarchiv was 
correct: Falkenhayn was not about to risk everything on one throw in an attempt to win a 
"decisive" battle. 
Indeed, Falkenhayn's conclusions took him much ftirther than Moltke the Elder's 
ideas. By the end of 1914, he had chosen to pursue a strategy of attrition. Delbriick had 
demonstrated that Clausewitz had shown the time for Ermattungsstrategie was when a 
nation had only "modest political goals, weak motives, [or] limited strength. ""' To the 
new General Staff Chief, it was clear that Germany only possessed "limited strength. " 
Without the capacity necessary to defeat her enemies totally, Falkenhayn believed that 
Germany would have to convince at least one enemy that the price of continuing the war 
was too great to pay. If the Chancellor could not do this through diplomacy alone, than 
Falkenhayn felt offensives with limited, but political, goals would have to be waged. 
After the failures of the initial campaigns, time was needed to rebuild German strength 
and to rethink German doctrine in light of the unexpected battlefield conditions. 
112 The section concerning this period of the war in Der Welticrieg was entitled "Entscheidungslose 
Kriegfiffirung. " Der WeItkrieg VI, pp. 405-433. 
113 Falkenhayn, General Hegdguarters, pp. 44-49; Afflerbach, FalkenhM, pp. 172-178. 
114 Falkenhayn, General Headguarters, pp. 42-44. 
115 Hans Delbrack, "Die Strategie des Perikles, " PJ 64. Bd. (1889) p. 263. 
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Chapter Five: 
Attack in the East 
In both the west and the east, the opening offensives of the Central Powers in 
1914 had failed. In the west, the German armies were forced to retreat from the Marne 
but still held significant portions of French territory and all but a slender portion of 
Belgium. The Austro-Hungarian forces had not quite fared as well in the east. Due in part 
to faulty deployment, the Habsburg forces neither conquered Serbia nor defeated the 
Russian forces arrayed against them. In fact, the Austro-Hungarian forces had not only 
failed to achieve their initial goals but had been driven with great losses from Serbia and 
from Austrian Galicia. ' Within 3 weeks of the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian 
offensive against the Russians, they had suffered over 300,000 casualties and prisoners of 
war, close to a third of the strength of the Austro-Hungarian army at the war's outbreak. 
A further 100,000 men were trapped in the besieged fortress of Przemysl. ' 
A series of ill-fated offensives in the autumn and winter failed to alter the 
situation in Austria-Hungary's favor. Though Przemysl was relieved on 10 October 1914, 
it was besieged again when the Austro-Hungarian forces were forced to pull back by 
Russian counter-attacks. Despite their best efforts, the combined offensives of the 
OberbefehIshaber Ost (Ober0st), the German command in the east, and the Armee- 
Oberkommando (AOK), the Austro-Hungarian general staff, came to nothing but the 
attrition of the Habsburg army. ' 
By the spring of 1915, Austria-Hungary was in deep trouble. The offensives of 
the past several months had reduced the army to a shell of its pre-war capability. In 
December, Conrad had told the Austrian Foreign Minister, Leopold von Berchtold, that, 
1 For a narrative of the beginning stages of the war see, Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg 1914 bis 1918: Bd 1: 
Die Grenzschlachten im Westen (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1925) and Bd 11: Die Befreiung Oereußens (Berlin: 
ES Mittler, 1925). For the Austro-Hungarian side, Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung, Oesterreich- 
Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918: Bd I: Das Kriegsjahr 1914 (Vienna: Verlag der 
Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 193 1). 
2 Oesterreich-Ungams Letzter Krieg 1914-1918 1, pp. 319-320. 
3 See Der Weltkrieg: Bd VII: Die Operationen des Jahres 1915: Die Ereignisse ün Winter und Frühjahr 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 193 1) and Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krie Bd 11: Das Kriegsjahr 1915 (Erster Teil) 
(Vienna: Verlag der Militärwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 193 1) for füll accounts of the offensives. 
III 
"the best officers and non-commissioned officers have died or have been removed from 
service, likewise the core of the rank and file. " Further, he believed that unless something 
radical was done soon Austria-Hungary "... could no longer master the military 
situation. "' In the opinion of most Austro-Hungarian military leaders, the Habsburg army 
had ceased to exist after the failure of the winter offensive. Indeed, from this point 
onwards, the Austro-Hungarian official history refers to the army as merely a collection 
of Landsturm and militia. ' Contemporary German assessments of the worth of the 
Habsburg troops were equally damning. ' 
The great losses of the winter offensives were ftirther exacerbated by Russian 
successes. The Austrians had been unable to relieve the besieged fortress of Przemysl or 
to push the Russians back from the Carpathian Mountains. On 22 March, Przemysl's 
governor, Hermann Kusmanek von Burgneustadten, ordered the fortress' surrender and 
its garrison of 120,000 went into Russian captivity. Shortly before the fall of Przemysl, 
the commander of the Russian Southwest Front, General N. Y. Ivanov, had been ordered 
by the Russian high command to complete the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian 
anny. ' To accomplish this task, Ivanov intended to drive through the Carpathian passes to 
the Hungarian Plain. His 30 divisions, now reinforced by the force that had besieged 
Przemysl, slowly pushed the Austro-Hungarians back through the Carpathian passes. The 
Carpathian Mountains constituted the last natural obstacle before the Hungarian Plain, 
and once these crucial passes were lost, Conrad had no hope of stopping the Russians 
from taking Budapest. This fresh pressure caused Conrad to launch at his Gen-nan ally 
increasingly shrill cries for help. 
Initially, the OHL saw the AOK as too pessimistic and rebuffed Conrad's pleas! 
On 25 March, Falkenhayn telegraphed Generalmajor August von Cramon, the German 
liaison officer with the AOK, for an assessment of the situation. Falkenhayn questioned 
how the intervention of two German divisions, as Conrad requested, could alter the 
situation. ' Cramon replied the next day that it was no longer clear whether the Austrians, 
particularly the 3 rd Army fighting in the Carpathians against superior Russian forces, 
4 Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit Vol. 5 (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1925) p. 753. 
5 Holger Herwig, The First World War: GermM and Austria 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997) p. 13 7. 
6 Gerhard Tappen, Meine Kriegserinnerungen unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, W10/50661, p. 106. 
7 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975) pp. 120-12 1. 
8 "Bei den Oesterreichern scheint man die Lage fdr sehr schwarz anzusehen. " Gerhard Tappen, 
"Kriegstagebuch, " 2 April 1915, BA/MA, N56/1. 
9 Falkenhayn to Cramon, 25 March 1915, OHL Nr. 632 Olb, BA/MA, W10/51388. 
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could hold against further Russian attacks. In his opinion, the intervention of even a few 
German divisions would help to stabilize the situation. " To this end, two Gennan 
divisions, called the Beskidenkorps, were despatched in early April to shore up the 
threatened 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army. " 
Conrad kept up his pleas for help even after the despatch of the Beskidenkorps, 
threatening in a meeting with Falkenhayn in Berlin to sue for peace with Russia if further 
German help was not forthcoming. " Conrad's gloomy view of the situation was 
supported by Cramon. His reports stressed the weakness of the Austrian forces and the 
growing necessity of German support. On 6 April, he wrote that the Austro-Hungarian 
forces could hold against a determined attack only if supported by German troops or 
commanded by German generals. His report concluded that further German support was 
"extremely desirable. "" Falkenhayn came to the conclusion that if the Austro-Hungarian 
army could not hold the Carpathian line, the last meaningful natural obstacle before the 
Hungarian Plain, then Vienna would be lost within 6 weeks. " 
Austria-Hungary's deteriorating military situation was made all the worse by the 
Central Powers' deteriorating diplomatic position. By the spring of 1915, Italy and 
Rumania were threatening to join with the Entente against the Central Powers. All 
attempts to convince them to join with the Central Powers floundered. Both states 
possessed sizeable am-lies, and the entry of either into the war before the military 
situation in the east was stabilized could lead to disastrous results. " Falkenhayn believed 
that Austria-Hungary would be forced from the war if faced with the necessity of fighting 
10 Cramon to Falkenhayn, 26 March 1915, (No Akten Nr. ), BA/MA, W 10/51388. See also August von 
Cramon, Unser Oesterreichisch-Ungarischer Bundesgenosse im Weldaieg (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1922) pp. 
7-13 and Oesterreich-Ungams Letzter Krieg 11, pp. 235-242. 
11 In fact, a number of German units and commanders had already been dispatched to aid Austro-Hungarian 
formations. The Siidarmee was commanded by a German general, Alexander von Linsingen and was made 
up of Austrian and German units. Another German general, Remus von Woyrsch, commanded another 
mixed army to the north. The Austro-Hungarians feared, with good reason, that this increasing reliance on 
German troops and commanders would lessen their independence. See transcript of telephone 
conversations between Moritz Fleischmann (the Austrian liaison officer with OberOst) and AOK, 2 January 
1915, BA/MA, WIO/51373. 
12 Letter of Adolph Wild von Hohenborn (then Minister of War) to his wife, 3 April 1915, BA/MA, N44/3; 
and Hans von Plessen (commander of the Imperial Headquarters), "Tagebuch, " 5 April 1915, BA/MA, 
W 10/50656. Falkenhayn did not take Conrad's threat seriously. 
13 Cramon to Falkenhayn, 6 April 1915, Nr. 460, BA/MA, W10/51388. 
14 Stone, op. cit., p. 127. (Throughout this chapter, please refer to Map 3 at the end of this work. ) 
15 Though the Italian Chief of Staff, Cadorna, boasted he could field a million troops within a month of 
receiving a moblization order, the Italians were able only to attack the Austro-Hungarians with 460,000 
men in June 1915. When Rumania finally entered in August 1916, she had an army of 623,000. Herwig, 
op. cit., pp. 151-153 and p. 218. 
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another enemy. " This fact pushed the German General Staff Chief to intervene in the 
east. If a victory could be achieved against the Russians, perhaps Italy and Rumania 
could be persuaded not to enter the war. At the very least, Falkenhayn hoped intervention 
by sizeable German forces would lead to an improvement in Austria-Hungary's military 
position. " 
Thus, the severity of the military and diplomatic positions in April caused 
Falkenhayn to consider seriously, for the first time in the war, large scale intervention in 
the east. On 4 April, he telegraphed Cramon to enquire whether or not the railway lines 
and the general conditions in the area of Gorlice were good enough to support a 
"powerful thrust from the area of Gorlice in the direction of Sanok. "" On 6 April, 
Cramon reported back that he believed the conditions favorable for a German attack of 
around four army corps supported by heavy guns in the second half of April. " For the 
next several days, Falkenhayn and his staff, who had been deeply involved in planning an 
offensive in the west, debated intervention in the east. " His operations officer, Gerhard 
Tappen, and the Minister of War, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, argued that the German 
reserves should be held for use in the west. They believed that only in the case of an 
extreme emergency should German reserves be used in the east. " Finally, on 13 April, 
convinced of the perilous situation, Falkenhayn decided on the necessity of intervening in 
the east and sought the Kaiser's approval. ' 
The eastern intervention was made possible by a re-organization of German 
forces in the spring of 1915 planned by Generalmajor Ernst von Wrisberg, the director of 
16 Tappen, Kriegserinnerungen pp. 94-95. 
17 Erich von Falkenhayn, General Headg arters and Its Critical Decisions, 1914-1916 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1919) pp. 78-8 1. Falkenhayn also believed a successful offensive would take troops away from 
the planned Russian offensive against Turkey, which intelligence had reported in April. Cramon to OHL, 
21 April 1915, (No Akten Nr. ), BA/MA, W 10/50689. 
18 Falkenhayn to Cramon, 4 April 1915, (No Akten Nr. ), BA/MA, W10/51388. In fact, the chief of the 
Feldeisenbahnabteilung, Oberst Wilhelm Groener, had been ordered by Falkenhayn on 29 March to study 
the railroads in the Gorlice aread in preparation for a possible German offensive. Wilhelm Groener, 
Lebenserinnerungen (ed. Friedrich Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen) (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
1957) pp. 226-227. After the war, a great debate arouse as to the originator of the idea for an attack from 
the area of Gorlice, with Conrad and Falkenhayn both claiming the honor. For an overview, see Oskar 
Regele, Feldmarschall Conrad: Auftrag und Erfallung 1906-1918 (Vienna: Verlag Herlod, 1955) pp. 346- 
352. 
19 Cramon to Falkenhayn, 6 April 1915, Nr. 460, BA/MA, W10/51388. 
20 For Falkenhayn's western plans, see Chapter 6. 
21 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 7 April 1915; Wild von Hohenborn to his wife, 13 April 1915, BA/MA, 
N44/3. 
22 Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 13 April 1915. The Kaiser and Plessen both had doubts about the feasibility of the 
planned operation and feared the Western Front would be fatally weakened by the removal of forces. 
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the Allgemeines Kriegsdepartment of the Ministry of War. Wrisberg created a number of 
new divisions by removing each division's fourth regiment and by taking two guns from 
each artillery battery. In return for the lost fourth regiment, each division received 2,400 
recruits. This plan had the advantage of creating new units by mixing experienced troops 
with recruits, rather than creating a new division largely from scratch, and allowed for the 
formation of 14 new divisions by March 1915. ' While some were held as reserves on the 
Western Front, eight divisions were organized as a new army, the I 1'h Army. Originally 
formed to conduct a breakthrough operation in the west, the 1 I'h Army received Hans 
von Seeckt, then a colonel and chief of staff of the III Corps, as its chief of staff. "' Once 
the OHL had decided to employ the army in the east instead, August von Mackensen, the 
commander of the 9th Army and participant in the Battle of Tannenberg, was named to 
command. On 14 April 1915, the OHL gave the II th Army the task of carrying out the 
eastern offensive. 
The 11 th Army was to be assisted in its task by the strategic reserve of artillery, 
which had recently been formed by the OHL. Oberst Frahnert, the deputy chief of the 
Artillerie-Abteilung in the OHL, was given the task of adjusting the organization of the 
German Fuj3artillerie forces in the light of the rise of Stellungskrieg. ' By stripping 
fortresses of their guns, by taking back into service recently retired cannon, and by an 
increased construction programme, the OHL was able to equip the 11 th Army with 352 
"light" cannon and 144 "heavy" cannon, or 496 guns of all calibers. To the German guns 
were added a further 200 Austro-Hungarian artillery pieces, a considerable number by the 
16 standards of early 1915. Additionally, each of I lth Army's corps was assigned two light, 
one medium, and one heavy trench mortar detachment (Minenwerfer Abteilung), as well 
as a number of 30.5 cm Austro-Hungarian howitzers. " 
23 Ernst von Wrisberg, Heer und Heimat 1914-1918 (Leipzig: KF Koehler, 1921) pp. 16-17 and Der 
WeItkrieg VII, p. 303. Originally, the Minister of War believed that 24 new divisions could be formed in 
this manner. In the end, they were only able to build 14. 
24 See Chapter 6. 
25 Frahnert to Reichsarchiv, 20 January 193 1, BA/MA, W 10/51408. 
26 "Beispiele ffir Artillerie-StArken bei Durchbruchsangriffen, " BA/MA, W10/50160. For an account of the 
artillery reorganization see Wrisberg, op. cit., pp. 3643 and pp. 58-65 and Xchard] von Berendt, "Mit der 
Artillerie durch den Weltkrieg, " WuW Jg. 1924 pp. 36-47 and pp. 185-197. 
27 Oskar Tile von Kalm, Gorlice (Schlachten des Weltkrieges Bd. 30) (Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1930) p. 
29. 
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Falkenhayn's Strategic Principles 
Armed with the Kaiser's approval to commence operations in the east, 
Falkenhayn met Conrad in Berlin on 14 April to agree upon the particulars. On the 16th, 
he telegraphed Conrad with the final details and outlined the I Vh Army's task: 
Die aus zunächts 8 Infanterie-Divisionen neu zu gebildende 1 1. deutsche 
Armee unter dem Befehl des Generalobersten v. Mackensen ... wird in 
den Raum 
der k. u. k. 4. Armee südöstlich von Krakau transportiert, um, über die allgemeine 
Linie Gorlice-Gromik nach Osten vorstossend, im Verein mit der 4. Armee die 
russichen Stellungen zu durchbrechen und im weiteren Verlauf die russiche 
Karpathenfront westlich des Lupowpasses unhaltbar zu machen. ` 
The II th Army was also to be assigned two Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions and a 
cavalry division, and the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army was to come under the orders of 
Mackensen. The 11 th Army would receive its orders from the AOK, who would take "all 
important decisions in consultation with the German OHL . "29 
Units of the I Iffi Army 
began transportation to the Eastern Front on 17 April and completed their deployment on 
29 April. Mackensen's attack orders went to his corps on 29 April, with the attack to 
begin on 2 May. Thus, from the day of decision (13 April) to the day of attack (2 May) 
only 20 days elapsed. In this period, eight German divisions, a large park of artillery with 
munitions, and supplies sufficient to support a major offensive were transported east. In 
20 days, Mackensen and Seeckt completed their operations plans. Speed was clearly one 
of Falkenhayn's goals. 
In the course of the planning for the eastern intervention, important aspects of 
Falkenhayn's strategic thinking began to emerge clearly. Perhaps foremost amongst these 
was Falkenhayn's insistence on strategic surprise, which explains in part his haste. From 
the beginning of the decision to intervene in the east Falkenhayn had insisted on 
maintaining strict secrecy. In his initial query to Cramon on 4 April, he had even 
specified that the AOK was not to be informed of his plans. " Falkenhayn stated explicitly 
his belief in the importance of strategic surprise in a telegram to Conrad on 22 April, 
28 Falkenhayn to Conrad, 16 April 1915, OHL Nr. 727 Olb, BA/MA, W10/50744. 
29 Ibid. The 11* Army was composed of the Gardekorps, XXXXI Reserve Corps, X Corps, 119'h Division, 
the I Ph Bavarian Division, the Austro-Hungarian VI Corps and the Austro-Hungarian I Ph Cavalry 
Division. 
30 Falkenhayn to Cramon, 4 April 1915, (No Akten Nr. ) BA/MA, W10/51388; OHL put little trust in the 
security measures of AOK. Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 2 July 1932, BA/MA, N56/5. 
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writing he believed an essential element of the operation's success was that 
"... Generaloberst von Mackensen not lose the advantage of surprise. "" 
As the planning progressed, the OHL took elaborate measures to ensure secrecy. 
First, the transported troops were not informed of their final destination and neither were 
most of the railroad officials. " The troops transported from the west were sent along 
northerly rail lines in an effort to make observers believe the troops were destined for 
Hindenburg's front in East Prussia. All unit designations were also obscured. In an effort 
to prevent spying in the immediate area of Gorlice, the local inhabitants were removed to 
the far rear of the battle area. Additionally, when German staff officers arrived to survey 
the positions their units would be occupying, they donned Austrian headgear so as not to 
give away their presence to the Russians. Also, German troops were to relieve Austro- 
Hungarian troops at night to minimize the chances of the Russians becoming suspicious 
at a great number of unit changes. " Last, Falkenhayn stressed to Conrad and to 
Mackensen that the attack should come as soon as the German forces had completed their 
deployment. "' 
Falkenhayn also proposed to keep the Russians guessing by carrying out a 
number of diversionary attacks. On 16 April, he ordered Ober0st to execute an attack 
with the aim of "... deceiving the enemy for as long as possible as to our intentions, as 
well as binding the enemy forces north of the Pilica. "" OberOst began a series of 
demonstrations. On 2 May, the German 9th Army launched an unsuccessful gas attack 
and the I Od' Army began a series of local offensives. The real success came, however, 
with the "invasion" of the Courland. Initially opposed by no serious forces, a weak 
German force succeeded in taking most of this barren area, including the antiquated 
fortress of Libau, and in threatening Riga. The Russian high command was forced to 
divert forces away from Galicia to defend Riga. " 
31 Falkenhayn to Conrad, 22 April 1915, Nr. 754 Olb, BA/MA, W10/50689. 
32 Leonhard Graf von Rothkirch Freiherr von Trach, Gorlice-Tarnow (Der groBe Krjg&Lui 
Einzeldarstellunge H. 21) (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1918) pp. 18-19. 
33 Trach, op. cit., pp. 26-27; Kalm, op. cit., pp. 21,24,27; Tappen, Kriegserinnerungen p. 97. 
34 Falkenhayn to Conrad, 22 April 1915, Nr. 754 Olb, BA/MA, W10/50689 and transcript of a telephone 
conversation between Falkenhayn and Seeckt, 27 April 1915, in SeecK op. cit., p. 119. 
35 Falkenhayn to OberOst, 16 April 1915, Nr. 726 Olb, BA/MA, W10/50744. 
36 Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerunge (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1919) pp. 109-112; Stone, op. cit., 
p. 172. In all, the Russians were forced to deploy 9 infantry and 9 cavalry divisions to face the German's 5 
infantry and 7 1/2 cavalry. 
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Falkenhayn's strategic deception campaign extended to the Western Front and to 
his ally's forces as well. The gas attack by the German 4 th Army at Ypres on 22 April 
was designed to disguise the transfer of troops east, which explains in part the lack of 
reserves for exploitation. " Falkenhayn was more ambitious with Habsburg forces. In 
addition to local attacks along the Austro-Hungarian front, Falkenhayn proposed the 
Austro-Hungarian 3rd Army retreat in order to draw Russian forces deeper into the 
Carpathians. Falkenhayn hoped that Russian reserves would then be withdrawn from the 
front at Gorlice and that more Russian forces might be trapped by the coming operation. " 
Conrad refused this request, though in the end, Austro-Hungarian forces hardly needed a 
special order to withdraw. " 
1 Ith Army's Operational Principles 
On 27 April, Mackensen issued the 1 lth Army's "Grundlegende Direktiven" 
(Guiding Orders). In this document, Mackensen outlined the operational principles by 
which the I lth Army was to fight at Gorlice and for the remainder of the campaign in the 
east. This order owed much to Seeckt's experience with the limited offensives on the 
Western Front examined in Chapter 4. " Mackensen stressed that the units of the 11 th 
Army must keep the momentum of their attacks going: "T'he II th Army's attack must be 
carried forward with all speed, if it is to fulfil its assignment. " The continuous 
momentum of the attack was to be accomplished by "... arraying the attacking infantry in 
deep columns (Tiefengliederung] and rapid following of the artillery fire. " Mackensen 
did not foresee the army's attacking units making equal progress. His orders envisaged 
that those units ahead of others would support the general advance by continually moving 
forward and thus keep the Russians off balance. "' 
37 Falkenhayn, General Headguarters pp. 84-85; Tappen, Kriegserinnerungen p. 99; Der Weltkrie VII, pp. 
38-49. 
38 Falkenhayn to Conrad, 22 April 1915, Nr. 75401b, BA/MA, W10/50689; Falkenhayn, General 
Headguarters p. 82; Oesterreich-Unams Letzter Krieg 11, p. 306. 
39 Through the second half of April, Russian attacks pushed the Austro-Hungarian units slowly back all 
along the Carpathian line. Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 11, pp. 261-267. 
40 See Ardiur Bullrich, "Die Schlacht bei Vailly am 30. X. 1914 als Ausgangspunkt für die Erfolge bei 
Gorlice entscheidener neuer taktischer Grundsatze, " unpublished manuscript in USNA, Seeckt Papers, M- 
132, Roll 20. 
41 AOK II "Grundlegende Direktiven fUr den Angriff, " Nr. 117 la, 27 April 1915, printed in [Hermann] 
von Frangois, Gorlice 1915: Der KMathendurchbruch und die Befreiung von Galizien (Leipzig: KF 
Koehler, 1922) pp. 34-35; excerpted in Kalm, op. cit, pp. 32-33. 
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The II th Army also paid particularly close attention to artillery preparation before 
the battle and artillery support during the battle. Mackensen intended to use the artillery 
as much as possible to blast his way into the Russian position. " On 29 April, when 
Mackensen issued his attack orders to his command, he issued a special artillery order as 
well. For the first time in the war, the army-level artillery was commanded by one officer 
only, General Ziethen. " Under Ziethen's direction, the evening of 1-2 May was given 
over by Mackensen to "harassing fire" [Storungsfeuer], designed to prevent the enemy 
from strengthening their positions, from shifting reserves, and to keep the enemy troops 
off balance. Additionally, flat-trajectory guns were given the task of destroying Russian 
bunkers. This harassing fire was to slacken between 10: 00 and 11: 00prn and between 
1: 00 and 3: 00am to allow pioneer patrols to cut through the Russian barbed wire and 
reconnaissance patrols time to assess the effect of the fire. ' 
Mackensen ordered that the full bombardment commence at 6: 00arn on 2 May. 
This "barrage" was to continue for 4 hours until the infantry assault at 10: 00. Though he 
gave the individual corps freedom of action regarding targeting, Mackensen outlined the 
employment of the various types of guns. Heavy flat-trajectory guns were to be used in 
the last quarter of an hour before the infantry assault to hit potential concentration areas 
so that the Russian forward positions could not be reinforced. Howitzers were to 
bombard the enemy trenches and mortars were to target specific bunkers and wire 
entanglements. Additionally, the 11 th Army's order stipulated that each corps was to 
assign a number of batteries to the front line. These batteries were to work closely with 
the attacking infantry to destroy enemy machine gun nests and other strong points. 
Mackensen stressed the importance of close infantry/artillery co-operation and that the 
artillery was to follow the advancing infantry as quickly as possible. Artillery observers 
were to advance with the infantry and co-operate closely with them to break down enemy 
resistance. " 
42 August von Mackensen, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen (ed. Wolfgang Foerster) (Leipzig: 
Bibliographisches Institut, 1938) p. 141. 
43 Previously, army-level artillery was assigned to the individual corps, usually to the corps that bore the 
attack's Schwerpunkt, to be used as they saw fit. Bruce 1. Gudmundsson, On Artille (Westportý CT: 
Praeger, 1993) p. 55 and Berendt, op. cit., p. 43. 
" Kalm, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
45 [bid. The best account in English of the infantry/artillery co-operation at Gorlice is Bruce 1. 
Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German AMY. 1914-1918 (New York: Praeger, 
1989) pp. 107-123. For an example of a corps' artillery order, see Franqois, op. cit., pp. 39-42. 
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The Breakthrough at Gorlice 
The 11 th Army's attack on 2 May was a resounding success. Except for minor 
points, all units achieved their pre-established goals and captured large numbers of 
Russian prisoners. By the evening of 2 May, the Russian first position and the village of 
Gorlice were in German hands. Falkenhayn's insistence on strategic surprise paid off 
handsomely. Despite knowing that German troops had replaced Austro-Hungarian troops 
in the area of Gorlice, the commander of the Russian 3 rd Army, General Radko- 
Dmitriev, 11 focused as he was on penetrating the Carpathians, made no preparations to 
counter a German offensive. At the point of the breakthrough, the 11 th Army's 10 
divisions were faced by 5 1/2 second-rate Russian divisions. The 700-odd German guns 
were faced by 140 Russian light and 4 heavy artillery pieces. "' OberOst's attacks against 
the Russian Northwest Front convinced its commander, General Michail Alexeyev, that a 
major attack was coming from the north. As a consequence, he refused to send 
reinforcement once the II th Army attacked at Gorlice. Poor railroads meant that the 
Russians could not move reinforcements in quickly once the Germans had attacked. " 
Radko-Dmitriev's reserve, the III Caucasian Corps, could not reach the battlefield until 4 
May, too late to restore the position, but not too late to be destroyed by Mackensen's 
relentless attacks. 49 
While Falkenhayn's strategic surprise ensured the isolation of the Russian 3 rd 
Army, Mackensen's operational technique ensured victory on the battlefield. The heavy 
concentration of Austro-Hungarian-German guns and mortars pounded the Russian 
positions with little Russian reply. Radko-Dmitriev's short supply of guns were starved 
of ammunition and were no match for the accuracy or weight of the German guns. " 
Though pockets of resistance remained, German accounts are replete with stories of the 
German infantry walking into the Russian positions to be met with Russian soldiers 
46 Radko-Dmitriev had been Bulgaria's diplomatic representative to Russia before the war. Upon the war's 
outbreak, he resigned this position to take a commission in the Tsar's service. For a synopsis of his varied 
career, see C. H. Baer, ed. Der V61kerkrieg Band 6. (Stuttgart: Julius Hoffmann, 1915) pp. 238-240. 
47 Stone, op. cit., p. 130. 
48 N. N. Golovin, The Russian AM in World War I (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1969) p. 186. 
49 Anon., "Erinnerungen an Galizien 1915, " WuW H. 3 Jg. 1922, p. 167. The author was a staff officer with 
the I Ib Army during the campaign. 
50 Alfred Knox, With the Russian Army, 1914-1917 (Vol 1) (London: Hutchinson, 1921) pp. 282-283. Cf 
Stone, op. cit., pp. 144-164. Knox was the British military attachd to Russia during the war. 
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beaten senseless by the shelling. " On the first day of the offensive, the 11 th Army took 
17,000 Russian prisoners and 8 guns. " 
During the night of 2 /3 May, Mackensen's artillery moved forward and his corps 
prepared for the next day's attack. Again, on 3 May, the I Vh Army smashed through the 
Russian positions and took large numbers of prisoners. This pattern of rapid build up and 
attack, Mackensen's "pursuif 'of the Russians, continued without pause until 10 May, 
and provided the model for the remainder of the campaign in the east in 1915. Ordered 
by the high command to hold at any cost, Ivanov's Southwest Front could do little but 
throw units in piecemeal to be destroyed. Outflanked by the advancing Germans and 
pressured by the Austro-Hungarians in the Carpathians, on the 1 O'h, he was finally given 
permission to withdraw to the San River. By this time, the Russian P Army had lost 
140,000 prisoners and 200 guns to the Germans. At the beginning of May, the Russian 
3 rd Army had consisted of close to 200,000 men. A further 50,000 replacements had been 
received by 10 May. Only 40,000 reached the new defensive position on the San. " 
By 9 May, Falkenhayn was able to declare, "the German troops under 
Generaloberst von Mackensen have fulfilled their mission... " 'A grateful Kaiser 
Wilhelm shifted his headquarters to Schloss Pless in Silesia and showered honors upon 
his men after celebrating with his customary bottle of Sekt: Falkenhayn received the 
Order of the Schwarzer Adler; Mackensen and Seeckt, as well as Archduke Friedrich and 
Conrad, received the Pour le Mdrite; and Tappen was awarded the Ritterkreuz of the 
House of Hohenzollern. " Mackensen became a hero overnight and was named by the 
press as the "master of the breakthrough-"(The irony, however, of Schlieffen's onetime 
adjutant now being called the "master of the breakthrough" was not lost on some 
contemporaries. )" 
Indeed, Mackensen's operational principles proved to be an effective approach to 
the conditions of the World War I battlefield. Unlike the pre-war emphasis on flank 
attacks and envelopments, Mackensen relied instead on breaking through a prepared 
enemy position with heavy artillery. This process inflicted severe casualties upon the 
5 'Kalm, op. cit., pp. 50-51; Trach, op. cit., pp. 39-52; Frangois, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
52 Frangois, op. cit., p. 63. 
53 Stone, op. cit., p. 139. 
54 Falkenhayn to Conrad, 9 May 1915, Nr. 1054r, BA/MA, W 10/513 80. 
55 Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 12 May 1915; Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 12 May 1915; Treutler to Bethmann 
Hollweg, 12 May 1915, PRO, GFM 34/25 84 (Weltkrielz geh. Bd. 15). 
121 
enemy. Given the reliance on heavy artillery, however, the I Vh Army's advance was slow 
and the Russians were able to withdraw to positions prepared in the rear. Mackensen's 
"pursuif 'of the Russians consisted of repeated breakthrough operations, which cost the 
Russians dearly. This approach stood in contrast to that of OberOst, who continued to 
emphasize the pre-war approach of large-scale envelopments. 
Exploitation and Strategic Priorities 
Despite the success of the breakthrough, as Wilhelm Groener noted on 15 May, it 
was time for the "second act" which would turn the tactical success into an "operational" 
victory. " Falkenhayn seemed in agreement with Groener despite declaring Mackensen's 
mission accomplished. The original mission of relieving military pressure on Austria- 
Hungary had been accomplished. Falkenhayn now turned his sights on what was perhaps 
on his mind since intervening in the east - ensuring that Austria-Hungary was safe from 
future Russian threats. " Falkenhayn and Conrad agreed on 13 May that Mackensen's 
next task was to reach the San River and retake the fortress of Przemysl -a defensive 
line which could be held quite easily by Austro-Hungarian forces. " 
The strategic situation, however, militated against a rapid decision on future goals 
and against a rapid exploitation of the I Vh Army's success. To the south, the Austro- 
Hungarian 7 th Army had been attacked on 9 May and suffered serious losses to the 
Russian 9h Army. ' Conrad wanted to shift troops south to Bukowina to reinforce his 7th 
Army. Accordingly, he requested Falkenhayn to transfer more troops from the west to 
cover the withdrawal of two Austro-Hungarian divisions from Galicia. " Falkenhayn 
replied that due to the "expected large English-French offensive southwest of Lille" no 
further German troops could be spared for the east. This long-anticipated Anglo-French 
offensive began on 9 May and broke with unexpected ferocity. For the time being, 
Falkenhayn felt unable to shift reserves from the west to the east. He questioned, 
56 Theo Schwarzmaller, Zwischen Kaiser und "FUhrer": Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen 
(Paderborn: Ferdinand Sch6ningh, 1996) p. 108. 
57 Diary entry for 15 May 1915, in Groener, op. cit., p. 232. 
58 After the war Falkenhayn wrote that his original aims were "... the permanent crippling of Russia's 
offensive power ... but in the 
first place the freeing of the allies' front from the pressure upon it. " 
Falkenhayn, General Headguarters p. 80. The surviving evidence indicates that this wider goal only came 
about after the success of the initial breakthrough. 
59 Der WeItkrieg VII, p. 426; Oesterreich-Ungams Letzter Krieg 11, p. 372. 
60 Oesterreich-ULigams Letzter Krieg 11, pp. 357-361. 
61 Conrad to Falkenhayn, 9 May 1915, Nr. 999 1, BA/MA, W10/51380. 
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however, Conrad's desire to send troops to Bukowina. He believed that "the decision lies 
in West Galicia" and that upon its success rested the fate of the remainder of the Austro- 
Hungarian Anny. " 
In addition to the Russian offensive in Bukowina and the Anglo-French attack in 
the west, the Central Powers expected Italy to declare war any day. Falkenhayn and 
Conrad were at loggerheads concerning how the Central Powers should react to this 
Italian move and this impasse dominated their discussions for most of mid-May. " 
Conrad was obsessed by the desire to punish the Central Powers' onetime ally and 
suggested that Germany and Austria-Hungary each send 10 divisions to the coming 
Italian front. " Despite the fact that the Habsburg army was already over stretched, 
Conrad insisted forcefully that the Central Powers wage war against Italy offensively. 
Falkenhayn favored remaining on the defensive against Italy. Instead, he raised 
again the idea of launching an offensive against Serbia designed to knock Serbia out of 
the war once and for all and to open communications with a beleaguered Turkey. " 
However, he remained convinced that before any other undertaking, Austria-Hungary 
must be made safe ftorn any future Russian attack. Falkenhayn held that the Austro- 
Hungarian-German forces must first deal the Russians a powerful blow, which would 
push them behind the San and reduce their offensive capability. " He did not believe this 
had been achieved by late May and, consequently, the allied forces should remain 
focused on Galicia until their goals had been achieved. Conrad finally agreed to 
Falkenhayn's proposals, though he remained inclined to shut down operations in Galicia 
and to punish the Italians. ' 
62 Falkenhaynto Conrad, 10 May 1915, Nr. 1072r, BA/MA, W10/50689; Der Weltkfie BdVIII: Die 
Operationen des Jahres 1915: Die Ereignisse im Westen im Frühjahr und Sommer, im Osten vom Frahi 
bis zum Jahresschluß (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1932) pp. 55-78 
63 For an account of the acrimonious exchange between Conrad and Falkenhayn see, Tappen, 
Kriegserinnerunge pp. 105-107. Conrad's obsession with Italy was noted by Karl Graf von Kageneck, the 
German military attachd to Austria-Hungary. Kageneck to Reichsarchiv, II August 193 1, BA/MA, 
W10/51408. 
64 Conrad to Falkenhayn, 14 May 1915, Op. Nr. 10 176, BA/MA, W 10/50689. 
65 "Vorschlag General v. Falkenhayn ffir die FUhrung der Operation der VerbUndeten im Fall des sofortigen 
Eintritts Italiens in den Krieg, " 18 May 1915, BA/MA, W10/50683. 
66 Falkenhayn to Conrad, 16 May 1915, Nr. 1224r, BA/MA, W10/50689 and "Bemerkungen General v. 
Falkenhayns zur Erwiderung General Conrads, " 17 May 1915, BA/MA, W10/50683. Falkenhayn 
envisioned the creation of a strong defensive position based on the line of the major rivers in the region. He 
hoped this could be held with 30 divisions, thus freeing some 25 divisions for use elsewhere. 
67 Conrad to Falkenhayn, "Erwiderung auf die Denkschrift des Chefs des Generalstabes des deutschen 
Feldheeres Nr. 1224r, " 17 May 1915, Nr. 10285, BA/MA, W 10/50683. 
123 
In the end, the two general staff chiefs were overtaken by events. By 23 May, 
when Italy declared war against Austria-Hungary (though not against Germany), 
Mackensen's offensive in Galicia had begun to lose stearn. Although Mackensen had 
been on ordered on 13 May to throw the Russians behind the San and to retake Przemysl, 
he was forced to postpone the attack until 17 May. The I 1'h Army needed time to bring 
up sufficient supplies to renew the offensive, and the Austro-Hungarian armies flanking 
the predominantly German 11 th Army had difficulty getting into position for the attack. 
It was not until 25 May that the 1 Vh Army had secured the San River line and had 
established bridgeheads across the river. The P Austro-Hungarian Army on the I Vh 
Army's southern flank had made little progress in re-taking the fortress of Przemysl, and 
Mackensen was forced to divert units of the I lth Army to aid the Austro-Hungarians, 
while the remainder of his troops prepared defensive positions along the San. On 3 June, 
Przemysl was finally retaken by the I Ith Bavarian Division. " 
Through late May, the Russians shifted more and more reserves to the Galician 
front. By 20 May, German intelligence had already discovered in Galicia Russian units 
originally intended for an offensive against Turkey (the so-called "Odessa Army"). Each 
day brought the knowledge of more of these units. " Although these newly introduced 
forces were not rated highly by German intelligence, they achieved local successes, 
especially against Austro-Hungarian forces, and for some time, the Central Powers' 
position on the San was insecure. " 
Reality forced Falkenhayn and Conrad to lay aside their strategic differences and 
agree upon a course of action. To deal with the Italian question, a specially formed 
German unit, the Alpenkorps, was transported to the Italian Front and three newly formed 
German divisions (10 1,103, and 105) were sent to southern Austria-Hungary (Synnia), to 
replace the five Austro-Hungarian divisions sent to the Italian Front. 72 The two agreed to 
stand on the defensive against Italy for the time being. To reinvigorate the slowed 
68 Der Weltkrieg VIII, p. 141 and [Friedrich ]von Mantey, "In welchem Masse vermögen Verkehrsmittel 
den Ansatz und Verlauf militärischer Operation zu beeinflussen?, " WuW Jg. 1939. pp. 37-5 1. 
69 Frangois, op. cit., pp. 145-180. Mackensen "laid7' the recaptured fortress at Kaiser Franz Joseph's feet. 
("Ich bitte Seiner k. u. k. apostolischen Majestät zu melden, daB die I I. Armee Przemysl Allerh6chstihm zu 
FUBen legt. ") Quoted in Seeckt, op. cit., p. 144; Herwig, op. cit., p. 142. 
70 Nachrichtenabteilung Ost, "Vortragsnotizen, " 20-29 May 1915, BA/MA, W 10/513 88. 
71 Der WeItkrieg VIII, pp. 217-220; OesterreichUnRams LetzterKrie ll, pp. 383-386; Tappen, 
Krie%tserinnerungen p. 108. 
72 Tappen, Kriegserinnerungen, pp. 106-107; Falkenhayn, General Headquarters, pp. 94-95. The three 
German divisions in south Austria-Hungary had the task of defending against a possible Rumanian invasion 
and to guard against a possible problem with the south Slavs of this area of the Habsburg Empire. 
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offensive in Galicia, OHL ordered additional German forces to the region: two and a half 
divisions were taken from the west, two divisions from OberOst, and two of the divisions 
destined for Syrmia were assigned to Mackensen's command. " 
On 3 June, Mackensen received his new instructions concerning the conduct of 
the campaign. A reshuffling of forces took place, putting German units in the Austro- 
Hungarian 3 rd and 4th Armies to strengthen their offensive power. Mackensen assumed 
command of these Austro-Hungarian armies in addition to his own II th Army, that he 
might have "the strength to conduct an offensive against the Russian forces east of the 
San... "'4AOK ordered Heeresgruppe Mackensen to "strike decisively" the enemy before 
him and to take the city of Lemberg. " Falkenhayn hoped that the capture of Lemberg, the 
city which upon its capture in 1914 the Tsar proclaimed would always remain Russian, 
would "... create a disastrous impression for the Russians throughout the whole east. "" 
Before Mackensen could go over to the offensive, however, preparations had to 
be made, once again causing delay. The Austro-Hungarian units under his command had 
to move into suitable position and supplies had to be accumulated. Like the earlier 
offensives of the campaign, the Central Powers attacked with great amounts of artillery, 
designed to crush Russian positions and stun the defenders. The build up of the needed 
supplies was delayed by the poor road and rail network of Galicia. While these 
preparations were progressing, the Russians counter-attacked the Austro-Hungarian P 
Army, causing delay in their preparations. Additionally, the Austro-Hungarian 0 Army 
had difficulty reaching its designated position. " As a result, Heeresgruppe Mackensen 
could not begin its offensive until 12 June. 
Repeating the formula perfected in the previous month's fighting, Heeresgruppe 
Mackensen began a breakthrough operation on 12 June. Between 13 June and 22 June, 
they smashed through two Russian defensive positions as they had at Gorlice. As the 
powerfid German 11 th Army pierced the Russian positions, it "pulled" its neighbouring 
units along through the breach. A small breakthrough quickly became a rout. By 22 June, 
73 Der Weltkriea VIII, P. 202. 
74 "Direktiven ffir die Fortsetzung der Operationen in Galizien, " 4 June 1915, AOK Nr. 11160, BA/MA, 
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requested OHL pressure the AOK to reinforce the Austro-Hungarian P and 4h Armies. 
125 
Heeresgruppe Mackensen had captured Lemberg. " With Lemberg's fall came the end of 
the first phase of operations in the east and the end of one of the war's most successful 
campaigns. The Central Powers had advanced over 300 kilometers since 1 May and had 
relentlessly ground down the Russian army. From I May until 22 June, the I I'h Army 
alone captured over 250,000 prisoners, 225 of the Russian's precious guns, and over 600 
machineguns. It had cost the II th Army 87,000 casualties, 12,000 of whom were dead. 71 
In his memoirs, Falkenhayn summed up what he saw as the outcome of his reluctant 
eastern venture up to 22 June: 
The threat to Hungary had been completely removed; Austria-Hungary was given 
the possibility of sending sufficient forces to the Italian front; Turkey was 
relieved from the danger of an attack upon the Bosphorus by the Russian Odessa 
Army; these and the pacification of Rumania and the resumption of connections 
with Bulgaria were the immediate and highly valuable consequences. " 
Additionally, the operational principles employed by the German armies proved 
their worth. The combination of heavy artillery and close infantry/artillery co-operation 
succeeded in breaking through Russian positions time after time. No Russian trench 
position seemed to be able to withstand the onslaught. Although the Russians were 
normally able to withdraw before they could be encircled and destroyed by the advancing 
Germans, the process of the breakthrough caused them serious losses. German tactics 
caused a slow but steady haernorrhaging of the Russian Army, from which Falkenhayn 
hoped it would never recover. 
A Separate Peace with Russia? 
After the fall of Lemberg, it seemed the role of the powerful German assault 
group was at an end, and Falkenhayn began making plans to transport units back to the 
west. There they would be useful in defending against the powerful Entente attacks and 
form the nucleus of an army that would attack the Western Allies. "' In the west, the 
Entente again prepared for an offensive, and the OHL reckoned on an inferiority of 600 
battalions. " The re-introduction of forces from the east seemed necessary to shore up the 
78 The fall of Lemberg was seen by most as much more important politically than militarily. See Plessen, 
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threatened front. Additionally, Falkenhayn conceived of plans for the "cleansing" of 
French forces from the small portion of German territory they occupied. The conduct of 
the operations in the east were again to fall prey to the requirements of other fronts. " 
Falkenhayn soon altered his opinion, however. The Entente superiority in the 
west militated against Falkenhayn's planned small offensive in Alsace and the German 
forces seemed able to hold their own defensively against the Entente attacks. 
Additionally, despite the notable successes in Galicia, Falkenhayn, and many authorities 
of the Central Powers, came to believe that not enough had yet been achieved in the 
east. " As the campaign in the east progressed, the "permanent crippling" of Russian 
offensive power became an important goal of the OHL. The performance of Russian 
troops during the offensive from mid-May until 22 June had shown that the Russian army 
had been considerably weakened. " However, Falkenhayn did not believe that the Russian 
military had yet been "permanently crippled. " He determined to keep the pressure on 
Russia through the summer to destroy what he believed to be the last of Russia's 
reserves. 
In addition to wearing down Russia's army, Falkenhayn came to believe that 
Russia could be pressured into coming to terms with the Central Powers. As Chapter 4 
has shown, shortly after the failure of the German campaign in 1914, Falkenhayn 
concluded that Germany could not win a long war against all the Entente powers, and 
that Germany should make strenuous efforts to detach Russia or France from the 
coalition. As Falkenhayn believed that between Germany and Russia there existed no real 
difference of interests, at least none necessitating war, he was again convinced that 
Russia could be brought to the peace table. " 
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Returning again to MoItke the Elder's idea that military success should serve as 
the springboard for a negotiated peace, " the General Staff Chief felt that by the summer 
of 1915 the time was right to approach Russia with a German offer of a separate peace. 
As early as 3 June, he proposed Russia be offered an armistice in view of the military 
setbacks recently inflicted. " Bethmann, once again, held the moment to be inappropriate. 
After the fall of Lemberg, Falkenhayn renewed his drive for a separate peace, and 
operations were directed towards this goal. He intended fin-ther operations to demonstrate 
to the Russians that they could never defeat the Central Powers. The Russian army was to 
be destroyed and Russian Poland was to be conquered. Falkenhayn knew how important 
Poland was to Russia and he intended to use this territory as a bargaining chip in 
negotiations with his enemy. " 
Conrad agreed with Falkenhayn's goals. On 21 July, in the midst of another 
highly successful campaign, he sent Falkenhayn a memorandum suggesting the time was 
right to offer Russia peace terms. He proposed that Russia be offered special rights in the 
Dardanelles and perhaps even an alliance with the Central Powers. A peace with Russia, 
Conrad declared, would allow the transfer of sufficient forces to other theaters to decide 
the war. He stressed that Germany and Austria-Hungary should make all efforts to 
construct a "golden bridge" to Russia. Falkenhayn answered the next day, declaring that 
he had advised the German government along similar lines for some time and that he had 
forwarded Conrad's memorandum to Bethmann. ' 
Falkenhayn and Conrad's pressure for a separate peace met with no success, 
however. Though the Auswartiges Amt made some overtures to the Russians through a 
Danish intermediary, the Russians were unwilling to discuss peace terms, declaring they 
would stand by the Entente pledge of 5 September 1914 that no member would conclude 
a separate peace. The Chancellor felt that a publication of definitive terms, as Falkenhayn 
wanted, would be seen as a sign of German weakness by the Entente and the neutrals. 
Bethmann also realized that as long as there remained the prospect of the Entente 
opening the Dardenelles, Russia would have no reason for responding to German offers. 
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He suggested instead that, in order to keep the Russians well-disposed to a peace offer, 
Falkenhayn should "conduct the war against Russia with 'benevolence' [wohlwollend). 
As part of his "benevolent" conduct of the campaign, Falkenhayn ordered that no public 
celebrations of the capture of Warsaw were to be held. " By early August, however, the 
drive for a separate peace was slowing down and no amount of German military success 
seemed to be able to restart the process. ' 
The Conquest of Russian Poland 
By July 1915, Russian Poland formed a great salient in the Central Powers' line; W 
its northern flank being formed by East Prussia and its southern by the recently re- 
conquered Austrian Galicia. The Russians defended this portion of the front with 
formidable fortresses and with six armies. The Russians hoped that these powerful 
fortresses, upon which so much money had been spent before the war, would act as 
brakes on the coming German attack. Novogeogievsk, at the confluence of the Weichsel 
and Narev Rivers, covered the approach to Warsaw with 1,680 guns and over a million 
rounds of ammunition. All told, Novogeogievsk, together with Ivanogorod, Dvinsk, 
Osoweic, Grodno, and Kovno, protected the frontiers of Russian Poland with a total of 
5,200 old and 4,030 modem artillery pieces. ' The two Russian fronts (the Northwest 
Front under Alexeyev and the Southwest Front under Ivanov) were arrayed in the salient 
placed under the command of Alexeyev at the beginning of the month. The two fronts 
defended the 1,300 km salient with six armies (including the armies so roughly handled 
by Mackensen in May), or 80 divisions, two-thirds of the whole Russian army. " 
Falkenhayn, intent on not becoming too deeply engaged in what he regarded as a 
fi-uitless attack deep in Russia, intended to attack with a shallow envelopment and to 
cripple the Russian army in the process. " The General Staff Chief rejected the calls of 
OberOst and Conrad for a grand envelopment from Prussia in the north and Austrian 
Galicia in the south, aimed at encircling all the Russian forces in the Polish salient. Given 
the experience of the past months, he felt that the Russians would simply retreat faster 
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than the arms of the German envelopment could advance. Instead, he decided to rely 
upon the operational techniques perfected by Mackensen. The Russian army would be 
broken up in a series of step-by-step offensives, which relied on the effect of artillery. ' 
Accordingly, on 13 July, the Central Powers began attacking all along their line, 
in what was to be the largest German operation since the invasion of France. From the 
north, Gallwitz' Armeeabteilung advanced against the Russian I" and 12th Armies on the 
Narev River and, with the German 9h Army attacking from the south, quickly threatened 
Warsaw. Armeeabteilung Woyrsch, composed mainly of Landwehr units, attacked in the 
center to prevent the Russians from reinforcing the salient's flanks. In the south, 
Heeresgruppe Mackensen (now the II th Army, the 4h Austro-Hungarian Army, the I" 
Austro-Hungarian Army, and the newly formed Bugarmee) received the order to break 
through the Russian position along the Weichsel and Bug Rivers and advance northerly 
towards Brest-Litovsk to break Warsaw's lines of communication. " All told, nine 
German and Austro-Hungarian armies attacked the Russian salient. 
Again, the Central Powers attacked with great material superiority, overwhelming 
Russian resistance with heavy artillery. (Gallwitz attacked on 13 July with 500 guns and 
400,000 rounds of ammunition, a greater intensity of fire than at Gorlice. ") One Russian 
corps commander wrote of the experience, 
The Germans plough up the battlefields with a hail of metal and level our 
trenches and fortifications, the fire often burying the defenders of the trenches in 
them. The Germans expend metal, we expend life. " 
As at Gorlice, the Russian artillery was unable to reply, being hopelessly out gunned and 
out classed, and the attacking infantry was often able to walk into battered Russian 
positions unopposed. Russian replacements were hurried into battle, some only having 
time for 2 or 3 weeks of training. " 
Following the formula perfected in the previous months, the Central Powers 
advanced remorselessly, if slowly. The Russian were unable to construct defensive 
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positions strong enough to contain the formidable striking power of the Germans, and 
repeatedly the German armies broke through hastily constructed Russian positions. '01 
The Russian high command faced the unenviable decision of retreating from Poland 
completely or of losing much of their army. Finally, on 22 July, General Alexeyev 
ordered a general retreat, which continued until September. "' Everywhere important 
Russian positions fell to the Central Powers: Warsaw and Ivanogorod were taken on 4 
August, Kovno was captured on 18 August, Novogeorgievsk fell on 19 August, Osoweic 
on 22 August, Brest-Litovsk on 26 August. 
By September 1915, the Central Powers had driven the Russians from Poland. 
Additionally, OberOst's renewed offensive to the north had advanced deeper into 
Courland and into Russia itself, capturing the fortress of Kovno and Vilna and 
threatening Riga. The advance to Vilna cut the only Russian north-south railway, 
effectively cutting the Russian front in two. "' The human cost to the Russians was just as 
great. From the beginning of May until the end of the year, the Russians had lost over 2.2 
million men, including over 1 million prisoners. In January 1916, German intelligence 
reckoned that Russian divisions only numbered 11,000 men, most of whom would be 
poorly trained, poorly equipped, and poorly led. "' 
By 31 August planning had begun on defensive positions along the newly 
captured ground, and the operations in Poland began to wind down. "' The massive losses 
inflicted on the Russian army and its poor combat performance in the campaign 
convinced both Falkenhayn and Conrad that the Russian army was incapable of offensive 
action for the foreseeable future. " Though Russia had not been forced into a separate 
peace, the other more immediate goal of the Central Powers had been achieved. The 
Central Powers possessed, by early September, a seemingly defensible frontier. The 
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offensive power of the Russian army had been broken and German forces could now be 
used elsewhere without fear of an Austro-Hungarian collapse. 
Though small German and Austro-Hungarian offensives continued until the end 
of the year, the great campaign was over by early September. " On 6 September, the 
Bulgarians finally agreed to a military convention with the Central Powers and 
Falkenhayn's long-planned Serbian expedition could go ahead. Mackensen was again 
chosen to spearhead this combined Austro-Hungarian-Bulgarian-Gerrnan invasion 
scheduled to begin in early October. Additionally, the expected Anglo-French offensive 
in the west claimed more troops, and Falkenhayn began shifting troops west in 
anticipation of this attack and for a future German offensive. "' Conrad was finally free 
to deploy his troops against his arch-enemy, Italy. 
Conclusion 
By the end of 1915, the Central Powers stood at the height of their success. The 
campaigns begun in May 1915 had resulted in the conquest of Russian Poland, the 
weakening of the Russian army, and the destruction and occupation of Serbia. German 
and Austro-Hungarian victories had persuaded Bulgaria to enter into alliance with the 
Central Powers and Rumania at least to remain neutral. The defeat of Serbia opened 
secure land communications with Turkey and ensured that supplies could flow freely to 
aid against ftirther Entente attacks. With Turkey secure, no Entente supplies would reach 
the strickened Russia through the Dardanelles. To the strategic leaders of Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, Falkenhayn and Conrad, their backs seemed protected, allowing them 
to entertain the thought of offensives elsewhere. 
Despite these notable successes, Falkenhayn's conduct of the campaigns in the 
east in 1915 was highly criticised by historians after the war. Liddell Hart wrote that 
Falkenhayn's strategy in 1915 lacked decisiveness, and that "Falkenhayn's cautious 
strategy was to prove the most hazardous in the long run, and indeed pave the way for 
Germany's bankruptcy. "" In a discussion about conclusions to draw from the 1915 
eastern campaigns, the writers of the German official history came to a similar 
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conclusion. They believed that Falkenhayn should have withdrawn forces from the 
Western Front sufficient to defeat Russia "decisively" enough to dictate peace terms, 
even if this meant a general withdrawal to shorten German positions in France. The 
consensus of opinion amongst the Reichsarchiv writers was that Falkenhayn lacked the 
strategic vision and the moral strength necessary to conduct the operations to a decisive 
end. The director of the Historische Ateilung of the Reichsarchiv, Hans von Haeften, 
concluded that "... Falkenhayn had led us to catastrophe. "' 10 
Central to this criticism was Falkenhayn's decision to conduct a step-by-step 
offensive with limited goals in the east. T'his strategy was partly forced on Falkenhayn by 
the relative weakness of the Germans on the Western Front and the Central Powers' 
unstable diplomatic position. More than that, however, this strategy, as well as the 
strategy he would follow in the west, reflected what Falkenhayn believed to be 
Germany's material weakness. "' As we have seen in Chapter 4, Falkenhayn believed that 
Germany did not have the strength, even with a shortening of the front in the west, to 
defeat Russia or either of her other enemies decisively. "' Convinced that "decisive" 
operations were not possible under the current conditions, he focused instead on what he 
believed to be achievable goals and tailored his strategy accordingly. 
Although after the war he would be criticised for scattering his forces in 
diversionary operations, his critics missed that these secondary operations were central 
components of Falkenhayn's strategy. To Falkenhayn, one goal remained constant 
throughout the operations in the east in 1915 - the securing of the Eastern Front from 
Russian threat through the destruction of the enemy's offensive power. To achieve this, 
Falkenhayn had to strike a careful balance between operations central to destroying the 
Russian army and side operations (like the conquering of the Russian Baltic region) 
which drained away German strength. These secondary operations, however, played an 
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important role in Falkenhayn's strategy. They functioned as diversions, which kept the 
enemy guessing about the location of the real attack, and served to siphon off enemy 
reserves away from the main attack. 
These diversionary attacks were essential in securing the necessary strategic 
surprise in early May when Mackensen's II th Army attacked at Gorlice. The Russians, 
focused as they were on their own operations in the Carpathians, were unprepared for the 
German assault and had few reserves handy. The scarce Russian reserves were partially 
diverted by the German attack in the Courland, which convinced the commander of the 
Northwest Front that strong attacks would fall there rather than on the Southwest Front. 
Consequently, he refused to dispatch the necessary reinforcement. For a limited 
operation, the diversion in Courland reaped disproportionate results. 
This concept of strategic surprise was considered by Falkenhayn to be essential to 
the success of the operations in the east. While this idea was by no means new in 1915, 
war in the west had shown how crucial it was to successful operations. Falkenhayn had 
learned by 1915 that an enemy, in strongly constructed positions, could easily bring up 
enough reserves to counter almost any attack if given enough warning. Consequently, in 
the eastern campaigns of 1915, the OHL went to elaborate lengths to hide its intentions 
from the enemy for as long as possible. This included, in addition to wide-ranging 
diversionary attacks, going so far as to keep the Austro-Hungarian AOK in the dark 
regarding German plans. 
Another tool crucial to Falkenhayn's planned destruction of the Russian army was 
the liberal use of heavy artillery. Artillery provided the manpower-deficient but 
materially rich Germans with a cost-effective means for fighting the manpower-rich but 
materially deficient Russian army. The German advantage stemmed not just from a 
superiority in number of guns but also from superior technique. By 1915, the German 
army had made great tactical and technical developments in infantry/artillery co- 
operation. The Russians suffered horribly under the accurate German fire through the 
entire offensive, and German infantry was often called upon merely to mop up shattered 
Russian forces. In short, Falkenhayn's policy matched German strengths with Russian 
weaknesses, summed up succinctly by the commander of the Russian M Corps, 
General Zuev, "the Germans expend metal, we expend life. ""' 
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Between May and September 1915, Falkenhayn's strategy had succeeded in 
inflicting over 2 million casualties upon the Russians - the greatest number of casualties 
inflicted on an enemy in any campaign until that time. "' (By contrast, though the figures 
are still highly disputed, in the course of the Battle of the Somme in 1916, the British 
suffered 420,000 casualties, the French 200,000 and the Germans 465,000 or 1,085,000 
all told. "') Worse, these casualties encompassed the trained manpower and, in German 
eyes more importantly, the trained and experienced officers essential for modem warfare. 
It is understandable that Falkenhayn (and Conrad) believed the Russian army incapable 
of any offensive action for the foreseeable future. 
In part, the very success of Falkenhayn's strategy in the east in 1915 led to the 
criticisms of future historians. Falkenhayn's success had led to a diminution of the 
Hindenburg/Ludendorff star. As Wilhelm Groener noted in his diary after a conversation 
with the Kaiser in the summer of 1915: "His trust in Falkenhayn is unshaken and 
unshakeable. He [the Kaiser] believes in him [Falkenhayn], while he has no close 
connection with the personalities of the east [Hindenburg and Ludendorff]. "' " Hans von 
Haeften, and many other German officers, found Falkenhayn's methods of warfare 
repellent. In the summer of 1915, they longed for a return to grand envelopments, as 
Ludendorff advocated. Their post-war critique reflected their wartime opinions. 
Falkenhayn's choice of strategy, however, has been seconded by a more recent (and 
probably more objective) researcher than Liddell Hart or the Reichsarchiv, Norman 
Stone: 
Falkenhayn was a modem general, and had a more sensible view of the war than 
Ludendorff or Conrad. He knew that great manoeuvres, as in past wars, could not 
fit the present circumstances. The war in the East proved Falkenhayn to be right. 
What shook Stavka was not the ostensibly brilliant manoeuvring of Ludendorff - 
and certainly not that of Conrad - but the huge losses they suffered in set-piece 
soldiers' battles such as Gorlice, or Mackensen's bludgeoning before Lublin. 
They were much more costly, even than Tannenberg. "' 
One aspect of Falkenhayn's strategy in 1915, however, did not fare so well - that 
of forcing Russia into agreeing to a separate peace. Falkenhayn's idea of purnmelling the 
Russians to the negotiating table came to no end. This was in part because the concept 
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relied upon two factors out of Falkenhayn's control - the Auswdrtiges Amt and Russia's 
resolve. Falkenhayn could not force Bethmann into negotiations with the Russians and he 
clearly underestimated Russian will. In the end, he had to settle for a goal he could 
achieve - the crushing of Russian military power. Russia was not taken from the war, as 
Falkenhayn had desired since November 1914, but her offensive capability was 
seemingly crippled. 
At the end of 1915, German successes in the east allowed Falkenhayn to 
concentrate on what was to him the decisive theater of combat, the Western Front. He 
took with him important lessons from the campaign in the east, which would see 
application in his strategy for defeating the Western Allies. Falkenhayn's insistence on 
strategic surprise was crucial to success in Poland. He would attempt to use it again in 
France. Diversionary attacks had been successful in deceiving the Russian command and 
in keeping large enemy forces tied up elsewhere. Falkenhayn would attempt this again in 
the west. Powerful artillery combined with close infantry/artillery co-operation had 
played a central role breaking through and destroying many Russian units, causing 
grievous harm to the capability of the Russian army. Artillery would play an even more 
crucial role in his campaign against the western allies. At Verdun the Germans would use 
more artillery, better supplied with ammunition and with improved infantry/artillery 
tactics. And last, Falkenhayn would again return to the idea of forcing one enemy into a 
separate peace by inflicting unacceptable damage to its army and by forcing it to fight for 
an important geographical feature. 
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Chapter Six: 
Defence in the West 
Falkenhayn's reluctant eastern venture in the spring and summer of 1915 had 
disturbed German plans for an offensive in the west. After Bethmarm Hollweg's failure 
to bring about a separate peace with Russia in late 1914/early 1915, Falkenhayn had 
again turned to the west, in his eyes the most important theatre. ' In keeping with the 
strategy outlined to Bethmann in November 1914, the General Staff Chief hoped to 
launch an offensive on the Western Front which would divide the two western allies and 
bring France to a separate peace. In order to do this, however, he had to find a solution to 
the tactical deadlock produced by the trenches, i. e. to find a way to break through the 
enemy positions and restore mobility to the war. 
As 1915 began, the strategists of Germany and the Entente were thinking along 
similar lines. The results of previous offensives had convinced many leaders on both 
sides that if only a bit more pressure were applied, if only a bit more heavy artillery were 
employed, the enemy position could be broken through and mobility could thus be re- 
introduced to the war. ' Once mobility had been restored, most strategists believed the war 
could be won quickly. To this end, both sides began preparing for an offensive which 
would break through the stalemate of the trenches. 
The French, who had no second front to make demands upon their forces, put into 
motion the first major offensive of the year in early February in the Champagne region. ' 
There, they hoped to drive through the German position, capture the vital rail line 5 
kilometers behind the front, and cause the German northern front to collapse. Despite 
heavy losses, the French were unable either to pierce the strong German position or even 
to push the German front back the short distance needed to capture the Challerange- 
Bazancourt railway. The results of the month-long offensive was 240,000 French 
Erich von Falkenhayn, General HeadgRarters and Its Critical Decisions, 1914-1916 (London: Hutchinson 
& Co., 1919) pp. 4243. 
2 Konrad Kraffi von Dellmensingen, Der Durchbruch (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1937) p. 32f. 
3 Throughout this chapter, please refer to Map 4 at the end of this work. 
137 
casualties" and a new term in German military vocabulary, "Trommeýfeuer, " the 
continuous rain of heavy artillery shells upon the German positions. ' By mid-March, the 
French were exhausted by their efforts and the initiative passed to the Germans. ' 
German Breakthrough Plans 
The most pressing problem facing the OHL in early 1915 was reserves. After the 
failures of 1914, the German army needed time to rebuild. The reserves built up in 
January were sent to the east against the General Staff Chief s better judgement, and 
Falkenhayn had was forced to wait until early spring until additional units could be 
constructed. ' As we have examined in Chapter 5, the reorganization of the German army 
directed by the Ministry of War's General Ernst von Wrisberg offered the prospect of a 
large number of new divisions by the end of March! Consequently, on 3 March, the 11 th 
Army was formed by the OHL, with the intention of utilizing it for the nucleus of a 
western attack group. Falkenhayn gave General der Infantrie von Fabeek command of 
this new army and named Hans von Seeckt as his chief of staff. Both officers had 
extensive experience on the Western Front; Fabeck had commanded an army group 
during the Ypres offensive and Seeckt had planned the III Corps' successful assault on 
Vailly. With these new units coming into being and with experience leaders on hand, 
Falkenhayn was able to return to his idea of a major offensive in France. Accordingly, he 
set the Westheer's planning mechanism into motion, requesting plans for breakthrough 
operations from the armies on the Western Front. 
By mid-March, Falkenhayn had received a number of plans, two of which seemed 
promising. On the same day as the II th Army was formed, the OHL received the report of 
Generalleutnant Konrad Krafft von Dellmensingen, Chief of Staff to the 6h Army, which 
4 Ibid., pp. 31-34. The Germans suffered only 45,000 casualties to the 240,000 French. 
5 Max Bauer, Der grosse Krieg in Feld und Heimat (Tilbingen: Osiander'sche Buchhandlung, 192 1) p. 85. 
6 On the Winterschlacht in the Champagne see Der Weltkrie Bd. VII: Die Operationen des Jahres 1915: 
Ereijznisse im Winter und RUN (Berlin: ES Mittler, 193 1), pp. 35-53; and Minist&e de la Guerre, Les 
Armdes Francaises dans la Grande Guerre Tome 11: La Stabilisation du Front - Les Attaques; Locales (14 
Novembre 1914-1 Mai 1915) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 193 1) pp. 41048 1. 
7 Heinz Krafft, Staatsrason und Kriegfiffimg im kaiserlichen Deutschland 1914-1916: Der Gegens; 
zwischen dern Generalstabschef von FalkenhMm und dern Oberbefehlshaber Ost irn Rahmen des 
Bdndniskriejzes der MittelmAchte (G6ttingen: Musterschmidt, 1980); Ekkehardt Guth, "Der Gegensatz; 
zwischen dem Oberbefehlshaber Ost und dem. Chef des Generalstabes des Feldhceres 1914/15, " MGM 
1/84 pp. 75-111. 
' Ernst von Wrisberg, Heer und Heimat 1914-1918 (Leipzig: KF Koehler, 192 1) pp. 16-17; Der Weltkrieg 
VII, p. 303; Krafft, Der Durchbruch, p. 36. Originally, it was hoped that 24 new divisions would be formed. 
In the end, Wrisberg's reorganization resulted in only 14. 
138 
called for a breakthrough in the area of Arras. The goal of this operation was the splitting 
of the British and French forces and the pushing of the British forces into the sea. ' Ten 
days later, the OHL received a second promising plan from the 1" Army. 
Generalleutnant Hermann von Kuhl, the Chief of Staff the I" Army and author of this 
plan, believed the most favorable area for a breakthrough to be along the border of the I" 
and the 7th Annies. Kuhl planned to attack along a 20-km front from Vailly eastwards 
across the Aisne and achieve a breakthrough in the French line from Cond6 to Paissy. 
The 1" Army believed that a tactical breakthrough in this area would result in operations 
returning to the "free field, " and that the operations could be extended from here to 
Paris. " 
After examining I" Army's report, the new Minister of War, Adolf Wild von 
Hohenborn, expressed his doubts in the plan in a memorandum of 15 March. Wild 
believed that the OHL possessed sufficient forces to achieve a tactical breakthrough 
under the I" Army's plan, but that the German strength was insufficient to turn the 
tactical success into a operational success. Wild believed the result of the operation 
would merely be a gain of "worthless" terrain, and not a "campaign decision" 
[Feldzugsentscheidung]. " Indeed, Kuhl admitted the same faults in his plan in a second 
Denkschrift to the OHL later in the month. " While Falkenhayn continued to consider the 
1 st Army's plan, especially as a diversionary attack, " attention shifted to the 6th Army's 
proposals. 
The task of carrying out and exploiting this breakthrough on the Western Front 
was to fall to the II th Army. Consequently, when the staff of the 1 1'h Army formed on II 
March in Kassel, Falkenhayn gave verbally to Seeckt the mission of examining areas of 
9 Quoted in an untitled and unpublished manuscript of the Reichsarchiv in BA/MA, W 10/50707, pp. 10-12. 
(Hereafter, "Durchbruchsplline") Although the original documents have been destroyed, this Reichsarchiv 
manuscript contains long excerpts from the original Denkschriften. This manuscript seems to have served 
as the basis for the chapter, "ErwAgungen ftIr einen kriegsentscheidenden Durchbruch im Westen, " in Der 
We "tkrie VIL pp. 307-323. See also KraM Der Durchbruch pp. 36-42. 
10 AOK I to OHL, la Nr. 1182,13 March 1915, in "Durchbruchplane, " pp. 20-23. (Throughout this chapter, 
please refer to Map 4 located at the end of this work. ) 
" Adolph Wild von Hohenborn, 15 March 1915, in ibid., p. 25. 
12 "Durchbruch im Westen, " AOK I Ia Nr. 1221,18 March 1915, in ibid., p. 32. This Denkschrift was 
submitted to the OHL by Kuhl personally, not as Chief of Staff of the I" Army, and examines several 
possible breakthrough plans. 
13 Gerhard Tappen was sent to 7h Army for several weeks to serve as its Chief of Staff and to make a 
judgement on the I" Army's plan. Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 7 March 1915, BA/MA, N56/1. 
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the Western Front for the coming offensive. "' On 16 March Seeckt received his written 
orders. Falkenhayn wrote: "The Oberste Heeresleitung has the intention to break through 
the Western Front after sufficient forces have been assembled. " Seeckt was to 
"reconnoitre the terrain between Canal la Bass6e and the Avre Brook near Roye for an 
operation with the goal of breaking through the enemy position north of the Somme on a 
front 25 to 30 km wide and continuing to the sea. "" The I 1th Army's completed proposal 
was to be submitted by the end of the month. The OHL reserved for itself the right of 
preparing plans for the exploitation of the tactical breakthrough. 
On 30 March, Seeckt submitted his report. " After examining the possibilities of a 
breakthrough along the I 00-krn stretch of front from Canal la Bassde to near Roye, he 
concluded that the area which offered the best tactical and operational conditions for a 
breakthrough was along a 25-km front running from north of Ficheux Oust south of 
Arras) to south of Thiepval Oust north of Albert). To Seeckt, this section of the front 
offered a number of advantages to an attacker. First, this section of front lay only around 
65 kilometers from the coast. Second, Seeckt wrote that the enemy positions on this 
section of the front "appeared to be not more than average in strength, and in parts below 
average. " Additionally, the area behind the front there was less developed than other 
areas of northern France; hence, there would be fewer areas upon which the enemy could 
form an effective center of renewed resistance. Last, as the attack developed, its left wing 
would be covered from an enemy counter-attack to a certain degree by the Somme. 
Seeckt believed that a successful breakthrough in this section of the front would lead to 
the separation of the northern and southern portions of the Allied armies. 
Seeckt's report also outlined the 1 Vh Army's plan of attack and the forces 
necessary. He envisioned the initial breakthrough of the 25-km front being carried out by 
a "breakthrough army" [Durchbruchsarmee] of five corps. This Durchbruchsarmee 
would be supported by a second wave, designed to protect its Ranks and keep up the 
momentum of attack; one army corps would follow behind its right wing, another behind 
its center, and two behind its left wing. )While the right wing of the Durchbruchsarmee 
would advance in a northwesternly direction on Warlus and Couy en Artois, the center 
14 Hans von SeecK Aus meinern Leben 1866-1917 (ed. Friedrich von Rabenau) (Leipzig: Hase & 
Koehler, 193 8) p. 102. 
15 OHL to AOK 11,16 March 1915, quoted in "Durchbruchspigne, " p. 27. 
16 1 Vh Army, la Nr. 7g, 30 March 1915. The following paragraphs are drawn from the extracts of Seeckt's 
report in "Durchbruchpldne, " pp. 52-59. See also Der Weltkrieg VII, pp. 318-320. 
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would drive on Avesnes le Comte and the left wing would cover the army from a 
southern attack. Seeckt also felt a second army of five corps would be necessary to carry 
the attack forward enough to split completely the Allied armies. When the attacking 
German forces reached Doullens, he believed the objective of dividing the enemy armies 
would have been achieved. The breakthrough assault would have to be supported by 
large amounts of artillery. At least one heavy field howitzer battery for every 200 meters 
of the front was necessary, in all 125 batteries. He further recommended an additional 30 
heavy cannon and heavy howitzer batteries. 
Through March and April, Falkenhayn took ftu-ther steps to implement his 
offensive intentions in the west. On 29 March, Falkenhayn issued a directive covering 
defensive doctrine designed to make the Westheer's positions stronger and allow the 
release of more troops to serve as an OHL reserve (a process to which he would return 
later in the year). This directive covered items from the construction of reinforced 
shelters for trench garrisons to the improvement of wire entanglements. Additionally, 
each corps was to prepare plans for an offensive in its sector. " The Westheer had been 
largely on the defensive for a considerable time, and this last element of Falkenhayn's 
directive indicates he felt it necessary to improve the offensive capability of the army, 
even if only through staff exercises. 
Two days after this first directive, another entitled, "Training of the OHL 
Reserve, " was issued by the OHL. Falkenhayn wrote, "The units standing behind the 
front as an OHL reserve are intended for use in an offensive ...... As such, they were to 
receive, "careful training in the area of technical attacks [besonders sorgfdltige Schulung 
in dem Gebrauch der technischen Angriffismittefl. " Exercise areas, with model enemy 
trenches, were to be constructed behind the front lines to achieve these training goals. 
The directive specified that the training was to begin with small units and to progress 
ultimately to the division. Further, in an effort to spread the knowledge obtained in 
previous offensives by other units, Falkenhayn specified that these reserve units should 
study the reports of the 1" Army's successful limited offensives at Vailly and Soissons, 
as well as share knowledge amongst themselves. " 
17 OHL Nr. 19305,29 March 1915, BA/MA, W10/51308; Der Weltkrieg VII, p. 316. 
18 OHL, "Ausbildung der Reserven der Obersten Heeresleitung, " Nr. 19500,31 March 1915, BA/MA, 
W10/51308; Der Welticrieg VII, p. 317. This training scheme seems to have been separate from the 
formation of the Sturmabteilung in the VIII Army Corps, which would develop into the stormtroops of later 
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The plans for a breakthrough produced by the Westheer in March contain many 
similarities and provide an insight into the minds of the German military leadership in 
early 1915. Clearly, both the Westheer's commanders and the OHL, despite the evidence 
of the recent French offensive, believed a breakthrough to be possible, if sufficient forces 
were properly employed. Seeckt's report of 30 March, what seems to be OHL's final 
plan, called for the breakthrough to be carried out by 14 army corps, including 11 newly 
built corps. This compared with the 17 army corps required by Krafft's plan and the 9 V2 
required by Kuhl's plan of 13 March. Additionally, each plan called for the initial 
breakthrough to be supported by large amounts of heavy artillery. 
Propitious terrain, however, was more important than weight of forces to each of 
these authors. All three Denkschriften stressed the necessity of choosing the most 
favorable sector of front for the breakthrough attempt. Kuhl's opinion speaks for all three 
authors: 
Der Ort, wo der Durchbruch stattfinden soll, muss so gewählt werden, dass der 
Angriff taktisch günstig ist, starke Teile des Gegners geschlagen oder abgedrängt 
werden und vor allem ein erneutes Festsetzen in vorbereiteten rückwärtigen 
Stellungen verhindert wird. ` 
Given their own experience at defense, the Germans were clear that the portion of the 
front picked for a breakthrough had to be carefully chosen. The enemy trench system 
must not be inordinately strong and the terrain had to be favorable to the attacker. All 
three authors chose a section of the front which offered few natural features upon which 
the enemy could fall back and reorganize their defense. The pressing need to choose the 
proper sector for a breakthrough led Falkenhayn to assign Seeckt, the chief of staff of the 
force intended to execute the offensive, the task of personally reconnoitring the front. 
All three authors also identified other important elements in ensuring a successful 
breakthrough. First, each author wrote of the necessity of a powerful diversionary attack, 
designed to tie down enemy forces far from the point of decision. Second, each stressed 
the importance of hitting the enemy quickly and powerfully with a surprise blow. In 
Krafft's words, the enemy position "... must be completely smashed. The first blow must 
break in with elemental force [mit elementarer Wucht] and with all possible surprise... "" 
in the war. See Bruce I. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German AM. 1914-19 18 
(New York: Praeger, 1989). 
19 AOK I to OHL, la Nr. 1182,13 March 1915, quoted in "Durchbruchpltine, " pp. 18-19. 
20 AOK 6 to OHL, 3 March 1915 in ibid., p. 9. 
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Kuhl wrote similarly and with reference to French attacks: "It must not come to the 
French procedure, one corps after the other being pushed against the enemy position. We 
must strive for surprise at all costs. The breakthrough must succeed suddenly 
[schlagartig]. "' Further, each author highlighted the importance of maintaining the 
momentum of the attack once the initial breakthrough had succeeded. 
All three authors emphasized the importance of heavy artillery, particularly heavy 
howitzers with their high-trajectory fire, in breaking through an enemy trench system. 
However, they put far less importance in weight of artillery than did the Entente planners. 
Instead, after the experience of successful limited attacks at Vailly and Soissons, the 
German planners emphasized short but accurate bombardments, which focused on key 
enemy targets (strongpoints, enemy observation posts, enemy artillery, etc. ). Such 
bombardments allowed for more selective targeting and also had the significant 
advantage of maintaining the element of surprise. Each plan called for close 
artillery/infantry co-operation, and Krafft even wrote of the importance of using aerial 
observation for the artillery, for which he recommended the employment of 20 aircraft 
22 Atedungen. 
Throughout the planning in the spring of 1915, Falkenhayn had reserved for 
himself the responsibility of directing the exploitation of any breakthrough, merely 
giving the 1 Vh Army the task of planning the breakthrough itself. " Thus, the General 
Staff Chief kept in his hands the strategic direction of the campaign. Unfortunately, with 
the evidence which has survived, it is difficult to determine exactly Falkenhayn's 
strategic intentions in early 1915. However, given the strategy he outlined to Bethmann 
in November 1914 and the planning that was carried out by the Westheer some 
conclusions can be drawn. 
First, as we have seen, Falkenhayn did not believe that the forces at Germany's 
disposal would allow for a "decisive" battle to be fought. He told the Chancellor plainly 
that at least one enemy would have to be detached from the anti-German coalition if 
Germany were to have any chance of winning the war. In the spring of 1915, evidence 
suggests that Falkenhayn aimed to force France into a separate peace. First, the General 
Staff Chief gave the I I'h Army the task of "breaking through the enemy front ... with the 
21 AOK I to OHL, la Nr. 1182,13 March 1915 in ibid., p. 19. 
22 AOK 6 to OHL, 3 March 1915 in ibid., p. 13. 
23 Falkenhayn to II AOK, 16 March 1915, quoted in "Durchbruchplane, " p. 27. 
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goal of driving to the sea. "" In a comment to Kuhl's Denkschrift of 18 March, 
Falkenhayn wrote that if the British army could be divided from the French and forced to 
retreat from the Continent, "then the French would certainly be finished with their ally. "" 
The plan devised by Seeckt clearly aimed at the separation of the forces of the two 
nations. However, we cannot know how Falkenhayn then planned to force the British 
from the Continent. Indeed, it is questionable if Germany would have had the forces 
necessary to reach even this limited goal. Seeckt's plan required 14 army corps and 
numerous heavy artillery batteries just for the breakthrough and drive to the coast. "' 
Despite the hopes raised by Wrisberg's reorganization plan the OHL had built up a 
reserve of only 16 divisions behind the Western Front by the middle of April; ` clearly, 
not enough to carry out Seeckt's plan, let alone any exploitation. 
In the end, despite all the preparation, Falkenhayn's plans for a breakthrough 
operation in the west were brought quickly to a halt by the deteriorating position of 
Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary. As we have seen in Chapter 5, in April 1915, 
Falkenhayn was forced to send substantial reinforcement to the east, including the 
spearhead of his upcoming western operation, the I 16' Army. The resulting offensive in 
Galicia drew in more and more German units as Falkenhayn sought to deal Russia a blow 
which would bring her either to the negotiating table or would damage her army so much 
that she would be unable to threaten Austria-Hungary with an offensive for an extended 
period of time. The OHL was forced once again to allow the initiative in the west to pass 
to the Entente. 
Defensive Doctrine 
Forced to postpone his plans for an offensive in the west and faced with 
increasing demands for troops in the east, Falkenhayn shifted from preparing for an 
attack and instead concentrated on securing, with the smallest number of troops, the 
Western Front from Entente assaults. The Entente attacks during the winter, especially 
those of the French in the Champagne, had at times come close to breaking through the 
German position and had forced the Germans to re-examine their defensive doctrine as 
24 Ibid. 
25 Comment to Kuhl's Denkschrift, ibid., p. 36. 
26 Falk-enhayn had originally refused the 6h Army's plan on the fact that it required too many units. Krafft, 






keeping the troops alive. Troops arrayed behind the first trench survived enemy attacks 
more easily and could be used to drive the enemy out with counterattacks. " 
The success of these measures seemed proven by the poor results of the Entente 
offensives in Artois in May and June, and, increasingly, the safety of the German 
position in the west seemed assured to the OHL. " On 6 June, Falkenhayn travelled from 
Pless to the OHL's western headquarters in Mdzi&es to begin an inspection of the front. " 
Upon his arrival, Falkenhayn found the I't, 2nd , and 6 
th Armies involved in "severe" 
battles, but everywhere the German troops held their own against Entente attacks. After 
meeting with the chiefs of staff of the Westheer, Falkenhayn was convinced that the 
Entente attacks would achieve no meaningful results and that the Westheer would be able 
to give up several units for use in the east (these would be replaced with fought-out units 
from the east). " On 10 June, Falkenhayn returned to Pless to direct the ongoing offensive 
in Galicia, convinced in the ability of the Westheer to ward off any Entente offensive. 
Tappen wrote in his diary, "Generally, situation good [in the west]. Relief of troops shall 
take place. "" 
Falkenhayn's trip to the Western Front in early June brought a number of steps 
designed to strengthen the Westheer's defensive position ftirther and free additional 
troops for use "in other theatres. " First, shortly after Falkenhayn's return to the east, 
several officers from the OHL in Pless were ordered to the west with important missions. 
On 20 June, Generalmajor von Mertens, the general of engineers of the 10 th Army, was 
ordered by Falkenhayn to the west. The purpose of his mission is today somewhat hazy. 
The Reichsarchiv reported that General von Mertens' task was to establish a military line 
of demarcation for a future peace between Germany and the Entente. " This view is 
somewhat supported by Falkenhayn's ideas at the time concerning a separate peace. (See 
31 William Balck, Die Entwickelung der Tak-tik im Weltkriege (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1922) pp. 84-85. 
For an example of how the revised instructions were issued at corps level see, "Ile Lessons of the recent 
fighting in the Ban de Sapt, " [German ] XV Reserve Corps, Ia Nr. 1635,17 July 1915, PRO, WO 157/1. 
See also Friedrich Seel3elberg, et. al., Der Stellungskrieg 1914-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1926) pp. 102-230. 
32 Reichsarchiv, Der Welduieg Bd. Vlll: Die ORerationen des Jahres 1915: Die Ereignisse im Westen im 
Frahiahr und Sommer, im Osten vorn Frilhiahr bis zum Jahresschluss (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1932) pp. 55-78. 
33 When the OHL relocated to Pless in May, it left behind a number of officers under the command of Fritz 
von LoBberg, then the la of the OHL, at its headquarters in M6zi6res to liaise with the Westheer. See Fritz 
von Loßberg, Meine Tätigkeit im Weltkriege 1914-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1939) p. 148. 
34 The orders were originally sent on 2 June but the transport of units was postponed until Falkenhayn 
visited the west. OHL to 4h Army, 2 June 1915, OHL Nr. 1948r; OHL to Armee-Atedungen Gaede and 
Falkenhausen, 2 June 1915, OHL Nr. 1950r, BA/MA, W 10/513 88. 
35 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 10 June 1915. 
36 Der Weltkrieg VIII, p. 6 10. 
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below) However, the OHL's Biirooffizier, Major Friedrich Mewes, wrote that Mertens' 
mission was much more radical. He maintained that Mertens was sent to the west to 
identify a position upon which the Westheer could fall back and hold with far fewer 
troops. " Falkenhayn, driven by the requirements of his eastern offensive, seems to have 
considered seriously for a time a shortening of the Western Front, designed to free more 
reserves for employment in the east. While in the end Falkenhayn chose not to undertake 
a general withdrawal to a shorter position in the west, he still needed to find more troops 
to feed his eastern venture. Shortly after Mertens' return to the east two more officers 
went from the OHL's headquarters at Pless to the Western Front as part of Falkenhayn's 
general re-organization. 
On 3 July, General der In/antrie Eberhard von Claer and General der Artillerie 
Ludwig Lauter were sent by the OHL to the Western Front. " Claer's task was to referee 
the debate which had developed within the western OHL over the Westheer's various 
defensive systems and recommend a single, common system to be used by all annies on 
the front. " Lauter's mission was to examine the artillery of the Westheer and to update 
the artillery training procedures and manuals, taking into account the most recent lessons 
and requirements of position warfare. " Re-establishing a common infantry and artillery 
doctrine in the armies of the Westheer would go a long way towards creating a more 
secure front, and bring Falkenhayn the troops he needed for his offensive in the east. 
Over the course of 1915, much attention had been paid to creating a new infantry 
defensive doctrine, but the equally important artillery doctrine had been neglected. Under 
the direction of Lauter, the artillery of the Westheer was to be overhauled. The 
experiences of the previous battles on the Western Front had taught the importance of 
artillery in defense, and through the summer, the OHL issued directives on the proper 
employment of artillery in defensive battles. The Germans had admitted that their 
37 Mewes to Reichsarchiv, 15 August and 8 September 1931, BA/MA, W10/51408. Mewes suggestion that 
the Reichsarchiv query Majors Harbou and Geyer about Mertens' mission seems not to have been pursued. 
38 Eberhard von Claer, Inspector General of Fortresses from 1913, became General vom Ingenieur- und 
Pionierkorps im Grossen Hauptquarfier at the war's outbreak and Ludwig Lauter, the Inspector General of 
Artillery since 1911, became the General der Fussartillerie im Grossen Hauptquarfier in August 1914. 
39 Bauer, op. cit., p. 86. For a full discussion of the debates on defensive doctrine in 1915 see, Samuels, 
op. cit., pp. 159-170. G. C. Wynne's If Germoy Attacks: The Battle in Depth in the West (London: Faber 
and Faber, 1939) offers an interpretation based almost solely on Lol3berg's memoirs. 
40 Der Weltkrieg VIII, pp. 98-99; Lol3berg, op. cit., pp. 157-158. Lol3berg recorded that Claer earned 
himself the sobriquet, "Grabenschreck, " or "Terror of the Trenches. " 
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artillery had been "unable to combat the effects of the French artillery on our [defending] 
infantry. " However, the German defensive artillery was able to obtain 
... very successful results against the enemy's 
infantry, either by directing a heavy 
fire against the infantry positions from which the attack was issuing, and thus 
bringing it to a standstill, or else by directing a rapid and concentrated fire against 
the attack itself . 
41 
The artillery of the Westheer's armies, reinforced when necessary from the OHL artillery 
reserve, would assemble at threatened points and be parcelled out to subordinate 
formations as necessary. The combined fire of the guns would be crucial to destroying 
the attacking enemy infantry as they left their trenches and to cutting the attacking troops 
off from their rearward communications. " New techniques of observation and planned 
fire were introduced, including specialized ranging detachments behind the German lines 
designed to facilitate counter-battery fire. Lauter ensured that each army was employing 
its artillery most efficiently and that pre-war training manuals were updated to reflect the 
most recently lessons of Stellungskrieg. " 
As the reorganization of the Westheer progressed, Falkenhayn again travelled to 
the west. On 29 July, he conducted a meeting with all the chiefs of staff of the Westheer, 
which gives us important clues to Falkenhayn's strategic thinking in the summer of 1915. 
Falkenhayn opened by thanking the chiefs in the name of the Kaiser for their good work 
in warding off the Entente attacks and in giving the Ostheer the breathing room necessary 
to conduct operations. During this meeting, Falkenhayn expressed his belief that the 
Western Allies would not attack anytime in the near future and that, if they did, the "Iron 
Wall" in the west, strengthened by the recent re-organization, would undoubtedly hold 
firm. Falkenhayn opined that the French did not have the necessary will to undertake a 
major offensive and that the British were too pre-occupied with events in Gallipoli. A 
German attack in the west, Falkenhayn's wish, was also ruled out in the near future - 
41 AOK 3, "Experiences Gained in the Winter Battles in Champagne, " CDS 303. 
42 OBL, "Barrage Fire in case of Attack and the Necessary Expenditure of Ammunition, " Nr. 3550,11 July 
1915, PRO, W0157/3. 
43 The change in artillery doctrine necessitated altering some long-held beliefs about the employment of 
artillery. See Major Justrow, "Die artilleristische Waffe, " in SeeBelberg, op. cit., pp. 254-281; and also 
Major Dr. -Ing. Karl Becker, "Schiesstechnik und Ballistik, " in ibid., pp. 282-29 1. The heavy artillery 
[Fuy6artilleriel arm, which was trained for Festungskrieg, made the adjustment easier than the field artillery 
[Feldartillerie]. 
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operations in the east would not be concluded for some time. "Based on these beliefs, 
the General Staff Chief ordered additional units to be withdrawn from the west for use in 
the east. 45 
Falkenhayn remained convinced through the summer that the Entente would not 
launch a major offensive in the near future and that the re-organized Westheer could 
defend against any Entente attack. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that in the surnmer 
of 1915 Falkenhayn believed that, far from planning an offensive, the French were ready 
for peace. On 30 June, he sent a memorandum to Bethmann and the Auswdrtiges Amt 
outlining his assessment of the French. In its conclusion Falkenhayn wrote: 
Frankreichs Opfer sind in diesem Krieg so Reisenhaft, dass die Regierung weder 
vor dem Volke noch einst vor der Geschichte die Verantwortung dafür wird 
tragen können und in Bälde vor die Frage gestellt sein wird, zu entscheiden, ob 
nicht die Aufgabe des Widerstandes der Zukunft der Nation dienlicher sein wird 
als die Fortsetzung des für Frankreich trotz aller auswärtigen Hilfen aussichtlosen 
Krieges. " 
The failure of the French to launch a great relief offensive in August reinforced 
Falkenhayn's belief that the French were incapable of a ffirther great effort. ' Indeed, he 
remained firm in this belief, despite the growing evidence of a coming offensive offered 
by the 6th and P Armies, until he had seen the offensive with his own eyes on 25 
September. 
Accordingly, Falkenhayn continued to focus his effort in the east and to strip the 
Westheer of its reserves. However, many German leaders were still fearful of another 
powerful Entente offensive; both Kronprinz Wilhelm and Kronprinz Rupprecht 
complained about the weakness of the Westheer. " By 22 September, on the eve of a 
major Entente offensive, the OHL reserve on the Western Front had been reduced to four 
infantry divisions and two independent infantry brigades. Additionally, the Gardekorps 
and the staff of the X Corps with its 20d' Division had arrived in Belgium in mid- 
44 "Die Besprechung in Metz am 29. Juli 1915, " BA/MA, W 10/51312, contains the war diary entries for the 
chiefs of staff participating in the conference. See also Der Weltkrieg VIII, pp. 100- 10 1, which relies upon 
the diary entries of Hermann Ritter Mertz von Quirnheim. 
45 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 30 July 1915. 
46 Der WeItkrieg VIII, pp. 609-6 10. 
47 Falkenhayn, op. cit., p. 166. 
4' Both Kronprinz Wilhelm and Kronprinz; Rupprecht expressed their concern about the possibility of an 
enemy offensive and the weakness of the Westheer. Der WeItkrieg BcLDC: Die Qperationen des Jahres 
1915: Die Ereignisse im Westen und auf dem Balkan vom Sommer bis zum Jahresschluss (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1933) p. 17 and p. 27. 
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September for rest after the campaign in Russia and were available as a reserve in an 
emergency. The OHL artillery reserve, crucial to any defensive battle, consisted of 13 
modem heavy batteries and 11 older heavy batteries. Facing this meagre reserve of four 
full-strength divisions, three tired divisions, and two brigades, the OHL intelligence 
reckoned that the French and English possessed a reserve of 50 divisions. " 
The Herbstschlacht in the Champagne 
Despite Falkenhayn's confidence that the French did not have the will to launch 
another great offensive, the commander of the 3 rd Army, Generaloberst Karl von Einern, 
believed otherwise. Shortly after Falkenhayn's meeting with the chiefs of staff, the 
German 3 rd Army began noting French preparations for a major offensive. " In early 
August, Einein noted French preparations for a new offensive in the Champagne, but 
wrote, "we calmly and confidently await the attack. "" Tliroughout the month, the 
offensive preparations in front of Einem's P Army as well as in front of Kronprinz 
Rupprecht's 6th Army became more and more apparent and more threatening. By the end 
of the month, Einem. began re-organizing his army to strengthen threatened points on his 
front. He also began requesting infantry and artillery reinforcement from the OHL. " On 7 
September, General Lauter, the OHL's artillery officer, arrived to examine the P Army's 
artillery preparations and requirements. Convinced of an impending French offensive, 
Lauter recommended an immediate reinforcement of 10 heavy artillery batteries. " 
Falkenhayn, however, continued to believe the French preparations to be a feint, and in 
response to the 3 rd Army's requests for reinforcement, he offered only limited artillery 
and infantry reinforcement and more artillery ammunition. "' 
As September progressed, however, French intentions became clearer. From the 
beginning of the month, French deserters reported the coming offensive. One deserter 
49 Der Weltkrieg IX, p. 100; LoBberg, op. cit., pp. 161-162. The Gardekorps had suffered 2 1,000 casualties 
in the Russian campaign and was in the process of inducting recruits. 
50 This offensive has been called "one of the worst-kept secrets of the war. " Richard Griffiths, Marshal 
Ldtain (London: Constable, 1994, first published 1970) p. 14. 
51 Karl von Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " II August 1915, BA/MA, N324/12. Einem's diary was published in 
edited form after the war as Ein Armeeft1hrer erlebt den Weltkrieg, (ed. Junius Alter) (Leipzig: v. Hase & 
Koehler, 1938). As the publish version omits many details, I have used the original. 
52 LoBberg, op. cit., pp. 162-163. 
53 Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " 5 and 7 September 1915; Oberstleumant a. D. Muths, "Die deutsche schwere 
Artillerie im August his Dezember 1915, " Appendix 3 to "Forschungsarbeit zu Band IX, " BA/MA, 
W10/51353, p. 10. 
54 Falkenhayn, General Headguarters, p. 166; Der Weltkrie IX, pp. 32-34. 
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confessed that a major offensive was to begin between 14 and 21 September. These 
rumours were supported by reports from German agents. By the 16 th , the 3 
rd Amy had 
identified, in addition to the two previous corps, three new French corps on its front and 
large numbers of French heavy batteries. " Further, the French began pushing their 
trenches closer to the German positions in an effort to reduce the distance the infantry 
had to cover during an assault. ' All evidence pointed to a coming major French 
offensive, and the OHL's Nachrichtenabtedung reported on 7 September that they 
expected a French offensive, with a main attack in Champagne and a diversionary attack 
in Artois, any day. 57 Even Falkenhayn's normally sceptical operations officer, Gerhard 
Tappen, began to believe that an offensive was impending. " 
In fact, against Einem's P Army stood Nodl de Castelnau's groupe d'armies du 
centre, composed of two French armies, the 2 nd under Fernande de Langle de Cary and 
the 4th under Philippe Main. Castelnau's army group had been preparing an offensive 
since early July and had accumulated a powerful striking force. Einem's 8 divisions faced 
27 French divisions and the 3 rd Army's 600 some artillery pieces were overwhelmed by 
the 683 heavy and 1443 light French guns. The French also massed cavalry divisions 
behind the infantry in order to exploit the expected breakthrough. At the French 
Schwerpunkt, the German VIR Reserve Corps faced five French corps. " 
The French, determined not to repeat the mistakes of earlier offensives, paid 
meticulous attention to preparations for this attack. Since early August, the French had 
followed a policy of rotating their assault divisions into the front line, giving them 
enough time to become familiar with the terrain but not enough time to suffer serious 
casualties. ' Joffre hoped that this great accumulation of troops supported by masses of 
artillery, like at Gorlice, would give the little extra needed to punch through the German 
lines into open ground. Stealing another page from Falkenhayn's book, Joff-re believed 
that a powerful diversionary attack in Artois to be important in keeping the Germans 
55 Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " 31 August to 16 September 1915. 
56 Arndt von Kirchbach, KAml2fe in der ChMagne (Winter 1914-Herbst 1915) (Der groBe Krieg 
Einzeldarstellunge H. 11) (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stelling, 1919) p. 70. 
57 Hauptmann a. D. Krogh, "Kriegstagebuch, " 7 September 1915, BA/MA, W10/51305. 
58 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 5 September 1915. On the 21', however, he wrote that commanders of the 
Westheer's armies seemed excessively nervous. 
59 Minist6re de la Guerre, Les Arm6es Francaises dans la Grande Guerre Tome III: Les Offensives de 
1915-L'Hiver de 1915-1916 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1923) p. 3 10; "Beispiele ffir Artillerie-Starken 
bei Durchbruchsangriffen, " BA/MA, W10/50160. See Appendix 1. 
60 AOK 3, Die ChAMpap-ne-Herbstschlacht 1915 (Munich: Albert Langen, 1916) pp. 24ff. 
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guessing as to the location of the main attack. The greatly weakened Westheer was 
shortly to be attacked by a vastly superior enemy. " 
At 7: 00am on 22 September, the French opened their Trommelfeuer in the 
Champagne and in Artois. Einem recorded in his diary on the same day that he awaited 
the French infantry attack at any moment. In fact, the firing on the 22 nd signalled the 
beginning of a 72-hour bombardment that in the end obliterated many German positions, 
wiped out their garrisons, swept away the German wire, destroyed artillery observation 
posts, and cut rearward communications. The bombardment also extended far beyond the 
forward trenches in an effort to hinder the Germans from bringing forward 
reinforcement. The rail facilities at Bazancourt and Challerange were destroyed and 3 rd 
Army's headquarters was attacked by French aircraft. The Germans observed an average 
of 30 to 35 French batteries directed against each German division. For 3 days, the smoke 
and dust kicked up by the French fire blocked out the sun above the position of the 
German 3 rd Army. " 
In all, the French 2 nd and 01 An-nies fired close to 3.4 million artillery rounds 
(including almost 600,000 heavy rounds) on the P Army's positions during their 
preparatory bombardment . 
6' The Trommelfeuer fell heaviest against Generalleutnant 
Fleck's VIH Reserve Corps, where the French intended to concentrate their main effort. ' 
French preparations over the past month had convinced the 3 rd Army that the main 
French blow would fall in the VIH Reserve Corps' sector (and on its neighbour, the 21 st 
Reserve Division of the 5th Army) and efforts had been made to reinforce this position. 
Here Einem collected most of his artillery reserve, and upon the opening of the French 
61 Trommeýfeuer, ftu-ther heavy artillery reinforcement arrived from the OHL. 
Despite the beginning of the French bombardment on 22 September, Falkenhayn 
remained sceptical of French intentions. The General Staff Chief had left Pless on 21 
September for the west to judge for himself the seriousness of the situation. On the 24th, 
61 Les Armdes Franjaises 111, pp. 275-278; Griffiths, op. cit., pp. 13-14. 
62 AOK 3, Die Chg! jipagne-Herbstschlacht pp. 31-39; Kirchbach, op. cit., pp. 74-77; Der Weltkrieg IX, pp. 
4849. 
63 Les Arm6es Frangaises 111, p. 537. Ironically, the French blamed insufficient ammunition for the failure of 
the offensive. p. 548. 
64 The VIII Reserve Corps was composed of the Division Liebert (I 5h Reserve Division), the 500' Infantry 
Division, and the Division Ditfinth (16'h Reserve Division). It held a front of around 20 kilometers. Fleck 
had distinguished himself in command of an army group during the previous French offensives in the 
Champagne. 
65 Kirchbach, op. cit., pp. 75-76; Der WeItkrieg IX, pp. 49-50; Muths, op. cit., p. 10. 
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in a discussion with Einern, he repeated his belief that the French did not have the will to 
launch a major offensive. " Several French probing attacks against VIII Reserve Corps 
were repulsed on the 24h, reinforcing his opinion. "' Kronprinz Rupprecht later recalled 
that Falkenhayn expressed to the Kaiser the view that the 3 rd Amy saw things "far too 
black. " Nevertheless, the General Staff Chief took a number of steps to reinforce the 3 rd 
Army. First, he placed the 5h Infantry Division, which had been ear-marked for the 
Serbian campaign, at the disposal of the 3 rd Army. ' Then, from 22 to 24 September, 23 
heavy batteries were transferred to the 3 rd Amy from various areas of the front. " 
At 9: 15arn on 25 September, the long-awaited French infantry offensive began. 
As expected, the attack fell heaviest against the VIII Reserve Corps and its neighbour, the 
5th Army's 21s'Reserve Division. Here, 5 German divisions were attacked by 19 French 
divisions with almost three times the number of guns. " The efforts of the French 
preparatory bombardment had paid handsome dividends. In many areas, the attacking 
French infantry found the German positions to be almost completely destroyed and the 
remaining defenders to be too stunned to offer meaningful resistance. 72 Indeed, many 
German defenders were caught by French infantry in their dugouts before they could man 
their positions. ' The bombardment had also done a good job of cutting German 
communications, making it difficult for the German infantry to call in artillery support or 
request reinforcement. Supported by a gas attack, the French quickly broke into the 
German position and began rolling up the trenches. Before noon, several French corps 
had made deep penetrations into the German position, overrunning completely the first 
71 German line. The French command poured reserves into the initial breaches. 
As the French attacks began on the morning of the 25 th , Falkenhayn and the 
Kaiser, who were on a tour of the Westheer's armies, were preparing to leave Montmedy 
66 Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " 24 September 1915, "Ich spreche mit Falkenhayn und mache ihn auf die sehr 
ernste Lage aufinerksam. Er meintjedoch, die Franzosen hätten keinen Schneid... " 
67 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 24 September 1915; Der Weltkrieg IX, p. 51. 
68 (Wilhelm] Solger, "Die Leitung des deutschen Westheeres im September und Oktober 1915 seit dem 
Begin der Herbstschlacht in der Champagne und im Artois, " unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, 
W10/51353, p. 1. 
69 After the war, Einern wrote that he believed the 5"' Infantry Division was released to the P Army far too 
late in the battle. Einem to Reichsarchiv, 17 September 1932, BA/MA, W10/51352. 
70 Der Weltkrieg IX, P. 50. 
7' Noel de Castelnau, "Rapport d'ensemble sur les operations offensives de Champagne (Septembre 
1915), " 1 November 1915, Les Armdes Francaises III, Annexes IV, Annexe Nr. 3019. 
72 AOK 3, Die Chmagne-Herbstschlac pp. 55ff-, Kirchbach, op. cit., p. 86; Report of 14 Corps d'Armde, 
Nr. 144,1 October 1915, Les Arm6es Francaise III, Annexes 111, Amexe Nr. 2513. 
73 Der Weltkrieg IX, p. 61. 
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for the 5h Army's headquarters at Stenay, 60 kilometers away. Before leaving 
Montmedy, the Westheer's morning reports arrived at around 10: 00am, forwarded by 
LoBberg from Mdzi6res. " The contents of the initial reports confirmed Falkenhayn's 
previous opinion of the French intentions. The P Army reported that in its sector the 
French artillery fire continued as before. The 3 rd Amy staff, whose communications with 
its units had been severely restricted by the effects of French artillery fire, was unable to 
detennine whether or not a French attack had taken place during the night or in the early 
hours of the morning. The 6th Army reported that although infantry attacks had taken 
place, they appeared "to be insignificant. "" 
By the time Falkenhayn and the Kaiser had arrived at Stenay, the staffs of the 6th 
and 3 rd Armies had begun to realize the scale of the Entente operations, and Falkenhayn 
found grave reports waiting for him. The 6th Army reported to the OHL at 12: 30prn that 
the enemy had broken into its position in a number of places and that all its reserves had 
been committed to battle. Rupprecht wrote, "ftirther immediate reinforcement is 
necessary. "" At 12: 15,3 rd Army called its neighbour, the 5th Army, with an urgent 
request for reinforcement, saying that the "enemy has broken through in the area of 
Souain-Somme Py. " As the 5th Army's XVIII Reserve Corps was already heavily 
engaged in battle, the 3 rd Amy's request was refused by Kronprinz Wilhehn. ` Further, a 
tense telephone conversation took place between Falkenhayn and Einern and his chief of 
staff, Generalleutnant Ritter von H6hn, in which Falkenhayn felt it necessary to remind 
Einern that the Kaiser expected "every man to do his duty. "' Falkenhayn soon left Stenay 
for the OHL headquarters at Mdzi6res. 
Falkenhayn began to take steps to reinforce the threatened sectors even before he 
left Stenay. He ordered the 192 nd Infantry Brigade from reserve behind the 7h Army to 
the 6h Army and the 56d' Infantry Division from Armeeabteilung Falkenhausen to the 3 rd 
Army. After arriving at M&i6res, he ordered the Gardekorps be transported from its rest 
areas south of Brussels to the 6th Army and the X Army Corps headquarters with its 20th 
Infantry Division from its rest area south of Antwerp to the 3 rd Army. Later, he re-routed 
74 Les Arm6es Francaises 111, pp. 372-373. 
75 Loßberg, op. cit., p. 164. 
76 AOK 3 and AOK 6, "Morgemneldung, 25 September 1915, " printed in Solger, op. cit., p. 2. 
77 AOK 6, "Mittagsmeldung, 25 September 1915, "in Solger, op. cit, p. 3. 
78 "Niederschrift eines Fernspruchs oder Femspräches von AOK 3 and AOK 5,25 September 1915, 
12: 15,11 printed in Solger, op. cit., p. 4. 
79 Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " 25 September 1915. 
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the 192 nd Infantry Brigade to the 3 rd Army. Einem also received a battalion of heavy field 
howitzers from the 7th Army. " It would, however, take several hours for these 
reinforcements to arrive, and until that time, the 6ffi and 3 rd Armies were left to their own 
devices. " 
As the day progressed, the extent of the French penetration in the 3 rd Amy's 
sector slowly became known to the OHL, and it became apparent that the most 
threatening attack was in the 3 rd Army's sector rather than in Artois. The VIII Reserve 
Corps' 15'h Reserve Division and 50'h Infantry Division had been forced back to their 
second defensive position (R-Stellung), and its 16d' Reserve Division had also been badly 
shaken. " All local counterattacks had failed to re-take the divisions' initial positions. 
Throughout the day, Einem rushed reserves as they arrived forward to stem the breach, 
but they were only barely able to hold the VIII Reserve Corps' incomplete R-Stellung; 83 
in some areas the VIH Reserve Corps had even been pushed out of its forward-most 
positions within the R-Stellung. "' Each of the corps' divisions had lost close to 5,000 men 
and the 50'h Infantry Division had lost a number of its guns. " After the first day, the VIII 
Reserve Corps' commander, Generalleutnant Fleck, was so shaken by the French attack 
that he recommended a general withdrawal of his corps early in the evening. " 
Indeed, there is some evidence to show that not only Fleck, but the command of 
the 3 rd Army as well was badly shaken by the events of the day and were unable to come 
to grips with the fast moving situation. The 3 rd Army's written reports for the clay seem to 
indicate that its staff had little grasp of the day's battle and are worth quoting at some 
length. At 1: 50pm, the 3 rd Army reported: 
so Der Weltkrieg IX, pp. 66-68. The X Army Corps' 200' Infantry Division was still in transit from the 
Eastern Front. 
81 Communications between the Operations- and the Nachrichtenabteilungen of the OHL seemed to have 
been exceedingly poor. Despite being repeatedly warned of the impending French attack by the N-Abt, the 
O-Abt had developed no contingency plan. Major Hessig of the N-Abt recalled that in the crucial first few 
hours of the attack, personnel from the O-Abt flooded his office with requests for information about enemy 
strengths along the front. Hessig to Rauch, 4 July 1929, BA/MA, WI 0/51305. 
82 The 16* Reserve Division (Division Ditftuth) had even shown itself skittish before the battle. Its 
commander, Generalmajor Ditftu-th had found it necessary to issue an order restricting the use of artillery 
as the division had been calling in fire whenever the enemy showed any signs of attack. 16'h RD, la Nr. 215, 
II August 1915, PRO, WO 157/3. 
83 On the condition of the R-Stellung see, AOK 3, Die ChgWaMe-Herbstschlacht, pp. 16-17. 
" "Ferngesprach zwischen Hohn and Knobelsdort 5: 30 pm, 25 September 1915, " from the Akten of the 5h 
Army, quoted in Solger, op. cit., p. 16. 
85 Der Weltkrieg IX, p. 73; LoBberg, op. cit., p. 168. 
86 Der Weltkrieg IX, p. 71. 
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Heute Vonmittag erfolgte auf ganzer Front des XIII. Reserve- und des 
VIII. Reservekorps ein äußerst starker Infanterie-Angriff, Welle hinter Welle... 
Angriff bei 23. Reserve-Division abgeschlagen. Bei 24. Reserve-Division 
und Division Liebert ist der Feind an einigen Stellen eingebrochen. Einzelheiten 
fehlen. 
50. Infanterie-Divison behauptet ihre Stellung. Der linke Flügel der 
Division Ditfurth ist etwas eingedrückt. 
In fact, by 11: 00am, both the I 5h Reserve Division and the 5 Od' Infantry Division had 
been pushed completely out of their first and into their second positions. At 3: 05pm, the 
3d An-ny reported again to the OHL. Once again, its report showed little appreciation of 
the situation: 
XII. Reservekorps hat sehr starke Angriffe abgewiesen, etwa 600 Gefangene 
gemacht. Lage bei VIH. Reservekorps unübersichtlich. Kommandierender General 
meldet, das grosse Teile der vorderen Stellung, voraussichtlich auch viel 
Artillerie verloren gegangen sind. Rückwärtige Stellung wird gehalten. Es fehlt 
an Artillerie. 
Two firther reports in the evening and night showed a similar lack understanding of the 
situation by Fleck's VHI Reserve Corps. While this confusion was somewhat 
understandable given the great destruction of the communications network by French 
artillery, the 3 rd Army could easily have gained a clearer picture of the confused situation 
by sending a representative from its staff to the front line. " No attempt seems to have 
been made to do this, despite the fact that the 5th Army had already sent its intelligence 
officer to the VHI Reserve Corps. " 
This command muddle persuaded Falkenhayn, who was already dissatisfied with 
the P Army, that changes were necessary. First, the P Army was placed under the 
command of Heeresgruppe Deutscher Kronprinz on the afternoon of the 26h. 11 As the 5h 
Army was attacked as well, Falkenhayn felt that Wilhelm could better co-ordinate the 
defense of both armies. " The 5h Army's staff had also shown more initiative in dealing 
with the crisis. In addition to the intelligence officer from the 5h Army's staff, Kronprinz 
Wilhelm himself sought to make contact with the VHI Reserve Corps on the 25th to 
97 P Army's reports for 25 September 1915 are printed in Solger, op-cit., pp. 3-15. 
H6hn to Reichsarchiv, 15 July 1923, BA/MA, W 10/513 53. 
89 Heeresgruppe Deutscher Kronprinz had been formed in early August out of the 5h Army and 
Armeeabteilungen Strantz, Falkenhausen, and Gaede. 
90 Der Weltkrieg IX, pp. 72-73. Einem later wrote that he felt greatly insulted by this move, but realized it 
was the best way to get badly needed reinforcements from 5h Army. Einem to Reichsarchiv, 17 September 
1932, BA/MA, W10/51352. 
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steady their shaken nerves, and his chief of staff, Generalleutnant Constantin Schmidt 
von Knobelsdorf, visited the threatened areas of the front. " It is quite probable that OHL 
received more information about the plight of the VIH Reserve Corps on the 25h from 
the 5th Army than from the 3d Army. 
This change in the command arrangements provided Falkenhayn with the 
opportunity to make changes within the Yd Army staff as well. In the afternoon of the 
26th, Falkenhayn telephoned Yd Army headquarters to inform them of their new 
command relationship with the 5th Army. Einem's chief of staff, H6hn, was senior to 
Kronprinz Wilhelm's chief of staff, and consequently, told Falkenhayn that he refused to 
serve under a junior. " As a further notice of his dissatisfaction with the 3 rd Army, 
Falkenhayn replaced H6hn immediately with Fritz von LoBberg. 
LoBberg left M&i&es with Falkenhayn's admonition to hold on to the remaining 
positions at all costs ringing in his ears and arrived at P Army's headquarters at 
Vouziers around 3: 30prn on the 26th. Immediately upon his arrival, he answered a call 
from General Fleck, asking if the planned withdrawal of VIII Reserve Corps was still to 
take place the next day. LoBberg replied, "The VIII Reserve Corps must stand and die in 
its curTent position. 5993 Shortly thereafter, LoBberg visited Fleck's headquarters to see the 
situation for himself. There he met Schmidt von Knobelsdorf who also felt a personal 
visit necessary to calm the frayed nerves of the corps staff. The two army chiefs left after 
a short reconnaissance convinced that the VIII Reserve Corps would hold its current 
position (the original R-Stellung) with the reinforcements now arriving. LoBberg then left 
to tour the 3rd Army's remaining units. 9' 
After reconnoitring the P Army's position and examining the incoming 
reinforcements, LoBberg determined the 3rd Army's defensive position needed greater 
91 Kronprinz Wilhelm, Meine Erinnerungen aus Deutschlands HeldMkainp (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1923) 
p. 142. 
92 H6hn to Reichsarchiv, 15 July 1923, BA/MA, W10/51353. Einern wrote that Falkenhayn, not H61m, bore 
the responsibility for the P Army's desperate position as he had weakened the Westheer far too much 
pursuing his campaign in Russia. Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " 26 September 1915. 
93 LoBberg, op. cit., pp. 167-168. LoBberg wrote that H6hn had given permission for the VIII Reserve Corps 
to withdraw, and that this decision had caused Falkenhayn to dismiss him. After the war, H6hn denied ever 
giving such permission. H6hn to Reichsarchiv, 15 July 1923, BA/MA, W10/51353. Einem also later denied 
ever acquiescing to a withdrawal. Einem to Reichsarchiv, 17 September, 1932, BA/MA, W 10/51352; see 
also his diary entry for the day, Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " 26 September 1915, in which he wrote that he 
learned of Fleck's plans from Knobelsdorf. The Id of VIII Reserve Corps, Fdrster, wrote that Fleck had 
already given the orders for a withdrawal by the time LoBberg arrived at 3rd Army headquarters. F6rster to 
Nathusius, 5 October 1932, BA/MA, W10/51352. 
94 LoBberg, op. cit., p. 172. 
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depth to withstand the renewed French attacks. After losing their first position on the 
25th, the VIH Reserve Corps had fallen back on its incomplete R-Stellung. This position 
had the advantage, however, of being situated on the reverse slope of the Py Valley, and 
hence, sheltered from French observation. " LoBberg ordered this position to be held with 
few troops and artillery observers. Artillery was now to take over the burden of the battle. 
The French attacks were to be checked in the first instance by artillery fire called in by 
the observers in the front line. " Once a French attack started, the German guns were to 
cut the advancing French infantry from its rear and lay down a barrage on the trenches 
from which the French were attacking. ' 
Behind the front line, LoBberg arrayed strongpoints, machinegun and field gun 
placements, and garrisons for counter-attacks, which were designed to support the first 
position. The creation of a new R-Stellung several kilometers behind the new front line 
ftirther strengthened the 3d Army's new position. These steps, combined with the arrival 
of the 5th Infantry Division, the 56h Infantry Division, the 20'h Infantry Division, and 
artillery reinforcements over the next several days, created a new defensive system that 
was far stronger than the original. " 
By the time Tappen reached Mdziftes from Pless on 27 September, the 
immediate crisis had passed and he could record that, "in general, everything is in 
order. "" Over the next several weeks, the French continued their attacks, but gained only 
minor successes against the strengthened positions of the Yd Army. By 14 October, the 
French operation which had come so tantalisingly close on the first day to breaking 
through the German position was over. Falkenhayn's belief in the defensive strength of 
the Westheer proved correct. The Westheer had, in fact, survived the initial period with 
only local reserves. The divisions brought from the east only began to arrive on the 
Western Front on 5 October. " The two attacking French armies had suffered greatly in 
95 On the French observation difficulties see, Langle de Cary to Jofrre, 4h Army Nr. 5075,12 November 
1915, in Les Arnides Frangaises III, Annexes IV, Annexe Nr. 3069; Castelnau, op. cit., p. 103. 
96 Der Weltkriea IX, P. 97. 
97 AOK 3, Die ChMpagne-Herbstschlacht, pp. 68-73. Through the course of the battle the Yd Army fired 
some 1,564,000 field gun rounds and almost 400,000 heavy artillery rounds. Der Weltkrieg p. 97. 
98 Wynne, op. cit., pp. 90-96; Samuels, op. cit., pp. 168-169. 
99 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 27 September 1915. By 4 October, Falkenhayn had declared the danger of a 
French breakthrough to be over. Bethmann to Jagow, AS5157,4 October 1915, PRO, GFM 34/2587 
(Weltkrieg gveh. Bd 23). 
100 The XI Army Corps was the first formation from the east to arrive. "Die grossen Transportbewegungen 
vom Ost- zum Westkriegschauplatze im September/Oktober 1915, " (Vorarbeit zu Bd IX), unpublished 
manuscript in BA/MA, W10/51313. 
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their efforts to break through the German defensive system, losing close to 150,000 
men. "' The Germans, however, suffered too; the defenders had lost around 17,000 
officers and 80,000 men. 'O' 
Conclusion 
With his plans to conclude a separate peace with Russia in tatters, Falkenhayn 
turned his attention back to the west in early 1915. " There, he hoped to salvage the 
strategy he had outlined in November 1914. Instead of negotiating a peace with Russia, 
though, the General Staff Chief now wanted to bring France to the peace table. To 
accomplish this, France would have to be delivered a powerful blow and she would have 
to be separated from her British ally. Therefore, a solution would have to found to the 
problem of Stellungskrieg. In early 1915, Falkenhayn believed that this solution would be 
a breakthrough operation. "' 
Accordingly, in early spring of 1915, the OHL began receiving plans from the 
Westheer's armies for a breakthrough, and had begun to build up a strategic reserve large 
enough to carry out Falkenhayn's intended offensive. The Westheer's plans, though they 
chose different areas of the front for the operation were remarkably similar. Each called 
for powerftfl forces (over 10 army corps) supported by strong artillery to attack an 
appropriate area of the enemy's front. Each emphasized the need for surprise and 
diversionary operations to tie down enemy reserves. By the end of March, the General 
Staff Chief had a final plan from Hans von Seeckt and Wrisberg's re-organization 
promised the necessary new divisions. Falkenhayn's preparations came to an abrupt halt, 
however, when Austria-Hungary's situation necessitated the transfer of substantial 
German forces to the east. 
The experience of the Entente during 1915, however, spoke against the possibility 
of achieving a meaningful breakthrough under the conditions of the Western Front. Like 
Falkenhayn, the leaders of the Entente also sought to find a solution to the trench 
problem. In three great offensives, the Western Allies attempted to breakthrough the 
German position in France. In the last of these offensives, in the Champagne region in 
101 Les Armdes Francaises III, p. 538. 
102 Der Weltkrieg IX, p. 97; LoBberg, op. cit., p. 185. 
103 Falkenhayn maintained that, "the war's decision could only fall in the west. " Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 16 
June 1932, BA/MA, N56/5. 
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September 1915, the Entente came the closest to achieving their goal. After 3 days of 
continuous preparatory fire, 19 French divisions, supported by 8 in reserve, attacked 5 
German divisions along a 30-kni front. By noon of the attack's first day, the greatly out- 
numbered and severely shaken German troops had been forced out of their first Position 
and into their second. The P Army's command, out of touch with its fighting troops and 
lacking significant reinforcement, contemplated a general withdrawal. Ultimately cooler 
heads prevailed, and with the arrival of reinforcements, the 3rd Amy was able to hold its 
secondary positions against renewed French assaults. In the end, this powerful offensive 
was held at bay. 
The French offensive in September made a deep and lasting impression on the 
General Staff Chief After the war, Freytag-Loringhoven wrote that Falkenhayn had 
given his orders with "unshakeable calm" during the first crucial hours of the 
offensive. "' Gerhard Tappen painted a different, and probably more accurate, picture. 
When he arrived from Pless on 27 September, Tappen found Falkenhayn "very dejected. " 
In a letter to the Reichsarchiv, Tappen wrote, "the impression [of the Herbstschlacht] 
was so deep and enduring on General Falkenhayn that he made reference to the battle 
during the attack on Verdun. ""' Falkenhayn's reaction was brought on by a number of 
factors. First, his assessment of the Entente had been proved wrong by the power of the 
attacks on 25 September. His policy of stripping the Westheer for troops to use in the east 
- first in his offensive in Russia, then for his campaign in Serbia - had nearly brought 
catastrophe to the Germans on the Western Front. The experience brought home 
forcefully the necessity of maintaining a sufficient reserve to deal with such 
contingencies. Additionally, as Wilhelm Solger of the Reichsarchiv remarked, the 
setback in the Champagne came almost a year to the day when Falkenhayn took over as 
Chief of the General Staff from Helmuth von MoItke under very similar circumstances. " 
This memory must have made the shock of the initial French success all the more jarring. 
The impact of the Herbstschlacht went beyond the emotional, however; it also 
had important implications for German plans. Despite possessing vastly superior forces 
'04 The General Staff Chief was convinced this could be accomplished. He told Groener on 24 March that 
"he expected the war to be over by the time the leaves fall[! ]" Groener, Lebenserinnerunge p. 533. 
105 Hugo Freiherr von Freytag-Loringhoven, Menschen und Dinge, wie ich sie in meinem Leben sah 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 1923) pp. 288-289. 
106 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 16 June 1932, BA/MA, N5615. See also Falkenhayn, General He"d garters, 
p. 172. 
107 Solger, op. cit. pp. 17-18. 
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and attacking after an intense 3-day bombardment, the French were unable to achieve a 
meaningful result. Falkenhayn reached certain conclusions from this. First, the French 
failures strengthened his belief that their army was a flawed instrument and that it was 
nearing the end of its strength. "' More importantly, the events of September had proven 
to the General Staff Chief that a "mass attack" could not work under the battlefield 
conditions of late 1915. He later wrote: 
... the lessons to be deduced 
from the failure of our enemies' mass attacks are 
decisive against any imitation of their battle methods. Attempts at a mass break- 
through, even with the extreme accumulation of men and material, cannot be 
regarded as holding out the prospects of success... " 
In short, by the end of the Herbstschlacht, Falkenhayn was convinced that a breakthrough 
was impossible given the conditions prevailing on the Western Front in late 1915. " 
After October 1915, Falkenhayn began to look for another way to win the war in the 
west, which would ultimately result in his unique strategy in the battle of Verdun in early 
1916. 
log Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 15 May 193 1, BA/MA, N56/5; Falkenhayn, General Headguarters, p. 209. 
'09 Falkenhayn, General He"d uarters pp. 212-213. (See Chapter 7) 
110 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 16 June 1932, BA/MA, N56/5 BI. 4246; Falkenhayn, General Headguarters, 
p. 174. P6tain reached a similar conclusion, declaring, "The Battle of Champagne demonstrates the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility of carrying in one thrust successive enemy positions... " Philippe P6tain, 
"Rapport sur les opdrations de la He armde et enseignements a en tirer, " He Armde PC Nr. 5668, I 
November 1915, Les Armdes Francaises III, Annexes IV, Annexe Nr. 304 1, p. 168. 
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Part Three: 
Attrition at Work 
Introduction 
As 1916 began, Erich von Falkenhayn was no closer to achieving the goals he had 
set out in November 1914. Despite suffering crippling losses in the summer of 1915, 
Russia had spurned Germany's advances for a separate peace, and the German General 
Staff Chief had been unable to carry out an offensive in the west aimed at dividing the 
Western Allies. Consequently, Germany was forced to maintain substantial strength on 
both fronts and was unable to accumulate sufficient forces to defeat any one enemy in a 
great "decisive" battle, as pre-war doctrine prescribed. 
The war to date had shown that traditional approaches to combat had to be re- 
thought. The development of trenches across the entire Western Front by late 1914 meant 
that flank attacks and envelopments, the German army's preferred means of achieving 
success on the battlefield, could not be carried out. Germany's manpower shortage, 
combined with the difficult tactical conditions of the World War I battlefield caused 
Falkenhayn to search for another way of defeating Germany's enemies. 
His attempt to find a new strategic and operational means of achieving victory for 
Germany led to the application of the concept of attrition on the battlefield and to one of 
the most notorious, and perhaps the least understood, battles of the war - the long drawn- 
out battle of Verdun. Since its outbreak, Verdun has been spoken of in superlatives. 
Marshal Philippe P6tain declared, it was at Verdun, "the moral bulwark" of France, that 
the German advance on France would be stopped. ' On the German side, Verdun was 
spoken of as "a beacon light of German valour. "' At the time, the battle was seen by the 
French as "... the great test, a purely French affýir, since there was only three or four 
1 Henri Philippe Pdtain, Verdun (trans. Margaret MacVeagh) (London: Elkin Mathews & Marrot 1930) 
P. 15. 
2 Paul von Hindenburg, quoted in Holger Herwig, The First World War: GermM and Austria-Hungn 
1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997) p. 184. 
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colonial battalions in it and no British. Verdun, fought with unequal material strength, 
was almost a victory of the race. "' 
In the years after the war, however, the battle was no longer seen as a "heroic" 
struggle, but rather as a symbol of the tragic waste of World War I. One historian even 
described it as "the most senseless episode in a war not distinguished for sense 
anywhere. "" During the battle's course, 259 of France's 330 infantry battalions and 48 
German divisions were rotated through the "Meuse Mill, " as the area was called by the 
Germans. ' From this great battle of material, the French and German armies, if not 
nations, emerged radically altered. As epitomized by the post-war writings of Ernst 
Ringer, the German soldier had become a new type of soldier, one who was practically 
fused with technology and who operated as a true fighting "machine. " Humanity had 
been removed from the battlefield. ' The French victims were spoken of as "the lost 
children of 1916. "' As one historian has noted, "for sheer horror no battle surpasses 
Verdun. "' 
The "sheer horror" of the battle makes any objective historical analysis of its 
course difficult. Given the vast expenditure of life for seemingly little purpose, it is 
understandable that the battle's directors, especially those on the German side, chose to 
obscure their roles in the event. Each attempted, to greater or lesser extent, to shift the 
blame for the battle's failure to others. Analysis is made all the more difficult by another 
factor. To ensure secrecy during the planning stages, the chief architect of the battle, 
Erich von Falkenhayn, ordered that all communication between the OHL and the 5th 
Army be carried out in person. ' This fact alone ensured that there are few records from 
3 Marc Ferro, The Great War, 1914-1918 (London: Routledge, 1995; first published, 1969) p. 77. 
4 A. J. P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated Historv (New York: Perigee Books, 1980; first 
published, 1963) p. 123. 
5 Ferro, op. cit., p. 77; AOK 5, "Bezeichnung der KAmpfe seit 21.2.1916, " la Nr. 3953,25 October 1916, 
BA/MA, W10/51534. 
6 For example, see Ernst Ringer, The Storm of Steel (London: Chatto & Windus, 1929). Although Ringer 
was writing about the experience on the Somme, the shift that took place in the soldier's images of 
themselves began at Verdun. See Berrid HtIppauf, "Langemarck, Verdun and the Myth of a New Man in 
Germany after the First World War, " War and SociM Vol. 6 Nr. 2 (1988) pp. 70-103. 
7 Ferro, op. cit., p. 76. 
8 Cyril Falls, The First World War (London: Longmans, 1960) p. 156. 
9 Kronprinz Wilhelm, Meine Erinnerung-en aus Deutschlands HeldenkM (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1923) 
p. 160; Der Weltkrieg Bd X: Die Operationen des Jahres 1916 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1936) p. 28. 
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which to work. Even the Reichsarchiv ran into this problem when writing the official 
history. " 
The only full exposition of Falkenhayn's intentions is his "Christmas 
Memorandum, " reputedly delivered by the General Staff Chief to the Kaiser "around 
Christmas" 1915. This Denkschrift, in which Falkenhayn outlines his strategic plan for 
winning the war in 1916, was published by him in his memoirs in 1919. " However, its 
authenticity has been repeatedly called into question. When writing the official history, 
the researchers of the Reichsarchiv were unable to locate a copy of this document in any 
of the existing army files, nor did any of the others involved in the plan ever admit to 
reading it. " Most recently, Holger Afflerbach has revisited this issue in his biography of 
Falkenhayn. After examining the evidence surviving in the Kriegsgeschichtfiches 
Forschungsanstalt files, he concluded that the "Christmas Memorandum" was in all 
likelihood written by Falkenhayn after the war. However, he also concluded that it, in 
fact, reflected many of Falkenhayn's ideas in early 1916. " 
The confusion created by the lack of documentary evidence has allowed an 
unusual number of interpretations of Falkenhayn's intentions during the battle. His 
contemporary critics used the battle as further evidence that Falkenhayn was unfit for 
high command. They saw it as a demonstration of his inability to make the difficult 
decisions a true Feldherr must. To them, the General Staff Chief s indecisiveness 
resulted in a strategy of "half-measures" that had no clear objective. " A number of 
historians have also questioned Falkenhayn's ultimate goals. Some believed that the 
"Christmas Memorandum, " with its emphasis on "bleeding the French army white, " was 
in fact created after the war by Falkenhayn as a justification for his failed strategy and 
10 In 1932, Reichsarchiv researchers complained of this problem to Gerhard Tappen and asked whether he 
would approach Falkenhayn's widow to gain additional material. "Besprechung mit dern Generalleutnant 
a. D. Tappen im Reichsarchiv am 6. IX. 1932, " BA/MA, N56/5, p. 1. 
" Erich von Falkenhayn, The General Staff and Its Critical Decisions, 1914-1916 (London: Hutchinson, 
1919) pp. 209-218. 
12 Der Weldcrieg X, p. 2. The Reichsarchiv even called in an army psychologist, Dr. Wohlfahrt, to analyse 
the document, who concluded that the memo was written after the war. BA/MA, W 10/50703. 
13 Holger Afflerbach, FalkenhMLn: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 1994) pp. 543-545. See also Wilhelm Groener's similar opinion. Groener to Reichsarchiv, 5 March 
1934, BA/MA, W10/50705. (Partially quoted in Afflerbach, p. 544. ) 
14 This view of Falkenhayn pervades Der Welticrieg, but was expressed most forcefully by the director of 
the KGFA, Wolfgang Foerster, in his "Falkenhayns Plan ftIr 1916. Ein Beitrag zur Frage: Wie gelangt man 







Verdun: The Plan 
As 1916 began, the German strategic situation was stable if not favorable. 
Through the course of 1915, the German armies had advanced deep into Russia and had 
seemingly crushed the Russian offensive capability. Serbia had been dealt an even 
heavier blow, as a combined German-Austro-Hungarian-Bulgarian force occupied the 
country and ejected the remnants of the Serb army from the Continent. The destruction of 
Serbia opened rail communications with Turkey, thus helping to shore up this 
beleaguered ally. In Italy and on the Western Front, the Central Powers had warded off 
powerful Entente offensives and looked likely to be able to hold off any similar attacks 
for the foreseeable future. 
Despite the stable strategic situation, both Falkenhayn and Conrad were in 
agreement the war would have to be ended by 1917. The two general staff chiefs saw that 
their nations would soon reach the end of their resources. In early January, Falkenhayn 
informed Bethmann that "because of our economic and internal political conditions, it is 
extremely desirable to bring the war to an end before the winter of 1916/17. "' In an 
audience with the Kaiser in late January 1916, the General Staff Chief told the assembly 
that "... time [is] against us. Our allies, Austria and Turkey, [cannot] carry on the war 
beyond autumn of this year. "' Conrad expressed similar thoughts, telling Falkenhayn that 
"the Central Powers cannot take the risk of allowing the war with the well-provided 
Entente to become a war of exhaustion, rather it must be, the sooner the better, brought to 
1 Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, diary entry for 7 January 1916, quoted in Karl-Heinz JanBen, Der 
Kanzler und der General: Die Fahrunjzskrise um Bethmann Hollweg und FalkenhM, 1914-1916 
(Gdttingen: Musterschmidt, 1967) p. 288. Similar thoughts were expressed by many of Germany's other 
strategic leaders. See Gerhard Tappen, "Besprechung mit dem Generalleutnant a. D. Tappen im 
Reichsarchiv am 6. DC. 1932, " BA/MA, Tappen Nachlass, N56/5, p. 5. (Hereafter, Tappen, "Besprechung"); 
Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserinnerungen (ed. Friedrich Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen) (G6ttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 1957) (diary entry for 24 December 1915), p. 545; Hans von Plessen, 
"Tagebuch, " 3 December 1915, BA/MA, W10/50676. However, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn held a 
contrary view. He reported to Bethmann in early December 1915, "wir k6nnen noch lange, lange Krieg 
fahren! " Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, "Kriegstagebuch, " II December 1915, BA/MA, Wild Nachlass, 
N44/2. 
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a decision through a large-scale action. "' This being so, both leaders began to plan 
offensives which they hoped would end the war before the resources of their respective 
nations ran out. 
Falkenhayn had always viewed the Western Front as the decisive theater of war. 
As Chapter 5 has shown, he was only drawn into an offensive in the east because of 
Austria-Hungary's desperate situation. With Russia substantially weakened, Falkenhayn 
now believed he could turn his attentions again to the west without fear of a Russian 
threat to either eastern Germany or to Austria-Hungary. Thus, while Conrad planned to 
knock Austria-Hungary's arch-enemy, Italy, out of the war, Falkenhayn in late 1915 
turned his attentions back to the Western Front. ' There, he hoped to take the offensive for 
the first time since 1914 and force an end to the war. 
The Strategic Situation on the Western Front 1915116 
Although several powerful Entente offensives had dented the German lines in the 
west during the course of 1915, the German position remained largely the same as at the 
end of 1914. The Western Front still consisted of a trench system that ran unbroken from 
just south of Ostend in the north to Pfetterhausen on the Swiss border. Behind their 
respective trenches, 119 German divisions faced 96 French and 43 British divisions. 
Additionally, each side could draw upon significant reserves. By mid-January 1916, the 
Germans maintained a reserve of 25 divisions in the west, while the French reserve 
6 
consisted of 24 divisions and the British of 3. 
As Falkenhayn again contemplated a major offensive in the west, the 
Nachrichtenabteilung (N-Abt) of the OHL drew up a number of reports assessing the 
2 Georg von Mt1ller, The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries, Note Books and Letters of Admiral Geor 
Alexander von MUller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet, 1914-1918 (ed. Walter Gorlitz) (London: MacDonald, 
196 1) (diary entry for 24 January 1916), p. 129. 
3 Bundesministerium far Landesverteidigung, Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918 Bd III: Das 
Kriegsiahr 1915 von der Einnahme von Brest-Litowsk bis zur Jahreswende (Vienna: Verlag der 
MilitArwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1932) pp. 590-591. 
4 Erich von Falkenhayn, General Headguarters and Its Critical Decisions 1914-1916 (London: Hutchinson, 
1919) p. 24; Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, Menschen und Dinge, wie ich sie in meinem Leben sah 
(Berlin: ES Mittler, 1923) p. 284; Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 16 June 1932, BA/MA, N56/5. 
5 This division of effort was much criticized after the war. See Georg Wetzell "Konnte im Jahre 1916 
deutscherseits eine Kriegsentscheidung angestrebt werden und war der Gedanke, sie bei Verdun zu suchen, 
berechtigt? " (Paper presented to at the Reichswehrministerium, 1926) unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, 
W10/51528; and more recently, Holger Herwig, The First World War: Germmy and Austria-Hungga, 
1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997), pp. 204ff. 
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manpower available to the Entente annies. In mid-November 1915, they estimated the 
French army, including the 1916 Class which had not yet reached the front, to be around 
3 million men, 500,000 of whom were in replacement depots behind the front. This 
number was 400,000 less than had been available at the war's outbreak, indicating to the 
Germans that French strength had peaked. The N-Abt further estimated that, under 
everyday conditions, the French were losing 70,000 men per month. At this rate of 
"wastage, " German intelligence anticipated that by September 1916 the French would be 
experiencing severe shortages and would be forced to call up its younger classes earlier 
7 
and earlier to meet the expected shortfall in manpower. Of course, any offensive action 
would only speed this process. 
Assessing the British strength proved to be somewhat more problematic for the 
N-Abt, as it lacked a clear picture of the British army's final structure. At the end of 
November 1915, they reckoned that the British army had a strength of close to 950,000 
men, with 270,000 regulars, 400,000 in the Kitchener formations, and 170,000 in 
Territorial formations. To this number, 60,000 Indians and 47,000 Canadians had to be 
added. The N-Abt estimated the British would have either 35 1/2or 36 V2divisions plus 6 
cavalry divisions on the Western Front in early 1916. While their report also stated that 
the British army would eventually reach around 70 divisions, the N-Abt did not know 
when this would occur or where these divisions would be deployed! 
Thus, the Germans faced a numerically superior foe in the west -a strong French 
army with generally good reserves and a British army which had not yet reached its peak. 
Added to this numerical superiority of the enemy, the Entente experience in 1915 had 
shown just how difficult it was to break through a well-constructed defensive system. 
The Entente had attempted on three separate occasions in 1915 to break through the 
German defensive lines by employing overwhelming force. Although the lack of ready 
German reserves almost allowed the French to achieve an operational breakthrough in 
6 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd X: Die Operationen des Jahres 1916 bis zum Wechsel in der Obersten 
Heeresleitun (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1936) pp. 11-12 and pp. 52-53; James B. Edmonds, Mil Lta-a Operations: 
France and Belgium, 1916 Vol. I (London: MacMillian & Co, 1932) pp. 18-19. 
7 Nachrichtenabteilung West, Report dated 14 November 1915, quoted in "Die Beurteilung der Kampfkraft 
der franz6sischen Armee durch die deutsche OHL zwischen dem 1.1 und 29.8.16, " BA/MA, W10/51521, 
pA (Hereafter, "Beurteilung P) The N-Abt believed that the 200,000 men of 1917 Class would be used up 
by September 1916. This meant that the French would be forced to call up their 1918 Class in June 1916 to 
be ready to meet the shortfall in September. 
8 "Die Beurteilung der Kampflcraft der englischen Armee durch die deutsche OHL. Ende 1915, " BA/MA, 
W10/51521. (Hereafter, "Beurteilung 11") 
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late September 1915, each Entente offensive had merely resulted in high casualties, 
especially to the attacker, and minor gains in territory. ' These experiences spoke against 
the success of a German breakthrough attempt, while the large numbers of Entente 
reserves ensured that even if the Germans succeeded in breaking through their lines any 
exploitation would be impossible. 
Offsetting the material factors, however, were morale and skill. In early 1915, 
Falkenhayn judged the French army to be deficient in both these categories and the 
British to be lacking in the latter, but the German army to possess both in abundance. 
Indeed, even before the war, Falkenhayn, together with many other German leaders, had 
judged the French harshly, believing France to be a nation in decline. " As early as June 
1915, he reported to the Chancellor that France did not have the necessary will to 
continue the war for much longer and that France was nearing the end of its resources. " 
In September, Falkenhayn told the Kaiser that "... the French are at the end of their 
strength and in no condition to attack. "" The utter failure of the French offensives in 
1915 only served to reinforce his low estimation of the French and his high evaluation of 
the German soldier. Although after the war Falkenhayn was criticized for this 
underestimation of the French, " his opinion was shared by others in the German high 
command at the time. In early December 1915, Adolph Wild von Hohenborn 
characterised the French as "weak. "" Gerhard Tappen wrote after the war of the 
prevalent belief in the OHL in early 1916 . ..... the worth of the 
individual German soldier 
was so much greater than the enemy that numbers alone could not be decisive. "" 
Falkenhayn's evaluation of the quality of French troops was supported by the N- 
Abt. Many French deserters spoke of the war-weariness of the French soldiers and 
9 During the Herbstschlacht in 1915, the French suffered around 250,000 casualties and the Germans 
around 150,000. Peter Graf von Kielmannsegg, Deutschland und der Erste Weltkrieg (Frankfurt: 
Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1968) p. 97. 
10 Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhffl: Politisches Denken und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 
Verlag, 1994) pp. 68-71; Tappen later said, "wir hatten uns im Frieden immer gesagt, dass die Franzosen 
keine Reserven hätten, um ihre Lücken auszufüllen! ' Tappen, "Besprechung, " p. 18. 
11 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg, Bd. VIII: Die Operationen des Jahres 1915: Die Ereignisse im Westen im 
Frahiahr und Summer, im Osten vom Frühiahr bis zum Jahresschluss (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1932) pp. 609- 
6 10. See Chapter 6, p. 149. 
12 Quoted in Wilhelm Solger, "Die Leitung des deutschen Westheeres im September und Oktober 1915 seit 
dern Beginn der Herbstschlacht in der Champagne und im Artois, " unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, 
W10/51353, p. I. 
13 Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege Vol. 2 (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 192 1) 
p. 42; Groener to Reichsarchiv, 5 March 1934, BA/MA, WIO/51523; Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 358. 
14 Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 11 December 1915. 
15 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 15 May 193 1, N56/5. 
169 
particularly of the adverse affect on French morale of the failure of and the high 
casualties suffered during the offensives in September/October 1915. " Agent reports also 
spoke of a shortfall of junior officers in the front line. " Further, when the French began 
instituting a defense in depth and leaving their first trench line only lightly defended, the 
N-Abt interpreted this to mean that the French command feared that their troops would 
break under German Trommelfeuer. " Therefore, like Falkenhayn, the N-Abt saw the 
French army as a numerically strong force, but one with serious internal weaknesses. 
The British, on the other hand, were seen to have an army with high morale - the 
lack of deserters attested to this - but for the most part with limited combat value. The N- 
AN divided its assessment into three categories to correspond with the three parts of the 
British army in late 1915. The Germans believed that the pre-war army had been largely 
destroyed, but that it had provided the necessary cadres to form the backbone of several 
new "regular" divisions. These divisions were seen as "ein vollwertiger Gegner. " The N- 
AN evaluated the Territorial divisions similarly. These two groups, however, made up 
less than half of the British divisions in France (14 V2of 36). The remainder were the so- 
called "Kitchener Divisions. " The Germans evaluated the combat ability of these 
formations much lower than the rest of the army. " Their lack of experienced officers and 
combat experience meant that the Germans judged them, for the immediate future at 
least, incapable of effective offensive action. They concluded that, "the British army at 
the end of 1915 still makes an unfmished impression. 9920 
Thus, of the two main enemy annies on the Western Front at the end of 1915, the 
French appeared the weaker to the Germans. Although the French army possessed 
sufficient reserves to last through normal operations in 1916, it was clearly at the peak of 
16 "Beurteilung I, " pp. 8-9. Karl von Einem reckoned that the French had taken 97,000 casualties during the 
Herbstschlacht in the Champagne as compared to 37,000 German casualties. Karl von Einem, "Tagebuch, " 
3 October 1915, BA/MA, N324/12. 
17 Agent " 17, " Report of 5 December 1915, in "Beurteilung I, " p. 7. "Agent 17, " in reality the Austrian 
Baron August Schluga, had begun working for German intelligence in 1866. From then until his death in 
1916, he had served the Germans well, obtaining details of the French deployment plan before the war and 
important intelligence during the war. See David Kalm, Hitler's Spies (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1978) pp. 32-35. My thanks to James Beach for bringing this information to my attention. 
"' Nachrichtenabteilung West, "Verteilung der franzdsischen und englischen Infanterie und 
Maschinengewehre an der Karnpffront, " 26 January 1916, BA/MA, W10/51543. 
'9 The experience of fighting against the British in Artois reinforced this belief The Germans believed that 
the Kitchener divisions had such a limited combat capability that "generals had to lead assaults personally. " 
Falkenhayn lost a ffiend from China in this way. Bethmann to Jagow, 4 October 1915, AS5157, PRO, 
GFM 34/2587 (Weltkrieg Reh. Bd 23). 
20 AOK 4, "Die englische Armee, " 19 October 1915, in "Beurteilung II, " pp. 7-8. 
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its strength. " The 1917 Class was called up in late 1915, to be ready for service at the 
front in mid 1916. " After this class was exhausted, the French would be forced to call up 
its younger classes earlier than expected. Further, evidence pointed to a French army with 
much diminished morale due to the length of the war and the failure of its own offensives 
the preceding year. Falkenhayn also assumed that the French government and people did 
not have the necessary willpower to continue to accept the high level of casualties which 
occurred in any offensive action in Stellungskrieg. These beliefs would play a central role 
in Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916. 
Falkenhayn's Strategic Plans 
Falkenhayn faced a challenging strategic problem at the end of 1915. Although he 
assumed Russia would be incapable of offensive action for the foreseeable future, Russia 
had not been knocked from the war. " Germany still needed to maintain significant forces 
in the east to protect against any possible Russian action, however small. " Therefore, 
Falkenhayn could only count on a 25-26 division reserve in the weSt. 21 In France, he 
faced two enemies, who each possessed large reserves and who were each firmly 
ensconced behind well-constructed trenches. The General Staff Chief had to determine 
where and how to launch an attack with limited resources which would decide the war in 
1916. Through December 1915 and January 1916, he developed his final ideas. 
Although Falkenhayn believed Great Britain to be Germany's main enemy, 
Britain was the more difficult to defeat. Falkenhayn felt that they occupied a defensive 
position on the Continent which could not be assailed with the forces at Germany's 
disposal. (The British sector had one of the highest concentrations of troops anywhere on 
the front. ) Further, he believed that even if Germany were to deal the British force on the 
Continent a powerful blow, this would not force Britain from the war. Such an offensive 
would leave Britain herself largely unharmed and would leave the army of her French 
21 Indeed, the same could be said of the German army. Manpower shortages meant that Falkenhayn 
believed no ftirther formations could be raised. Falkenhayn, op. cit., p. 226. 
22 "Beurteilung I, " p. 5. 
23 In early January 1916, Falkenhayn reported to Bethmann that the Russian army was incapable of any 
"large-scale offensive" for the immediate future. Bethmann, diary entry for 7 January 1916, in Janf3en, 
op. cit., p. 288. 
24 The Ostheer, excluding the I Vh Army in the Balkans, consisted of 47 V2 divisions in February 1916. Der 
Weltkrieg X, p. 427. 
25 This number was deemed insufficient for a breakthrough even in early 1915. (See Chapter 6. ) This belief, 
however, was not shared by Falkenhayn's close advisor, Wild, who believed a reserve of 24 divisions was 
sufficient to launch a major offensive in the west. Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " II December 1915. 
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ally wholly intact. Despite these difficulties, Falkenhayn felt that Germany's goal in 1916 
should be to convince Britain that she could never defeat Germany. In order to 
accomplish this, he planned to strike Britain directly by unleashing unrestricted 
submarine warfare against British shipping and, more importantly, by knocking 
"England's best sword" out of her hand - France. ' 
Therefore, in order to conclude the war in 1916, Falkenhayn returned to an idea 
from the summer campaign in Russia - to force an end to the war by compelling one 
enemy into a separate peace. " Here again Falkenhayn faced a difficulty. In order for 
France to be forced into peace with Germany, her army would first have to be destroyed, 
or at least seriously weakened. Although the OHL felt that the French had severe internal 
weaknesses, they still held two advantages - sizeable reserves and a strong position in the 
field. 
The course of the war in the west to date had shown the difficulties of conducting 
an operationally successful breakthrough against an enemy with strong reserves. In his 
"Christmas Memorandum, " Falkenhayn wrote, 
** the 
lessons to be deduced from the failure of our enemies' mass attacks 
are decisive against any imitation of their methods. Attempts at a mass break- 
through, even with an extreme accumulation of men and material, cannot be 
regarded as holding out prospects of success against a well armed enemy, whose 
moral is sound and who is not seriously inferior in numbers. The defender has 
usually succeeded in closing the gaps. This is easy enough for him if he decides to 
withdraw voluntarily .... The salients thus made, enormously exposed to the effects 
of Ranking fire, threatened to become a mere slaughter-house. The technical 
difficulties of directing and supplying the masses bottled up in them are so great 
as to seem practically insurmountable. " 
In late 1915, Falkenhayn clearly believed that the Germans would be unable to destroy 
the French army through conventional means. Therefore, another method had to be 
found. This "new way" would combine lessons from the war to date and would 
incorporate some unique strategic and operational concepts. Indeed, a former member of 
26 Falkenhayn, op. cit., pp. 212-217; Groener to Reichsarchiv, 5 March 1934, BA/MA, W10/51523. Space 
prevents a detailed discussion of the debate over the U-boat campaign. For a recent overview see, 
Afflerbach, op. cit., pp. 376-404. 
27 For German diplomatic moves towards France in 1916, see Fritz Fischer, Germyny's Aims in the First 
World War (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1967) pp. 224-228; L. L. Farrar, Jr., "Peace Through 
Exhaustion: German Diplomatic Motivations for the Verdun Campaign, " Revue Internationale d'Histoire 
Militaire 32 (1972-1975) pp. 477-494. 
28 Falkenhayn, op. cit., pp. 212-213; Groener to Reichsarchiv, 5 March 1934, BA/MA, W10/51523. 
Falkenhayn stressed repeatedly before Verdun the impossibility of a mass attack. See below. 
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his staff later wrote that he could "fmd no analogue" in military history for the General 
Staff Chief s singular approach. ' 
Falkenhayn had begun to turn his gaze westwards even before the conclusion of 
operations in the east. In mid-November, he gave to the 5h Army the task of planning 
several offensives, from which would ultimately spring the "Angriff im Maasgebiet, " or 
the Battle of Verdun. His original concept was to carry out three separate limited 
offensives: the main undertaking, Operation "Schwarzwald, " in Upper Alsace (Belfort); 
and two secondary operations, "Waldfest, " in the Argonne (Verdun) and "Kaiserstuhl, " 
in the Vosges. Falkenhayn left the goals of these operations temporarily open. " 
On 3 December, Falkenhayn apprised the Kaiser of the state of planning on these 
operations and sought his approval for their go ahead. At this audience, the first strands 
of Falkenhayn's "new method" began to emerge. Generaloberst Hans von Plessen 
recorded the meeting in his diary: 
General von Falkenhayn entrollt S. M. ein ernstes Bild von der Kriegslage 
mit dem Schluss, dass zur Herbeiführung einer Entscheidung ein Schlag im 
Westen geRihrt werden muss, wozu alle verfügbaren Kräfte bereit zu stellen sind! 
Er will Belfort angreifen, weil er da die beste Flankenanlehnung hat .... So 
gewinnt die Friedensaussischt sehr, sehr lang aussehende Allüren, es sei denn, 
dass die Entente uns im Westen angreift und sich dabei verblutet? ' 
Although his ideas were not clearly defined in early December, Plessen's diary entry 
indicates that by this point Falkenhayn had contrived the notion that the French must be 
forced to attack German positions, thereby suffering high casualties. He intended that the 
attack on Belfort, supported by smaller attacks elsewhere along the front, to threaten the 
29Groener to Reichsarchiv, 5 March 1934, BA/MA, W10/51523. See also Jehuda Wallach, The Domao 
the Battle of Annihilation (Westport, CT: Greedwood Press, 1986) p. 170. 
30 Wilhelm Solger, "Die OHL in der Fahrung der Westoperationen Ende 1915 bis Ende August 1916: 1. 
Vom IXII. 15 - 8.1.16. Die Entstehung des Operationsplanes, " unpublished manuscript, BA/MA, 
W10/51318, pp. 2-12. (Hereafter, Solger, "Entstehung. ") 
31 Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 3 December 1915. Emphasis in original. This seems to be the first use of the word 
"verbluten" in Falkenhayn's strategic plans. See Solger, "Entstehung, " p. 7; Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 364. Cf 
Gerd Krumeich, "'Saigner la France'? Mythes et rdalitd de la stratdgie allemande de la bataille de Verdun, " 
Guerres mondiale et conflits contemRorains Nr. 182 (April 1996) p. 25, who claims the concept only 
originated after the initial failure of the battle. 
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French in such a way as to cause them to respond immediately with a counter-attack. " 
Contrary to post-war interpretation, this evidence demonstrates that the ultimate goal of 
these operations was the Verblutung, or bleeding to death, of the French army. " This idea 
was to become more clearly defined as the planning process continued. 
Both Falkenhayn and Generalleutnant Constantin Schmidt von Knobelsdorf, the 
Chief of Staff of the 5 th Army, soon began to have doubts as to the suitability of these 
plans, however. An operation against Belfort had its difficulties. First, it was far from the 
main areas of fighting and, hence, poorly serviced by rail lines. Second, Falkenhayn 
feared operations would be constricted by the proximity to the Swiss border. " Further, in 
the pre-war period, it had been agreed that in the case of war, the Italians would serve in 
Upper Alsace. In March 1914, the German and Italian General Staffs worked out a plan 
for the Italian forces to assault and take Belfort. Tappen believed that these plans must 
surely be in French hands by December 1915. " Knobelsdorf also raised objections to 
Operation "Waldfest. " He felt it lacked the forces necessary to threaten seriously the 
fortress of Verdun, which he believed should be the main result of the attack. " Most 
important, though, both men concluded that these operations would not result in the 
desired psychological effect, which was deemed necessary to cause the French to launch 
an immediate counter-attack. 
Accordingly, Falkenhayn began to consider an operation elsewhere. On 8 
December, he had a long discussion with Tappen and Wild about the situation. Although 
no decision had been made, the General Staff Chief was clearly leaning towards 
scrapping the offensive against Belfort in favor of one against Verdun. An operation 
against Verdun had advantages. First, the area was well-serviced by rail lines. Second, 
32 Falkenhayn's intentions in early December were repeated by the Kaiser in an interview with a 
Reichsarchiv researcher after the war. Alfred Niemann, "Bericht tiber den Vortrag, den S. M. der Kaiser am 
25. Februar 1934 von mir entgegengenommen hat, " BA/MA, WIO/51523, pp. 1-2. (Hereafter, Niemann, 
"Kaiser Vortrag7'). See also Tappen, "Besprechung, " p. 5. 
33 Wolfgang Foerster, "Falkenhayns Plan für 1916. Ein Beitrag zur Frage: Wie gelangt man aus dem 
Stellungskrieg zu entscheidungsuchender Operation? " MWR Jg. 1937 pp. 303-330; Gerd Krumeich, 
... Saigner la France'? Mythes et rdalitd de la stratdgie allemande de la bataille de Verdun, " Guerres 
mondiale et conflits contenora Nr. 182 (April 1996) p. 25, both of whom claim that the concept only 
originated after the initial failure of the battle. 
34 Erich von Luckwald to Bethmann, 17 February 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Weltkrieg 1914/18. 
15. Allg. Milit. - und Marine Berichte aus dern Gr. H. Qu. Bd. 1) BA/MA, W 10/51543. Luckwald was the 
Auswartiges Amt representative at the OHL. 
35 Tappen, "Besprechung, " p. 5. 
3' Knobelsdorf to Falkenhayn (personal letter), 3 December 1915. Reprinted in Hermann Wendt, Verdun 
1916. Die Ang-riffe FalkenhMms im Maasgebiet mit Richtung auf Verdun als strategisches Problem (Berlin: 
ES Mittler, 193 1) p. 226. 
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the fortress of Verdun sat in the center of a salient, which could be dominated by German 
guns. Wild recorded in his diary the advantages this would give: "During an attack from 
the north and the east, the [French] positions will soon be so diminished that not even a 
mouse can live in them. "" Most importantly, Verdun was an object "... for the retention 
of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they 
have. "" On the day after his discussion with Tappen and Wild, Falkenhayn ordered 
Knobelsdorf to Berlin for discussion concerning the impending offensive. Falkenhayn 
asked him to come prepared to discuss turning "Waldfest" into a major operation. " 
Knobelsdorf arrived in Berlin on 14 December with a plan to attack the French 
salient at Verdun and to take the fortress. The 5th Army envisioned an attack along the 
front from Four de Paris (southwest of Varennes) to Ornes (i. e., an attack along both 
banks of the Meuse). They hoped to put the 5th Army in a position to dominate the 
fortress of Verdun with heavy artillery, making it unusable by the French. 40 Knobelsdorf 
recorded in the 5th Army's Kriegstagebuch Falkenhayn's response to their plan: 
Da OHL nach Prüfung der zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel nicht genügend Kräfte 
zur Verfügung stellen kann, um den Angriff wie von Armeechef geplant von 
Norden, Nordwesten, Nordosten gleichzeitig zu machen, entscheidet sich 
Armeechef für Angriff beginnend bei V. R. K. und dann folgend. Die zu 
erreichende Linie bleibt in beiden Fällen die gleiche. ` 
Thus, although the General Staff Chief believed that Knobelsdorf s initial plan required 
too much strength (23 divisions), on 15 December, the decision was taken to scrap plans 
to attack Belfort and concentrate instead on an offensive against Verdun. 42 Falkenhayn 
promised Knobelsdorf five army corps from the OHL reserve for the operation and set 
37 Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " II December 1915. See also Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 8 December 1915. 
38 Falkenhayn, op. cit., p. 217. Knobelsdorf recognized that by attacking Verdun, they would have to reckon 
with "at least half the French army. " Knobelsdorf to Ziese-Beringer, 6 March 1933, printed in Hermann 
Ziese-Beringer, Der einsame Feldherr: Die Wahrheit Ober Verdun (2 vols) (Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag, 
1933), vol. U, pp. 200-201. 
39 OHL to AOK 5,9 December 1915, quoted in Solger, "Entstehung, " pp. 15-17. 
40 This plan had been developed by the 5th Army in October. Marginal comment by Knobelsdorf to Solger, 
"Entstehung, " p. 23. 
41 AOK 5, "Kriegstagebuch, " 16 December 1915, BA/MA, W10/51318. 
42 The exact date on which the Kaiser was informed of the change of plans has never been clear. Based on 
the Kaiser's post-war testimony, the Reichsarchiv concluded that Falkenhayn had informed the Kaiser of 
his changing plans between 10 and 12 December, i. e. before Falkenhayn's meeting with Knobelsdorf. 
However, it is clear that the Kaiser was well informed about Falkenhayn's intentions, even if he never read 
a "Christmas Memorandum. " Der Weltkrie X, p. 25. See also Niemann, "Kaiser Vortrag, " p. 2; Afflerbach, 
op. cit., p. 365. 
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the start date for the "beginning of February. " Against the wishes of the 5h Army, he 
restricted the initial attack to the east bank of the Meuse only. 43 
Falkenhayn hoped that the 5ffi Army's attack on Verdun would either seize the 
fortress quickly or that the threat to the fortress would cause the French to send all their 
reserves to hold it. 44 In a meeting with the chiefs of staff of the Westheer, he outlined the 
likely Entente responses to the attack: 
1) Sie [the French high cornmand) halten Verdun für so vorzüglich verteidigt, 
dass sie alles lassen, wie es steht. Sehr günstig für uns, daher unwahrscheinlich. 
2) Sie ziehen alle verfügbaren Kräfte dorthin.... 
3) Französische Gegenoffensive an anderen Stellen. Wahrscheinlich am selben 
Punkte wie fi-üher, Artois, Champagne, Woewre, Ober-Elsass. Mit Freude 
begrüssen. OHL hält sich versichert, dass alle Angriffe scheitern, Franzosen 
schwere Verluste. 
4) Versuch, Verdun mit allen Kräften zu halten, Engländer zum Angriff 
veranlassen. Fraglich ob ihnen das gelingt, zumal augenblicklich grosse 
Umwälzungen in englischer Armee, Einschieben der Kitchener-Truppen, 
45 Vermischen mit den alten Verbänden bis in die Bataillone. 
According to the post-war testimony of both Tappen and Kaiser Wilhelm H, Falkenhayn 
believed the fourth possibility to be the most likely: The attack would cause the French to 
send all their reserves and to strip units from their front line to support Verdun. Thus, by 
seizing or by threatening to seize such a vital point in the French line, the Germans could 
deal quickly with the entire French reserve, binding them in the Verdun salient where 
they would exhaust themselves in fruitless attacks against the German positions 
supported by powerful artillery. ' In response to this situation, the British would be 
forced to launch an offensive designed to relieve the French before their army was ready, 
thereby, like the French, wearing themselves down. " 
Thus, the Germans could reach an operationally favorable position without 
relying on a "mass attack. " By attacking such a sensitive point in the French line, which 
43 AOK 5, "Kriegstagebuch, " 16 December 1915, BA/NIA, WIO/51318. 
44 For Falkenhayn's intentions regarding the taking of Verdun, see below. 
45 AOK 7, "Kriegstagebuch, " 11 February 1916, quoted in Wilhelm Solger, "Die OHL in der Führung der 
Westoperationen Ende 1915 bis Ende August 1916: 11. Vom 9.1.16 - 21.11.16. Die Vorbereitung des 
Angriffis auf Verdun und die Weitergestaltung der damit in Verbindung stehenden Operationsgedanken, " 
unpublished'Manuscript in BA/MA, WIO/51529, pp. 112-113 (Hereafter, Solger, "Vorbereitung") See also 
Der Weltkrie X, pp. 39-40. 
" Niemann, "Kaiser Vortrag, " p. 3; As Tappen said after the war, "wir waren der Meinung, dass der Feind 
bei seinen Gegenangriffen im Feuer unserer gewaltigen schweren Artillerie, die ihn schon bei unserem 
Angriffe hart mitgenommen haben musste, ausserordentliche Verluste haben würde. " Tappen, 
"Besprechung, " p. 13; Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 363f 
47 Hermann von Kuhl to Reichsarchiv, 28 October 1932, BA/MA, WIO/51318. 
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had the added advantage of being dominated by German guns, Falkenhayn did not need 
to resort to employing the "mass tactics, " which had proved so costly and so ineffective 
for the Entente. The operations of the war to date, especially the Herbstschlacht, had 
shown the devastating effect of Gerinan artillery. Therefore, Falkenhayn intended the 
heavy artillery to carry the burden in this battle. In effect, the enemy would "bleed 
himself white" by counter-attacking into the German positions supported by heavy 
artillery. All the General Staff Chief needed to do was retain sufficient forces to reinforce 
any threatened point of the Gen-nan front and to retain adequate reserves to carry out his 
own counter-offensive to mob up the remnants of the enemy armies once the Entente 
strength had been broken as a result of their offensive action. This was summed up by 
Tappen: "Das Maasangriff blieb immer noch Ausgangspunkt für die gesuchte 
Kriegsentscheidung im Gegenstoss. "" 
Falkenhayn had found his "new way. " His strategy for winning the war in 1916 
would consist of two phases. First, the operation at Verdun would result in the removal 
of the French, and hopefully the British, reserves. This would create the conditions 
necessary for the second phase. Once the Entente reserves had been worn down, the 
German army would fall on the now weakened Entente front. This offensive would 
destroy once and for all the weakened French army, forcing France from the war and 
pushing the British army from the Continent. ' 
Several points were crucial to this plan's success. First, the Germans had to retain 
sufficient reserves to meet the expected Entente relief offensives. Second, they had to 
keep sufficient forces to launch a German counter-offensive once the Entente forces had 
worn themselves out in their relief offensives. This pressure influenced greatly 
Falkenhayn's plans for the conduct of the first phase of his strategy - Operation 
"Gericht. " And finally, Falkenhayn's plan for 1916 relied upon the enemy doing exactly 
what Falkenhayn wanted. 
48 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, comments to RA Nr. 45,18 October 1934, BA/MA, N56/5. 
49 In keeping with their ideas of Vernichtungsstrategie, the Reichsarchiv assumed that Falkenhayn intended 
the war's decision to come from this counter-stroke. However, this second attack was meant to clear up a 
foe who had already defeated himself with his own attacks, rather than to be "decisive" itself See -Der Weltkrieg X, p. 671f; Foerster, op. cit., pp. 319- 322. Cf. Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 357; and Wendt, op. cit., pp. 
43ff. 
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Plans for the First Phase 
On 6 January, the 5 th Army submitted its plan of attack to the OHL. It began: 
"The decision to take the fortress of Verdun in an expeditious manner rests on the proven 
ability of the heavy and heaviest artillery. " In keeping with their instructions from the 
OHL, the 5h Army planned initially to attack only the French positions upon the east 
bank of the Meuse, stating, "whoever possesses the Utes ... on the east bank, as well as 
the positions upon those heights, is also in possession of the fortress. " They envisioned 
reaching the line Froide Terre - Fort Souville - Fort Tavannes. 'o From these heights, they 
believed it would be possible to suppress the French positions on the west bank using 
artillery fire. The Angriffsentwurf called for the initial assault to be carried out by three 
army corps, which would be joined by two additional corps as the attack developed. 
Contrary to Falkenhayn's wishes, however, the plan also called for an attack on 
the west bank following on the heels of the initial assault on the east. The 5 th Army 
claimed that only after the taking of the west bank would Verdun be completely 
neutralized. They planned for the VI Corps, reinforced by an additional corps, to advance 
44soon after the attack on the east bank has started. " As a final goal for the offensives on 
both banks, the 5th Army envisioned flattening the Verdun salient, in effect, seizing the 
fortress. " 
This attack along both banks of the Meuse was central to the 5h Army's plan to 
take the fortress of Verdun, or at least to take the heights dominating the fortress. Even 
before Knobelsdorf had left Berlin on 16 December, tensions between the desires of the 
5th Army and Falkenhayn over this had developed. At their meeting, Knobelsdorf had 
spoken firmly for an attack along both banks. He feared that the French artillery on the 
heights of the west bank would be able to fire into the flank of the German attack as it 
progressed. " Similar fears were held by almost everyone else involved in planning the 
offensive. " In late January, Oberst Max Bauer, the heavy artillery specialist in the OHL, 
travelled to the 5h Army's front to check upon the attack preparations. He too returned to 
5" See also Der Weltkrieg X, p. 12 1. 
51 AOK 5, "Angriffientwurf, " Nr. 78,4 January 1916, BA/MA, W10/51526; reprinted in Ziese-Beringer 11, 
pp. 197-200; Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., pp. 161-164. 
52 AOK 5, "Kriegstagebuch, " 16 December 1915, BA/MA, W10/51318. 
53 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 9 February 1934, BA/MA, N56/5; Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 23 February 1916; 
Gerhard von Heymann (former Ia of the 5ýh Army) to Reichsarchiv, 28 August 1935, BA/MA, W10/51523; 
Der WeltkTie X, p. 27. 
178 
M&i6res convinced that the attack on Verdun would only succeed if launched 
simultaneously on both banks and tried to change Falkenhayn's mind on the matter. " 
Falkenhayn, however, refused to consider a simultaneous attack along both 
banks. " First, he believed that Germany did not have the necessary manpower to 
undertake a large-scale offensive. He feared that when the anticipated Entente relief 
offensive came, the OHL would not have sufficient reserves to hold the line. " When 
pressed to widen the Verdun offensive to the west bank as well, Falkenhayn expressed 
this fear to Tappen: I am responsible. I do not want to come to the same dangerous 
situation as in the autumn [of 1915] during the battle in the Champagne. I will not allow 
that to happen again. "" Additionally, as we have seen, Falkenhayn had concluded from 
the experience of 1915 that a "mass attack" could not succeed under the conditions 
prevalent on the Western Front. To attack with too large a force would only repeat the 
same mistakes of the Entente. " 
Despite these reservations, Falkenhayn approved the 5h Army's plan of 4 
January, seemingly giving in to the 5h Army's desires. As Hermann Wendt has noted, 
however, he reserved for himself the final word as to how the offensive would progress. 
Falkenhayn agreed to provide the 5h Army with the additional forces necessary to widen 
their assault to include the west bank - the X Reserve Corps for the attack on the west 
bank and the XXII Reserve Corps for an attack by Armeeabteilung Strantz. However, he 
only agreed to send them "in good time. "" Shortly before the offensive was to begin, 
Falkenhayn informed the 5th Army that the two promised corps would remain in the OHL 
reserve until he saw fit to release them for fin-ther operations. The X Reserve Corps, 
wrote Falkenhayn, "... has to remain in the sector of the 3rd Amy in case of an enemy 
counter-attack in the Champagne, which is by no means unlikely... "' The XXII Reserve 
54 Max Bauer, Der gosse Krieg in Feld und Heimat (Tilbingen: Osiander'sche Buchhandlung, 192 1) p. 10 1; 
Marginal comments by Knobelsdorf to Solger, "Entstehung, " p. 24. 
55 Despite Falkenhayn's clear refusal, Knobelsdorf began planning for an attack on the west bank 
immediately upon his return to Stenay. Untitled and unpublished manuscript on the attack on the west bank 
of the Meuse in BA/MA, W10/51526, p. 5 (Hereafter, "Angriff auf dem. Westufer") 
56 OHL to AOK 5, Nr. 22662 op., 28 January 1916, printed in Wendt, op. cit., pp. 35-36. See also, Hermann 
Geyer to Reichsarchiv, 27 December 1934, BA/MA, Geyer Nachlass, N221/25. 
37 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 9 February 1934, BA/MA, N5615. 
59 In a meeting to discuss ftiture offensives on 3 February, Falkenhayn told Conrad that "a limited number 
of troops, correctly employed, holds out the prospect of success. " k. u. k. Oberst Kundmann, diary entry for 
3 February 1916, quoted in Solger, "Vorbereitung, " p. 86. 
59 Wendt, op. cit., p. 34; Wallach, op. cit., p. 175. 
60 OHL to AOK 5, Nr. 22662 op., 28 January 1916, printed in Wendt, op. cit., pp. 35-36. 
179 
Corps was also held in reserve for the time being, "in consideration of the general 
situation on the Western Front. 9961 
The 5 th Army's plan also implied that they envisioned a rapid capitulation of the 
fortress of Verdun. At first glance, this goal seems at odds with Falkenhayn's idea of 
"bleeding white" the French army and that the 5th Army did not understand this idea 
fUlly. 6' After all, this Verblutung would presumably take considerable time and involve 
hard fighting. A rapid capitulation of the fortress would hardly bring this about. 
However, Falkenhayn's goals for the first phase of his strategy were quite subtle. 
Although he repeatedly stressed the capture of Verdun was not his aim, a fall of the 
fortress would not be unwelcome. ' The General Staff Chief wanted to destroy the French 
reserves. He envisioned this happening through a successful German defense of a French 
counter-attack. As we have seen, he was unsure if this counter-attack would come at 
Verdun or elsewhere on the front. 
Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that Falkenhayn believed this goal would be 
reached quickly as long as the 5h Army reached a position from which its heavy artillery 
could dominate the French counter-attacks. First, he planned to launch his "decisive" 
counter-attack against a greatly weakened Entente front "around the middle of 
February. "" Hermann von Kuhl took this to mean that Falkenhayn believed that the 
French would be forced by the German conquest of Verdun to send all their available 
forces to retake the fortress and, thereby, the enemy forces elsewhere on the Western 
Front would be considerably weakened. " Second, in a meeting with Conrad on 3 
February, the German General Staff Chief expressed the belief that a decision would be 
reached shortly after the start of the offensive. According to the diary of an Austrian staff 
officer present at the meeting, Falkenhayn told Conrad: "The operation against France 
could bring a decision in 14 days. " 
There is, however, no denying the evident tensions between Falkenhayn's vision 
of events and that of the 5h Army. Although Knobelsdorf s post-war statement that he 
61 OHL to AOK 5, Nr. 22987 op., 4 February 1916, printed in Wend, op. cit., p. 36. The XXII RK was in 
reserve in behind the 6fll Army's sector, an area where Falkenhayn felt an Entente relief offensive was likely 
to fall. 
62 See especially, Wendt, op. cit., pp. 31-34. 
63 Falkenhayn, op. cit., pp. 217-218; Freytag-Loringhoven, op. cit., p. 291; Tappen to Hermann Wendt, 10 
July 1919, BAIMA, N56/4, B1.224. 
64 Hermann von Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " II January 1916, BA/MA, W10/50652. 
65 Kuhl to Reichsarchiv, 7 January 1934, BA/MA, W 10/51523. 
66 k. u. k. Oberst Kundmann, diary entry for 3 February 1916, quoted in Solger, "Vorbereitung, " p. 87. 
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would not have carried out the offensive had he known Falkenhayn's real desires is 
disingenuous, " the 5h Army was at least uncomfortable with the General Staff Chief s 
goal of "bleeding white the French army. " Kronprinz Wilhelm later wrote: 
Was mich beunruhigte, war der mehrfach ausgesprochene Gedanke des 
Chefs des Generalstabes des Feldheeres, dass es darauf ankomme, Frankreichs 
Heer bei Verdun "zum Ausbluten" zu bringen, gleichgültig, ob die Festung dabei 
falle oder nicht. " 
The goals of the 5h Army were different from those of Falkenhayn. They believed the 
fortress could and should be taken and aimed for this at all stages of the offensive. As we 
shall see, this difference of opinion would have important consequences as the battle 
wore on. 
Plansfor the Second Phase 
The day Falkenhayn received the 5 th Army's initial plan, he set in motion the 
planning for his strategy's second phase - the final counter-attack. On 6 January 1916, 
Falkenhayn ordered the Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, Generalleutnant Hermann von 
Kuhl, to Berlin for a meeting. The two men met in the Ministry of War building on 8 
January. " According to Kuhl's diary, Falkenhayn posed to him the question: "Can we 
carry out a large-scale offensive in the area of the 6th Army, and what forces would be 
necessary for such an operation? " Kuhl had an answer ready: The 6th Army proposed to 
carry out an attack "in the general direction of Albert, with the left wing of the 6 th Army 
arid the right wing of the 2 nd Amy, " with the goal of rolling up the flank of the British 
forces. Twelve army corps would be necessary to carry out the offensive. " Like every 
other offensive proposal requiring such forces, Falkenhayn refused Kuhl's plan, again 
67 Alistair Home, The Price of Glga: Verdun 1916 (London: Penguin Books, 1993, originally published 
1962) p. 40. After the war, Knobelsdorf attempted to distance himself from the failure of the Verdun 
undertaking by claiming that he was not fully informed about Falkenhayn's goals for the offensive. (See for 
instance, Knobelsdorf to Ziese-Beringer, 6 March 1933, in Ziese-Beringer 11, p. 200 and Knobelsdorf to 
Reichsarchiv, 6 January 1934, BA/MA, W 10/50705) It is clear, however, that the 5h Army knew that 
Falkenhayn's goal was the "bleeding white" of the French army and, indeed, propigated it even if they did 
not agree completely with the policy. See Berthold von Deimling, Aus der alten in die neue Zeit (Berlin: hn 
Verlag Ullstein, 1930) p. 209, for Knobelsdorf s instructions to the XV Army Corps before the battle. This 
also disproves Wallach's claim that Falkenhayn did not reveal his true intentions to his subordinates. See 
Wallach, op. cit., p. 174. 
68 Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 160. This passage was mistranslated by Home. Home, op. cit., p. 3 8. 
69 Despite giving up his position as Minister of War in January 1915, Falkenhayn retained his residence at 
the Ministry of War until December 1916. See Kriegsministerium Unterkunfts-Dept. to Falkenhayn, 6 
December 1916, Nr. 2597/11 16UI, Falkenhayn Nachlass (N2088), BA-Lichterfelde. 
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declaring it would require more resources than Germany possessed. Instead, he asked 
Kuhl to return to Douai and prepare a plan which would involve an attack with 8 
divisions and around 20 heavy batteries. He told Kuhl to expect an enemy much 
weakened by the forthcoming offensive at Verdun and the Entente relief offensives 
which were sure to follow. " The General Staff Chief hoped that this offensive by the 6th 
Army would "restore life to the solidified front" and would bring Bewegungskrieg once 
again to the Western Front. 72 The 6th Army should be ready to begin this more limited 
offensive "around the middle of February. " 
On 27 January, the 6th Army's new proposal for an offensive arrived at Mdzi6res. 
The Denkschrift began inauspiciously by questioning Falkenhayn's assumption that the 
Entente would attack the 6th Army suddenly. Kuhl noted that each previous Entente 
offensive had taken place only after careful, prolonged preparation. Further, the 
Denkschrift pointed out that the British forces were still in the process of building their 
army. Consequently, the 6th Army was of the opinion that an enemy offensive could only 
take place in the late spring at the earliest. " 
Despite these reservations, the Denkschrift went on, as ordered, to outline a plan 
of attack using the eight divisions from the OHL reserve under the conditions assumed 
by Falkenhayn. Kuhl proposed a counter-attack at the spot in the front where the enemy 
attack had come. He felt that this counter-attack should come at either of two moments: 
immediately after the enemy's attack had collapsed or after the enemy had broken into 
the first German position. In either case, Kuhl felt the counter-attack must come before 
the enemy had time to make good his losses and strengthen his position. He believed that 
the enemy would be weakest at the point where he had launched his own attack. Given 
the difficulty of timing such a counter-attack properly, he requested the promised forces 
from the OHL reserve be put under the 6th Army's command and that the 6th Army be 
given engineering units to construct the necessary artillery and jumping-off positions. 
70 This offensive proposal shared many similarities with the I Ph Army's proposal from March 1915. See 
Chapter 6. 
71 Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " II January 1916. See also Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern, Mein 
Kriegstagebuch Bd. I (ed. Eugen von Frauenholz) (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1929) (diary entry for 10 January 
1916) p. 412. Before the war, Kuhl had served for a long time in the Grosser Generalstab, last serving as an 
Oberquartiermeister. See Hanns M61ler-Witten, "General der Infanterie v. Kuhl zum 95. Geburtstag, " 
WWR H. 6/7 (195 1) pp. 77-78. 
72 Kuhl to Reichsarchiv, 28 October 1932, BA/MA, W10/51318; Der Weltkriejz X, p. 30. 
73 At this point in the Denkschrift, Falkenhayn wrote in the margin: "Der Entschluss wird ihnen nicht leicht 
werden. Sie mtlssen ihn aber, wie ich glaube, fassen. " 
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Kuhl felt that the limited forces promised by the OHL would allow for only 
limited goals. The immediate objectives of this counter-attack should be to deal the 
enemy a "powerful blow, " to win key territory which would better the overall German 
position, and to inflict thereby a heavy blow to the enemy's morale. At the very best, 
Kuhl hoped the Germans might be able to take complete possession of the Loretto 
Heights (Vimy Ridge) (to which Falkenhayn noted in the margin: "Fortes Fortuna 
adjuvat! "). Kuhl would project no goals further than this. Reflecting the overall 
scepticism of the 6th Army, he refused to be drawn into further speculation as to the 
objectives of such an operation. ' 
A week later, Falkenhayn responded to the 6th Army's equivocal Denkschrift. 
Despite the opinion of the 6th Army, Falkenhayn stuck by his original assumptions. He 
wrote: 
Abweichen von dortiger Ansicht halte ich Angriffsversuch des Feindes 
oder sehr starke Schwächung desselben an der Front nördlich Somme für nahzu 
sicher, wenn der ... Vorstoss 5. Arrnee auf Verdun glückt. 
He continued to believe that the German attack at Verdun would force the Entente to 
attack whether they wanted to or not. However, Falkenhayn was not sure where this 
attack would come. He believed that the attack might occur in the Champagne instead. 
Accordingly, he refused to release the promised OHL reserves to the 6th Army until the 
Entente relief offensive actually began. These forces, Falkenhayn promised, could be in 
the line within 3 or 4 days of the attack. "' 
The 6h Amy continued to be unsettled by Falkenhayn's assumptions and plans. 
On 3 February, Kuhl wrote in his diary: 
Ich glaube nicht an französischen und englischen Angriff. Wir wollen abwarten, 
wer recht hat .... Ich fürchte, wir kommen mit unserer Armee zu gar nichts. 
Der 
Gegenangriff ist eine komplizierte Sache, man ist zunächst vom Feinde abhängig 
und kann leicht zu spät kommen. ' 
These personal doubts were expressed in a report to the OHL several days later. After 
analysing the experiences of the demonstrative attack in late January, Kuhl concluded 
that the Entente forces were certainly not planning a major offensive in the immediate 
74 AOK 6 to OHL, la Nr. 267g, 24 January 1916, BA/MA, W10/51520; Weltkrieg X, pp. 30-32. This 
document is also reprinted in Wendt, op. cit., pp. 230-232. 
75 OHL to AOK 6, Nr. 22621 op, 3 February 1916, BA/MA, W 10/51520. See also Rupprecht, 
Kriegstagebuch 1, (diary entry for 3 February) p. 422f 
76 Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 3 February 1916. 
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future and that they were convinced that a German attack would not fall in the area of the 
6th Army. In this report, Kuhl again questioned Falkenhayn's belief that a sudden Entente 
attack must take place after the beginning of the German offensive at Verdun. He felt it 
was highly unlikely that the Entente would attack the 6h Army if the Verdun attack 
succeeded. More likely, the British would relieve the French 10 th Army, thus freeing 
more French troops for use at Verdun. However, Kuhl doubted that the British would 
then attack: "Whether they [the British] will attack, is doubtful, since they are in the 
process of re-ordering their units (divisions) and at this time apparently not ready... "" 
Thus, as the first phase of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916 began in February, the 
General Staff Chief s assessment of the situation on the Western Front stood in 
opposition to that of the 6h Army. Despite Falkenhayn's assurances, Kronprinz 
Rupprecht and Kuhl could not believe that the Entente would attack their army at short 
notice. Further, they did not believe the eight divisions promised by Falkenhayn would 
be enough to produce any meaningful results. As with the 5th Army, this difference of 
opinion with the 6th Army remained unresolved. 
Believing the Champagne to be another likely area for an Entente relief offensive 
and as an area which offered good prospects for a German counter-attack, Falkenhayn 
approached the P Army while he was dealing with the 6th. On I February, the General 
Staff Chief telegraphed Vouziers, 
... würde 
ich für eine Stellungnahme zu der Frage dankbar sein, ob und wo sowie 
mit welchen heranzuführenden Kräften aus der dortigen Front heraus ein 
grösserer Gegenstoss, der mindestens bis in die Gegend Vitry le Frangois" führen 
müsste ... 
As with his query to the 6h Army, Falkenhayn asked the 3rd Army to assume that the 
French forces before them would be considerably weakened. " 
Several days later, the P Army sent its plan for an offensive to the OHL. The 
Army believed that any offensive undertaking must meet two important conditions. First, 
77 AOK 6 to OHL, Nr. 276 g, 7 February 1916, BA/MA, W 10/51520. A portion of this document is 
published in Wendt, op. cit., p. 233. 
78 This point lay close to 50 kilometers from the German front lines in January 1916. 
79 Quoted in Solger, "Vorbereitung, " p. 75. See also Fritz von LoBberg, Meine Tatigkeit im Weltkriege 
1914-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1939) pp. 204-205. 
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the location chosen for the breakthrough must be tactically advantageous to the Germans. 
Second, the location must allow for an operational exploitation of the tactical 
breakthrough. After examining their front the P Army recommended an attack along 
the Prunay-Vaudesincourt line. This portion of the front offered good rearward 
communications and the thickly wooded area could hide the concentration of assault 
troops. Further, the area had good observation points for artillery spotters and had many 
protected areas from which the artillery could fire. The one drawback was the distance 
between the German and French lines here - 300 to 1,000 meters. This obstacle would 
have to be overcome by digging jump-off trenches forward to the French lines and by a 
gas attack to shield the assaulting infantry from observation. 
The 3 rd Army projected that the initial tactical breakthrough would require six 
divisions and considerable heavy artillery, and had as its objective the Vesle. Once this 
objective had been reached, the 3 rd Army planned to exploit the successful tactical 
breakthrough by two ftirther attacks which would advance southwest and southeast and 
drive the French back across the Marne and back to Vitry le Frangois. This plan, like the 
6'h Army's initial plan, called for the use of considerable forces. The 3 rd Army asked for 
14 divisions from the OHL reserve to add to its 5 divisions. Additionally, the plan called 
for the use of considerable amounts of heavy artillery - in total, 86 heavy howitzer 
batteries, 24 mortar batteries, and 19 heavy cannon batteries. Most of these units would 
have to come from the OHL reserve as well. The P Army believed it would take at least 
2 months to make the necessary preparations for the offensive. " 
Falkenhayn gave his by now non-nal response to the P Army plan. On 7 
February, he wrote the P Army refusing their plan on the grounds that it required 
strength beyond Germany's means. Once again, Falkenhayn stressed his belief that "mass 
attacks" like that of the P Army's plan could not succeed under the conditions current in 
January 1916. Instead, he requested they prepare another plan which would use five or 
six divisions in the first wave, followed by a second wave of three or two divisions, i. e., 
the P Army could have the same eight divisions promised to the 6h Army. Falkenhayn 
so AOK 3 to OHL, la Nr. 675 g, 4 February 1916, printed in Wendt, op. cit., pp. 234-236. See also LoBberg, 
op. cit., pp. 204-205. 
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further promised enough heavy artillery to have one battery for every 150 meters of 
front. " 
Unfortunately, the P Army's second plan seems not to have survived the years 
since 1916. " In his memoirs, Fritz von LoBberg wrote only: "Immediately, the 3 rd Army 
submitted a new plan for an offensive under the conditions assumed by General 
Falkenhayn. No answer was forthcoming. "" Einem's Kriegstagebuch gives little more 
detail: 
Mit dem uns zur Verfügung gestellten Kräften können wir weder den östlich vor 
unserer Front stehenden Feind vertreiben, noch Mourmelon nehmen, sondern wir 
können höchstens bis zu den Höhen von Baconnes gelangen, diese nehmen und 
uns dort eingraben. Das ist alles. " 
The tone of Einem's diary entry suggests that the 3 rd Army, like the 6h Army, expected 
little from a German counter-attack with such limited resources. Again like the 6 th Army, 
the 3 rd Army set only limited objectives in its revised plan. The staffs of the two armies 
clearly felt the war to date had shown the great size of forces and the amount of heavy 
artillery necessary to carry out a successful breakthrough. 
The lack of response from Falkenhayn to the 3 rd Army's revised plan is evidence 
that he increasingly came to view a German counter-attack in the Champagne as not 
worthwhile. As we will see, as the Verdun battle dragged on, Falkenhayn increasingly 
came to count on a British relief offensive in the area of the 60'Ariny, despite the 
continued scepticism of the 6h Army. Consequently, he let his plans for a German 
counter-attack in the Champagne fall by the wayside. The surviving documentation, 
however, shows that Falkenhayn and the P Army had different views of the situation on 
the Western Front. Falkenhayn expected the French to be severely weakened immediately 
after the attack on Verdun and thus vulnerable to an attack with limited resources. The P 
Army, on the other hand, did not believe that significant gains could be achieved with the 
eight divisions promised by Falkenhayn. Once again, the General Staff Chief s 
assumptions bore almost no relation to those of his subordinates in the field. 
81 OHL to AOK 3, No Akten Nr., 7 February 1916, W10/51520. Falkenhayn's response prompted Einern to 
question why Falkenhayn had not informed the P Army of the force limitations in his initial query. Einem, 
"Kriegstagebuch, " 7 February 1916. 
82 This second plan is not even discussed by the Reichsarchiv in any of the surviving Forschungsarbeiten 
or in. Der Weltkrieg X. 
83 LoBberg, op. cit., p. 205. 
84 Einem, "Kriegstagebuch, " 10 February 1916. From this entry it appears that LoBberg presented the 3d 
Army's revised plan to Falkenhayn at the Chejbesprechung on II February. 
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Secrecy and Diversionary Attacks 
In December 1915, Falkenhayn returned to a strategic idea that had served him 
well in the campaign in the east in April - strategic surprise. At Gorlice, the German 
forces had been able to catch the Russians completely unawares and, hence, completely 
unprepared to meet the German assault. Accordingly, when Knobelsdorf returned to the 
5 th Army's headquarters on 16 December to prepare the plans for the new offensive, 
Falkenhayn impressed upon him the importance of secrecy. However, this time 
Falkenhayn took this idea of secrecy even further than in April. " He insisted that access 
to the planning process for Operation "Gerichf' be kept to the absolute minimum and 
that discussions about the undertaking not be put to paper, but only carried out 
personally. ' 
Falkenhayn was so carried away with the concept of secrecy that he tried to keep 
the decision for Verdun secret from Gennany's other strategic leaders for as long as 
possible. He particularly attempted to keep the Chancellor out of the loop. In a meeting 
shortly after Falkenhayn had approved the 5 th Army's Angriffsentwurf, he told Bethmann 
that he remained "undecided" whether or not to undertake a "large-scale offensive" on 
the Western Front. "' Falkenhayn's Geheimhaltung continued right up to the beginning of 
the attack. On the eve of the original start date of the offensive, he complained to 
Admiral Georg von MWler that somehow Bethmann had "got wind of our proposed 
'Offensive on the Western Front. ""' 
Indeed, the General Staff Chief was almost as reticent with his staff at the OHL. 
Falkenhayn did not inform them of the change from Belfort to Verdun until Christmas 
Day 1915, leaving them to work on preparations for the Belfort undertaking long after 
85 Falkenhayn's efforts led Wild to comment, "meitsterhaft ist Falkenhayn im Ersinnen von 
Tauschungsmassnahmen. " Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 2 February 1916. 
86 Der Weltkriejz X, p. 28; Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 160. 
87 Bethmann, diary entry for 7 January 1916, printed in Janf3en, op. cit., p. 288. His Austro-Hungarian allies 
fared even worse. Falkenhayn deliberately misled the Austrian plenipotentiary at the OHL about German 
attack plans. Herwig, op. cit., p. 186. 
88 Miller, op. cit., (diary entry for 9 February 1916) p. 134. In fact, on 2 February, Luckwald had reported to 
Bethmann: "Von gut informierter Seite ... 
höre ich, dass vorerst nur ein Angriff auf Verdun zu erwarten ist. " 
Luckwald to Bethmann, 2 February 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Weltkrieg 15/1), BA/MA, 
W10/51543. 
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the decision had been made to scrap it. " This, however, was part of his campaign of 
strategic deception. The preparations for Operation "Schwarzwald" were continued in an 
effort to deceive the French as to where the German offensive would come. ' Barracks 
were constructed, a38.5 cm cannon was left in place to shell Belfort occasionally, and 
Kronprinz Wilhelm paid the area a number of visits prior to the launching of the attack 
on Verdun. " The OHL even went so far as to evacuate portions of the population from 
Alsace in early December. " 
To help cover the Verdun preparations ftu-ther, Falkenhayn ordered the other 
armies of the Westheer to prepare local offensives, a repeat of the Nebenangriffen he had 
used so effectively in the spring to deceive the Entente before the Gorlice undertaking. " 
Accordingly, in the days before the Verdun offensive began, a number of "offensives 
with limited goals" took place across the Western Front. On 14 February, the 4h Army 
launched an attack against the "Grosse Bastion" on the Lys Canal southeast of Ypres. ' 
The 6h Army renewed its assault on the Giesler Heights east of Souchez. " Einein's P 
Army launched a number of minor attacks on 12 and 13 February to better their field 
positions, which had taken such a battering in the Herbstschlacht. ' 
While the 5h Army did not carry out any diversionary attacks before the 
offensive, the army carried out its own covering measures, believing firmly that "the 
prerequisite for success was surprise. "" First, the 5h Army declared to its troops that a 
French offensive was expected in February. The preparations they carried out for the 
Verdun offensive were ostensibly to prepare for this supposed French attack. " Further, 
the 5h Army increased its anti-aircraft defenses with the goal of preventing French 
89 Geyer to Ernst Kabisch, 8 January 1932, BA/MA, N221/25. Geyer and the rest of the OHL recognized 
that Falkenhayn did this to maintain the illusion that a German offensive was really going to take place in 
Upper Alsace. 
90 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 16 June 1932, BA/MA, N56/5. 
91 Luckwald to Bethmann, 17 February 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Weltkrieg 15 1), BA/MA, 
W10/51543; "Kriegstagebuch der Adjutantur S. K. H. des Kronprinz, " 8 February 1916, BA/MA, 
W10/51519. 
92 Minist6re de la Guerre, Les Armdes Francaises dans la Grande Guerre Tome IV: Verdun et la Somme 
Vol. 1: Les Projects Offensifs Rour 1916 el la Bataille de Verdun (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1926) 
p. 136. (My thanks to James Beach for the use of his translation. ) 
93 Falkenhayn, op. cit., p. 223; Der Weltkrieg X, pp. 270-276. Indeed, Kronprinz Rupprecht even got the 
impression that Falkenhayn intended to "exhaust" the enemy with small offensives. Rupprecht, 
KriegstaLebuch I, (diary entry for 25 December 1915) p. 409. 
94 Der Welflaieg X, pp. 270-271. 
95 Rupprecht, Kriegstagebuch 1, pp. 429-432; Kriegstagebuch III, pp. 79-82. 
96 Lo8berg, op. cit., pp. 207-208. 
97 Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 163. 
98 "Angriff auf dem Westufer, " p. 13. 
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reconnaissance flights from making it ftu-ther than the line Montfaucon-Consenvoye- 
Azanes. " In a further effort to hide the attack preparations from the French, most of the 
building of depots, troop laagers, artillery positions, and jumping-off trenches took place 
under the cover of night. " Last, the attacking corps were only brought into the line just 
before the assault so that the French would not recognize the German build up. "' 
Conclusion 
While Falkenhayn had desired a separate peace with one of Germany's enemies, 
this goal had eluded him up until 1916. Russia had proved herself unwilling to come to 
the bargaining table despite the punishment she had suffered during the summer of 1915. 
The General Staff Chief believed that Germany could find no fin-ther successes there, and 
thus turn his sights back to the Western Front. There, he hoped to be able to split the 
Western Allies and bring an end to the war. However, the challenge of the tactical 
situation had first to be overcome before any solution to Germany's strategic problem 
could be found. To this end, Falkenhayn developed a unique approach that attempted to 
apply the concept of attrition to the battlefield. 
Unable to break through the fortified front lines and unable to deal with the 
Entente reserves behind those lines, the General Staff Chief proposed instead to force the 
enemy to attack strong German positions. In order to compel the enemy, in this case the 
French, to do this, a sensitive point on the front had to be threatened. Falkenhayn 
intended his attack on Verdun to so endanger the fortress that the French would be forced 
to launch a counter-offensive, which would be defeated with great loss by the German 
guns located on the dominating heights over the battlefield. He believed that the French 
would thereby be placed in a very precarious strategic situation and the British would 
also be forced to launch a hastily planned relief offensive. This, too, would be repulsed 
with great losses. If these actions did not compel the French to open peace negotiations, a 
powerful German counter-offensive could then be launched to break apart the Western 
Alliance. 
Although Falkenhayn certainly came up with a unique approach for winning the 
war in 1916, in formulating this strategy he drew heavily upon the experiences of 1915. 
99 AOK 5, Ia Nr. 20 geh., 29 December 1915, printed in ibid., p. 15. 
'00 Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., pp. 164-165. 
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The war to date in the west had shown the impossibility of achieving a meaningful 
breakthrough. However, attacks with limited objectives were generally successful in 
reaching their goals with minimal casualties to the attackers. Further, the war on both 
fronts had demonstrated the deadly effect of artillery. In the east, Mackensen's offensives 
used heavy artillery to great effect to inflict large numbers of casualties upon the 
Russians. In the west, it had proved its worth in defense, again inflicting high losses on 
the attackers. Moreover, fortresses had proved incapable of withstanding the effect of the 
heavy artillery employed by the Germans. 
Falkenhayn intended to apply the war's operational lessons at Verdun. The 5th 
Army would make a lunge forward in what amounted to a large-scale attack with limited 
objectives to seize the heights on the right bank of the Meuse. From this position not only 
would the Germans threaten the fortress of Verdun, but their artillery would dominate the 
battlefield. When the French counter-attacked to relieve the pressure on the fortress, they 
would be attacking into strong German defensive positions. Through these attacks, the 
French army would "bleed itself white. "'O' 
This plan clearly depended upon the enemy doing exactly as Falkenhayn desired, 
something that could not be guaranteed. Additionally, its success rested upon the 5 th 
Army doing as Falkenhayn wanted. As the next chapters shall show, neither of these two 
requirements were filled completely. 
101 Ludwig Gold, Die Tragodie von Verdun 1916: Vol. 1: Die deutsche Offensivschlacht (Bd. 13 Schlachten 
des Weltkrieges (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1928) p. 23. 
102 Michael Geyer has described the Battle of Verdun as "the complete disjuncture between strategy, battle 
design and tactics. " "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, " in Peter Paret, ed. Makers of 
Modem Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 536. However, it is clear that Falkenhayn 
conceived of his plan on all these levels. 
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Chapter 8: 
Verdun: The Execution 
For most of the war until February 1916, the Verdun salient had been a quiet 
sector, with no large-scale actions from either side since Sarrail's defense of the fortress 
against orders in 1914. In fact, the forts which made up the fortress of Verdun had been 
stripped of most of their artillery pieces during the second half of 1915 to provide the 
artillery deficient French army with heavy guns. By 15 October, 43 heavy batteries had 
been removed from the fortifications. ' The French High Command (the Grand Quartier 
Gingral, or GQG) had also begun making plans to abandon the entire right bank of the 
Meuse and were busy reinforcing the positions on the left bank. ' The sector's casualty 
rate was low. On the German side, the XVI Army Corps suffered the highest number of 
casualties in the 5fl'Army during January 1916; it reported 153 dead, 488 wounded, and 
II missing. 3 
As 1916 began, Falkenhayn's campaign of strategic deception was working 
admirably. The Entente powers were unclear where a German offensive might fall. 
Initially, both British and French intelligence held that the main German offensive effort 
for 1916 would take place in Russia. ' Although there was a great deal of intelligence 
coming in about German attack preparations across the Western Front, this was at first 
seen merely as a diversionary effort. Only slowly did the Entente awake to the growing 
German threat in the west. By the end of January, sufficient intelligence had arrived to 
predict a major German offensive there. Again, however, German counter-measures 
prevented predicting where this attack would fall. The consensus of opinion in GQG was 
1 Georges Blond, Ve (trans. Frances Frenaye) (London: White Lion Publisher, 1976; originally 
published 196 1) p. 3 0. 
2 Minist&e de la Guerre, Les Armdes Francaises dans la Grand Gueffe Tome IV: Verdun et la Somme 
Vol. I: Les Projects Offensifs pour 1916 et la Bataille de Verdun (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1934) 
pp. 1 17ff, H. A. DeWeerd, "The Verdun Forts, " The Cavaky Journal Vol. XLI Nr. 170 (1932) pp. 27-28. 
3 Untitled and unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, W10/51526, pA (Hereafter, "Angriff auf dem 
Westufer. ") 
4 James Beach, "Haig's Intelligence: GHQ's Perception of the Enemy, 1916-1918: Intelligence in 1916, " 
unpublished manuscript, p. 9; Henri Philippe Pdtain, Verdun (trans. Margaret MacVeagh) (London: Elkin 
Mathews& Marrot, 1930) p. 38. 
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that the German main effort would take place in the Champagne, with diversionary 
attacks falling perhaps in Flanders and at Verdun. ' 
As a consequence, the French made no serious effort to reinforce the rigion 
fortifie de Verdun before February. On 12 February, the initial start date of the German 
campaign, the salient was defended by four divisions and two Territorial brigades under 
the command of General Herr. Additionally, with the heavy artillery removed from 
Verdun's forts, Herr could only count on a limited amount of field artillery. The 5th Army 
only identified 65 batteries in the days before the offensive. ' 
The 5 th Army's Plans and Preparations 
Shortly after Falkenhayn's decision to attack Verdun, the III Anny Corps 
(Lochow), the VII Reserve Corps (Zwehl), the XV Army Corps (Deimling), and the XVH 
Army Corps (Schenck) were assigned to the 5th Army to form the attack group for the 
coming offensive. Each of these units had extensive experience on the Western Front. 
The VII Reserve Corps had captured the French fortress of Maubeuge early in the war 
and the III Corps had even pioneered the concept of "attacks with limited objectives" at 
Vailly and Soissons. Each was also well rested, as they had been removed from the front 
line for rest and extensive training before being sent to the 5th Army. ' Each corps was 
also reinforced by a reserve of 2,400 experienced men and 2,000 newly trained recruits. 
In the interests of secrecy, these units were fed into the Verdun sector slowly. The VII 
Reserve Corps arrived first in late December and the remainder followed towards the end 
of January. ' 
The 5h Array staff had begun planning for their undertaking shortly after 
Knobelsdorf s return from his meeting with Falkenhayn in Berlin on 16 December. The 
first result of this was the Angriffsentwurf delivered to the OHL on 6 January, which 
outlined the general concepts behind the offensive. After this had been approved by the 
General Staff Chief, the 5th Army began to work out the details of their attack. On 27 
January, this process was completed and orders went out to the assault corps and to the 
artillery commanders of these corps. Like the orders of the III Corps at its attacks on 
' Les Arm6es Francaises IV/ 1, pp. 134-143. 
6 Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Bd. X: Die Qperationen des Jahres 1916 bis zum Wechsel in der Obersten 
HeeresigiLigg (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1936) p. 69. 
7 Ludwig Gold, Die Tragödie von Verdun 1916 Teil 1: Die deutsche Offensivschlacht (Schlachten de§ 
Weltkriege Bd. 13) (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1928) pp. 18-22. 
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Vailly and Soissons in 1914/15 and like the II th Army's orders for the breakthrough at 
Gorlice, the 5th Army's attack orders to its subordinates went into considerable detail and 
marked a continuing trend of higher commands interfering in what, before the war, 
would have been considered the responsibility of the kommandiere Generdle. 
The 5th Army divided its zone of attack into four sectors, three of which would 
make up the main assault. Sector A was assigned to the VII Reserve Corps, sector B to 
the XVIII Corps, and sector C to the III Corps. Artillery preparation was to begin on the 
morning of 12 February. At 5: 00pm, the infantry of sectors A-C, supported by flame- 
throwers and grenadiers, would advance in open firing lines [mit lichten Schatzenlinien] 
against the French first positions. ' Where possible, they were to take possession of these 
positions and then reconnoitre the French second positions for calling in artillery fire to 
support the next day's assault. The 5 th Army emphasized that during the attack, the 
artillery was to pay special attention to avoid hitting the advancing German infantry. " 
This portion of the 5h Army's order reads very much like a large-scale "attack 
with limited objectives. " Each army corps was set specific goals. Its attack was to be 
carefidly prepared by artillery fire and its assaulting infantry was to be well supported by 
fire. Great emphasis was placed on keeping German casualties low. Indeed, this was in 
keeping with Falkenhayn's general conception for the offensive - the artillery was to bear 
the burden of the battle, while the role of the infantry was to seize key terrain and to keep 
the pressure on the French. He later wrote, "our object ... was to inflict upon the enemy 
the utmost possible injury with the least possible expenditure of lives on our part... "" 
The next paragraph of the 5th Army's order, however, proclaimed that an 
important feature of the assault was its relentless pressure, and seemed to indicate that 
the offensive's goal was to break through the French positions rather than to seize terrain 
from which the artillery could dominate the battlefield. The 5h Army wrote: 
Ebenso wie bei dem Artilleriefeuer kommt es bei dem Infanterieangriff 
für die gesamte Kampfhandlung um die Festung Verdun unbedingt darauf an, den 
Angriff niemals in's Stocken kommen lassen, damit die Franzosen keine 
'Der Weltkrieg X, p. 61- 
9 The III Corps was further supported by the Sturmabteilung Rohr, the fledgling stormtroop formation. See 
Bruce 1. Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics: Innovation in the German Amy, 1914-1918 (New York: 
Praeger, 1989) pp. 55-75; and Hellmuth Gruss, Aufbau und Verwendung der deutschen Sturmbataillone im 
Weldaieg (Berlin: Junker und Dannhaupt Verlag, 1939) pp. 28-3 1. 
10 AOK 5, la Nr. 418g., "Befehl far die Angriffskorps, " 27 January 1916, BA/MA, W 10/51534; reprinted 
in Gold, Verdun 1, pp. 258-260. 
" Falkenhayn, op. cit., p. 224. 
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Gelegenheit finden, sich in rückwärtigen Stellungen erneut zu setzen und den 
eimnal gebrochen Widerstand wieder zu organisieren. 12 
This portion of the order clearly reflected the 5 th Army's desire to capture the fortress 
quickly, as opposed to Falkenhayn's idea of taking dominating terrain, and shows the 
continuing difference of opinion between the General Staff Chief and the 5 th Army over 
the campaign's goals. Understandably, this dual goal present in the 5th Army's attack 
order created some confusion with its subordinates. Despite their requests for 
clarification, however, the 5th Army let its original order stand and each corps was left to 
itself to determine the meaning. " This would lead to difficulties once the attack was 
launched. 
The 5th Army's initial goals - the seizure of Meuse Heights along the line Froide 
Terre - Fort Souville - Fort Tavannes - was in agreement with Falkenhayn's concept of 
the offensive. From there, the Germans would be in safe defensive positions and would 
be able to repel easily any French attempts to retake the lost terrain. However, at the 
beginning of the campaign the 5th Army's final goals diverged widely from Falkenhayn's. 
The attack plans of the 27h extended the offensive to the Woevre Plain was well as the 
Meuse Heights. The XV Army Corps (sector D) was to drive the French from the Plain 
shortly after the beginning of the main offensive on the Heights. " While this was perhaps 
a logical extension of the attack on the Heights, the 5 th Army's order for the VI Reserve 
Corps to attack the west bank shortly after the start of the offensive went much further. " 
These two orders demonstrate the army's desire to take the fortress quickly and to 
continue on until the Verdun salient was flattened, rather than fighting a defensive battle 
designed to "bleed white" the French army. "' 
Falkenhayn and the 5" Army, however, were in agreement about how to employ 
their artillery. In keeping with Falkenhayn's general conception of the battle, the 5th 
Army planned for the artillery to bear a heavy burden in the assault on the French 
positions. Accordingly, the army issued a special "Befehl fUr die Tatigkeit der Artillerie 
12 AOK 5, "Befehl fdr die Angriffskorps, " para. 3. Emphasis added. 
13 Der Weltkrieg X, pp. 67-68; Hermann Ziese-Beringer, Der einsame Feldherr: Die Wahrheit über Verdun 
Bd. I (Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag, 1933) pp. 159-162. 
14 AOK 5, "Befehl für die Angriffskorps, " para. 3. 
15 AOK 5, "Weitere Mitteilungen" to the "Befehl für die Angriffskorps. " 
16 Gerhard von Heymann (la of 5Ü'Army) to Reichsarchiv, 28 August 1916, BA/MA, WIO/51523. See also 
Hermann Wendt, Verdun 1916: Die Angriffe FalkenhfflMs im Maasgebiet mit Richtung auf Verdun als 






OHL determined as three days worth of munitions. In total the OHL reckoned on firing 
2,000,000 rounds during the first 6 days and an equal number over the next 12 days . 
21 To 
keep the pace of fire steady, 331/2munitions trains would arrive daily. 22 Fire at the pace 
and for the duration envisioned by Falkenhayn, however, would take its toll upon the 
German artillery pieces. Therefore, five repair shops were set up close to the front so that 
minor repairs could be effected in the field. New barrels and other spare parts were 
stocked at these workshops. As the battle wore on, artillery pieces were shipped back for 
more comprehensive repairs to factories which were geared to repair and ship them back 
to the front quickly. ' 
The 5h Army also carefully planned for a redeployment of the artillery once the 
infantry had reached their goals. The field guns, the mobile heavy howitzers, and the 10 
cm cannons were to move forward first under the covering fire of the mortars, the 
"heaviest" howitzers, and the heavy cannon. Once these batteries were in place and 
firing, the remaining mobile artillery would move forward. To expedite this process, 
great attention was to be paid by the advancing troops to finding and preparing possible 
artillery and observation areas. "' 
Given that the artillery was to bear the main burden of the battle for Verdun, the 
5'h Army deployed what was for the time a massive array. All told, 1,201 pieces, more 
than twice the number used at Gorlice, were assembled for the first day of the assault. 
Although close to a third of this number were "light" field guns (7.7 cm) or "light" field 
howitzers (10.5 cm) of the Feldartillerie, the remainder were the "heavy" and "heaviest" 
guns and howitzers of the Fqj3artillerie, which ranged in size ftom 15 cm to 42 cm. 
Indeed, to assemble this collection, the OHL had been forced to strip the other armies of 
the Westheer of their mobile, modem artillery and replaced them with older models or 
20 Ibid., para. 11. Emphasis in original. 
21 By way of contrast, the British fired 1,768,873 shells during the first 8 days of the Somme. Martin 
Samuels, Command or Control? (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 15 S. 
22 Wilhelm Groener, Lebenserimerungen (ed. Friedrich Frhr. Hiller von Gaetringen) (G6ttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1957) p. 209 (diary entry for 11 February 1916); Der Weltkrieg )ý p. 62. 
23 Werner Freiherr von GrUnau to Bethmann, 29 March 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Kriegsakten 1 
Bd 6), BA/M. A, W10/51543. 
24 AOK 5, "Befehl fUr die Tatigkeit der Artillerie und Minenwerfer, " para. 12. 
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with captured Russian guns. ' The assault was to be further supported by the fire of 202 
Minenwerfer and 8 flame-thrower companies. 26 
Great hope was placed in this collection of artillery. The gunners of the 5th Army 
bragged that the effectiveness of their fire would allow the infantry to make a 
"Parademarsch nach Verdun. 112' The rest of the German leadership set great store in the 
artillery deployment as well. Adolph Wild von Hohenbom, who as Minister of War was 
responsible for equipping the army, wrote proudly that the "... artillery deployment at the 
point of attack is of... unheard of strength. "" Hans von Plessen wrote in his diary: "The 
'Fat Berthas' (42 cm) will help us to victory here just as they did at Li6ge, Namur, 
Maubeuge, Antwerp! "2' Wilhelm Groener had expressed a similar opinion of the ability 
of German heavy artillery to destroy modem fortresses, writing that enemy fortresses 
"cracked like empty nuts" under German fire. " 
Indeed, the Germans had call to be confident in the effect of their artillery. As 
Plessen and Groener noted, throughout the war the heavy artillery had proved its worth 
against fortifications, not only in the west, but also in the east. Indeed, Wild observed 
that the Verdun salient was one great "fire sack. " Placed as it was at the center of a great 
salient, Verdun could be easily enfiladed by German guns. German batteries could 
remain dispersed, and hence harder to hit with counter-battery fire, but still concentrate 
their own fire. " As one artillery expert has noted, the Germans enjoyed a number of other 
advantages over their enemy: 
The terminal effect of the German shells, most of which were larger and fired at 
higher angles, was superior to that of the French shells. The rate of fire of German 
pieces, most of which had been built in the decade prior to the battle, was greater 
than that of the generally older French pieces. And, most significantly, the 
German artillery greatly outnumbered the French artillery in the sector. This 
overwhelming superiority in artillery gave Falkenhayn every reason to assume 
that the 501 Army would be able to gain permanent fire superiority over the French 
25 Gerhard Tappen, Meine Kriegserinnerunge unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, W10/50661, p. 172; 
Ernst von Wrisberg, Heer und Heimat 1914-1918 (Leipzig: KF Koehler, 192 1) pp. 59-60. 
26 Der Weldcrieg X, pp. 61-63. Wendt, op. cit., p. 46f gives slightly different numbers, as does Gold, Verdun 
I, pp. 35-36. 
27 Cordt von Brandis, Der Sturmangdff- Kriegserfahrunp-en eines Frontoffiziers (No Publisher, 1917) p. 5. 
My thanks to Bruce Gudmundsson for a copy of this document. 
28 Adolph Wild von Hohenborn, "Kriegstagebuch, " I February 1916, BA/MA, Wild Nachlass, N44/2. 
29 Hans von Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 7 January 1916, BA/MA, W10/50656. 
30 Groener, diary entry for 20 August 1915 in Lebenserinnerung , p. 247; See also, Erich von Luckwald to Bethmann, 17 February 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Weltkrieg 1914/18.15. Allg. Milit- und Marine- 
Berichte aus; dern Gr. H. Q Bd 1) BA/MA, W10/51543; Holger Afflerbach, Falkenhan: Poltisches Denken 
und Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1994) p. 363f. 
31 Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " II December 1915. 
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artillery while having enough firepower left over to repel French counterattacks 
antry positions. and repeatedly bombard French inf 
32 
Falkenhayn's First Phase 
By 12 February, the 5th Army stood ready to launch its offensive. The attacking 
corps had taken up position in the front line and the artillery batteries were in place and 
provisioned. The weather, unfortunately, intervened to postpone their assault. The 
attack's reliance upon artillery meant that good weather was essential for observation, 
and when morning broke on the 12d, the 5th Army's observers were blinded by rain and 
snow. For the next 10 days, they waited for the weather to break. The assault troops froze 
in their jumping-off positions or marched back and forth between the front lines and their 
billets, while the staffs waited impatiently in the rear. " 
The delay was not merely frustrating, however. It had serious consequences for 
the outcome of the offensive. The massing of so many troops and artillery batteries at 
Verdun could not be kept secret for long. In the days between the initial start date and 21 
February, the French had received more detailed intelligence concerning the German 
attack, which caused them to reassess their earlier assumptions. By 21 February, the 
French were well informed about the strength of the German deployment at Verdun. 
Although the German deception measures were generally successful in keeping the 
Entente guessing as to where the major German offensive might fall, they realized a large 
attack was coming at Verdun. "' While the GQG's request on 18 February that the British 
relieve the French I Oth Army was rejected, reinforcements were nonetheless sent to 
Verdun to meet the impending German attack. " 
On 12 February, the French force in the Verdun salient had consisted of five 
divisions. By 21 February, the defensive force had been considerably strengthened. Three 
French corps were now crowded into the salient - one corps of two divisions on the west 
bank and two corps, each of three divisions, on the east bank. A further three divisions 
were held in reserve. The French artillery strength had also grown. By the start of the 5th 
Anny's offensive, the French had 388 field guns and 244 heavy artillery pieces in the 
32 Bruce 1. Gudmundsson, On Artill (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993) pp. 58-59. 
33 Gold, Ve I, pp. 48-50. Some assault units had to remain in dugouts which had filled with freezing 
water by 21 February. 
34 Joffre feared a German offensive in the Champagne, especially after the Yd Army's diversionary attack 
there in early February. Les Armdes Francaises IV/1, Annexe 171. 
35 Beach, op. cit., pp. 12ff. 
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salient. " Thus, rather than meeting a weak, surprised enemy on 21 February, the three 
German attack corps met an opponent reinforced and forewarned. " 
However, the knowledge of the coming attack did not spare the defenders the 
intensity and accuracy of the 5th Army's opening bombardment. From 8: 00am until 
5: 00pm, the 1400 German artillery pieces and mortars pounded the French positions. 
Shells from the heavy artillery rained down on the city of Verdun, destroying bridges and 
setting fire to the train station. Long-range artillery cut the rail line. By 9: 00am, all 
communication with the French ftont line had been cut, and reinforcements could not 
penetrate the thick German bombardment. " French defensive fire was "generally weaIC' 
and was "scattered about without a set plan. "" 
In late afternoon, patrols ftom the attacking German units began probing the 
French first line. In general, they were met by little or no French fire. By 5: 00pm, the 
infantry of all three attack corps was engaged with the enemy. In sector A, the VII 
Reserve Corps met little resistance and was able to clear most of the Bois d'Haumont, 
capturing the French first and second trench lines. Its infantry reported that the artillery 
had completely destroyed the enemy positions and had stunned or killed the French 
defenders. In sectors B and C, however, the XVIII Corps and the 1H Corps met with 
stiffer resistance. The XVIII Corps found that the French positions in Bois des Caures 
had not been fully destroyed. Consequently, they were able only to take a small portion 
of the first French trench. The III Corps faced a similar situation in Herbebois. Only after 
taking heavy casualties had they been able to wrestle most of the forward trench from 
French hands. Wherever the French had placed their defenses in wooded areas, the 
German artillery had been unable to prepare the battlefield properly, and the attacking 
infantry encountered shaken but reasonably unharmed French defenders in undamaged 
positions. ' Additionally, on many areas of the front, the French second trench had not 
been under German observation and had, therefore, been largely spared German 
preparatory fire. " 
36 Der Weltkrieg X, pp. 104-106; Wendt, op. cit., pp. 60-65. 
37 See Helmuth Otto, "Die Schlacht um Verdun (Februar-Dezember 1916), " MilitArgeschichte 5/1986, 
pAl Of German Werth, Verdun Die Schlacht und der Mythos (Augsburg: Weltbild Verlag, 1989), pp. 62ff. 
38 Les Armdes Francaises IV/1, pp. 216-221; Alistair Home, The Price of Glga: Verdun 1916 (London: 
Penguin Books, 1993; originally published 1962) pp. 70-76. 
39 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 21 February 1916. 
40 Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 174. 
41 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 21 February 1916; Der Weltkrie X, pp. 72-74. 
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For the next day's assault, German observers moved forward to direct the artillery 
fire, and after several hours of bombardment, the infantry of the attack corps advanced 
again. The VH Reserve Corps once more had great success, seizing the village of 
Hatimont and outflanking the French position in Bois des Caures. This enabled the XVHI 
Corps finally to take the French first and second positions there. The III Corps was able 
to advance through the French second position in the Bois de Ville. For the first time 
during the offensive, French artillery fire from behind the C6te de Marre on the west 
bank of the Meuse hindered the German advance. German counter-battery fire, including 
a gas attack, was unsuccessful in silencing these batteries. " 
The offensive's third day, 23 February, proceeded similarly to the first two days. 
The corps attacked after several hours of artillery preparation and after hard fighting 
seized the next French defensive position. By the end of the day, the attack's right flank 
had reached the Meuse at Brabant. On the left flank, the 1H Corps cleared the remainder 
of the French from Herbebois and in the center, the XVHI Corps captured the remaining 
trenches of the French second line. Once again, fire from the French batteries on the 
river's west bank caused considerable casualties amongst the attacking troops. " By the 
day's end, however, the entire French first defensive position was in German hands. By 
nightfall, the 5th Army ordered the first artillery displacement to take place. 44 
For the next several days, the Germans repeated their performance, with a few 
notable successes, particularly the capture of Fort Douaumont on 25 February. By 27 
February, the attack corps had generally reached their initial objectives. However, 
progress was now much slower and was costing many more casualties. At this point, it 
was clear that the French had decided to hold the heights and the right bank of the 
Meuse. Increasingly, the 5th ArTny was met by powerful French counter-attacks, 
supported by heavy artillery fire from the west bank. " The progress of the offensive was 
further hampered by the difficulty of moving the artillery forward through the crater- 
pitted no man's land. "' The 5th Army also maintained that the offensive strength of its 
attack corps was temporarily spent. " On the 27th, the OHL was forced to admit that "the 
42 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 22 February 1916; Der Weltkrieg X, pp. 74-78; Tappen, 
Krieg-serinnerunizen, p. 178. 
43 Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 175. 
44 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 23 February 1916; Der Weltkrie X, pp. 76-78. 
4 '5 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 27 February 1916. 
46 Kronprinz Wilhelm, op. cit., p. 179. 
47 Ibid., p. 177; Der Welticrieg X, p. 84. 
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enemy has brought the offensive on the [Meuse] Heights temporarily to a halt, " and the 
first phase of the operation at Verdun carne to a close. " 
The measures taken by the OHL and the tactics employed by the 5h Army 
allowed the offensive to produce significant results in its first phase. Although by 21 
February the French had come to expect a German offensive at Verdun, they did not 
believe this would be the main German undertaking. The reinforcement that had arrived 
by the start of the offensive was by no means sufficient to halt the initial German 
advance. Further, the 5d' Army's use of heavy artillery had allowed them to blast their 
way through the French defensive positions with little difficulty. As a consequence, by 27 
February, the 5dArmy had captured 216 officers, 14,534 men, 45 artillery pieces, 
including 17 heavy pieces, and 54 machineguns . 
4' All told, the French had lost 24,000 by 
26 February. " Additionally, they had advanced 3 kilometers forward over aI O-km front. 
The cost to the 5thArrny, though, was not inconsiderable - around 25,000. " 
However, despite these notable successes, the 5h Army had been unable to reach 
their goal of capturing the Meuse heights. The capture of these dominating hills was 
essential to the objective of "bleeding white" the French army while minimizing German 
casualties. So long as the French held these positions, they would be able to direct 
accurate artillery fire down upon the German troops and inflict high casualties upon the 
attackers. 
The French Response 
The German assault had severely shaken the French defenders. The 72 nd and 5 Is' 
Reserve Divisions of the XXX Corps were all but destroyed, " and on 24 February, the 
commander of the regionfortike de Verdun, General Herr, issued orders to begin the 
evacuation of the right bank. His decision was initially supported by Marshal Joseph 
Joffre who believed that Verdun was not essential for the defense of France and, 
therefore, not worth holding. However, his deputy, General Nodl de Castelnau, arrived at 
Verdun on 25 February and made the decision that, with reinforcement, the right bank 
48 OHL, "Kriegstagebuch, " 27 February 1916, quoted in Der Weltkrieg X, p. 100; Falkenhayn, op. cit., pp. 
233-234. Cf. Wendt, op. cit., pp. 93ff. 
49 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 27 February 1916. 
50 Wendt, op. cit, p. 243. 
51 Ernst Kabisch, Verdun: Wende des Weltkrieges (Berlin: Vorhut-Verlag Otto Schlegel, 1935) p. 108. 
52 The 5 1' Reserve Division had lost 62% of its officers and 61% of its men in only 4 days of fighting. 
Wendt, op. cit., p. 74. 
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could indeed be held and countermanded Herr's evacuation orders. His order read: "The 
Meuse must be held on the right bank. There can be no question of any other course than 
that of checking the enemy, cost what it may, on that bank. "" General Main's 2 nd Army, 
the immediate French reserve, was despatched to the fortress with the orders to hold at all 
costs. " Going ftirther than Castelnau, Pdtain's first order after taking command at Verdun 
had an offensive component. He ordered: "Beat off at all costs the attacks of the enemy, 
and retake immediately any piece of land taken by him. "" 
Upon arriving in Verdun, Pdtain began bringing in reserves and reorganizing the 
sector for defense. The first reinforcements, units of the XX Army Corps, began arriving 
in Verdun during the night of 24/25 February and were immediately deployed. The units 
of the 2 nd Army began arriving on shortly thereafter. By the 26h, there were nine French 
corps either deployed in the Verdun sector or on their way there. " Pdtain ordered new 
positions to be constructed behind the front lines and the forts to be rearmed. Crucially, 
the ability of the defenders to continue to resist was ensured by the creation of a supply 
line which ran along a secondary road from Bar-le-Duc, what would become known as 
the "Sacred Way. " From 27 February to 6 March, over 190,000 troops and 23,000 tons of 
munitions were brought along this route in to Verdun. " 
Most importantly, however, P6tain took special interest in reorganizing the 
French artillery. First, he ordered that the artillery be used aggressively and offensively to 
give the French infantry the impression the Germans did not dominate the battlefield. " 
This order had another, perhaps more significant, effect. It hit the Germans when they 
were at their most vulnerable - during the attack. Crossing no man's land to assault the 
French positions, the German troops were highly vulnerable to the fire of the French 75s, 
the French army's most effective and numerous artillery piece, and Ntain's order 
ensured they were used to the utmost effect. Moreover, Pdtain centralized the command 
over the French batteries, and the heavy artillery was deployed behind the hills of the 
west bank to enfilade the Germans on the right. " With their good observation positions 
53 Quoted in Main, op. cit., p. 76; see also, Home, op. cit., pp. 126-13 1. 
54 Les Amides Frangaises IV/1, pp. 295-296; F. W. Prater, "Der 24. Februar 1916 von Verdun von 
franz6sischer Seite gesehen, " WuW Jg. 193 3 pp. 1- 17. 
55 Quoted in Richard Griffiths, Marshal Pdtain (London: Constable, 1970) p. 23. Emphasis added. 
56 Wendt, op. cit., p. 87. 
57 Main, op. cit., p. I 11. 
58 Les Armdes Francaises IV/1, p. 322. 
59 Ibid., pp. 320-321. 
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on the heights of both banks, the French artillery was now able to do great darnage to the 
Gernian assault troops. 
By resolving to hold the right bank of the Meuse regardless of casualties, the 
French had taken a decisive step. They created a symbol that could not be voluntarily 
surrendered without doing great damage to French morale. Across the board, French 
soldiers and politicians now stressed the importance of holding Verdun. The Minister of 
War, General Galli6ni, announced on 2 March: "The enemy may go on with his efforts. 
But the French nation, serene and confident, feels sure that our army is confronting him 
with a barrier that cannot be overthrown. " The theme was picked up by others in the 
GQG and by the government. A steady stream of visitors called upon P6tain's 
headquarters, including President Raymond Poincar6. " Falkenhayn had indeed found an 
object for which the GQG was "... compelled to throw in every man they have. " However, 
not only was Verdun, the "moral bulwark of France, "" to be held at any price, but any 
lost terrain was to be retaken by counter-attack. The French had fallen headlong into 
Falkenhayn's trap. 
Attack on the West Bank 
The slowdown of the offensive brought renewed calls from the 5h Army for 
further troops and artillery. Prior to the offensive, Falkenhayn had believed that the 
French artillery on the west bank could be suppressed by German counter-battery fire. 
However, this failed to be the case, even after the 5th Army created a special artillery task 
force to accomplish this mission. " Fire coming from the French batteries on the west 
bank continued to cause severe casualties and hamper the progress of the offensive. On 
24 and 26 February, the 5th Army requested additional forces to expand the assault to the 
west bank. The General Staff Chief refused, remarking to Tappen that "due to the rapid 
advance on the east bank, we do not need to give [the 5th Army] additional forces. "" He 
believed that the east bank would be captured soon and that the 5h Army would then be 
able to take the west bank with the forces at its disposal. Further, expanding the attack at 
Verdun did not fit into Falkenhayn's overall strategy for 1916. He reported to the 5h 
60 Quoted in Main, op. cit., p. 112. 
61 Blond, op. cit., pp. 131-132. 
62 Pdtain, op. cit., p. 15. 
63 Der WeItkrieg X, p. 93. 
64 Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 26 February. 
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Army: "The point is not only to strike the French army but to destroy it. That will 
certainly occur when the Germans attack at another point after the French have brought 
together powerful forces at Verdun. "" Sufficient reserves needed to be maintained to 
carry out this second phase. The 5th Army was so concerned about the flanking fire from 
the west, however, that an abortive attack was made by the VI Reserve Corps to take the 
French positions by a coup de main. ' 
Clearly, until 27 February when the first standstill in the offensive took place, 
Falkenhayn was satisfied with its results. To this date, the 5h Army had achieved its 
initial goals and looked likely to be able to take the Meuse Heights without 
reinforcement. However, once it became clear that the French had determined to hold the 
right bank at all costs and that the 5h Army could not seize rapidly the crucial heights, 
the General Staff Chief began to have doubts about the attack. He later wrote of this 
time: "... the question that had to be considered by the GHQ was whether to intimate that 
the continuance of the operation on the Meuse would be abandoned, and a new enterprise 
started on another front. "" The 6th Army had already sent the OHL a Denkschrift on a 
breakthrough operation in its sector 6' and in early March, Falkenhayn began to receive 
61 plans for an offensive from the other annies of the Westheer. 
Despite his doubts, Falkenhayn was convinced by Knobelsdorf on 29 February to 
release two additional divisions to expand the offensive to the west bank. Knobelsdorf 
assured the General Staff Chief that when the western Meuse Heights were taken, the 
offensive on the east bank could be resumed and the ultimate goal, the heights on the east 
bank, reached. " Additionally, Falkenhayn's goal of destroying the French reserves had 
not yet been reached by the end of February. Although the French had sent substantial 
reinforcement to Verdun, they still maintained a considerable reserve. The 
Nachrichtenabtedung reported that the French had deployed 15 to 18 divisions to the 
Verdun sector by the end of February. This, however, still left them with 6 or 9 divisions 
in immediate reserve plus the 15 divisions which would be freed by the British relief of 
65 Heymann to Reichsarchiv, quoted in Der WeltIcrieg X, p. 277. 
66 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte V' 27 February 1916; "Angriff auf dern Westufer, " pp. 36-39; Der Weltkrieg 
X, pp. 206-207. 
67 Falkenhayn, op. cit., p. 235; Tappen, Kriegerinnerung-en p. 178. 
68 AOK 6, "Der Durchbruch, " Nr. 41494,26 February, BA/MA, W 10/51520. 
69 Der Weldcrieg X, pp. 279-283. See Cha yter 9 below. 
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the 10'h Army. " A resumption of the offensive would cause the French to send in 
72 
additional reinforcement and to launch further counter-attacks. Falkenhayn and 
Knobelsdorf agreed that the VI Reserve Corps, strengthened by the X Reserve Corps, 
should seize the line south of Avocourt - C6te 304 (north of Esnes) -"Mort Homme"- 
Bois de Cumi6res - C6te 265,73 from which they believed it would be possible to destroy 
the French artillery on the west bank and allow the attack on the east to proceed. ' 
The assault on the west bank was meant to progress much like the previous 
attacks on the east bank. The infantry assault would follow a powerful artillery 
bombardment designed to destroy the first French defensive positions and to neutralize 
the French artillery. To accomplish this, the organic artillery of General der Infanterie 
von Gossler's two-corps strong assault group was reinforced by 25 heavy artillery 
batteries. As during the attack on the east bank, the group's artillery was centralized 
under the command of one officer. The group was to be further supported by fire from 
the German heavy batteries on the east bank and by a crossing of the Meuse by a brigade 
of the VU Reserve Corps. " Given the limited artillery, Gossler determined to split his 
attack into two separate phases. The first, scheduled to begin on 6 March, would take the 
eastern portion of the attack's goals ("Mort Homme" and C6te 265), while the second 
would follow on 9 March and take Avocourt and C6te 304.16 
At 8: 00am on 6 March, the artillery of Gossler's attack group began its 
preparatory fire, and at 11: 50am, the infantry began their assault. Once again the heavy 
artillery bombardment had done its task. Communications between the French front line 
and the rear were cut and the defenders were severely shaken. ' Quickly the German 
assault troops overran the first French positions. However, the attack soon began to falter 
under heavy French fire and determined French resistance. The VII Reserve Corps' 
brigade became bogged down in fighting in Regn6ville and was unable to support the 
71 "Die Beurteilung der Kampficraft der franz6sischen Annee durch die deutsche OHL zwischen 1.1 und 
29.8.16, " BA/M. A, W10/51521, pp. 26-30; Der WeItkriev, X, p. 286. 
72 Falkenhayn, op. cit., p. 237. 
73 Two hills close together, C6te 285 and Ute 285.9, together made up the "Mort Homme. " See Home, 
op. cit., p. 156. 
74 Luckwald to Bethmann, 15 March 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Weld: rieg 1511) BA/MA, 
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75 Gossler, la Nr. 380,3 March 1916, BA/MA, W10/51526. 
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assault on C6te 265. " Consequently, this attack also became stuck, and only after 
repeated, costly assaults was the hill taken at 6: 00pm. ' Despite some successes, the right 
wing of the attack also failed to take its objective for the day, "Mort Homme. " 
Over the next week, Gossler's attack group tried to take "Mort Homme, " but met 
with only slow progress. Despite powerful artillery preparation and good artillery support 
during the battle, the infantry was able to take its objectives only with great casualties 
and after repeated assaults. In several places German advances were thrown back by 
French counter-attacks, and as the battle went on, Gossler was forced to keep two-thirds 
of his force in reserve to meet these counter-attacks. " The advance of the German 
infantry was further hampered by French artillery fire, which tore into their ranks while 
they formed for an assault as well as during the attack itself. Finally on 14 March, the 
group was able to take the northern-most hilltop of "Mort Homme" and hold it against 
violent French counter-attacks. " The summit, however, remained in French hands, and 
would do so until late May. 
After more than a week of hard fighting, Gossler's group had finally reached the 
objectives of the first phase of his attack. 82 However, even this did not bring relief for the 
German troops on the east bank. French artillery fire from behind the Ute de Marre and 
Bois Bourrus still ranged over the German positions, causing severe casualties. The 
artillery brought up to Ute 265 by the Germans to combat the French artillery was itself 
taken under heavy, systematic fire. " It was clear to the German leadership that C6te 304, 
the objective of Gossler's second phase, would now have to be taken to ensure the safety 
of the German gains so far and to combat effectively the French artillery on the west 
bank. " 
Gossler's attack group began the second phase of its offensive on 20 March. After 
another heavy barrage, which included a special bombardment of over 13,000 trench 
mortar rounds, the I Vh Bavarian Division and the 11 d' Reserve Division attacked the 
78 Despite Home's assertion that the German attack went as planned on this day, the Reichsarchiv wrote 
that the "unity of the attack collapsed7 when the brigade of the VII RK became bogged down in Regndville. 
Home, op. cit., p. 157; "Angriff auf dem Westufer, " p. 58. 
79 "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 6 March 1916. 
80 "Gefechtsberichte 1, " 8 March and 10 March 1916. 
81 Der Weltkrieg X, pp. 212-213. 
82 The three divisions of Gossler's attack group lost nearly 10,000 men between 6 and 20 March. Der 
WeltkrieR X, p. 213. 
93 Der Weltkrieg_ X, p. 213. 
84 AOK 5, "Gefechtsberichte ffir die Zeit vom 15.3.16-3.4.16, " 18 March 1916, BA/M. A, W10/51583 
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French positions south of Malancourt and in the Bois d'Avocourt. " Once again, the 
German troops reached their initial goals with little difficulty. Rather than continue the 
attack immediately, Gossler's group paused to consolidate their new positions and to 
prepare another heavy barrage for the next day's assault. On 22 March, the two divisions 
advanced against the French positions on "Termite Hill, " a key position on the way to the 
summit of Ute 304. They were met with a hail of artillery and machinegun fire. The 
French also took the German assembly points and lines of communication under heavy 
artillery fire. The combination brought the German advance to an immediate halt. " 
Although some small gains were made during the day, the cost to the Germans was high, 
and the positions they reached remained under such heavy French fire that they were able 
to dig in only with great difficulty. " 
By 30 March, Gossler's attack group had still not taken Ute 304, despite losing 
around 20,000 men. " On this day, the XXII Reserve Corps was brought in as 
reinforcement and General der Artillerie Max von Gallwitz was given command over the 
newly created Angriffsgruppe West. This reorganization and reinforcement, however, did 
little to improve the situation and C6te 304 was not to fall until May. 
The attacks on the west bank in March show clearly how the conditions on the 
battlefield had changed since the offensive's beginning on 21 February. The Germans 
had lost the advantage of surprise and were now attacking a determined, well-supplied 
enemy in strong defensive positions. Although the German artillery was still superior to 
the French and could annihilate the French forward positions when need be, the attacking 
German infantry suffered severe casualties from French counter-fire aimed at both the 
assaulting infantry and at their rearward communications. Forward progress could only 
be achieved after intense preparation and was often repulsed by French counter-attacks. 
When the Germans could hold the positions they had seized, the French artillery caused 
continued losses. 
The attack on the west bank showed another important characteristic of the 
offensive. When a "key" position, such as "Mort Homme" or Fort Douaumont, was 
captured, often another terrain feature had to be taken to ensure its retention. Even if the 
85 Der Weltkrieg X, p. 215. 
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attrition of the French army had not been the goal of the German leadership, this 
characteristic ensured that the battle would be ahnost continuous until a safe defensive 
position could be reached. " 
Standstill and Doubts 
The attacks on the west bank had not achieved their goal of allowing the advance 
on the east bank to proceed, and by the end of March progress at Verdun had once more 
come to a standstill. Additionally, the offensive had cost the Germans dearly. From the 
offensive's start until the end of March, the Germans had suffered 81,607 casualties. " 
Falkenhayn again questioned how the campaign should be continued, fearing that the 
offensive might come to be another Ypres. " On 27 March, Wild recorded in his diary: 
"At Verdun it goes slowly - unforlunately! To Falkenhayn's earnest question whether the 
operation should be stopped, I answered no.... France must be tapped of much more 
blood... "' The General Staff Chief s unease with the course of operation caused another 
sharp exchange with the 5th Army, who wanted additional forces to continue the 
offensive. 
On 31 March, the 5h Army answered Falkenhayn's request for justification for 
further reinforcement. " The 5h Army clearly had a much more positive view of the 
situation at this stage than did the General Staff Chief. Their letter indicated that they 
believed the offensive had brought the French army to the brink of exhaustion, and that 
the French were no longer capable of large-scale offensives. This made them conclude 
that "... the fate of the French army will be decided at Verdun, " and that the "annihilation 
of the trained French reserve as well as the reserve of material and munitions should be 
completed with all possible speed. " The 5h Army wanted to continue the attack on the 
east bank until it had reached at least the line Ouvrage de Thiaumont - Fleury - Fort 
Souville - Fort de Tavannes. On the west bank, they wanted to allow the "... enemy 
reserves to destroy themselves over the course of time through violent counter-attacks. 7994 
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Clearly, the initially reluctant command of the 5h Army had accepted Falkenhayn's goal 
of "bleeding the French army white" completely. " 
Despite the 5th Army's conversion to Falkenhayn's idea of attrition, the General 
Staff Chief did not agree with much of their letter. On 4 April, he wrote back to correct 
some of the 5h Army's misconceptions, advising them that they both underestimated 
French strength and overestimated German resources. He reckoned that the French still 
possessed considerable reserves. " As for German strength, he wrote: "The assumption 
that we are in the position to relieve the worn-out units with ftesh, high-quality units at 
any time and that we are able to provide a continuous replacement of material and 
munitions is false. " The resumption of the offensive on the east bank was impending. If 
this assault were unsuccessful, Falkenhayn requested that the 5th Army confer with the 
commanders of its units and advise the OHL whether a continuation of the offensive was 
worthwhile and, if so, to recommend how it should proceed. The General Staff Chief 
recognized clearly that if the offensive were broken off without taking the Meuse 
Heights, it would be considered a failure, but was willing to accept this price if the 5th 
Army believed the offensive had reached the end of its progress. " 
The offensive of early April was not a success, and in the middle of the month, 
Knobelsdorf collected reports from the attack corps over the prospects of the offensive. 
The commanders of the 5th Army's corps all spoke for a continuation of the offensive. 
They were unanimous that they could not remain in their current locations for several 
reasons. First, and most importantly, the infantry in the front line were exposed to a 
withering fire in their current positions. General der In/anterie Bruno von Mudra, who 
had commanded the Angriffsgruppe Ost, spoke for all the units when he wrote: 
Die Angriffs-Infanterie ist hiernach in ihren Stellungen dauernd schwerem 
und Feldartilleriefeuer ausgesetzt, vielfach flankierend, teilweise Rückenfeuer. 
Die rückwärtigen Verbindungen, die Lager der Bereitschaften und selbst die 
Reserven sind in gleicher Weise dem gegnerischen Feuer aller Kaliber 
preisgegeben. 
Die Infanterie erleidet also in den vorderen Stellungen täglich schwere 
Verluste; nicht weniger auf ihren Verbindungen und in ihren Lagern. Das 
95 In his memoirs, Kronprinz Wilhelm distanced himself from this position, writing that it was only 
Knobelsdorf who was now an adherent to the idea of the "MaasmWe. " Kronprinz Wilhelm op. cit. pp. 186- 
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Vorbringen der Verpflegung und sonstigen Nachschubes verbraucht 
unverhältnismässig viel Zeit und Kräfte. " 
The construction of suitable defensive positions was difficult, as the infantry of the 
German attack corps stood exposed in land which had been swept clean by the German 
artillery fire and was now exposed to continuous French fire. Further advance was 
imperative to push the French from the high ground above the German positions and 
ensure the retention of the offensive's gains so far. " 
A second reason given for the continuation of the offensive was psychological. 
General der Infanterie Berthold von Deimling, commander of the XV Army Corps, 
wrote: "Enduring passively the fire of the French heavy artillery and gas rounds, without 
being able to move forward themselves, places great demands on the moral strength of 
the infantry. "" The commanders and staffs of the units involved in the offensive clearly 
felt that progress was needed to sustain the morale of their troops. 
Knobelsdorf presented Falkenhayn with the reports of the attack corps on 20 
April. As a ftirther inducement, he told the General Staff Chief that, if the offensive did 
not go forward, it would have to go back. He did not believe they could stay in their 
current position, so a withdrawal to the offensive's start line would be necessary if they 
did not make further progress. Rejecting Mudra's approach of advances by individual 
divisions in "attacks with limited objectives, " Knobelsdorf pressed for a resumption of 
the offensive on a large-scale, i. e., a simultaneous attack by all the units in a given sector. 
In this way, he still hoped to make considerable progress and reach the line Ouvrage de 
Thiaumont - Fleury - Fort Souville - Fort de Tavannes rapidly. ' In the end, Falkenhayn 
was swayed by the opinions of the 5h Army's staff and its corps commanders and 
decided to continue the offensive along the lines proposed by the 5th Army's chief. 
From this decision on, there was no turning back on the offensive. By the end of 
April, 21 German divisions, most of the OHL reserve, were engaged in the Verdun 
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sector, and additional units had been brought in from the Eastern Front. '02 At the 
offensive's beginning, the capture of Verdun had not been Falkenhayn's goal. From May, 
however, the expenditure of blood and the value placed on the fortress by the French 
nation meant that anything less then its capture would be considered a failure by 
Germans and enemies alike. Indeed, the Kaiser had announced on 1 April: "The decision 
of the War of 1870 took place in Paris. This war will end at Verdun. ""' What had been 
only the first phase of Falkenhayn's strategy in 1916, now came to be the decisive 
element. German prestige, as well as Falkenhayn's personal reputation, was now closely 
bound to the success or failure of the offensive. "' 
From the end of April, the offensive would suck in more and more German units 
and result in severe German casualties. Knobelsdorf s approach of large-scale, all-out 
assaults replaced Mudra's approach of attacks with limited objectives. Moreover, by 
April the nature of the battle had changed. German troops now attacked a strong enemy 
in solid defensive positions. Progress could only be made slowly and at great cost. This 
brought about a shift in where the attrition of the French army was to occur. AThile the 
original idea had been for the " Verblutung" of the French to come from their attacks 
against secure German defensive positions, after the initial successes in February the 
attrition was carried out instead by German attacks and French local counter-thrusts. 
Despite this shift in approach, Falkenhayn, who believed that German troops attacked 
more effectively than French, still felt the gruesome task could be accomplished. Even 
though the German units were suffering horribly, the General Staff Chief maintained that 
the French were suffering more; "for two Germans put out of action five Frenchmen had 
to shed their blood. ""' This shift in the method of attrition focused attention to tactics. 
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Tactics 
As we have seen, before the offensive had begun Falkenhayn had rejected the use 
of "mass tactics" to attempt a breakthrough on the Western Front. Instead, he chose to 
deploy a relatively small number of troops backed by a powerful artillery force. The 
artillery rather than the infantry was to be the main striking arm. Generally, the tactics 
employed by the attack corps in their initial assaults reflected this idea. The assaulting 
infantry "hugged" the artillery bombardment, advancing to within a short distance of the 
falling shells. "' In this way, they were able to rush the French positions as soon as the 
artillery shifted their fire to more distant targets. To reduce further the time the advancing 
infantry was exposed to possible enemy defensive fire, patrols went forward and cleared 
and marked lanes of advance through the French wire. 'O' Further, German long-range 
artillery was largely successful in isolating the foremost French positions from the rear, 
making reinforcement almost impossible. These tactics were successful at keeping the 
German casualties to a minimum while maximizing the enemy's losses. 
However, already at the offensive's beginning, Knobelsdorf s concept of how the 
attack was to be conducted vied with Falkenhayn's tactical ideas. The 5h Army's attack 
order of 27 January had allowed the commanders of the attack corps to choose for 
themselves how they would conduct their battle. The order allowed for either a procedure 
along the lines of Falkenhayn's ideas or for an attack along the 5 th Army's concept of a 
rapid assault carried out with all possible strength. Consequently, the General Staff 
Chief s principles were sometimes ignored by the attacking troops. For instance, already 
on the third day of the offensive, the 6th Division of the Ul Corps ordered its troops to 
attack and take the Herbebois "regardless of casualties. " On the same day, the III Corps' 
other division, the 5th, sent its troops into the attack on Wavrille with its band playing 
"Prussia's Glory" and "Yorck's March. ""' The Reichsarchiv's work on the battle 
recalled the bloody assault by the Prussian Guards during the Franco-Prussian War by 
naming the attack by the 5th Division's neighbour on Wavrille a "St. Privat assault. "" 
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Increasingly, the units of the 5h Army followed Knobelsdorf s concept rather than 
Falkenhayn's, especially as new units were drafted in to continue the offensive. 
Disturbed by the growing losses and the disregard for the original tactical ideas, 
Falkenhayn issued a Denkschrift to the units of the 5h Army in mid-March in an effort to 
convince them to employ tactics which limited German casualties as far as possible. "0 
Drawing on the experience of the battle so far, the General Staff Chief advocated the 
increased use of "Stoj3truppe, " over the traditional attack waves used by many units. 
These Stoj3truppe were to be made up of one or two squads of select infantry with a 
combat engineering squad under the command of a company commander. "' They were to 
be liberally armed with automatic weapons and hand grenades and, if needed, with trench 
mortars or flame throwers. Using terrain to mask their advance, these special units were 
to precede the main body of the attacking infantry and reduce enemy strongpoints that 
could not be neutralized by artillery fire, thus facilitating the advance of the main body. 
In another departure from traditional practice, the main body of the infantry was to 
advance through the enemy positions, leaving strongpoints and pockets of resistance to 
be reduced by following troops. 
Falkenhayn also had much to say about artillery. In general, he wrote, "the 
psychological effect of the heavy artillery is very great. " However, while the 
Feldartillerie worked very well with the infantry, the Fu, 8artillerie did not do so well. He 
recommended better links between the two arms, advising that "mixed battle groups of 
heavy and Feldartillerie under the direction of a single commander and, as far as 
possible, with common observers and communication with the infantry is more effective 
than the two operating on their own. " The General Staff Chief also stressed the 
importance of concentrating widely dispersed artillery batteries on specific targets. To 
facilitate this, he wrote that the artillery should be controlled by an officer in the corps 
headquarters, who was only to release special artillery battle groups to the divisions on a 
task by task basis. "' 
110 Erich von Falkenhayn, "Einige Erfahrungen aus den Kampfen im Maasgebiet, " Nr. 27956 op., 15 March 
1916, BA/MA, W10/51534. 
111 Falkenhayn cautioned against using combat engineers in infantry roles; they were specialist troops to be 
used for clearing obstacles, strongpoints, etc. 
112 For the impact of Verdun on the development of "stormtroop tactics" see Gudmundsson, Strormtroop 
TacticsI pp. 55-75; Gruss, op. cit., pp. 28-35. 
113 These methods presaged those that would be used by the Germans effectively in the March 1918 
offensives. See David Zabecki, Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmaller and the Birth of Modem Artillejy 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994). 
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As the battle continued, Falkenhayn issued other Denkschriften along similar 
lines. In mid-April, he again returned to the concept of close infantry/artillery co- 
operation and advised that the infantry advance as close as possible behind the artillery 
bombardment: 
Sie drangen also in die Gräben des Gegners fast gleichzeitig mit dem letzten 
Einschlägen vor Vorverlegung des Feuers ein. Wo hierdurch Verluste durch die 
eignen Geschosse eintraten, wurden sie in Kauf genommen, denn sie standen in 
keinem Vergliech zu denen, die der Angreifer bei zögerndem Handeln erleidet. 114 
While the General Staff Chief acknowledged that this procedure was not new, he felt 
once again the evidence of the offensive to date had shown that not all units had 
understood the concept completely, and that it was necessary to stress its importance to 
the units of the 5h Army. 
Once again, however, Falkenhayn's efforts to re-introduce tactics that would keep 
German casualties to a minimum were undermined by Knobelsdorf, who rejected the 
step-by-step advance implicit in the General Staff Chief s tactics. Instead, as the battle 
continued, Knobelsdorf continually pushed his subordinates to maintain the momentum 
of any assault; in essence, to attack without regard for casualties. Commanders who 
disagreed with his view point, such as Mudra, were sacked. "' This approach finther 
exacerbated German casualties. 
In another effort to keep German casualties to a minimum, Falkenhayn also tried 
to influence German defensive tactics. As the German front line was clearly visible to 
French observers, it could be taken under accurate artillery fire. Therefore, the General 
Staff Chief advised the front line formations to thin out their first line. Instead, they were 
to concentrate the main defense on the second line. There, the defensive position was to 
become more responsive to French attacks. Machineguns were to be set up with 
interlocking fields of fire. Each man was to know his position during an attack and was 
to have a specific zone of the battlefield to cover. From the second line, immediate 
counter-attacks were to be launched to re-take the first line if it fell to the enemy. 
Falkenhayn also drew upon the German experience of French fire to outline the use of 
artillery in the defense. At the first signs of an attack, German artillery was to begin 
bombarding French trenches and assembly points. At the onset of an attack, the artillery 
114 Falkenhayn, "Entwurf, " Nr. 26648 op., 14 April 1916, W10/50705. 
115 Heymann to Ernst Kabisch, 28 August 1935, BA/MA, W10/51523; Wendt, op. cit., p. 127. 
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was to cut off the attacking infantry from behind with a barrage [Sperrfeuerl, which was 
to be prepared before hand. "' Falkenhayn hoped this way to inflict the greatest possible 
number of casualties on the French during their frequent counter-attacks. 
However, the General Staff Chief s efforts to reduce casualties by better 
defensive tactics was largely unsuccessful. As with the German attacks, casualties largely 
came from artillery fire, rather than infantry action. The exposed position of the German 
defenders kept them vulnerable to French fire, which was able to range over the first and 
second lines as well as the lines of communication easily. The report of the Chief of Staff 
of the X Reserve Corps on 13 May is typical of the situation: "The troops lie day and 
night under the Trommelfeuer of the enemy artillery. The average daily loss of the three 
divisions is 230 men. The construction of deeper firing and communications 
trenches ... has been continually 
ftustrated by enemy artillery fire. ""' 
In the end, Falkenhayn's efforts to reduce German casualties did not produce 
great results. In part, this was caused by the 5th Army's insistence that each attack be 
pressed home with all possible vigour. More importantly, the 5h Army's poor tactical 
position forced them to attack under unfavorable conditions. Until the French could be 
forced from the commanding position on the Meuse Heights, the 5th Army would be 
subject to the effects of heavy French artillery fire and would go on losing large numbers 
of casualties. Forced to continue its assaults and unwilling to institute tactics which 
would limit casualties, the 5th Army ultimately faced the same attrition as their French 
enemy. 
Conclusion 
At the offensive's beginning, Falkenhayn had hoped his operational attrition 
would result in France loosing quite rapidly her will to resist. This, however, did not 
happen. The very symbol that compelled France to expend so much life also provided a 
rallying point for the French nation. Instead of rapid results, Falkenhayn had increasingly 
to rely upon the effects of a steady haemorrhaging of the French army brought about by a 
near continuous German offensive. This shift demanded considerably more troops than 
Falkenhayn had envisioned at the offensive's beginning, and by the end of April, most of 
116 OjjL to all AOKs, Nr. 27793op., 12 May 1916, BA/MA, W10/51584. 
117 X. RK to AOK 5,13 May 1916, quoted in Wendt, op. cit., p. 148 
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the OHL reserve was engaged at Verdun, suffering severe casualties themselves in their 
effort to wear down the enemy. 
Although German casualties were high, the OHL could take solace in their belief 
that French casualties were much higher. Falkenhayn maintained that they were suffering 
five dead or wounded for every two Germans. On 11 March, he told Karl Georg von 
Treutler, the Auswdrtiges Amt representative in the OHL, that the French had already 
suffered 100,000 casualties, the equivalent of a "strong army, ""' and that if they did not 
surrender Verdun soon they would easily suffer a further 100,000 through the effects of 
the German artillery. "' By May, the General Staff Chief believed that France had lost 
525,000 to Germany's 250,000, " and by the end of the month, he believed the French 
army was down to as little as 300,000 reserves. "' 
Despite the fact that the Germans were doing considerable damage to the French 
army, the French were not experiencing the number of casualties assumed by 
Falkenhayn. The policy instituted by Pdtain ensured that the French army was able to 
withstand the punishment. Ntain had realized quite early that the battle would consume 
large numbers of French troops and on 9 March, he requested from Joffre a steady supply 
of reserves. Joffre, afraid of not having enough troops to take part in the planned Anglo- 
French offensive on the Somme, initially refused Ntain's request. However, Pdtain 
claimed that Verdun could not be held without a "continuous" flow of replacements. 
Joffre gave in, and Pdtain instituted his policy of rapid rotation of units through the 
battle. If a division took more than 50 percent casualties, it was removed from the front 
line for rest and re-fit. " In this way, the French were able to deal with the frightful level 
of casualties inflicted by the Germans without the morale of the army breaking. 
By the end of April, Falkenhayn had been stalemated by the French. The 5h 
Army's failure to capture their initial goal, the vitally important heights, had left them in 
a tactically unfavorable position and had forced them to continue the offensive at a 
"' Karl Georg von Treutler to Gottlieb von Jagow, AS 926,11 March 1916, PRO, GFM 34/2589 
(Weltkrieg geh. Bd 28). 
119 Treutler to Bethmann, AS 969,15 March 1916, PRO, GFM 34/25 89 (Weltkrieg, geh. Bd 28a). 
120 Tappen, "Besprechung, " p. 8. 
12' Fritz von Lossberg, Meine Tatigkeit im Weltkriege 1914-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1939) p. 21 If; see 
also Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 26 May 1916. Wild, as well, believed that "without a doubt, the French 
losses at Verdun [were] considerably higher" than the Geman. See Treutler to Jagow, 30 June 1916, PRO, 
GFM 34/2590 (Weltkrieg g-eh. Bd. 30). On the difficulties both side had in calculating casualties, see 
Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 371f. 
'22 Griffiths, op-cit., pp. 25-26. 
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disadvantage. This failure caused the nature of how the French army was to be "bled 
white" to be shifted to a much more costly approach, i. e., through continued German 
attacks and the French counterattacks these prompted, rather than through French 
counter-attacks into strong German defensive positions. Further, the steps taken by Main 
had ensured that the French army would be able to survive the battering given by the 
Germans at Verdun. As the spring turned into summer, it looked like the battle would 
drag on until the army of one side or the other cracked from the strain. " However, the 
stalemate was to be broken by the very element which Falkenhayn had hoped would 
ultimately result in the collapse of the Entente -a British relief offensive. 
123 Despite the generally good morale of the French, their army was experiencing great strain. In May, 
Auguste Terrier wrote to Marshal Louis Lyautey: "I have found, in many of our military leaders, the idea 
that Verdun has devoured the best forces in the army, notably those which we wanted to use in the common 
offensive ...... Quoted in Griffiths, op. cit., p. 25. 
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Chapter Nine: 
Verdun: The Failure 
As Chapter 7 has shown, Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916 had been divided into 
two phases: first, the assault on Verdun, which was to bind the French reserves in the 
Verdun salient where they would be relentlessly ground down; second, the German 
counter-attack to mop up the remains of the Entente annies. Together, these two phases 
were to break apart the western alliance and pave the way for peace. Although the course 
of the battle at Verdun slowly caused the General Staff Chief to alter his strategic plan, 
he never completely gave up hope that the second phase could still be carried out. 
However, when the necessary precursor to Falkenhayn's counter-offensive, the long- 
awaited Entente relief offensive, finally did come, it broke with a ferocity that was 
entirely unexpected and produced completely unanticipated results. 
Continued Plansfor Falkenhayn's Second Phase 
)While the 5th Army was engaged in wearing down the French reserves, 
Falkenhayn waited anxiously for an Entente relief offensive to fall elsewhere. Shortly 
after the beginning of the offensive, when it seemed likely that the 5th Army would 
quickly reach its initial goals, he began asking the armies of the Westheer for their 
assessments of the situation before their fronts and for plans for offensives. ' These began 
arriving in early March. ' 
Of the many plans, Falkenhayn paid the closest attention to the 6ffi Army, where, 
as we have seen in Chapter 7, he thought the Entente relief offensive would most likely 
take place. Already on 27 February, the General Staff Chief had requested an assessment 
of the situation and plans for an offensive from the 6th Army. ' They had replied the next 
day with a Denkschrift already prepared by Hermann von Kuhl entitled "Der 
1 Erich von Falkenhayn, General He"d uarters and Its Critical Decisions. 1914-1916 (London: Hutchinson, 
1919) p. 235; Gerhard Tappen, Meine Kriegserinnerung , unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, Wl 0/5066 1, p. 178. 
2 For their details, see Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrie Bd. X: Die Overationen des Jahres 1916 (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1936) pp. 279-28 1. 
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Durchbruch. "' In this, Kuhl cogently outlined the difficulties and requirements of a 
breakthrough operation. However, given that Falkenhayn had previously rejected such a 
tactically ambitious plan and had ordered the 6h Army to prepare for an offensive using 
only limited forces, it is not clear what Kuhl's intentions were in sending this curious 
Denkschrift. With the offensive at Verdun still underway, there was even less of a 
possibility that Falkenhayn would release the 24 divisions and numerous heavy artillery 
batteries needed for the plan. Quite possibly, Kuhl wanted to make Falkenhayn aware of 
the different opinion still held by the Oh Army of the possibilities of any serious results 
coming from a counter-attack following an Entente relief offensive. ' 
In the meantime, the assault on the heights along the right bank of the Meuse had 
come to a standstill as the French poured in reserves to hold their position. As Chapter 8 
has shown, the OHL was forced to acquiesce to the 5th Army's requests for additional 
troops to expand the offensive to the heights on the left bank in order to restart the stalled 
offensive. With this attack underway, Falkenhayn visited the 6th Army to assess the 
situation there for himself on 8 March. ' At this meeting, the Oh Army's command once 
more expressed their long-held doubts that the Entente would undertake an ill-prepared 
counter-attack, and they attempted to impress upon Falkenhayn the forces they thought 
necessary to conduct an operation which would "bring mobility once again to the front. " 
Kronprinz Rupprecht and his chief of staff stated their belief that the front before the 6th 
Army was too thickly occupied by the enemy to achieve a meaningful result with the 
eight divisions promised by the OHL. Indeed, the ground they covered was so familiar 
that Kuhl was unclear why the General Staff Chief had made the visit. Their talk resulted 
in no clear decisions for the future. Falkenhayn declared that the OHL did not have the 
number of divisions requested by the 6th Army. Further, he expressed once again his 
doubts about the efficacy of a large-scale breakthrough attempt. At its conclusion, Kuhl 
recognized clearly the strategic dilemma facing Falkenhayn. Germany could not gather 
3 Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern, Mein Kriegstagebuch vol. I (ed. Eugen von Frauenholz) (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1929) p. 432 (diary entry for 27 February). 
4 AOK 6, "Der Durchbruch, " Nr. 41494,26 February 1916, BA/MA, W10/51520; Hermann von Kuhl, 
"Kriegstagebuch, " 28 February 1916, BA/MA, W10/50652. 
5 Both Rupprecht and Kuhl still felt that a hasty relief offensive was unlikely. See Rupprecht, 
Kriegstagebuch 1, pp. 431432 (diary entry for 23 February 1916); and Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 3 March 
1916. 
6 Gerhard Tappen, "Kriegstagebuch, " 8 and 9 March 1916, BA/MA, Tappen Nachlass, N5611. 
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sufficient forces to achieve a breakthrough without making the other fronts dangerously 
weak. He was forced to ask, "how should we ... win the war? "' 
However, even after Falkenhayn's discouraging visit to Douai, the 6ffi Army 
continued to plan for an offensive using the eight divisions promised by the OHL. On 16 
March, they sent another proposal to Mdzi&es. The goal of this proposed offensive was 
the capture of Arras. As the British had just taken over this sector of the front from the 
French I O'h Army, the 6d' Army believed that the time was right for an offensive - the 
British reserve was at its lowest and they did not know their new positions well. If the 
city could be taken, the 6th Army believed it would make a great psychological impact 
upon the Entente. They wrote: 
Ein gelungener Schlag gegen die Engländer, der diesen das von den Franzosen so 
zäh verteidigte Arras entreissen würde, dürfte daher grossen Eindruck machen, 
noch dazu in einer Zeit, wo man alle unsere Kräfte vor Verdun gebunden glaubt, 
und wo der Stimmung in England sich anscheinend eine gewisse Flauheit 
bemerkbar macht. ' 
The 6th Army wanted to launch a two-pronged attack north and south of the city. 
Due to artillery limitations, this attack would have to take place in two parts. First, they 
hoped to seize the heights at Ecurie to the Scarpe. After this position was taken, the 
heavy artillery would be shifted to support an attack south of the city. The army would 
need at least 20 additional heavy batteries and munitions for a 5-day battle, as well as the 
eight divisions from the OHL reserve. They believed they could be ready to launch the 
offensive in two to three weeks. ' 
On 19 March, Kuhl was ordered to Mdzi6res for a meeting with Falkenhayn. The 
General Staff Chief ordered Kuhl to make all preparations for the attack on Arras. 
However, Falkenhayn told Kuhl that the 6th Army's attack would be dependent on the 
course of the offensive against Verdun. If things went well there, Falkenhayn promised 
30 additional heavy batteries to the 6th Army, which would allow for the two-pronged 
attack to take place simultaneously. " So once again, the decision was postponed. 
7 Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 8 March 1916; Rupprecht, Kriegstagebuch I, pp. 435-436 (diary entry for 8 
March 1916). 
8 AOK 6, "Angriff bei Arras, " Ia Nr. 282g., 16 March 1916, BA/MA, W10/50705; reprinted in Rupprecht, 
Kriegstagebuch 111, pp. 82-84. 
9 See Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 16 March 1916. Kuhl wrote that he did not believe the OBL would go for 
their plan. 
10 Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 20 March 1916. 
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By the end of March, even Falkenhayn was forced to admit that an Entente relief 
offensive was not likely to come quickly and that the overall situation on the front would 
not permit a great German success resulting from the employment of limited forces. " 
Further, the operation at Verdun was drawing in more and more of the OHL's reserves, 
reducing the forces available for a second undertaking. The prospects of the second phase 
of Falkenhayn's strategy occurring began to fade into the background as the Verblutung 
of the enemy reserves looked likely to take longer than anticipated. Although as Chapter 
8 has shown Falkenhayn clearly had his doubts about the action at Verdun, it was 
increasingly difficult for him to break off the offensive, especially as there was no 
prospect of success anywhere else. With an Entente relief offensive unlikely and great 
numbers of troops tied in Verdun, the idea of a second offensive transformed into a 
secondary offensive with limited goals. 
Thus, in early April, Falkenhayn revived the 6th Army's Arras attack plan. On 4 
April, he telegraphed the 6h Army, asking them whether or not they would be prepared to 
launch their offensive. In the meantime, however, the OHL reserve had been depleted by 
the Verdun offensive and Falkenhayn inquired whether the offensive could be conducted 
with four rather than eight additional divisions. In their stead, the General Staff Chief 
proposed reinforcement through additional heavy artillery batteries. " 
The 6th Army answered immediately. They did not feel that the number of 
additional divisions would be sufficient to capture Arras. They did believe that the four 
divisions plus the artillery reinforcement would enable them to capture Loos, although it 
would not have the same psychological result. The 6h Army stated that they would 
require at least 3 weeks to make the necessary preparations. 13 They had already issued the 
required orders for the preparation of the attack on Loos, when Falkenhayn's reply 
arrived on 10 April. To their surprise, the General Staff Chief ordered them to continue 
preparations for the attack on Arras. " 
Accordingly, the 6h Army updated their plan for the seizure of Arras. The 
situation before the 6h Army had altered since they last planned for the attack. The 
British had had the time to strengthen their positions, rebuilding the poorly constructed 
" Tappen, Kriegserinnerungen p. 179. Cf Holger Afflerbach, FalkenhMM: Politisches Denken und 
Handeln im Kaiserreich (Munich: Oldenburg, 1994) p. 373f 
12 Falkenhayn to AOK 6, OHL Nr. 26234op., 6 April 1916, BA/MA, W10/51534; Der Weltkrie X, p. 294. 
13 AOK 6 to OHL, Ia Nr. 291,6 April 1916, BA/MA, WIO/51534; Rupprecht, Kriegstagebuch 1, pp. 443- 
445 (diary entry for 6 April 1916). 
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French trenches in a way which made the attack much more difficult. Accordingly, 
although they believed eight additional divisions would suffice, the 6th Army raised their 
requirement for heavy artillery. Once again, they planned to take the city in two stages, 
launching first a northern and then a southern attack. " 
However, once more, events at Verdun forced a postponement of the An-as attack, 
this time permanently. By the end of April, most of the OJIL reserve was engaged at 
Verdun, including all of the OHL's modem heavy artillery. " Falkenhayn was forced to 
put aside any idea of a secondary attack, at least until the Zermarbungsschlacht had 
reached its conclusion. 
Just as Falkenhayn had begun to give up the possibility of carrying out his 
strategy's second phase any time soon, the signs of an enemy relief offensive began to 
appear. In early April, the 2 nd Army began reporting that the British before their front 
were making preparations for a large-scale attack; they were digging jumping-off 
trenches and were ranging their artillery. " 
The Entente Relief Offensives 
The preparations observed by the 2 nd Anny were, in fact, the beginnings of the 
long-planned Battle of the Somme. At a conference at Chantilly, France, between 6 and 8 
December 1915 the Entente leaders arrived upon a common strategy for 1916. Like 
Falkenhayn, they had decided on a two-phased approach; first, to wear down the German 
reserves; second, powerful, co-ordinated attacks launched on the Western and Eastern 
Fronts to achieve victory. Time, however, was needed to build the British army to the 
necessary strength and to reorganize the Russian army, still smarting after a disastrous 
1915. A second conference in mid-February 1916 between the French and the British had 
worked out the outlines of the western offensive. The two allies were to attack at the 
point of the juncture of their two armies, along the Somme River. The French were to 
contribute 40 divisions and attack along a 40-km front, while 25 British divisions 
attacked along a 22-km front. The offensive was scheduled to begin on I July. " 
14 Falkenhayn to AOK 6, No Akten Nr, BA/MA, W10/51534; Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " II April 1916. 
15 AOK 6, "Doppelangriff bei An-as, " la Nr. 301geh., 17 April 1916, BA/MA, W10/51520. 
16 At the end of April, the OHL reserve consisted of only eight divisions. Der Welduieg X, p. 298. 
17 Ibid., p. 295. 
18 James E. Edmonds, ed. Mil Lta-a Operations: France and Belgium 1916 Vol. 1: Sir Douglas HaiR's 
Command to the 0 July: Battle of the Somme (London: MacMillan, 1932) pp. 1-35. 
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However, the German offensive at Verdun had a great impact on the planned 
Anglo-French offensive. Immediately after the German attack, Marshal Joseph Joffre 
requested that Douglas Haig relieve the French I O'h Army and launch a British relief 
attack as soon as possible. While Haig agreed to relieve the I Oth Army, he did not feel a 
British offensive would contribute much to taking the pressure off the French at Verdun. 
The British commander-in-chief wanted to marshal his forces for the main offensive later 
in the year. " As the Verdun offensive wore on and the French army suffered more and 
more casualties, the French contribution to the joint offensive diminished. By 1 May, the 
French army had lost over 130,000 men and had rotated 42 divisions through the 
"Maasmiihle. " With such losses, they were forced to lower their commitment to the 
offensive to 30 rather than 40 divisions. Later the same month, the French contribution 
fell to 22 divisions, and Joffre again asked Haig to move forward the offensive in the 
wake of the German seizure of Fort Vaux . 
2' At a meeting on 26 May, Joff-re expressed 
the strain felt by the French army when he declared to Haig that "the French army would 
cease to exist, " if the Anglo-French offensive were not carried out by 1 July at the 
lateSt. 21 
The Germans were well aware of the declining French commitment to the joint 
offensive, and Falkenhayn saw this as a sign that the Verblutung of the French army was 
succeeding. However, it is clear that the OHL also overestimated the effects of Verdun 
and underestimated the enemy. Already in March, incoming reports spoke of the reduced 
number of French divisions taking part in the impending offensive. Karl Georg von 
Treutler reported, somewhat prematurely, from the OHL that "it is barely conceivable 
that the French can take their place in the great spring offensive. "" Over the next few 
months, Falkenhayn continued this train of thought. In April, Werner Freiherr von 
GrUnau was able to report that, although the French might have enough reserves to carry 
out an offensive, they did not have the heavy artillery needed to bring significant results. " 
19 Ibid., pp. 36-37; B. H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (London: Faber & Faber, 1930) p. 247f 
20 Minist6re de la Guerre, Les Armdes Frangaises dans la Grande Guerre Tome IV: Vol. 2: La Bataille de 
Verdun et les offensives des Allids (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1933), pp. 171-188. 
21 Douglas Haig, The Private Pgpers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919 (Robert Blake, ed. ) (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1952) pp. 144-145 (diary entry for 26 May 1916); A. H. Farrar-Hockley, The Somme 
(London: Pan Books, 1966; first published, 1964), p. 70; Cf Les Armdes Francaises IV/2, p. 175. 
22 Karl Georg von Treutler to Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 17 March 1916, (copied from 
KriegfUhruniz Nr. I 5/Band I, BA/MA, W 10/51543. 
23 Wemer Freiherr von GrUnau to Bethmann, 17 April 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Weltkriejz 
1914/18.15. Allig. Milit. - und Marine-Berichte aus dem Gr. H. Qu. Band 1) BA/MA, W 10/51543. 
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In May, Falkenhayn insisted that the attack on Verdun had reduced the planned Entente 
offensive substantially, as the French were no longer in any position to take part with any 
great numbers of troops. ' 
With the attention of the OHL focused totally on the Western Front, it was the 
Russians who surprised everyone (including themselves) by achieving unexpected 
success with their offensive in June. On the evening of 5 June, Falkenhayn began 
receiving disturbing messages from the Austro-Hungarian AOK. The first arrived from 
Conrad, who informed Falkenhayn that "the attack of the entire Russian Southwest Front 
[had begun] on 4 June. " Consequently, the Austrian General Staff Chief requested 
Falkenhayn reinforce the southern Eastern Front from the forces of Ober0st, as had been 
agreed on 23 May. 2' Falkenhayn, intent not to be drawn away from the Western Front and 
sceptical as ever of the Austrians, declined this shifting of reserves, insisting that the 
21 Russian forces facing Ober0st were far superior and, therefore, none could be spared. 
Conrad's messages were followed shortly after by two from Generalleutnant August von 
Cramon, the German liaison officer in the AOK. Cramon's messages carried the first 
reports of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian 4h Army, and a ffirther personal request 
for German reinforcement. 27 
Although Falkenhayn was reluctant to be distracted by the Eastern Front, the 
situation was rapidly deteriorating there. On 5 June, the four Russian annies of General 
Alexei Brusilov's Southwest Front launched what was intended to be a secondary attack 
for a relief offensive for Italy. However, they achieved a completely unexpected success, 
as the Russian 8d' Army broke through the three defensive positions and practically 
annihilated the Austro-Hungarian 4th Army. On the first day alone, the Austro-Hungarian 
24 Erich von Luckwald to Bethmann, 12 May 1916, (copied from Reichskanzlei. Weltkriejz 1511 BA/MA, 
W10/51543. See also Falkenhayn's comments at the Chejbesprechung of 26 May. Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 
26 May; Fritz von Lofterg, Meine TAti2keit im Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1939) pp. 221- 
212. 
25 Conrad to Falkenhayn, AOK Op. Nr. 25770,5 June 1916, BA/MA, W 10/51519. The Central Powers had 
been aware of the impending Russian offensive, but expected it, like the earlier Russian offensive at Lake 
Narotch, to come to nothing. See Falkenhayn, General Headquarters, p. 241; Der Weltlaieg X, pp. 437439; 
Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 41 If 
26 Falkenhayn to Conrad, OHL Nr. 28852op., 5 June 1916, BA/MA, W10/51519; Falkenhayn, General 
Headquarters p. 244f. Falkenhayn claimed that there were 1200 Russian battalions along OberOst's front as 
opposed to 232 battalions along Heeresgruppe Prinz Leopold's front. He was, in fact, correct. Two-thirds 
of the Russian army, 1400 battalions, were still deployed against the German sector of the front. See Holger 
Herwig, The First World War: Germny and Austria-HmggM 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1997) p. 208. 
27 Wilhehn Solger, "Die Oberste Heeresleitung in der Führung der Westoperationen Ende 1915 bis Ende 
August 1916: VII. Vom 5. Juni - 30. Juni 1916. Vom Eintreffen der Nachrichten über den Erfolg der 
224 
X Corps lost 80 percent of its effectives and the Corps Szurmay to its south was almost 
as badly treated. By the offensive's second day, Russian troops had penetrated the 
Austrian reserve position and had advanced around 20 kilometers to the 4th Army's 
headquarters at Lutsk. All along the Austro-Hungarian/Russian front, the Russian 
attackers achieved notable successes, if not as sweeping as those of the 8th Army. By 12 
June, the Russians could report that they had taken large numbers of prisoners. The four 
Russian armies that had taken part in Brusilov's offensive had captured close to 193,000 
officers and men. With casualties, the Austro-Hungarian army on the Eastern Front had 
lost over half of their strength. 28 
However, the scale and the nature of the defeat was slow in filtering through the 
Central Powers' chain of command. Falkenhayn had responded negatively to Cramon's 
personal plea for assistance on 5 June, repeating his assertion that OberOst was in no 
position to send reinforcements. He added: "Also in the west, where I daily await an 
English attack, reserves are not available. " He suggested that the Austro-Hungarians give 
up their Italian offensive to find the necessary reinforcement. ' Over the next several 
days, however, the true picture of the defeat became clear. The German General Staff 
Chief was forced on 7 June to relinquish part of his western reserve (one corps) to help 
restore the position in the east, and after meeting Conrad on 8 June decided a ftu-ther two 
divisions would be necessary to stabilize the front. " 
Despite the scale of the defeat in the east, perhaps not fully recognized in 
Mdzi&es, the OHL was clearly optimistic about the prospects for ultimate victory. " On 9 
June, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn recorded the opportunity the Brusilov offensive offered 
the Central Powers: 
Der russische Vorstoss muss ein Sieg für uns werden. Das im Osten 
zusammengeraffte Korps Bernhardi und das X. Armeekorps genügen nicht. Ich 
rate, noch die 11. bayerische Reserve-Division, die 3. Garde-Division und noch 
zwei Korps hinzuschicken. Das muss ein schneller, energischer Schlag werden, 
der den Russen zeigt, dass die Zeit ihrer Offensivideen vorüber ist, und der Welt 
Brussilow-Offensive bis zum Vorabend der Sommeschlacht (30. Juni), " unpublished manuscript in BA/MA, 
W10/51592, p. 365. 
28 Bundesministerium. ffir Landesverteidigung, Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krie Bd. IV: Das Kriegsi 
1916 (Vienna: Verlag der Militarwissenschaftlichen Mitteilungen, 1933) pp. 375-403; Norman Stone, The 
Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975) p. 254; Herwig, op. cit., pp. 208-217. 
29 Falkenhayn to Cramon, 5 June 1916, quoted in Solger, op. cit., p. 365. On 15 May, Conrad's long-desired 
offensive against Italy on the Asiago Plateau had begun, involving 14 divisions, including 6 removed from 
the Eastern Front. See Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg IV, pp. 253-349; Herwig, op. cit., pp. 204-207. 
30 Der Weltkriejz X, p. 457. A further five divisions were dispatched from OberOst. 
31 For the OHL's attitude towards the Russian offensive, see Afflerbach, op. cit., pp. 415ff. 
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und den Rumänen beweist, dass Russland hinter seinem Graben zu bleiben hat. 
Inzwischen mag Verdun, wo sich die Verhältnisse in der letzten Zeit ganz gut 
entwickelt haben, weiter betrieben werden, während die Kenntnis unserer 
Abtransporte aus dem Westen hoffentlich die Engländer endlich zum Angriff 
reizt. Geht alles gut, können wir etwa im August immer noch im Westen einen 
guten Schlagführen. ' 
Clearly, the offensive was seen by some in the OHL as an opportunity to settle the score 
with Russia once and for all. The day after Wild recorded the above opinion in his diary, 
he outlined how he would accomplish this: The German attack group would "slice off' 
Brusilov's salient, destroying the Russian force therein. " Falkenhayn was again faced 
with the question of whether to send troops for a potentially decisive counter-offensive in 
the east or to retain forces to meet the impending Entente offensive in the west. 
Falkenhayn appears never to have taken Wild's idea of a powerful eastern 
counter-offensive seriously. " His eyes continued to be set firmly on the Western Front, 
and he rejected sending more forces than were absolutely necessary to the east. On 24 
June, he informed OberOst that he still expected that the war's decision would fall in 
France. " The General Staff Chief was supported in this belief by Gerhard Tappen, who 
on 21 June had drawn up an assessment of Germany's strategic situation. His report 
began with the assumption that the war could only be settled in the west. He continued, 
"a decision in the west cannot be achieved when the English are met purely defensively. 
When the English attack and storm [Angriff undAnsturm] is broken, they must be driven 
back. "" 
Indeed, through June, the intentions of the Western Allies had become clearer. On 
14 June, the Nachrichtenabteilung (N-Abt) reported that 20-22 British divisions were 
preparing to attack the 2d Amy north of the Somme. An additional, diversionary attack 
was expected west or southwest of Lens. " Several days later, the N-Abt reported that the 
French role in the offensive would not merely be limited to a diversionary attack, but 
would include a major effort south of the Somme. For this attack, the French had 19 
32 Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, "Kriegstagebuch, " 9 June 1916, BAIMA, Wild Nachlass, N44/2. Emphasis 
added. 
33 Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 10 June 1916. 
34 Falkenhayn, General Headguarters, pp. 247ff. 
35 Falkenhayn to OberOst, 24 June 1916, quoted in Der WeltIcrigg X, p. 320. 
36 Gerhard Tappen, "Beurteilung der Lage am 21.6.1916, " printed in Solger, op. cit., pp. 383-384. 
37 Nachrichtenabteilung West, "Vortrags-Notizen, England, " 14 June 1916, BA/MA, W 10/51592. 
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divisions in reserve (although only 6 "white" and 2 "colored" divisions of these had not 
been through Verdun), but almost no heavy artillery. " 
Both Wild's diary entry and Tappen's assessment demonstrate that the OHL had 
not given up their idea of a counter-attack following the successful defense of an Entente 
offensive. The increasing signs of the impending Somme offensive had, in fact, given 
new hope to this phase of Falkenhayn's strategy. The General Staff Chief was, however, 
running up against the same problem that he had faced since he had taken over directing 
Germany's strategy -a lack of reserves. As the Entente preparatory bombardment began 
on 24 June, the N-Abt gave their final assessment of the Western Allies' dispositions. 
They believed that the offensive would fall primarily against the 2nd Army on a front 
between Monchy au Bois in the north to the Avre in the south. In total, the N-Abt 
believed that the Entente had deployed 39-41 divisions, together with a large force of 
artillery. " Facing this enemy concentration were the 13 divisions of Generaloberst Fritz 
von Below's 2 nd Army. 
To marshal the necessary forces for the defense against the Entente attack and for 
any subsequent counter-attack, Tappen had written in his assessment of 21 June that the 
German involvement in the east should be limited to only the smallest possible force and 
reserves should be gathered for the task. Indeed, Falkenhayn had begun doing just that. 
Already on 9 June, he had telegraphed Conrad to report that no fixther forces could be 
sent to the east as the situation in the west "is so serious that all the available reserves 
must be sent to the threatened front. "'O This was reinforced by Falkenhayn on 24 June, 
when he telegraphed OberOst that no additional troops would be forthcoming from the 
west. " The General Staff Chief began looking for forces from other areas of the Western 
Front, including Verdun. On 24 June, he sent the following message to the S'h Army: 
Die allgemeine Lage lässt es dringend wünschwert erscheinen, den 
Menschen-, Material- und Munitionsverbrauch bei der Heeresgruppe entschieden 
einzuschränken. Stellungnahme erbeten, wie dieses Ziel angestrebt werden kann, 
nachdem nunmehr durch Einnahme von Pw. Thiaumont, Fleury und des 
Vorgeländes vor Fort Vaux ein gewisser Abschnitt erreicht worden ist. ' 
38 Solger, op. cit., pp. 377-378. 
39 Nachrichtenabteilungen Westý "Vortrags-Notizen, " 24 June 1916, BA/MA, W 10/51592. 
40 Falkenhayn to Conrad, OHL Nr. 28981op., 9 June 1916, BA/MA, W10/51529. 
41 Falkenhayn to OberOst, 24 June 1916, quoted in Der WeItkrieg X, pp. 320-32 1. Although Wild wrote 
that "Falkenhayn schwankt betr. des Feldzugs im Osten hin und her, " (Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 26 June 
1916), it is obvious from his messages to OberOst and AOK that he never intended to launch a large-scale 
offensive there. 
42 Falkenhayn to AOK 5, Nr. 29769op., 24 June 1916, printed in Der WeItkrieg X, p. 195. 
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Further, Falkenhayn began stripping other armies of units to add to the OHL reserve. The 
3 rd Army was forced to give up a division and the 7h Army created a division out of 
battalions removed from its units. " However, even with the measures taken, the Germans 
could only gather 12 divisions as a reserve force, 4 of which were placed at the disposal 
of the 2 nd Army by the end of June. " 
With hindsight, it is clear that the Germans were facing one of the most trying 
phases of the war in late June 1916. At the time, however, the strategic situation seemed 
fairly promising to the OHL. "' The Germans had never taken the Russian offensive 
seriously, and, indeed, it had apparently been contained by mid-June. "' Further, the 
Verdun offensive had achieved good results with the attack on Fleury on 22/23 June. " 
Although the French were taking part in the Somme offensive, the Verdun offensive had 
seemingly reduced their contribution to a token force. Therefore, the brunt of the 
offensive would fall to the inexperienced British, whom, as Chapter 7 has shown, the 
Germans had rated poorly at the beginning of the year. Nothing had happened between 
January and June to change their assessment of the tactical worth of the "Kitchener 
divisions. " 
To meet this attack, Falkenhayn had reinforced the 2 nd Army with four divisions 
and a good deal of artillery from the OHL reserve. The long and obvious Entente 
preparatory period allowed the Germans to know almost exactly where the attack would 
fall. Below's army had ample time to reinforce their field positions. The defensive 
lessons drawn from the Herbstschlacht were circulated throughout the Westheer, and the 
43 Der Weltkrieg X, p. 348. 
44 Ibid., pp. 319-320. The Reichsarchiv lists only seven divisions remammg in the OHL reserve after 
reinforcement of the 2d Army. They appear to have overlooked the 123d Infantry Division, which was 
deployed behind the 4h Army. (See "Die Front gegen Frankreich: Stand am I. Juli 1916 morgens, " Map 4, 
Der Weltkrieg X. ) 
45 For Falkenhayn's optimism, see Georg von Mfiller, The Kaiser and His Court: The Diaries and Letters of 
Admiral Georg Alexander von MtIller, Chief of the Naval Cabinet 1914-1918 (ed. Walter Gorlitz) 
(London: MacDonald, 1959), diary entry for 20 June 1916, p. 174; Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 416. 
46 In the event, the Russian advance was stopped more by Russian logistical difficulties and timidity than by 
the efforts of the Central Powers. Stone, op. cit., pp. 255ff. This point seems to have been recognized by the 
OHL as well. Wild wrote, "die Russen scheinen über ihren leichten Erfolg selbst so erstaunt, dass sie nicht 
wissen, was sie weiter tun sollen! ' Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 10 June 1916. 
47 Using the new "Green Cross" gas shells, the Germans had managed to take the fortified village of Fleury 
on the east bank of the Meuse with relatively little difficulty. Der Weltkrie X, pp. 186-194; Bruce 
Gudmundsson, "Counter-Battery Fire: The Case of Fleury, " Tactical Notebook March 1992. 
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2 nd Army had constructed the layered defensive system indicated by that experience. " 
Although it was clear that the Entente had considerably superior forces arrayed against 
the 2 nd Army, the situation was far better for the Germans than it had been before any 
previous Entente offensive. The General Staff Chief could expect that the 2 nd Army 
would be able to withstand the attack from an inexperienced enemy without great 
difficulty. 
Falkenhayn's optimism and his continued desire for a decisive German counter- 
attack dictated his deployment of the Westheer before the Somme offensive. It was clear 
by the middle of June where the Anglo-French assault would fall. On 15 June, the 
General Staff Chief had informed the 6th Army's Chief of Staff that the "main attack 
would fall against the 2 nd Amy, with a secondary attack at Lens. "' Despite this 
knowledge and the knowledge of the enemy forces arrayed against the 2 nd Army, 
Falkenhayn reinforced this army with only four divisions, maintaining eight in the OHL 
reserve. Further, the 6th Army was not reduced at all to provide reserves for the 2nd Army. 
Holding a shorter front than Below's army, the 6th Army still consisted of 17 Y2divisions 
and large amounts of heavy artillery on the eve of the Somme battle. Additionally, the 
OHL maintained three divisions from its reserve behind the 6 th Army's front. " 
In retrospect, given the outcome of the battle of the Somme, this deployment 
seems ludicrous. Indeed, to explain this strange deployment, the Reichsarchiv stated after 
the war that Falkenhayn had misinterpreted where the enemy offensive would take place, 
writing that he believed the 6h Army would also be attacked. " However, there can be 
only one explanation for leaving such a substantial force deployed away from where the 
Entente offensive was to fall - Falkenhayn intended to launch his counter-offensive with 
Kronprinz Rupprecht's army. 
Throughout the year, Falkenhayn had favored the offensive plans of the 6h Army 
for use as his counter-offensive. Now that the British attack was finally coming, the 
conditions seemed right to implement these plans. Although the 6h Army's original plan 
for a counter-offensive had recommended attacking at the point of the unsuccessful 
48 For an example of the changes implemented after the Herbstschlacht, see AOK 2, "Experience Gained 
From the September Offensives on the Fronts of the Sixth and Third Armies, " la. Nr. 290geh., 5 November 
1915, British Army Translation, Stationary Service Series (SS) 454. (My thanks to Dr. Martin Samuels for 
a copy of this document. ) 
49 Kuhl, "Kriegstagebuch, " 15 June 1916. 
50 Solger, op. cit., p. 397. 
51 Der Weltkfiejz X, pp. 317-318. See also Affierbach, op. cit., p. 419. 
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Entente attack, it had also explored the possibility of attacking another, weakly held 
portion of the front. " Falkenhayn could assume that the British would attack on the 
Somme with their best divisions, leaving the remainder of their front occupied by 
second-rate and inexperienced formations; thus presenting the 6h Army with an 
opportunity to counter-attack the British at a point of the front held by ineffective units. " 
With the British reserves destroyed during their offensive and the French army depleted 
by the continuing action at Verdun, the General Staff Chief could expect any local 
breakthrough achieved by the 6d'Army to turn into a strategic success. 
After the war, Tappen. maintained that throughout the summer the OHL had kept 
a number of their "best" divisions available for this counter-offensive. "' He described 
how he, Falkenhayn, and Wild had continually discussed how to employ these formations 
most effectively. " Now, as the Somme offensive was about to begin, a number of these 
divisions were deployed with, or in the area of, the 6h Army, ready to launch a counter- 
offensive once the British had exhausted themselves in their offensive to the south. " 
Intriguingly, however, the General Staff Chief had not yet made definite plans for 
the employment of the reinforced 6ýh Army by the beginning of the Somme. This can, in 
part, be explained by Falkenhayn's secrecy. After the war, Tappen remembered how the 
two men would often outline different plans for the employment of these reserves on a 
blackboard at the OHL. To keep them secret, however, the blackboard would be wiped 
clean once the two had finished their conversation. "' The fact that plans had already been 
drawn up by the 6th Army for a counter-offensive would also have contributed to 
Falkenhayn's reluctance to be drawn any fin-ther into details. All that was needed was for 
these plans to be updated. The offensive at Gorlice had shown how quickly a large-scale 
operation could be organized and launched. 
52AOK6 to OHL, laNr. 267g., 24 January 1916, BA/MA, W10/51520. See Chapter 7, p. 182. 
53 See Tappen, Kriegserinnerunge p. 189. 
'4 Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 21 October 1932, BA/MA, N56/5; Idem, Kriegerinnerungen, pp. 189-190. 
55 Idem, "Besprechung mit dem Generalleutnant a. D. Tappen im Reichsarchiv am 6. IX. 1932, " N56/5, p. 2 
(Hereafter, Tappen, "Besprechung. "); Idem, Kriegserinnerungen, p. 197. 
56 The 17 V2 divisions of the 6h Army included the Guard Reserve Corps, the 11 Bavarian Corps, IV Army 
Corps, and the IX Reserve Corps, all rated as "first class" formations by the Entente. Further, the OHL 
reserve behind the 6h Army included another "first class" unit, the 3d Guard Division. For the deployment 
on I July 1916, see Der Weltkrieg X, p. 319. For this rating of the German units see, US War Office, 
Histories of the 251 Divisions of the German AM which ParticiRated in the War (London: Naval and 
Military Press, 1989; originally published 1920). This work is a compilation of the Allied intelligence's 
assessments of the German divisions. 
57 Tappen, "Bespechung, " p. 2. 
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Thus, as the Somme offensive began, the General Staff Chief had set the scene 
for the decision in the west. The 2 nd Army had been reinforced enough that he believed 
them capable of holding their own in the coming battle. The offensive at Verdun had 
been scaled back somewhat, but the 5th Army was to keep the pressure on the French to 
keep their reserves tied down there. " Finally, forces for the counter-stroke had been 
mustered and their deployment had even begun. All that was needed was for the British 
finally to begin their long-prepared offensive. 
The Failure ofFalkenhayn's Strategy 
On 24 June, the Entente preparatory bombardment began, marking the start of 
what was to be the greatest test of the Westheer since the war's beginning. For the next 8 
days, the Entente artillery pounded the German positions. In the British sector alone, the 
1,896 artillery pieces and trench mortars of the British 4h Army fired more than 
1,732,800 rounds. " The British guns were joined by 1,400 French artillery pieces. This 
opening bombardment signalled that the forthcoming battle was to be, above all, one of 
material and one that the Germans would have great difficulty countering. Facing the 
Entente artillery concentration of almost 3,300 artillery pieces was only the 2nd AMY, S 
598 light and 246 heavy gunS. 61 
Indeed, the strength of the offensive surprised the OHL considerably. Although 
the infantry assaults of the initial days had been largely thrown back with great loss to the 
attackers, the 2 nd Army had suffered under the weight of the Entente bombardment, and 
their early reports spoke of the effectiveness of the enemy fire. Most worryingly, the 2 nd 
Army reported the loss of numerous artillery batteries, crucial elements of the defensive 
system, to the overwhelming enemy fire. " Additionally, the OHL's insistence that any 
Entente gain be retaken through an immediate counter-thrust drained German units 
further. Soon, the German defenders were suffering far higher casualties than they had 
58 On 27 June, the 5dArrny had responded to Falkenhayn's call for a restriction of the Verdun offensive by 
stating that they would carry on with the resources of the 56'Army alone. AOK 5 to OHL, la Nr. 1657g., 27 
June 1916, printed in Wendt, op. cit., p. 170. 
59 MilLtaa QRerations: France and Belgium 1916 1, pp. 300-301; Weltkrieg X, p. 340. 
('() Der Weltkrie X, Anlage 1, "Deutsche und feindliche Artillerie bei Verdun und an der Somme. " 
61 Der Weltkrieg X, p. 352. 
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even at the height of the assaults on Verdun. During the offensive's first 10 days alone, 
the 2 nd Army had lost 40,187.62 
Moreover, even as the Somme offensive was beginning, the Russians scored 
renewed successes in their offensive against the Austrian front. During June, a complete 
reorganization of the Eastern Front had taken place. German units from OberOst and the 
divisions from the OHL reserve had be placed into Austro-Hungarian formations in an 
effort to increase their combat capability. The local counter-attacks launched by these 
units, however, did little to stabilize the situation. Once the Russian logistics had caught 
up with Brusilov's rapid initial advance, the Russians were ready to go again. They 
continued to punish the Central Powers' forces through late June and early JUly. 6' To 
make matters worse, the Russians extended their offensive to the OberOst's sector of the 
front when General Evert's Western Front attacked on 2 July at Baranovitchi. 6' Given the 
seemingly precarious situation in the east, calls began for OberOst to take over command 
61 of the entire Eastern Front. 
By early July, the situation was seen as extremely serious by much of the army's 
leadership, " and on 8 July, Falkenhayn was forced to justify his strategy in an audience 
with the Kaiser. As this is one of the few contemporary documents showing the General 
Staff Chief s intentions, it is worth quoting at length. He began by outlining the strategic 
views with which he had begun the year: 
Unsere Gesamtkriegführurig wurde bisher nach folgenden einfachen 
Gedanken geleitet: 
Im Osten schien es bei den inneren Zuständen Russlands genügend, wenn 
das während des vorigen Jahres Gewonnene im grossen ganzen behauptet wurde. 
Im Westen waren wir entschlossen, Frankreich durch Blutabzapftmg zur 
Besinnung zu bringen. England sollte dadurch zum offensiven Vorgehen 
gezwungen werden, das wie wir hofften, ihm schwere Verluste aber keinen 
entscheidenden Erfolg und uns später die Gelegenheit zur Gegenoffensive 
bringen würde. 
Auf diese Weise erwarteten wir, den drei Hauptgegnern bis zum Winter 
die Lust zur Fortführung des Krieges so gründlich verleidet zu haben, dass aus 
62 Wendt, op. cit., p. 176. By way of contrast, during the most costly I O-day period of the Verdun offensive, 
the Germans had "only" lost 25,989 men. 
63 Oesterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krie IV, pp. 547-623; Der Weltkrie X, pp. 469-48 1. 
64 Stone, op. cit., pp. 259-263; Der WeItkrigg X, pp. 499-503. 
65 See Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 24 June 1916; Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 17 and 25 June 1916. This proposal 
was energetically rejected by the Kaiser. 
66 Plessen wrote in his diary, "the overall situation is critical... " Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 6 July. Similarly, 
Moriz von Lyncker, the head of the Kaiser's Military Cabinet, wrote to his wife that Germany was facing a 
"critical time. " Lyncker to his wife, 7 July 1916, BA/MA, W10/50676. Cf. Rupprecht, Kriegstagebuch I, 
pp. 498ff. Falkenhayn himself felt the strain acutely. See Wild, "Kriegstagebuch, " 15 July 1916. 
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solcher Stimmung sich der siegreiche Frieden in irgend einer Form entwickeln 
musste. 
Falkenhayn regretted, however, that the collapse of the Austrians in the east had made 
this plan much more difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. He rejected the building of 
a powerful attack group in the east, as was advocated by Wild and others, on the grounds 
that he did not believe it would reach any real decision. Instead, he wanted to reinforce 
the Austrians with individual units and re-establish the front there through small-scale 
counter-attacks. The east would have to hold out with its own resources because "at the 
moment, we are engaged in the decisive battle in the west. " It was in France, not Russia, 
that the war would be won or lost. Falkenhayn believed that if Germany could hold out 
on the Somme, then France would be forced to sue for peace, as "in consideration of their 
manpower, France [could not] endure another winter campaign. "" 
By the end of the first week of July, Falkenhayn's strategy was rapidly 
unravelling. His audience with the Kaiser indicates that by the end of the first week of the 
Battle of the Somme, Falkenhayn had given up his idea of a counter-stroke to a failed 
Entente offensive, and that his strategy for 1916 was unravelling. The Germans just did 
not have the troops necessary for such an undertaking. The four divisions which the OHL 
had been forced to send east in early June had depleted their reserve from which any 
counter-thrust in the west would develop, " and the intensity of the Battle of the Somme 
to date had shown just how much effort would be needed to defend against the Entente 
assault. By 2 July, Falkenhayn had been forced to send the 2nd Army seven divisions. By 
9 July he had sent the 2 nd Army an additional seven divisions. These units came from 
Falkenhayn's precious OHL reserve and from the powerful 6th Army. " Falkenhayn's 
presentation to the Kaiser indicated that the General Staff Chief now believed the war 
would be won in the west by a successful defense on the Somme, rather than by any 
German offensive action. In a major change of heart, he now felt that a successful 
defense would convince the French that they could not defeat the Germans and that there 
was no longer any alternative but a negotiated peace. 
67 Erich von Falkenhayn, "Vortrag bei Sr. Majestät am 8. Juli 1916, " BA/MA, WIO/51584; printed in 
Wendt op. cit., pp. 174-176. Cf. Afflerbach, op. cit., p. 420f 
68 Falkenhayn and Tappen later blamed the sending of these divisions to the east for the end of the plans for 
a western counter-offensive. Falkenhayn, General He*uartersl p. 262; Tappen to Reichsarchiv, 15 May 
193 1, BA/MA, N5615. 
69 Der Weltkrieg X, Anlage 3: "Verzeichnis der vom 1. Juli bis Ende August auf dem Kampffelde 
eingesetzten Generalkommandos und Divisionen, ihre Ablösungen, Verschiebungen und Verluste. " 
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As the summer wore on and the attacks on the Somme increased in their intensity, 
the situation deteriorated even further. Losses were so high that, in mid-July, Falkenhayn 
instituted a major reorganization of the Westheer designed to free solid units for 
employment on the Somme. The 6h Army lost most of its best units and the remainder of 
the OHL reserve was allocated to the 2 nd Army. By the end of August, the OHL reserve 
had been reduced to one division, the Guard Ersatz Division. So many formations were 
deployed on tile Somme that Falkenhayn had split the 2 nd Army into two army groups to 
manage better the battle. Further, the Westheer, including the 5dArmy, was forced to 
give up portions of its heavy artillery, thus restricting their offensive capability. " 
The severe crisis caused by the Entente attacks on both fronts also had a major 
impact on the 5h Army's offensive at Verdun. While, in consideration of the forthcoming 
Entente attack, Falkenhayn had ordered the 5h Army to limit their attacks, he agreed to 
their proposal to make one last effort to take Fort Souville. This was the last major 
French work remaining on the east bank, and its possession would have meant that the 5 th 
Army had finally reached their territorial goals ftom the offensive's beginning. With the 
Meuse Heights on the east bank finally in their hands, the 5th Army would then have been 
in a strong defensive position and would have been able to dominate Verdun and its 
environs with their artillery. Further, Falkenhayn had believed that the continuation of the 
offensive would continue to wear down the French reserves even as the Somme 
progressed. When the attack on Souville failed on 12 July, the General Staff Chief 
ordered the 5th Army to go over "strictly to the defensive. ""' The 5 th Army was permitted 
to undertake local attacks to better their tactical position, but no further large-scale 
assaults were to take place. Falkenhayn hoped that this would give the French the 
impression that the offensive was still underway, and, hence, would keep large numbers 
of troops in the Verdun salient. " Thus, by the middle of July, Falkenhayn was not only 
forced to give up his counter-offensive, he was forced to scale back considerably his 
Zermiirbungsschlacht. ' 
70 on 12 July, Falkenhayn informed the Kaiser that 150 of the 5h Army's modem heavy artillery pieces 
would be transferred to the Somme front. Plessen recognized that this meant the Verdun operation would 
be severely restricted. Plessen, "Tagebuch, " 12 July 1916. 
7' Der Weltkrieg X, pp. 199ff. 
72 Falkenhayn, General Headquarters, p. 268. 
7' Although combat still took place at Verdun, the offensive had largely been ended by this point It did not 
drag on in the same manner as before as is often asserted. Home, op. cit., pp. 277ff, Afflerbach, op. cit., 
p. 418f 
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The obvious failure of Falkenhayn's strategy for 1916 had undermined his already 
weak support with the army. As the situation deteriorated over the summer, the calls for a 
constriction of his authority, or even for his dismissal, became more vocal. Since June, 
many, including Falkenhayn's friend Wild, had been advocating that Hindenburg take 
over command of the entire Eastern Front. By August, the situation had become so 
threatening that even Falkenhayn's staunchest supporters, the Kaiser's Military Cabinet, 
had turned against him. With no support for Falkenhayn, the Kaiser was forced, against 
his better judgement, to replace him with Hindenburg, with Ludendorff as his "Erster 
Generalquartiermeister. " On 29 August, the duo from the east took over the direction of 
Germany's strategic effort, ' and on 2 September, the new strategic leadership ended 
once and for all the offensive at Verdun. " With Falkenhayn's dismissal came the end of 
dalliance with Ermattungsstrategie. The new leaders refocused German efforts towards 
bringing about a dictated peace, through a great German battlefield victory. They 
returned to the ideas of Vernichtungsstrategie despite the overwhelming evidence that 
this could not succeed under the conditions of World War 1. 
Conclusion 
Falkenhayn's attempt to apply Ermattungsstrategie had failed miserably. The 
months-long battle at Verdun designed to drain away French resources had backfired and 
had, in fact, cost both armies dearly. The most reliable account of the battle's casualties 
comes from Hermann Wendt's study of Verdun. According to this work, from the 
offensive's start on 21 February until its end on 31 August, the 5h Army had suffered 
281,333 casualties, while the French had suffered around 315,000. "' Further, the 
Westheer had suffered high numbers of casualties in what had once been the eagerly 
awaited Entente offensive on the Somme. Thus, Falkenhayn's strategy of wearing down 
the enemy's reserves had, in fact, led to the near exhaustion of the German army. Instead 
of peace, Falkenhayn's efforts had led to the darkest hour of the war for Germany. 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over a nearly broken instrument in late August 1916. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the battle has been seen by historians as an act of 
futility, in which large numbers of French and Gennan soldiers lost their lives for no real 
74 See Affierbach, op. cit., pp. 424-450; and Affierbach, "Wilhelm as Supreme Warlord in the First World 
War, " War in Hi 5 (4) (1998) pp. 440-446. 
75 Wendt, op. cit., p. 187. 
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reason or gain. This view was put forward by German commentators during and after the 
war, who stressed the General Staff Chief s strategy lacked clear, attainable goals. This 
common opinion is perhaps best summed by Georg Wetzell: 
Eines vermisst man besonders bei den Falkenhayn'schen Betrachtungen: 
die grosse Linie eines einheitlichen Handelns, des Zusammenfassens aller 
verfüRbaren Kräfte der Mittelmächte auf ein grosses, gemeinsames Ziel! Nicht 
mit einem Wort ist irgend etwas Ähnliches in dem Memorandum Falkenhayns zu 
finden! " 
The writers of the German official history felt similarly, and found confirmation 
of their opinions in Falkenhayn's handling of the Verdun campaign. To them, 
Falkenhayn had proved himself an irresolute leader, incapable of making difficult 
decisions. " They represented Falkenhayn as prey to his self-doubts and as overly 
influenced by the 5d' Army command, particularly Schmidt von Knobelsdorf. Central to 
their argument was that the General Staff Chief had not, in fact, intended to "bleed the 
French army white" at the outbreak of the operation. ' Instead, they maintained that this 
goal came about after the failure of his initial plan of causing the French to strip their 
front of reserves. In an argument picked up recently by Krumeich, the writers of the 
official history maintained that only in late March/early April did Falkenhayn arrive at 
the formulation he later adumbrated in his post-war writings. They concluded that he 
arrived at this point merely because he could not decide either to continue the Verdun 
offensive with sufficient forces or to break off the battle and try elsewhere. " 
This analysis has advanced a different interpretation of Falkenhayn's strategy at 
Verdun. It has used the evidence found in the KGFA files to demonstrate how the 
General Staff Chief intended to utilize the operational lessons of the war up to 1916 to 
apply attrition on the battlefield, showing that Falkenhayn was not irresolute, but rather 
he was forced to change his ideas as the battle progressed. It has proved that his goal at 
76 Wendt op. cit., pp. 243-244; Der WeItkrie X, p. 405. 
77 Georg Wetzell, "Konnte im Jahre 1916 deutscherseits; eine Kriegsentscheidung angestrebt werden und 
war der Gedanke, sie bei Verdun zu suchen, berechtigt? " (Paper presented at the Reichswehrministerium, 
1926) unpublished manuscript in BAJMA, W10/51528. 
78 Der Weltkrieg, X, pp. 66 1 ff. 
79 Ibid., p. 671f 
so Ibid., p. 674. While Falkenhayn's recent most biographer, Holger Afflerbach, recognizes that 
Falkenhayn's aim from the start of the offensive was the Verblutung of the French, he sidesteps the 
question of Falkenhayn's supposed changing of aims as the battle progressed. See Afflerbach, op. cit., pp. 
373ff. 
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the campaign's start and, indeed, throughout the battle was, in fact, the Verblutung of the 
French army. " 
Falkenhayn had good reasons for seeking this goal. Contrary to some views, it 
was his attempt to overcome the strategic and tactical challenges of the great Volkskrieg 
that was the First World War. " The conditions of this war made a breakthrough and a 
mobile, decisive campaign impossible. Falkenhayn had to find another way to convince 
the French that the war could not be won and that the only sensible solution was a 
negotiated peace with Germany. His method of achieving this was to construct an 
approach from the war's operational lessons that aimed at inflicting unacceptable damage 
upon the French. As difficult as it is to comprehend today, his strategy to accomplish this 
was the Verblutung of the French army. Verdun was to be the first method of 
accomplishing this and an Entente counter-offensive was to be the second. These were to 
be followed, if necessary, by a German offensive to defeat the remainder of the Entente 
armies in the field. 
However, his strategy faltered on a number of levels. Although he had correctly 
chosen a point for which the French would thrown in every available man, the General 
Staff Chief had, not for the first time, underestimated his enemy. The will of the French 
army, government, and people was far stronger than had been anticipated. The war had 
already demanded great sacrifices of the French nation and this meant that Falkenhayn's 
goal of a negotiated peace would be unlikely. The will to continue the war to a victorious 
end at all costs allowed the all belligerents to absorb tremendous casualties. Although the 
French army was clearly suffering badly by the summer of 1916, it was able to maintain 
its morale and even contribute forces to the Somme offensive, thanks to the rotation 
system instituted by P6tain. Moreover, despite the pressure imposed on the French army, 
it was never close enough to collapse to force the British to launch an ill-prepared relief 
offensive. The enemy had clearly not reacted as Falkenhayn had anticipated. " 
81 This goal was recognized even by observers at the time. See Hans Delbrdck, "Kriegsereignisse im 
Mdrz, " PJ 25 March 1916, reprinted in Krieg und Politik, 1914-1916 (Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1918) pp. 
222ff. 
82 Michael Geyer, "German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945, " in Peter Paret, ed. The 
Makers of Modem Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 536. 
83 Hermann Ziese-Beringer's argument that the Verdun offensive caused the French army mutinies in 1917 
clearly overstates the importance of Verdun in this event. The unsuccessful Nivelle offensives were the 
primary reason. See Der einsame Feldherr: Die Wahrheit t1ber Verdun Vol. 2 (Berlin: Frundsberg-Verlag, 
1933). Cf Wolfgang Foerster, "Falkenhayn - der einsame Feldherr? " Deutsche Wehr 17 January 1934, 
pp. 41-43. 
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Falkenhayn had also overestimated the German army's ability to inflict casualties 
upon their enemy. Although the Germans caused more casualties than they themselves 
took, the ratio was not the five Frenchmen killed to two Germans assumed by the OHL. 
In part, this was due to the tactical methods employed by the 5 th Army. As their initial 
goals were more far-reaching than Falkenhayn's (i. e., the capture of the fortress), they 
pushed their units to attack regardless of casualties. Even after they had accepted the 
General Staff Chief s goal of "bleeding white" the French army, they applied costly 
tactics. Falkenhayn had been unable to impose his concept of "attritional" operations, 
with their emphasis on limited objectives, on the army, who continued for the most part 
to employ tactics more appropriate to Bewegungskrieg and Vernichtungsstrategie. 
Further, the failure to seize the vital Meuse Heights made Falkenhayn's approach 
all the more difficult. If this terrain feature had been taken early in the battle, the 
Germans would have been in a reasonably secure defensive position. From there, the 
powerful German artillery would have been able to inflict a disproportionate number of 
casualties on the counter-attacking French, as the defensive battles of 1915 had shown. 
The failure to take the Heights had a profound effect on the battle. The 5 th Army was 
compelled to carry out a number of further offensives purely to better the army's poor 
tactical position. At this point, the nature of how the French army was to be ground down 
also shifted. No longer would the attrition come solely from French counter-attacks as 
had been initially envisioned, now the attrition was also to come from German attacks 
and local French counter-attacks. This shift made it clear that the task of "bleeding 
white" the French army would not be as easy has the General Staff Chief had anticipated 
at the battle's outset. 
This prolongation of the battle had two important consequences. First, now it 
became extremely difficult to give up the offensive without at least capturing Verdun. 
German prestige was now just as closely bound to the fate of the fortress as was that of 
the French. Second, it made an Entente relief offensive all the more important. By the 
middle of April, it was clear that the Verdun offensive would not lead to a rapid French 
capitulation. Therefore, to defeat an Entente relief offensive and to launch a counter- 
attack increasingly looked like the only way out of the stalemate. Thus, Falkenhayn 
looked forward with anticipation to the Entente offensive on the Somme. This, however, 
was to be the final nail in the coffin of Ermattungsstrategie. The collapse of the Austro- 
Hungarian front and unexpected ferocity of the Anglo-French attack quickly ended any 
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ideas of a victorious German counter-attack. The German army was stretched merely to 
hold its positions on both fronts. 
In fact, the severe strain imposed upon the German army by the battles of 1916 
nearly brought it to collapse and certainly brought Falkenhayn's time as Chief of the 
General Staff to an end. By all accounts, the experience of 1916 caused not only the 
attrition of the French and German armies, but in Falkenhayn as well. He is described as 
being in broken health by the end of the summer 1916, and he never recovered from the 
experience and died an early death in 1922. "' His dismissal brought his great rivals, 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to power. The duo from the east discarded Falkenhayn's 
Ermattungsstrategie and attempted instead to apply their ideas of Vernichtungsstrategie 
to the Western Front. The results are well known. 
84 See Afflerbach, op. cit., pp. 53 1 ff. 
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Conclusion 
As was noted at the beginning of this work, since the end of World War 1, the 
term "attrition" has come to be associated with the futility of the war. Generals who 
practised the strategy have been labelled "butchers" and "donkeys. " The concept of the 
strategy of attrition was called into further disrepute by America's use of the strategy 
during the Vietnam War. Since then, it has been shunned by military intellectuals and 
historians alike. ' By using newly available sources to examine the intellectual 
underpinnings of Falkenhayn's conduct of World War 1, this study has attempted to 
reassess the negative interpretations of Ermattungsstrategie and show the true intentions 
of Falkenhayn in what has been described as the most senseless battle of the entire war. 
The thesis began by examfi-fing the changes in warfare demonstrated by the 
second phase of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870/71. The ability of the Republican 
government to raise and equip new armies after the complete defeat of the Imperial 
armies indicated to astute observers that the age of Volkslaleg had returned. As during 
the Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars, the states of Europe began tapping deeply into the 
resources of their nation after the defeat of France in 1871 in order to ensure the safety of 
their borders. However, several aspects had changed between 1815 and 1870. Now, 
central governments were better organized and, hence, better able to exploit the resources 
of their respective nations. Moreover, the size of populations had grown considerably, 
allowing a manifold increase in the size of armies. Most importantly, industrialization 
had occurred throughout the Continent, and its fruits were harnessed by the growing 
armies of Europe. 
To some observers, this trend, combined with the progress of the Volkskrieg of 
1870/71, offered a serious challenge to prevailing strategic wisdom. Indeed, as Rudolf 
Stadelmann and Stig F6rster have noted, the architect of the stunning German victories in 
the Wars of Unification, Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, recognized clearly the dangers 
1A notable exception to this outlook is the US Marine Corps' recent primer on strategy. Marine Corps 
Doctrinal Publication 1- 1, Strate (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1996). 
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this shift in warfare posed for Germany. ' Facing enemies who had created "nations in 
arms, " Germany could no longer count on being able to defeat her enemies' armies 
totally. Consequently, Moltke doubted he would be able to repeat the events of the Wars 
of Unification, where Germany had been able to dictate terms to a beaten foe. This fear 
led him to institute changes in Germany's war plans. No longer did he assume that the 
army alone could produce a victory, Germany's diplomats would play a crucial role in 
securing a negotiated peace. Thus, the father of Vernichtungsstrategie himself saw its 
limitations and how its utility had diminished in the age of Volkskrieg. 
At the same time that Moltke and others within the anny were questioning the 
efficacy of a strategy of annihilation, Hans DelbrUck was challenging it from his position 
as a civilian military commentator. He developed an alternative to the army's 
Vernichtungsstrategie - Ermattungsstrategie, or a strategy of attrition. Although this 
theory was historically based, it was clearly intended to be applicable to the 
contemporary situation, where it looked increasingly unlikely that a war could be won 
quickly and decisively. DelbrUck, like Moltke the Elder, envisioned a strategy that 
closely linked civilian political goals with achievable military ones. The result would not 
be a campaign with the great "decisive" battles favored by the many in the army, but 
rather a war that resulted in a negotiated peace after great exertion by both sides. 
As most historical literature has shown, this strategy was firmly rejected by the 
majority of the Wilhelmine army? This thesis has attempted to give some alternative 
reasons for why this was so. Most soldiers, then and now, were offended by the 
indecisiveness implicit in DelbrUck's Ermattungsstrategie. To the soldiers of the day, the 
Wars of Unification offered compelling proof that a swift decisive victory was indeed 
possible. ' The industrial mass armies which followed these wars certainly challenged this 
2 Rudolf Stadelmann, Moltke und der Staat (Krefeld: Scherpe Verlag, 1950); Stig F6rster "Facing 'People's 
War': Moltke the Elder and Germany's Military Options after 187 1, " Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 10 
Nr. 2 (1987) pp. 209-230; and Idem, "Der deutsche Generalstab und die Illusion des kurzen Krieges, 187 1- 
1914. Metalaitik eines Mythos, " MGM 54 (1995) pp. 61-95. 
3 See particularly, Jehuda Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz 
and Schlieffen and Their Lmpact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press, 1986); Arden Bucholz, Hans Delbrilck and the German MiIjjM Establishment: War Images in 
Conflict (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1985); Sven Lange, Hans Delbrilck und der 'Strategiestreit': 
Kriep-fiffirung und Kriegsgeschichte in der Kontroverse 1879-1914 (Einzelschriften zur Militargeschichte 
No. 40 Herausgegeben vom Milittirgeschichtlichen Forschungsamt) (Freiburg: Rombach Verlag, 1995). 
4 Indeed, much of the current historiography stresses the decisiveness of the wars. For example, see 
Geoffrey Wawro, The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Ita! y in 1866 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion 
of France, 1870-1871 (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1961). While the Austro-Prussian War deserves this 
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approach. However, for a variety of reasons, the strategic leaders who followed Moltke 
the Elder believed the changed nature of warfare did not rule out a rapid German victory. 
Rather than being slaves to a specific strategic vision as is often asserted, ' Germany's 
military leaders recognized the dangers facing Germany. However, they looked carefully 
at Germany's strategic position and the advantages that they had over their enemies and 
rejected following Delbrfick's Ermattungsstrategie. They assumed their army to be much 
more skilful at warfare than their opponents, an edge they intended to exploit to the 
fullest. This could only be exploited by fighting a war offensively. Further, Schlieffen 
and Moltke the Younger paid close attention to Germany's strategic situation. In this, 
Russia played a crucial role. When Schlieffen wrote his famous plan, the Russian army 
had proved itself incompetent and did not look likely to recover any time in the 
foreseeable future. Thus, Germany had an opportunity to concentrate the bulk of her 
forces against France. For Moltke the Younger, on the other hand, the growing strength 
of Russia meant that Germany had to defeat France quickly in order to be able to defend 
herself against Russia. Thus, to Schlieffen and Moltke, not only did Ermattungsstrategie 
offend their military sensibilities, it did not seem to make sense given Germany's 
strategic situation. 
However, the events of late summer 1914 proved MoItke the Elder and Hans 
Delbrfick right. The failure of Germany's war plan also represented the failure of 
Vernichtungsstrategie. The new General Staff Chief, Erich von Falkenhayn, understood 
that Germany just did not have the resources to defeat her enemies in a rapid, decisive 
campaign. ' Instead, as this thesis has shown, he embraced the ideas of Moltke and 
Delbrfick and adopted Ermattungsstrategie as his new course. ' Under Falkenhayn's 
leadership, Germany attempted to end the war not with a peace dictated by Germany, but 
rather through a negotiated peace, albeit on terms favorable to Germany. 
reputation, the Franco-Prussian War certainly does not. For example of alternative views, see Stig Forster 
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Falkenhayn, however, faced the problem of implementing this strategy. In this, he 
ran up against the two major, mutually supporting difficulties of World War 1. First, on 
the strategic level, the war permitted governments to exploit even further the manpower 
and industrial resources of their nations. Thus, they were able to maintain huge armies in 
the field, spread across the Continent of Europe. Losses could be made good by the large 
populations, and when manpower became scarce, unexploited areas of society, such as 
female labor, could be tapped into. The armies of World War I could not simply be swept 
away, as they had been in the past. On the tactical level, the killing power of these 
industrial mass armies meant that even tactical successes eluded World War I generals. 
Thus, they first had to find a solution to the tactical deadlock before any strategic 
solution could be found. 
Falkenhayn recognized these difficulties clearly. Thus, throughout 1915, he 
attempted different solutions. Ever believing that the war would be decided in France, he 
initially planned to execute a breakthrough of the Western Front, which would force the 
Western Allies apart and hopefully lead to peace negotiations. However, the desperate 
situation of Germany's ally forced Falkenhayn to turn his attentions eastward in spring 
1915. Once involved in the east, he sought, with no success, to force Russia into a 
separate peace. In the meantime, the Westheer stood firm against powerful Entente 
offensives. 
Although no decision was reached during 1915, there was much to be learned 
from operations during the year. While the campaign in Russia had suggested that a 
breakthrough might be possible given the proper tools, the fighting on the Western Front 
suggested otherwise. Upon further examination, contrary to the beliefs of OberOst and 
many historians since, the combat in the east showed that, in fact, strategic breakthroughs 
had not occurred! Instead, the tactical German breakthroughs resulted in the Russian 
army withdrawing and re-establishing a defensive line ftirther to the rear. This process, 
however, caused the severe attrition of the Russian army. This experience in the east, 
combined with the lessons of operations on the Western Front, suggested that a similar 
process might be possible in France. 
8 Herbert Rosinski, for instance, argued that "a mobile form of strategy" was still able to be carried out in 
the east throughout the war. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (Washington: The Infantry Journal, 
1940) p. 9 If. 
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By late 1915, the General Staff Chief was convinced that the war would have to 
be concluded by the end of 1916, or else the Central Powers would have exhausted their 
resources. A way had to be found to accelerate the process of wearing down the will and 
resources of the Entente to force at least one enemy to the peace table. Operations in 
Russia and in France suggested an approach which was to develop into the application of 
attrition to the battlefield at Verdun, and from these operations Falkenhayn developed his 
unique strategy for winning the war. His approach attempted to deal simultaneously with 
the two great difficulties of World War I. The General Staff Chief accepted that a 
breakthrough was impossible due to the defensive power of modem weapons. Therefore, 
he attempted to utilize this power to his own ends. Falkenhayn intended to force the 
French to "bleed themselves white" in counter-attacks to a successful German attack with 
limited objectives, and thereby deal with the French reserves and break the French will 
and ability to resist. The strategic problem of French manpower reserves was to be solved 
on the tactical level using the very weapons which created the tactical deadlock. 
Falkenhayn had, indeed, chosen his target well. The French were more than 
willing to sacrifice their soldiers to retain the fortress of Verdun. However, the plan 
broke down in its execution. Although to accomplish the gruesome task of killing off 
French manpower he had accumulated a vast park of heavy artillery, the 5h Army was 
unable to reach the positions necessary to accomplish their mission safely. Thus, the 
battle degenerated into a slogging match, where the German army, despite the beliefs of 
the OHL, was worn down almost as greatly as the French. The General Staff Chief had 
both underestimated the strength of French willpower and overestimated the killing 
ability of the German army. Falkenhayn was unable to inflict enough casualties upon the 
French to force them to sue for peace. 
The failure of the strategy of attrition at Verdun begs several questions. First, 
does the failure of Falkenhayn's strategy there demonstrate that Ermattungsstrategie is a 
false approach? Second, was there an alternative available to Germany during World War 
I? 
In answering the first, it should be remembered that the ultimate Entente victory 
did not come as a result of a great battle, rather Gennany surrendered because she was 
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exhausted after 4 years of hard fighting. The ability of her army to continue the struggle 
had been severely undermined by the losses sustained over numerous inconclusive 
battles. The lack of success, particularly the failure of Ludendorff s spring 1918 
offensives, caused the rank and file to despair of ultimate victory, and, as Wilhelm Deist 
has shown, to vote with their feet. ' However, it was not only the common soldier who 
tired of the war. Ultimately, the will of Germany's strategic leadership to continue to war 
collapsed as well. It was Ludendorff, after all, who called for the armistice. 
However, despite the fact that Germany succumbed in the end to the 
Ermattungsstrategie of her enemies, Germans and many historians of the German army 
rejected the approach. Throughout the war, the German army had certainly believed an 
alternative was available, and this belief continued even after the war. Most German 
officers had never accepted the eclipse of Vernichtungsstrategie. The successes of 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the east suggested to them that this approach could still 
work, even under the vastly altered strategic conditions of World War 1. They 
conveniently overlooked the fact that Russia was not, in the end, defeated in a great, 
decisive battle as Hindenburg and Ludendorff desired. Instead, Russia was brought down 
by internal unrest caused by the strain of a long and indecisive war. " Indeed, even when 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff attempted to apply their ideas to the west, the result was 
dismal failure. Despite great tactical success in the spring 1918 offensives, the Germans 
could not bring an end to the war. 
The Reichsarchiv and a group of like-minded writers together formed what could 
be labelled as the "Schlieffen School. "" These writers were intent on preventing another 
indecisive war like World War 1. Accordingly, they looked back to the ideas supposedly 
advanced by Schlieffen to illustrate how the war should have been fought. Rather than 
acknowledge the false assumptions upon which the Vernichtungsstrategie practised by 
Hindenburg and Ludendorff was based, the Schlieffen School looked to the various 
German commanders for the reasons for Germany's defeat. In doing so, they blamed the 
shortcomings of a particular commander for Germany's problems. Thus, the Schlieffen 
9 Wilhelm Deist, "The Military Collapse of the German Empire: The Reality Behind the Stab-in-the-Back 
Myth, " (trans. E. J. Feuchtwanger) War in Histoly Vol. 3 Nr. 2 (1996). 
10 Norman Stone, The Eastern Front, 1914-1917 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1975) pp. 282ff. 
11 See Wallach, op. cit., pp. 209-228; Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the German General 
Staff. MiliLmy and Political Decision-Making in Imperial GermM, 1906-1916 (University of Sussex, 
DPhil Thesis, 1997) pp. 250ff. 
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Plan failed not because of its faults but because Moltke the Younger had not fully 
understood Schlieffen's concept. Falkenhayn and his strategy were treated similarly. 
The Reichsarchiv painted Falkenhayn as an irresolute commander, who, like his 
predecessor Moltke the Younger, had not understood the principles taught by 
Schlieffen. " In keeping with their rejection of the fact that Vernichtungsstrategie had 
ceased to be a viable strategy during the war, post-war German writers sought to deny 
that Falkenhayn was an Ermattungstratege. Instead, Falkenhayn made the choices that he 
did because he lacked the strength of will to decide upon a single course of action which 
would risk everything on a powerful, war-winning blow. " Wilhelm Groener's words are 
representative of this school of thought: 
Wer den General v. F[alkenhayn] bei seiner Arbeit als Generalstabschef 
beobachten konnte, hat immer wieder beklagen müssen, dass sonst so kluge 
Mann nie eine grosse operative Idee mit weitem Ziel gefunden und daran alle 
verfÜgbaren Kräfte gesetzt hat, sondern stets sozusagen im Kleinen stecken blieb. 
Für diese Operationen hat F [alkenhayn] selbst die Formel 'vom beschränkten 
Ziel' gebraucht, und dazu hat er noch unzureichende Kräfte angesetzt. ` 
To the Reichsarchiv and others, Falkenhayn's supposed failings as a commander, rather 
than the strategy he followed, contributed greatly to Germany's defeat. 
To the writers of this school, the campaign at Verdun was the ultimate example of 
Falkenhayn's indecisiveness. Rather than set all of Germany's reserves against the 
fortress, capture it, and effect a rupture in the French defensive system, Falkenhayn had 
attacked this strong point with only eight divisions. Further, he starved the 5th Army of 
reserves during the crucial early stages of the operations, holding ftesh divisions to 
defend against a phantom Entente relief offensive. To make matters worse, Falkenhayn 
fed reinforcements to the 5 th Army piecemeal, which served to continue the operation, 
but which were not enough to bring a decision. Although the questioning of 
Falkenhayn's intentions at Verdun was fairly muted in Der Weltkriesz, the director of the 
12 This idea, raised during the war, became a common refrain after the war. See Hans von Haeften, quoted 
in Ekkehart P. Guth, "Der Gegensatz zwischen dem Oberbefehlshaber Ost und dem Chef des Generalstabes 
des Feldheeres 1914/15: Die Rolle des Majors v. Haeften im Spannungsfeld zwischen Hindenburg, 
Ludendorff und Falkenhayn, " MGM 1/84 p. 90. For post-war usage, see Wolfgang Foerster, Graf Schlieffen 
und der Weltkrieg (Berlin: ES Mittler, 1925) p. 86. 
13 For example, see Reichsarchiv, Der WeItkrie BdX Die Operationen des Jahres 1916 (Berlin: ES 
Mittler, 1936) pp. 66 1 ff.; Max Bauer, Der grosse Krieg in Feld und Heimat (Tilbingen: Osiander'sche 
Buchhandlung, 192 1); Wilhelm Groener, "Protokoll Ober die 890. Sitzung der Mittwochsgesellschaft von 
1864, " 11 January 193 3, USNA, M- 137, Roll 13. 
14 Wilhelm Groener, "Die Strategie Falkenhayns, " Vortrag in der Mittwochsgesellschaft, 29 May 1935, 
USNA, Groener Papers, Microform Series M-137, Roll 13. 
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KGFA, Wolfgang Foerster, published a semi-official article challenging Falkenhayn's 
statement that he had intended from the campaign's beginning to fight a battle of 
attrition. " 
The interpretations of the Reichsarchiv and the writers of the Schlieffen School 
have had great influence over the course of historiography. For example, B. H. Liddell 
Hart's view of Falkenhayn could have been written by one of Falkenhayn's most bitter 
opponents: "He was the ablest and most scientific general -'penny-wise and pound- 
foolish' - who ever ruined his country by a refusal to take calculated risks. Limitation of 
risks led to liquidation. "" Further, the Reichsarchiv's questioning of Falkenhayn's initial 
goals in the Battle of Verdun has allowed confusion over these goals to continue to this 
day. 17 
The fresh examination of the evidence undertaken in this study has revised this 
harsh opinion of Falkenhayn and Ermattungsstrategie and has shown that given the 
strategic and tactical realities of the day, Germany did not have any other choice but to 
follow this strategy, despite the strident assertions of the Schlieffen School. Moreover, it 
is hoped that, through the use of recently discovered evidence to examine in detail the 
planning for and the conduct of the Battle of Verdun, this thesis has shown Falkenhayn 
did indeed intend to fight a battle of attrition. 
15 Wolgang Foerster's "Falkenhayns Plan fdr 1916. Ein Beitrag zur Frage: Wie gelangt man aus dem 
Stellungskriege zu entscheidungsuchender Operation? " M" Jg. 1937 pp. 304-330. Cf Der Welt1krieg X, 
pp. 671f 
16 B. H. Liddell Hart, jeRutations (London: John Murray, 1928) p. 78. Liddell Hart titled his essay on 
Falkenhayn, "Erich von Falkenhayn: The Extravagance of Prudence. " In fact Liddell Hart seems to have 
drawn heavily on Max Bauer's Der SLosse Meg in Feld und Heirnat. 
17 This argument has most recently been advanced by Gerd Krumeich, "'Saigner la France'? Mythes et 
rdalitd de la stratdgie allemande de la bataille de Verdun, " Guerres mondiale et conflits contMorains 
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Map 3: 
"The Eastern Front, 1915" 
Source: Hans Dollinger, ed. 
Der Erste Weltkrie 
(Munich: Verlag Kurt Desch, 1965) 
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Map 4: 
"Champagne and the Argonne" 
Source: 
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